Return to reason: reviving political realism in western foreign policy

Twenty‐first‐century political crises stretching from Europe to the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific have undermined the worldview that governed post‐Cold War western thinking about a liberal end of history. This worldview assumed that shared norms and transnational institutions would transform the state based‐order. In this context, the use of force is considered appropriate only for humanitarian ends meeting a set of predetermined axioms laid down in chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Yet for any strategy to be effective—in an international order subject to change—a clear political aim is required, which might deviate from the general rule. Preoccupied with universal postulates, legal normativism has lost sight of the particular. The argument put forth in this article is that the failure of contemporary western foreign policy in the twenty‐first century to address this limitation or to prioritize political ends has led to strategic confusion from Afghanistan to Syria and Ukraine. In this context, it might be useful to reappraise the utility of abstract rationalist approaches to global governance and return instead to an earlier understanding of statecraft that avoided premature generalizations and treated norms as maxims of prudence rather than axioms requiring universal application.     

Economic Globalization and Institutions of Global Governance

Economic globalization is reducing the significance of state boundaries. We have a global economy but lack the institutions necessary for a global polity. Unilateral action by a would–be hegemon is untenable in the long term and hence there is a need to discuss our institutions of global governance. The benefits and costs of globalization have been distributed asymmetrically, placing poor people in poor countries at a disadvantage, especially as regards the free movement of low–skilled labour and the creation of intellectual property rights. The World Trade Organization, a target of the critics of globalization, should be seen as a welcome extension of the rule of law to the international arena and a counterweight to unilateralism. More generally, global economic liberalism should be balanced by institutions which provide global public goods and international mechanisms to finance them. All of this implies a further weakening of state sovereignty and a need to ensure that global institutions are democratic and can be held accountable to people worldwide for their performance.     

Global Governance: Poorly done and Poorly Understood

A set of ethical issues—tensions between democratization and globalization, about some ways in which the global inequalities have increased, and about gross failures of contemporary international cooperation—provide reason to consider our understanding of global governance and the political forces organized to support or transform it. Many scholars agree on the existence of a global polity characterized by the dominance of neo-liberalism, the growing network of both public and private regimes that extend across the world's largest regions, the system of global intergovernmental organizations, and transnational organizations both carrying out some of the traditional service functions of global public agencies and working to create regimes and new systems of international integration. Scholars who emphasize the historically contingent social construction of human institutions and who focus on the transformative potential of transnational social movements have provided the greatest insight into what can be done to confront the ethical issues raised by contemporary global governance. Almost all analysts agree that the current great powers cannot be relied upon to facilitate progressive change, although that is only one reason why global governance is likely to remain inefficient and incapable of shifting resources from the world's rich to the poor, even though it may continue to play a role in promoting liberal democracy and the empowering of women.     

Capitalism and the emergent world order

The two‐centuries‐old hegemony of the West is coming to an end. The ‘revolutions of modernity’ that fuelled the rise of the West are now accessible to all states. As a consequence, the power gap that developed during the nineteenth century and which served as the foundation for a core–periphery international order is closing. The result is a shift from a world of ‘centred globalism’ to one of ‘decentred globalism’. At the same time, as power is becoming more diffuse, the degree of ideological difference among the leading powers is shrinking. Indeed, because all Great Powers in the contemporary world are in some form capitalist, the ideological bandwidth of the emerging international order is narrower than it has been for a century. The question is whether this relative ideological homogeneity will generate geo‐economic or geopolitical competition among the four main modes of capitalist governance: liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian and state bureaucratic. This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these four modes of capitalist governance, and probes the main contours of inter‐capitalist competition. Will the political differences between democratic and authoritarian capitalists override their shared interests or be mediated by them? Will there be conflicting capitalisms as there were in the early part of the twentieth century? Or will the contemporary world see the development of some kind of concert of capitalist powers? A world of politically differentiated capitalisms is likely to be with us for some time. As such, a central task facing policy‐makers is to ensure that geo‐economic competition takes place without generating geopolitical conflict.     

