What’s new in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’?

This article provides an overview of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in the context of Africa's current economic and governance crises, the attempt to establish an Africa Union, and the interest in Africa displayed by the G8 leadership and in particular by the UK's prime minister Tony Blair.
NEPAD has to be seen simultaneously as a 'big idea', a new way of doing business, and a comprehensive development framework. The 'big idea' is to put Africa's concerns on the table of the G8 and seek a much better deal for Africa in terms of international aid, debt relief and access to markets. The new way of doing business is a new form of 'enhanced' development partnership that makes both donor and recipient mutually accountable for development outcomes. The development framework is a long—and expanding—list of programmes and projects, akin to those that have been tried before.
The heart of NEPAD is a commitment to good governance, operationalized through a radical plan for 'peer review' of governance performance. This promises a radical new approach to development partnership, but it also faces political hazards. The governance component is also analysed in the context of the pan–Africa institutions envisaged by the African Union. There is a need for coordinating and rationalizing peace and security initiatives. NEPAD may unlock additional financing for development, but it should not be seen as a cash cow.
The challenges for NEPAD include opening up the process to make it more participatory, including greater focus on HIV/AIDS. NEPAD faces the real danger of being over–sold and of raising unrealistic expectations among Africans. It is, nevertheless, an outstanding opportunity for Africa's development.     

Distinctions,distinctions: ‘public’ and ‘private’ force?

This article evaluates recent literatures within International Relations on so‐called ‘private force’. It suggests that the conceptual weaknesses of much of this literature can be accounted for, in part, by a misunderstanding of the historical and sociological importance of the way power is organized and legitimated through shifts in the public—private distinction. This distinction is one of the primary mechanisms, if not the primary mechanism, for organizing political, economic and, therefore, military power. For the sake of historical accuracy and conceptual integrity scholars should abandon the terminology of ‘public’ and ‘private’ force. Tracing how public‐private distinctions shift and change as an effect of political power is a joint task for historical sociology and international political theory     

‘One in,all in?’ NATO’s next enlargement

In 1999 NATO heads of state invited three states to join the alliance and are set to invite yet more states to join in November 2002 at the Prague summit. At present there are ten states that have declared their interest in gaining accession to NATO councils, and the prospect is that even more states will most likely be interested in joining in the years to come. The question for NATO is no longer whether to enlarge but how to manage enlargement. This article argues that NATO should invite seven of the ten currently declared aspirant states to join the alliance, on the condition that before actual accession occurs, each state must subsequently meet political, military, economic, security and legal standards that are set forth in an annexe to the official invitation. Furthermore, NATO should determine to hold a summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council triennially, for the purpose of assessing the candidates' membership progress in meeting the criteria, and to this end establish a mechanism, in the form of identified bodies, for the assessment of the candidate members' progress. Such a formal process sets forth a graduated yet assured process that aspirant states must progress through that will result in guaranteed accession to NATO councils and protection. A formal process such as this will ameliorate many of the problems that will almost surely arise from proceeding in a more ad hoc, piecemeal manner, while at the same time keeping the door open to other states who may want to join in the future.     

‘Romanian Peasants’ into ‘European Farmers’? Using Statistics to Standardize Agriculture

In this article, the agricultural sector in Romania provides the basis of a sociological enquiry into the contribution of statistics to the definition of legitimate economic organization. Using the analytical tools developed by James C. Scott, the emphasis is laid on the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) developed by the European Commission to define ‘economically viable’ farms. The measurement units which the FADN provides are applied at national level to determine legitimate agricultural practices. This imposes a productivist definition of the agricultural economy which diverges from the modes of social and economic organization observed in rural areas in Romania. Four million Romanian citizens make their living directly from working the land. The majority own smallholdings received during decollectivization and practise subsistence farming at the fringes of the legal economy. Instead of employing a definition of agriculture consistent with their practices and developing local distribution channels, quantification instruments provided by the European Commission form the basis of a selection procedure among these smallholders. These instruments have enabled the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture to set a threshold of ‘economic viability’ below which producers are deemed unable to develop a commercial approach to their activities. The objective is to help those who just about reach the required level to consolidate their agricultural holdings and take up intensive farming. The remainder are disqualified and encouraged to leave the sector. To further this objective, the category ‘semi‐subsistence’ agriculture has been created and takes centre stage in all measures implemented. Nevertheless, the statistical dividing lines on which this category is based have no substance and the structure of agriculture is manifesting high levels of inertia.     

