The United States government’s deliberations and actions on the status of the South China Sea Islands, 1943–1951: the formation of American policy towards South China Sea disputes

In 1943, the United States began to consider the issue of the world order after the end of World War II; at that time, the status of the islands in the South China Sea remained undetermined. Towards the end of the war, a US policy-planning document on this issue favored either returning the islands to one of the parties claiming sovereignty or placing the islands under international trusteeship once the war ended. Immediately after the end of World War II, the United States withdrew its support for an international trusteeship, and it did not back up any single party’s claim of sovereignty over the islands. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States did not clarify its stance on the issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, hoping the eventual outcome would not favor the newly founded People’s Republic of China. Finally, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, signed under the guidance of the United States, stipulated only that Japan relinquish the islands, but failed to identify who would take them over. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signaled the formation of the official US policy towards disputes over the islands in the South China Sea.     

60余年来中国学者关于第二次世界大战性质问题的研究

中国学者对第二次世界大战性质和阶段划分问题的研究历来十分重视.早在20世纪40年代就有学者对第二次世界大战的性质进行论述;50年代中后期曾进行过一次激烈的争鸣;80年代以来,关于二次大战性质问题的观点更加多样化.与此同时,学者们也对与第二次世界大战相关的阶段划分问题进行了深入的探讨,并提出了确定二次大战性质的标准和依据.     

The basic structure of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic strategy

As a leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek carried on Sun Yat-sen's legacy of using diplomacy as a force in the modern era and planned to rely on diplomacy to revise China's unequal treaties with foreign powers. Chiang elaborated on Sun's ideas and maintained that diplomacy as a war without battles worked more effectively than wars with battles. Faced with the threat of Japanese invasion, he upheld the strategy of using one foreign country to control another. He expected the outbreak of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union or between Japan and the United States so that a war between Japan and China could be avoided. Chiang engaged in active diplomacy aimed at turning these expectations into reality. His diplomatic strategy had an impact during the Anti-Japanese War.     

Foreign banks in the pacific: a note

The lives of Pacific Islanders during World War II can be described through a combination of documentary and oral history. This article reviews the experiences of the people of Chuuk (formerly ‘Truk’) in the Central Caroline Islands during the Pacific War. Chuuk served as headquarters for the Japanese Imperial Navy's Fourth Fleet and, later, rear area headquarters for the Combined Fleet. When the Japanese military shifted to defence in mid-1943, troops fortified the island, resulting in the confiscation of land and relocation of the Chuukese. From late 1943 to August 1945, Chuukese experience was shaped by Allied bombing, intensive labour demands from the Japanese garrison, and severe food shortages. After surrender, Chuuk was occupied by a minimal US Navy presence. The war and its aftermath shaped modern Chuuk through permanent changes in its resources, economy and political role.     

The 2004 Deepwrecks Project: Analysis of World War II Era Shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico

In July and August 2004, C & C Technologies, Inc. of Lafayette, LA, USA partnered with scientists and film makers from across the United States and Canada to assess and document archaeological and biological aspects of six World War II shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico. The depth of the shipwrecks ranged from 285–6,444 ft (87–1,964 m) below sea level. All six shipwrecks were found during oil and gas related surveys. The United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Management Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Office of Ocean Exploration under the auspices of the National Oceanographic Partnership Program sponsored this multidisciplinary study.     

朝鲜战争与英美关系

冷战初期 ,英美两国在二战时期建立的“特殊关系”得到进一步加强 ,英国成为美国推行冷战政策的最主要支持者和积极参与者。但是 ,这种“特殊关系”并不表明英国在所有国际问题上都与美国保持一致 ,对美国一味给予支持。围绕朝鲜战争和对华政策 ,双方存在着重大分歧和矛盾 ,从而使英美“特殊关系”经历了一次严峻考验。由于实力有限和对美国的依赖 ,英国不得不一再向美国做出妥协、让步 ,以避免双方关系的破裂。对于英国来说 ,维护和加强同美国的关系是其外交政策的核心所在。朝鲜战争从一个侧面揭示了英美关系的复杂性和不对称性     