The G8 in a changing global economic order

The G8 has rather crept up on our consciousness as an agency of global governance. It was brought into being in 1975 in order to give western leadership to the global political economy at a time of uncertainty and drew Russia into its activities in order to demonstrate and symbolize the triumph of western capitalist liberal democracy over its rival Soviet system. In that sense the G8 constitutes the club of the winners of late twentieth century history. But it has long been beset by problems of legitimacy and efficiency. Some of the leaders of the current G8 states also recognize that global politics has moved on a long way since the settlements of 1945 and 1989 and increasingly acknowledge the need to address that changing reality. They recognize that some other powerful countries have grown up and that it is now in the interests of the dominant countries to accommodate a limited number of these new powers within the structure and norms of the contemporary governance of globalization. In this spirit the G8 has lately sought to incorporate Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa into its affairs, dealing with them as ‘outreach’ partners within a process that has been dubbed the ‘G8 + 5’. For their part, these early twenty‐iirst‐century winners will have to show that they are willing to work within the framework of western leadership. That is what the ‘G8 + 5’ process is testing out. Only when, and if, these tests are passed will the formation of a G13 become a politically realistic possibility.     

The contested rescaling of economic governance in East Asia: a special issue

The special issue this article opens engages with an apparent conundrum that has often puzzled observers of East Asian politics—why, despite the region's considerable economic integration, multilateral economic governance institutions remain largely underdeveloped. The authors argue that this ‘regionalism problématique’ has led to the neglect of prior and more important questions pertaining to how patterns of economic governance, beyond the national scale, are emerging in East Asia and why. In this special issue, the contributors shift analytic focus onto social and political struggles over the scale and instruments of economic governance in East Asia. The contributions identify and explain the emergence of a wide variety of regional modes of economic governance often neglected by the scholarship or erroneously viewed as stepping stones towards ‘deeper’ multilateralism.     

Coordinated Credit Spaces: The Globalization of Chinese Development Finance

This article examines the emergence of Chinese development finance on the global stage and evaluates the extent to which it differs from, complements and/or competes with the Western‐backed development finance institutions. Whereas the new, China‐backed multilaterals are closer to the Western model, especially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this analysis finds that China's national development finance is significantly distinct along three parameters — the scale and business model of Chinese finance relative to its Western counterparts, the composition and approach of China's lending portfolio, and the governance of China's development finance institutions. These differences can be seen as complements to the Western‐backed system, given that much of Chinese development finance has flowed into countries and sectors in which Western development finance institutions have ventured to a lesser extent. However, the globalization of Chinese development finance, patterned on the international diffusion of what is coined in this article as the ‘coordinated credit space model’, contrasts with Western development finance, governance and business models, and has triggered a competitive stance from Western actors. Either contestation or convergence are possible trajectories for the future, and the outcome will be determined by whichever can produce conditions akin to the ‘politics of productivity’.     

Global social justice at the WTO? The role of NGOs in constructing global social contracts

Over the past decade, international non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) have been contesting the neo‐liberal economic order in international politics by campaigning for normative conditions to bring about what Richard Falk calls ‘humane governance’. However, the degree to which NGOs have contributed to the formation of global social contracts remains controversial. While NGO activists and various scholars advocate the establishment of such contracts, empirical testing of this normative argument is underdeveloped. Drawing upon this lack of empirical support, critics dismiss the global social contract concept and question the roles played by NGOs in international politics. This article addresses the controversy through a review, refinement and application of global social contract theory and an empirical study of two prominent international NGO campaigns directed at the World Trade Organization (WTO), an institution that represents a ‘hard test case’. It explores the ways in which NGOs and their networks are challenging the neo‐liberal basis of WTO agreements and contributing to the emergence of global social contracts. The article concludes that in some circumstances, NGOs have the capacity to inject social justice into international economic contracts and there is some basis for optimism regarding the formation of global social contracts involving NGOs, nation‐states and international organizations.     