‘Shirkers’, ‘Scrimjacks’ and ‘Scrimshanks’?: British Civilian Masculinity and Reserved Occupations, 1914–45

In both World Wars, the state retained men with essential skills on the home front. Despite needing to mobilise industry and labour in order to supply the military and to maintain key services such as healthcare and food provision, those men who remained in civilian roles were susceptible to accusations of cowardice and being derided as shirkers evading their patriotic duty. While the manliness of the ‘soldier hero’ was secure, the civilian man was susceptible to having his masculinity called into question. This article utilises a range of sources including parliamentary debates, cartoons, Mass Observation records, written testimony and oral histories to examine the policies that were implemented affecting civilian male workers deployed in essential jobs in both wars and the perceptions of men to their reserved status. While there were haphazard attempts to raise an ‘industrial army’ in the First World War, by 1939, a more systematic approach had been implemented with a Schedule of Reserved Occupations drawn up retaining key men in their work. While men on the Second World War home front were potentially diminished by the ‘soldier hero’ and the female war worker, they defined and defended their contributions to the national war effort in written and oral sources in gendered terms, making reference to job security, valued skills, significant earning power, the auxiliary position of female dilutees, positive cultural representations and the added dangers from aerial bombing.     

‘Saving the Solomons’: a New Geopolitics in the ‘Arc of Instability’?

The recent crisis in the Solomon Islands is reviewed in the context of historical and regional antecedents. In the past two decades political and ethnic disputes have flared in several parts of Melanesia and nearby parts of the ‘arc of instability’. Tensions and violence in the Solomon Islands, based on social, economic and political issues, exemplify regional development concerns. The collapse of the economy and civil order resulted in the Solomon Islands being characterised as a ‘failed State’. Localised warfare brought external military intervention, with a regional assistance mission led by Australia, which paralleled other involvement in the region. Involvement has emphasised renewed Australian interest in the region, in the light of global geopolitical shifts, and a more controversial approach to regional security and development.     

‘Humanitarianized’ Development? Anti‐trafficking Reconfigured

Over the past three decades humanitarianism has broadened considerably in scope. Humanitarian aid agencies have increasingly moved beyond a traditionally narrow concern with immediate relief aid to engage the wider implications of their work. Humanitarian arguments have also become central to policy legitimation in a range of contexts outside the humanitarian aid sector. By contrast, this article, based on research into anti‐trafficking programmes in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia, considers a case where a particular humanitarian discourse has in fact narrowed. Anti‐trafficking, once informed by development discourses of poverty reduction and long‐term well‐being of populations, has become increasingly shaped by a humanitarian emergency logic of exceptionalism. Long‐term development modalities have contracted into a zeal for the immediateness of ‘rescues’ and saving lives. By drawing attention to how development and humanitarian discourses intersect in anti‐trafficking interventions, this article explores how such shifts in legitimization and mobilization have taken place, in turn transforming actors and practices. The article will suggest that it is the different temporal registers of the two discourses — development and humanitarianism — that help account for this shift from the former to the latter.     

‘An enemy at the gates’ or ‘from victory to victory’? Russian foreign policy

Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the ‘western alliance’ to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post‐Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics.     

From terrorism to ‘radicalization’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?

This article argues that there has been an increasing convergence of the discourses of terrorism, radicalization and, more lately, extremism in the UK and that this has caused counterterrorism to lose its focus. This is particularly evident in the counterterrorism emphasis on non‐violent but extremist ideology that is said to be ‘conducive’ to terrorism. Yet, terrorism is ineluctably about violence or the threat of violence; hence, if a non‐violent ideology is in and of itself culpable for terrorism in some way then it ceases to be non‐violent. The article argues that there should be a clearer distinction made between (non‐violent) extremism of thought and extremism of method because it is surely violence and the threat of violence (integral to terrorism) that should be the focus of counterterrorism. The concern is that counterterrorism has gone beyond its remit of countering terrorism and has ventured into the broader realm of tackling ideological threats to the state.     