Battle/fields: braceros,agribusiness, and the violent reproduction of the California agricultural landscape during World War II

The first years of World War II were marked by a series of battles in and over the fields of California. Workers struggled with growers, growers struggled with the state, and federal and California bureaucrats struggled to gain control over the anarchic labor conditions that marked California agriculture. The introduction of a guest worker program – the bracero program – that brought farmworkers from Mexico to the harvests of California and other states, brought these battles to a head as growers ought to secure their traditional access to ‘cheap labor’ and their presumed right to control the farm labor process in the state. This paper examines these battles to show how growers fought – and managed – to preserve a landscape of great power and profit. The paper argues that the agricultural landscape extant at the beginning of the war shaped the nature of these multifaceted struggles, even as it was an object of those struggles.     

A Colonial Shipwreck in Saipan,Northern Mariana Islands

Previous underwater cultural heritage investigations conducted in the western Pacific's Northern Mariana Islands largely focused on the submerged World War Two remains, despite the islands’ rich colonial history. The island chain was the setting of numerous historical occupations including indigenous Chamorro populations, Spain, Germany, Japan and the United States, all of which created a lasting maritime heritage legacy on land and under water. This paper presents the first colonial shipwreck investigation to be undertaken by archaeologists and fills a gap in our history and knowledge of the Mariana Islands’ pre‐World War Two era.     

Understanding the British Empire

In the immediate post-war period and during the early cold war, Britain regularly defended Switzerland's interests against the two emerging superpowers: the Soviet Union and especially the United States. This advocacy was not, however, altruistically motivated. In light of their experiences during the Second World War, British policy-makers could still see the benefits of a neutral Switzerland. But more importantly, the relatively wealthy Swiss were willing to pay for British support and a neutral Switzerland implied other financial, political, and strategic advantages. When there were no such advantages, London abstained from defending Berne. In the case of the negotiations leading to Switzerland's informal participation in the Western strategic embargo against the Eastern Bloc, Whitehall did not stand up to defend Swiss neutrality against US might. Yet this article demonstrates that even if the British had been willing to help the Swiss in their dealings with the Americans, they would have lacked the power to prevent Washington from imposing its will. Britain's power continued to decline after the war, and advocacy for Switzerland could only be successful if the Swiss position was acceptable to the United States.     

The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War

After victory in the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek issued the famous radio speech “Letter to Soldiers and Civilians of the Whole Nation as well as the Peoples of the World after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War.” The main idea of this speech was long interpreted as “returning virtue for malice” (or “good for evil”), a basic principle of the Kuomintang's policy towards Japan. Many scholars who have considered the returning virtue for malice policy in the postwar period include the following major issues: first, China repatriated Japanese prisoners of war and the Japanese diaspora with mercy; second, China allowed the Tenno, or imperial, system to be preserved in Japan; third, China did not participate in the occupation of Japan; and fourth, China gave up the right to ask for war reparations from Japan. This article examines the above four issues to reevaluate the returning virtue for malice policy. The first issue seems to reflect the Chinese national character of being lenient with others. However, it was in fact due to Chiang's anti-Communist strategy and the declared policy of the United States of eradicating Japan's influence in China. With regard to the second issue, Chiang's attitude was merely to let the Japanese people make their own choice, while the fate of the Japanese Tenno system was entirely determined by the US occupation authority, on which Chiang had little influence. The third issue was mainly the outcome of Chiang's focus on domestic political struggle in the postwar era in China. As for war reparations, China actually made efforts to obtain them in the beginning, but had to give up its right eventually. The decision-making process in the Kuomintang government was restrained by American policy and subordinated to Japanese pressure. Thus, it is not persuasive to summarize the basic principle of Kuomintang postwar policy towards Japan as returning virtue for malice.     