Setting the rules: private power,political underpinnings,and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance

The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions‐based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross‐border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self‐regulation and/or public‐private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast‐moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision‐making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three ‘phases’ of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order.     

Justice Unbound? Globalization,States and the Transformation of the Social Bond

Conventional accounts of justice suppose the presence of a stable political society, stable identities, and a Westphalian cartography of clear lines of authority–usually a state–where justice can be realized. They also assume a stable social bond. But what if, in an age of globalization, the territorial boundaries of politics unbundle and a stable social bond deteriorates? Can there be justice in a world where that bond is constantly being disrupted or transformed by globalization? This article thus argues that we need to think about the relationship between globalization, governance and justice. It does so in three stages: first, it explains how, under conditions of globalization, assumptions made about the social bond are changing; second, it demonstrates how strains on the social bond within states give rise to a search for newer forms of global political theory and organization, and the emergence of new global (non-state actors) which contest with states over the policy agendas emanating from globalization; and third, despite the new forms of activity identified in the second stage, the article concludes that the prospects for a satisfactory synthesis of a liberal economic theory of globalization, a normative political theory of the global public domain, and a new social bond are remote.     

Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance

That democratic societies do not fall into conflict has become an axiom of contemporary international relations. Liberal societies, however, do not properly exist along the troubled margins of the global order. This absence has lent urgency to present efforts at social reconstruction. Whereas a couple of decades ago the principle of non–interference prevailed, this unfinished business has shaped a new will to intervene and transform societies as a whole. This article critically analyses the international will to govern through three interconnected themes. First, it examines accepted views on the nature of the new wars. These representations usually portray conflict as a form of social regression stemming from the failure of modernity. As such, they provide a moral justification for intervention. Second, an alternative view of the new wars — as a form of resistant and reflexive modernity — is developed. Made possible by the opportunities created by globalization, this resistance assumes the organizational form of network war. The essay concludes with an examination of the encounter between the international will to govern and the resistance of reflexive modernity. This encounter is the site of the post–Cold War reuniting of aid and politics. One important consequence has been the radicalization of development and its reinvention as a strategic tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction. The use of aid as a tool of global liberal governance is fraught with difficulty; not least, the equivocal and contested nature of its influence. Rather than reconsideration, however, policy failure tends to result in a fresh round of reinvention and reform. The increasing normalization of violence is but one effect.     

Linking Up to Development? Global Value Chains and the Making of a Post‐Washington Consensus

Over the last decade, the global value chain (GVC) approach, with its associated notions of chain governance and firm upgrading, has proliferated as a mode of analysis and of intervention amongst development institutions. This article examines the adoption and adaptation of GVCs at four multilateral agencies in order to understand the purchase of value chain approaches within the development field. Mixing GVC perspectives with other theoretical influences and applied practices, these institutions deploy value chain frameworks to signal a new generation of policies that promise both to consolidate, and to advance beyond, the market fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus. To achieve this, value chain development frameworks craft interventions directed toward various constellations of firm and non‐firm actors as a ‘third way’ between state‐minimalist and state‐coordinated approaches. The authors identify key adaptations of the GVC framework including an emphasis on value chain governance as an instrument to correct market failure in partnership with state and development agencies, and upgrading as a de facto tool for poverty reduction. They find that efforts are ongoing to construct a ‘post’ to the Washington Consensus and that the global value chain is enabling this process by providing a new language and new object of development intervention: ‘the chain’ and the local–global linkages that comprise it.     