‘What makes one an Israeli?’ Negotiating identities in everyday representations of ‘Israeliness’*

Abstract. This paper examines the construction of a sense of Israeli identity which is not deducible from the public political discourse. It analyses common verbal representations of ‘being an Israeli person’, namely, what people in contemporary Israeli culture repeatedly say about Israelis, and how they position themselves vis‐à‐vis the commonsensical agreements they exchange, assuming that the massive use of such clichés in certain contexts creates a discursive routine that has ‘a life of its own’, through which people constantly negotiate their self‐images and their sense of belonging. It investigates the ways these representations create solidarity or demarcation and how such current popular representations relate to canonical veteran images of Israeli identity, notably that of the pre‐state ‘Native Israeli’ (Sabra) archetype. The analysis is based on 295 anonymous open responses to the question ‘What makes one an Israeli?’ published weekly in the Weekend Supplement of Maariv, the second largest newspaper in Israel, between 1996 and 1998. The analysis has led to the following observations: (1) Instead of the most expected grand ideological (ethnic, national, religious, etc.) issues of conflict, the responses reveal a ‘pursuit of culturedness’, using an implied scale of mastering good manners and possessing a ‘genuine culture’ which form the dominant parameter of judging the ‘Israeli person’. (2) A tension between mainstream and marginalised groups is shaped by a ‘chase and flight’ dynamic of embracing and rejecting the mythological Sabra image (in asymmetry with these groups' assumed political stances), which image is believed to be a symbol of the once hegemonic veteran elite. (3) This tension paradoxically contributes to the persistence of the canonical image of the Sabra that is currently delegitimised by much intellectual discourse.     

Merovingian partitions: a ‘genealogical charter’?

This paper considers the classic accounts of Frankish partitions in 511 and 561 in light of the agenda of Gregory of Tours in the later 580s. While the partitions' political origins have long been emphasized, the concern here is with the political motivations of the source on which we depend, almost exclusively, for our knowledge. This discussion questions whether there were ever actually definite agreements to divide the kingdom, and suggests claims about shared inheritance supplied a 'genealogical charter' that justified and deflected attention from the interests of people like Gregory, in what was a continuously contested, evolutionary process.     

Two medieval ‘trepanations’ – therapy or swindle?

During the 1991–1992 excavation of the ruins of the medieval cathedral in Hamar, Norway, the broken skull of an elderly man was found, showing evidence of an incomplete trepanation. The ‘surgeon’ had obviously tried to penetrate the skull surface around bregma in an irregular circle of 23 × 21 mm. Upon investigation, the skull revealed a reactive‐pathological area of the internal surface of the occipital bone, which probably represents a respite after a meningeal disorder (a tumour or an infectious process), causing us to suggest that the trepanation was meant to cure the patient's increasing headache. However, as a second skull with similar marks was found in the same churchyard, another explanation seems possible. Because the brain tumour in the first case may have altered the patient's mental state, we may surmise that these incomplete operations were an attempt to remove from these patients' heads the ‘Stone of Madness’, which was then commonly considered to be the reason for psychiatric diagnoses as well as persistent headache, and often depicted in European art, most notably in the 16^th and 17^th centuries. The second skull, revealing an even more incomplete attempt, did not show any skeletal pathology at all. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Is imperialist nationalism an oxymoron?’*

According to Ernest Gellner's celebrated definition, nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Based on this definition, Alexander Motyl has declared that ‘nationalism and imperialism are polar types’. Even so, dozens of books and articles have used the concept of ‘imperialist nationalism’ without any qualms. Is this just a matter of terminological confusion, or does it reflect a deeper disagreement on what the phenomenon of nationalism actually is? In the lecture, I discuss the concept of ‘imperialist nationalism’ as used in the standard literature and find that numerous historical actors take pride in being both nationalists and imperialists. I distinguish between overseas colonial empires and contiguous land‐based empires and demonstrate that in both cases, ‘imperialist nationalism’ can be found. In the latter case, nationalism can take the shape of either ‘nation‐building imperialism’, in which nationalists strive for cultural homogenisation throughout the state, or ‘ethnocratic imperialism’, in which the distinction between ‘the imperial nation’ and other national groups is retained. In overseas colonial empires, I find only ethnocratic imperialism. As a case study, I analyse how Russian nationalists have related to the fact that Russia has historically been an Empire.     