Scholarship and the ship of state: rethinking the Anglo‐American strategic decline analogy

This article uses the centenary of the First World War as an opportunity to re‐examine a major element of the existing literature on the war—the strategic implications of supposed British decline—as well as analogies to the contemporary United States based upon that interpretation of history. It argues that the standard declinist interpretation of British strategy rests to a surprising degree upon the work of the naval historian Arthur Marder, and that Marder's archival research and conceptual framework were weaker than is generally realized. It suggests that more recent work appearing since Marder is stronger and renders the declinist strategic interpretation difficult to maintain. It concludes by considering the implications of this new work for analogies between the United States today and First World War‐era Britain, and for the use of history in contemporary policy debates.     

美国政府与中日甲午战争

在1894—1895年的中日甲午战争中,美国表面声称中立,实际却偏袒日本。战前一再拒绝中、朝两国的调停请求和英国的联合调停建议,默认或怂恿日本发动战争。战争期间,美国外交官作为中日两国侨民的战时保护人,一再逸出国际法合理范围,曲意保护在华日本间谍。作为中日两国的唯一调停者,美国一方面拒绝与欧洲国家联合调停,为日本继续发动战争减轻国际压力,另一方面又单方面劝说清朝政府接受日本的各项侵略要求,帮助日本实现发动战争的目的。美国偏袒日本的原因,主要是希望借日本之手废除中朝宗藩关系,进一步打开中国大门,同时利用日本削弱英国、俄国等在东亚的影响力。     

The United States and the Question of the Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922

Abstract

In the post World War II era, the strain in the trilateral relation between the United States, Greece and Turkey is one of the most disquieting and vexatious elements to emerge from American foreign policy. The so-called southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently beset with tensions that threaten to impede its contributory role in NATO's overall defense strategy for southeastern Europe (if they have not already done so). In this political drama, the principal antagonists, Greece and Turkey, have a number of outstanding differences which on occasion have brought them to the precipice of war. As a result, the United States has intervened as the protagonist and consequently has become the recipient of the enmity of these two NATO allies for not recognizing their ‘special’ claims or interests. As in the characteristic classical Greek drama, the chorus of NATO partners offer a common chant: they are united in proclaiming that the current state of affairs seems to portend failure to the concerted effort to defend Western Europe.     

Science as propaganda: Swedish scientists and the co-production of American hegemony in Sweden during the cold war, 1953–68

This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish–American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well.     

Education of the Supreme Commander: The Theoretical Underpinnings of Eisenhower's Strategy in Europe, 1944–45

Abstract

Eisenhower's popular image as both senior officer and, subsequently, President of the United States tends to overplay his personal geniality and undervalues his intellect and clear professional mastery of the military art. This article argues for an Eisenhower who devoted himself to the study of war in the decades before the Second World War, and whose professional attainments defy the popular image.     

"WHEN THE GREAT PLANES CAME AND MADE ASHES OF OUR CITY …"1: TOWARDS AN ORAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE DISASTERS OF WAR.

This paper reconstructs a view of armed violence from the personal testimony of civilians who survived massive bombing of their neighborhoods. A majority of raid victims are “ordinary” civilians, primarily women, children, and the elderly. In World War II the most destructive city-wrecking campaigns were directed against the “morale” of these civilians. Their concerns and experience receive little consideration in the literature of air war, yet huge wartime and postwar surveys recorded first hand testimonies of those in heavily bombed cities in Germany, Japan and England. Women's words are given priority: they represent the majority of able-bodied persons under the bombs, and bear witness to the human ecology of violent experience: the disruptions of everyday life; the worlds of blackout and underground; the losses of home places and urban culture. They testify as well to the uneven social and spatial distribution of harm within cities, where death, damage and homelessness overwhelmingly affected working class and inner city areas. The paper also suggests that personal testimony should be recovered and incorporated into studies of neglected and disadvantaged people in “oral geography.” Some of the radical departures and methodological rethinking involved are considered in a final section.     