America after Iraq

America won an asymmetric war in Iraq and lost an asymmetric peace. Translating material power advantage into favourable political outcomes has been a challenge for great powers down the ages—what makes this bridge even more difficult to cross today is the raised expectations on the part of liberal publics about the moral purpose of US‐led interventions. In this sense, Iraq is part of the explanation for why influential liberals believe there is a ‘crisis’ in America's world leadership. ‘America after Iraq’ subjects this claim to analytical scrutiny—in particular it addresses whether Iraq was simply a chapter in a longer book detailing American power and purpose in the post‐9/11 world? In answering this question the article is drawn to consider conceptual debates about a shift in the international system from anarchy to hierarchy with the US as the hegemonic power. While it rejects strong versions of the hierarchy thesis that imply the Washington is the new Rome, it is nevertheless drawn to an understanding of a hierarchical form of ordering where the US oscillates between a hegemonic role and an imperial outlaw. Seen through this lens, the Iraq War was an intervention that happened because it could, and not because it was just or necessary. Public opinion and the weakness of domestic institutions are also critical factors in explaining how it was possible for a previously status‐quo oriented hegemonic power to act recklessly and put the rules and institutions of international society under strain.     

Settler-colonialism's anti-social contract The Wiley Invited Lecture at the 2019 annual meeting of the Canadian Association of Geographers

Contemporary liberal governance requires constant access to a historical “reset” button, a simultaneous acknowledgement and disavowal of history. This is especially so in times of emergency or crisis; we are, supposedly, “all in this together.” The political economic institutions that facilitate this false solidarity—the anti-social contract—range from the mundane to emergency measures, but they share an origin in, and gain their legitimacy from, a key mechanism of liberal social life: contract. If contracts “settle” the past, what can build solidarity in the shadow of a past that cannot be settled?     

What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract and the State?

Since 1991 the international system has struggled and failed to recreate a state on the territory of the former Somalia. Proto‐state systems have been formed by Somalis themselves in Somaliland and Puntland and alternative forms of governance and order exist in other parts of Somalia, but none enjoys international recognition. The polities of Somalia offer important lessons concerning our general theories about social contract, the role that states play in creating wealth, indigenous systems of governance, and the failure of existing international approaches to state reconstruction. Contemporary Somali politics is re‐explored here to extract these lessons. The article explores the assumptions embedded in the works of the classic Western social contract theorists in the light of Somali experience in order to show that the underlying conceptual structure of international state reconstruction work needs to be rethought. We conclude that it frequently is better to allow for bottom‐up, organic, disjointed negotiation of indigenous governance solutions (even though they probably will not conform to Western ideas of liberal democracy) than for the international system to impose top‐down answers. The former more closely tracks the history of state formation in Europe and the latter is troubled by the inconsistent and not necessarily benign interests of the international actors involved. Indigenous, local political systems are changed by the stresses of violent conflict, so prompt action to employ them in a post‐conflict situation is indicated.     

Globalization,empire and natural law

Three controversial concepts are central to discussion on how international order originates, how it operates, and ultimately how we should respect it: globalization, empire and natural law. Each of these is examined in turn in this article. The currently prevalent way of thinking about globalization simply as a system of inter‐connections, of processes and networks that span national and cultural boundaries is likely to produce anti‐globalization backlashes. Many people reach the conclusion that global rules are simply a euphemism for some sort of imperial or neo‐imperial rule. Consequently, there is an increasingly intense discussion of the role of force and power in a global order. This article suggests an alternative mechanism for creating global order. The power of globalization rests not simply on material prosperity, but on the ability to communicate and share ideas as well as goods across large geographical and cultural distances. Natural law theories suggest that a sustained dialogue between apparently rival traditions of thinking can lead to agreement on shared norms and values.     

