The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

Soviet foreign policy

Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk‐Taking and Crisis Behavior: a theoretical and empirical analysis, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp.375. $29.95 (paper)

Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal (eds), Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp.296. $15.95 (paper)

Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), The USSR and the Muslim World, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp.298. $65.00 (cloth)     

Power in Australian foreign policy

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of ‘maximising’ Australia’s power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise ‘power’ or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute’s recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute’s carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest.     

The perils of a trade-first US foreign policy

The end of the Cold War, the advent of globalisation, and new horizons in trade theory, all seem to point out to the need for a new American economic strategy. Indeed, for many they beg for the implementation of economism as the new US foreign policy doctrine. The managed trade policy (1993-1996) of forcibly opening foreign markets for the benefit of corporate America showed much of what is wrong with a trade-first agenda in foreign affairs: it accomplished nothing in terms of economic gain while creating dangerous spillovers into other foreign policy areas--such as political and security bilateral relationships--thus endangering the broader goals of US foreign policy. A foreign policy that puts trade at the top of the agenda is unwarranted, probably unsustainable, and ultimately counterproductive. Moreover, it is hardly the most important tool by which the economic wellbeing of most Americans can be enhanced. The return of low productivity figures and a slowing American economy may well rekindle calls for a policy of managed trade. Such calls must be rejected and the lessons of the recent past must be heeded.     

Carter's foreign policy: The perception of failure

Harold Brown, Thinking about National Security: Defence and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World. (Westview Press, Boulder, 1982.)

Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1983.)

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981. (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983.)

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. (Bantam Books, New York, 1982.)

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983.)     

The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy

It is widely recognised that the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), adopted by heads of state and government in 2005, is an important new international principle. Australia has been one of the principle's most significant contributors, with prominent Australians and governments from both sides of politics contributing to its development, emergence, and implementation. This article traces and explains Australia's contribution to RtoP and asks what more it might do to assist in its implementation. It argues that Australia's commitment to RtoP is informed by a synergy of values and interests and has been strengthened by the Rudd government's reengagement with multilateralism. It concludes by calling for the development of a whole-of-government strategy for implementation and by suggesting some policy avenues that might be considered.     

Soft power in Turkish foreign policy

This article examines to what extent Turkey's foreign policy identity has transformed from being a ‘hard power’ to a ‘soft power’ over the last few years. In doing so, this article also contends that there is a close relationship between the degree of securitisation of issues and whether the power used to deal with them is hard or soft in nature. If issues of concern were securitised, the tendency to use hard power would increase. Another argument is that the main difference between these two types of power stems from the kind of ‘logic of action’ that governs the behaviour of agents. If an instrumental logic of action were in play, meaning if the goal were to force others to make a cost-benefit analysis through coercing or coaxing strategies, then one could talk about hard power. If the goal were to ensure that others would automatically follow the lead of the power-holder due to the power of attraction the latter has in the eyes of the former, then one could refer to the existence of soft power. The main conclusion of this article is that recent internal and external developments have contributed to Turkey's soft power potential.