Economic statecraft in China's new overseas special economic zones: soft power,business or resource security?

China's rapidly growing economic engagement with other developing countries has aroused intense debates, but these debates have often generated more heat than light. The Chinese government is clearly pushing its companies to move offshore in greater numbers, and state‐owned firms figure prominently in many of the major investments abroad. Yet relatively little research exists on when, how and why the Chinese government intervenes in the overseas economic activities of its firms. China's state‐sponsored economic diplomacy in other developing countries could play three major strategic roles: strengthening resource security, enhancing political relationships and soft power, and boosting commercial opportunities for national firms. This article examines China's programme to establish overseas special economic zones as one tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. It traces the process by which they were established and implemented, and investigates the characteristics of the 19 zones initially selected in a competitive tender process. The article concludes that even in countries rich in natural resources, the overseas zones were overwhelmingly positioned as commercial projects. Particularly in the Asian zones, China is following in the footsteps of Japan. The zone programme, and the Chinese foreign investment it hoped to foster, represents a clear case of the international projection of China's developmental state. However, in Africa (but not generally elsewhere) discourse surrounding the zones publicly positions them as a transfer of China's own development success, thus potentially enhancing China's political relationships and soft power on the continent.     

China’s cultural future: from soft power to comprehensive national power

The Hu Jintao administration used the ‘four‐in‐one’ wording for the overall arrangement of development in China, that is, economic development, political development, cultural development and social development. The term ‘soft power’ was adopted to conceptualise the cultural development dimension. This paper used a tripartite taxonomy to examine Chinese approaches to soft power, as ‘resources’, as ‘strategies’ and as ‘outcomes’. Soft power in China was mainly used in a domestic policy context to mean cultural resources to be amassed and accumulated. Soft power could be measured as part of its comprehensive national power and compared with the hierarchical status of other nation states. Soft power as strategies meant using power softly in seeking normal economic and political advantages abroad. Soft power as outcomes meant the rise of China and its cultural renaissance.     

Sino–American relations: new changes and new challenges

Sino–American relations encompass a highly complex array of cooperative and competitive dimensions. Recently, they have evolved around the question of ‘China's rise’ or (as Chinese analysts would state it) ‘peaceful evolution’. This article surveys both the cooperative and competitive structural elements of this important bilateral relationship. It tracks recent transitions in that relationship, arguing that China's new-found status as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in American eyes will present a new set of American expectations and new forms of strategic collaboration that will seriously test both sides’ policy creativity and ability to adapt to a rapidly changing global environment.     

Italy: A new language for a new politics?

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the language used by the major actors in contemporary Italian politics. After a brief introduction, which lists the general questions posed by such an analysis, we examine the language of the pre‐1992 regime, which has been rather too hastily condemned as obscure and solipsistic. We then pass to the self‐consciously simple language of Bossi, who constructs a discourse of protest, and of Berlusconi, who offers a discourse of government. These lead to the very different, albeit sometimes complementary, languages of Prodi and D'Alema, which go beyond populism and open new political perspectives. Through these and other examples we examine the role of political language in a changing Italy.     

Explaining everything? The power and perils of reading Rosenberg

This article examines the writings and teachings of eminent American medical historian Charles E. Rosenberg from the perspective of one of his former graduate students. It examines the appeal of the integrative quality of Rosenberg's historical approach; his attention to imperfect and inconsistent ideology; his use of graphic examples to shock and engage; his preference for continuity over change; his rejection of nostalgia and romanticism; the influence of his teacher Erwin Ackerknecht; and Rosenberg's response to American health policy issues. The article also places Rosenberg within the history of the rise and fall of American social medicine and assesses the potential influence of his work for twenty-first-century American medical history and health policy.     

Engagement or empire? American power and the international order

Three recent surveys of American foreign relations lie at the intersection of topical academic and policy debates. Robert Lieber's Eagle rules? makes a case for American primacy as a precondition for global stability, and in so doing reflects an agenda for US foreign policy that is broadly associated with the current Bush administration. By contrast, Joseph Nye's The paradox of American power argues against US unilateralism, and may be read as an implicit critique of the apparent recent shift in American strategy. Nevertheless, both Lieber and Nye make a case for extensive American engagement with the world as a basis for international stability. By contrast, Chalmers Johnson's Blowback views America's global ‘engagement’ as a thinly disguised diplomatic veil for imperialism. Although they make very different arguments, these three books are usefully considered together. Nye's stress on the importance of soft power, multilateral diplomacy and wider structural changes in the nature of world politics is a useful corrective to Lieber's emphasis on US primacy. But Johnson is right to criticize the excessive and ultimately counter‐productive level of military involvement of the United States around the world. In the absence of a more effective global balance of power, the preconditions for a robust system of international diplomacy as well as the management of globalization will not be satisfied.     

Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach

This article examines whether Australia is a middle power. It identifies the three most popular approaches to defining a middle power: by a country's position, behaviour and identity. The article tests each definition against Australia, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each. Highlighting an earlier systemic approach to defining states, an alternative ‘systemic impact’ definition for middle powers is proposed. This approach, it is argued, provides a more comprehensive manner for identifying whether a country like Australia is a middle power, along with the implications for international security.     

All the way? The evolution of German military power

German strategic decision‐makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO‐led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies’ reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision‐makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the ‘small war’ in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill‐prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war‐fighting. In addition, the government and the Bundeswehr lack vital strategy‐making capabilities. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force.