Identity and state formation in multi‐sectarian societies: Between nationalism and sectarianism in Syria

The relation between state formation and identity in MENA multi‐sectarian societies is examined, taking Syria as a case study. The paper looks at the impact of the mix of sectarianism and nationalism on the formation of state institutions and the impact of the latter on this mix. The flawed export of the Westphalian state system to MENA established the structural context—multiple identities, hybrid states—wherein the two identities compete, overlap, and coexist. Next, the factors that explain varying identity patterns in MENA are surveyed and their likely consequences for state formation; then, reversing the analysis, the impact of state formation and state institutions on the nationalism–sectarianism balance is examined. The Syrian case is briefly discussed in order to illustrate the argument, looking at three periods when the identity balance interacted differently with state formation: pre‐Ba'thist Syria when nationalism eclipsed sectarianism; Ba'thist Syria (1970‐2000) when patrimonial instrumentalization of sectarianism was compensated for by inclusive bureaucratic institutions, populist policies, and nationalist ideology; neo‐liberal Syria under Bashar al‐Asad (2000‐2010) when inclusion shrank, reanimating sectarianism; and civil war Syria (2010‐) when partial state failure fostered exclusionary militant sectarianism at the expense of nationalism.     

A call for a new Japanese foreign policy: the dilemmas of a stakeholder state

Japanese foreign policy is at a crossroads. A global power transition is under way; while the United States remains the leading global power, across the globe non‐western developing states are on the rise. Within Asia, China is a growing presence, wielding expansive claims on islands and maritime rights, and embarking on a defence buildup. As power shifts across Asia and the wider world, the terms of leadership and global governance have become more uncertain. Japan now finds itself asking basic questions about its own identity and strategic goals as a Great Power. Within this changing context, there are three foreign policy approaches available to Japan: (1) a classical realist line of working closely with the US in meeting China's rise and optimizing deep US engagement with China by pursuing a diplomacy focused on counterbalancing and hedging; (2) a transformative pragmatist line of rejuvenating itself through Abenomics and repositioning itself in East Asia; and (3) a liberal international line of pursuing a common agenda of enhancing global liberal‐oriented norms and rules through multilateral institutions along with the United States and the Asia–Pacific countries. Current Japanese foreign policy contains a mix of all three approaches. The article argues that a greater focus on the second and the third lines would enhance the current approach; it would ensure that Japan is more in harmony with the global environment and help it work positively for global and regional stability and prosperity, thus enabling Japan to pursue an ‘honorable place in the world’ (as stated in the preamble to its constitution).     

One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study of international society

This article is a revised version of the 2006 Martin Wight Memorial Lecture and examines the placeof regional states‐systems or regional international societies within understandings of contemporary international society as whole. It addresses the relationship between the one world and the many worlds‐on one side, the one world of globalizing capitalism, of global security dynamics, of a global political system that, for many, revolves a single hegemonic power, of global institutions and global governance, and of the drive to develop and embed a global cosmopolitan ethic; and, on the other side, the extent to which regions and the regional level of practice and of analysis havebecome more firmly established as important elements of the architecture of world politics; and the extent to which a multiregional system of international relations may be emerging. The first section considers explanations of the place of regionalism in contemporary international society and the various ways in which the one world aff ects the many. The second section deals with how regionalism might best be studied. The final section analyses four ways in which regionalism may contribute to international order and global governance.     

Feminist Mobilization,Claims Making and Policy Change: An Introduction

More than two decades after the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, gender equality policies have not delivered in the ways envisaged. This special cluster of articles seeks to understand why. Women's mobilization and feminist activism was central to the Beijing process and the advocacy that followed, yet their influence on policy processes seems constrained in the current context of global political and economic changes. The articles in this cluster explore the negotiations between different actors, institutions and discourses — and the tensions and contradictions therein — as explanations for why certain domains of women's rights remain at the margins of political agendas and others receive more attention. Specifically, why have women's labour rights and the demands of the unpaid care economy failed to gain policy traction? The articles point to the importance of political practice, which includes the ‘framing’ of policy demands as compelling narratives, engagement with state entities and the forming and managing of alliances. There are trade‐offs inherent in each of these elements, for example, between transformative gender equality objectives and the pragmatic impulse to frame claims in less politically and socially threatening ways. Further, in a context of increasing globalization, mobilization is required at multiple levels — from the local to the transnational. The articles thus seek to deepen our understanding of how policy change for women's rights occurs.