Changes in Japanese strategy in 1939–1940 and the internationalization of the Sino–Japanese War

In the early stage of the Sino–Japanese War, Japan was trying hard to limit the conflict to within a scope where it could be resolved bilaterally between only the two nations involved. However, her actual behavior was in stark contrast to her wishful desire to be at peace with the United States, pushing the latter step by step instead in the direction of aiding China and thwarting Japan. Caught in a dilemma created as the United States abrogated the American–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and faced with the changes in the European situation, Japan’s policy makers were eventually pushed by their obsession with the “New East Asian Order” and by their yearning for the “Extended New East Asian Order” which was to include Southeast Asia, deciding to steer the Sino–Japanese War in the direction of “international resolution,” which was just an alternate route to the same goal sought by China. Subsequently, not only did Japan refuse to withdraw from China, she actually took one step further in an expansion southwards, trying to kill several birds with one stone. The war thus spilled over from China to encompass a much greater area. In this process, Japan’s diplomatic corps was often several steps ahead of the military, reflecting the carefully considered background in Japanese policymaking.     

Norwegian and Soviet/Russian World War II Memory Policy During the Cold War and the Post-Soviet Years

Abstract

World War II has played a significant role in using “memory” in all kind of “memory politics” in Europe as well as in the USA. Using examples from Norway and the Soviet Union, later the Russian Republic, this article shows how successfully, but also how contradictorily, historical events can be used as memory politics. We will also see what “memory culture” and “memory policy” is predominant in circumpolar Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia after World War II. We are introduced to the concept of “memory agents”, the producers and directors of “memory politics”. The case is first and foremost the battle of Narvik in Norway in the spring of 1940. We also take a look at the circumpolar borderland between Norway and the Soviet Union during World War II, where the German “Gebirgsjäger” from the Narvik front regrouped and continued their assault on Soviet Union in Murmansk County from the summer of 1941. In what way were the war events useful in the post war era, and how could they directly affect Soviet–Norwegian relations during the Cold War? In addition we ask how memories contributed to the justification of different approaches to the foreign policy in both countries. Besides, the article demonstrates how the memory policy of World War II was affected after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in Norway and Russia, respectively.     

对日媾和与美菲同盟条约的缔结

冷战之初,面对中国内战局势的变化和美国改变对日政策可能导致的日本重新军国主义化威胁,菲律宾将确保国家安全的希望寄托于美国,积极寻求与之订立"太平洋公约",但该构想不符合当时美国的战略考虑,屡遭拒绝。朝鲜战争的爆发,促使美国加快对日媾和。由于媾和方案在安全和赔偿方面未能满足菲律宾等国需求,遭到反对。为平息盟国不满,美国改变对"太平洋公约"的态度并提出自己的方案,但该方案将日本包括其中,被菲否定。经过博弈,在美国提供正式安全保证的前提下,菲律宾最终接受了媾和方案。     

The Cold War, the US Bureau of Reclamation, and the technopolitics of river basin development, 1950–1970

This paper examines the links between Cold War geopolitics and economic development to explain the relatively rapid proliferation of the concept of river basin development throughout so-called “developing areas” of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America during the latter half of the twentieth century. The research focuses on the United States Bureau of Reclamation, the most significant water resource development agency of the US government, and its engagement in what it termed “foreign activities” beginning in the aftermath of World War II. Grounded in recent work on technopolitics, the constructed scales of water resource development, and histories of the “global” Cold War, this research examines the advancement of water resource development in the Litani River basin in Lebanon—as guided by staff of the US Bureau of Reclamation—during the period from 1950 to 1970. The Bureau operated as a geopolitical agent attempting to implement a universalized model of river basin development, but encountered continuous difficulties in the form of political and biophysical contingencies. The Bureau’s efforts, centred on the basin as the most appropriate unit of development, were consistently undercut by scale-making projects related to global and regional geopolitical concerns. The research concludes that understandings of the technopolitics of development interventions would benefit from a closer engagement with recent discussions regarding the construction of spatial scale within political geography and related fields. River basin development and its material transformation of multiple locales remains one of the largely neglected, but vitally important, legacies of Cold War geopolitics.