COP‐6 Collapse or ‘to be Continued?’

In November 2000 the Sixth Conference of Parties in The Hague was suspended without reaching agreement. Before the start of the meeting, Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar described the conference as 'a make or break opportunity for the climate change treaties'. However, the collapse of this meeting does not mean a total breakdown of the climate negotiations. Only 10 days after the collapse, leading developed country negotiators gathered again to revive the talks. Four articles in the April 2001 issue of International Affairs will analyse in much more detail the meeting in The Hague, the revived negotiations and the implications for further climate policy. Four distinguished authors will shed light on the climate change issue from four different perspectives: Europe, the United States, developing countries and the non-governmental organizations.     

American power: from ‘compellance’ to cosmopolitanism?

This article argues that the Bush strategy of 'spectacle war' is caught in an earlier Cold War paradigm primarily aimed at influencing American public opinion and that it fails to take into account the reality of the current global context, especially with regard to changes in the nature of sovereignty and in the role of military force. The United States, in its current posture, has the capability to be very destructive but is much less able to do 'compellance', that is to say, to impose its will on others. In particular, the current strategy cannot defeat terrorism.
The article draws up a typology of different visions of how American power is, or should be, exercised based on different assumptions about sovereignty and military power. It concludes that American power can only be exercised constructively within a cosmopolitan framework. Such a framework is best suited to the containment, and possibly, the defeat of terrorism. It would contribute both to global economic growth and to American democracy.     

Putin's Russia: shaping a ‘grand strategy’?

Since the middle of the last decade the Russian leadership has conducted a strategic overhaul, publishing a cascade of new concepts, strategies and doctrines that attempt to frame plans in a long‐term horizon to 2020 and beyond. Following Vladimir Putin's re‐election in 2012, a series of presidential instructions and new plans have been published to update this overhaul. This article examines this commitment to strategic planning and whether it is tantamount to a grand strategy. The article explores the various understandings of Russian strategy in the existing literature, before sketching a definition of grand strategy. It suggests that Moscow has shaped a broad horizon and made some progress towards achieving the goals it has set out. But a grand strategy is more than formulating plans, it is also the coordination of relevant organizations and resources—‘conducting the orchestra’—to execute effectively the plans. The article thus concludes by exploring the difficulties Moscow faces: on the one hand, an evolving and competitive international context and, on the other, a domestic context burdened by a heavy inheritance from the USSR and contemporary Russian problems. Taken all together, these suggest that although Moscow is committed to strategic planning, a grand strategy remains a work in progress.     

Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to revolution?

Syria was, until recently, seen as a ‘successful’ example of authoritarian ‘upgrading’ or ‘modernization;’ yet in 2011 the Syrian regime faced revolution from below: what went wrong? Bashar al‐Asad inherited a flawed regime yet managed to start the integration of his country into the world capitalist market, without forfeiting the nationalist card by, for instance, attempting to acquire legitimacy from opposition to Israel and the US invasion of Iraq. Yet, despite his expectations and that of most analysts, his regime proved susceptible to the Arab uprising. This article examines the causes and development of the Syrian uprising of 2011. It contextualizes the revolt by showing how the construction of the regime built in vulnerabilities requiring constant ‘upgradings’ that produced a more durable regime but had long term costs. It focuses on Bashar al‐Asad's struggles to ‘modernize’ authoritarianism by consolidating his own ‘reformist’ faction, balancing between the regime's nationalist legitimacy and its need for incorporation into the world economy; his shifting of the regime's social base to a new class of crony capitalists; and his effort to manage participatory pressures through limited liberalization and ‘divide and rule’. The seeds of the uprising are located in these changes, notably the abandonment of the regime's rural constituency and debilitating of its institutions. Yet, it was Asad's inadequate response to legitimate grievances and excessive repression that turned demands for reform into attempted revolution. The article then analyses the uprising, looking at the contrary social bases and strategies of regime and opposition, and the dynamics by which violence and foreign intervention have escalated, before finishing with comments on the likely prognosis.