Public Opinion and Policymaking in the States: The Case of Post-Roe Abortion Policy

Whether public opinion should be expected to play a role in the shaping of abortion legislation in the states is a debatable question. Representation is a difficult task, especially if legislators receive mixed cues from the public, activists, and the political parties. In this study, we find that grass-roots activism and public opinion tend to match, and both are reflected in state abortion policy. In addition, more Pro-Life policies are found in states with a tradition of conservative policies in other areas, Republican majorities in the state legislature, more Catholic residents, and fewer women legislators. These patterns hold true for a composite index of abortion policies and for the specific policy area of government funding of abortions. Slightly different patterns occur for parental consent laws, though these statutes also tend to reflect general preferences on abortion and interest group activity in a state.     

Policy Feedback and Preschool Funding in the American States

The early childhood education policy community has been described as a “divided constituency” in which groups with the same underlying goals sometimes work at cross purposes. This article examines how this internal division affects the contemporary funding of preschool education. It finds that states with a relatively large Head Start community are significantly more likely not to fund preschool education and significantly less likely to dedicate preschool funding exclusively to a freestanding state program. These results suggest that the creation and political solidification of Head Start generated policy feedback. They contributed to an ongoing tension within the early education community as Head Start beneficiaries viewed the creation of a freestanding preschool program as a political threat. This political dynamic illustrates the more general way in which the existence of a public policy can alter the dynamics of future political action.     

With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism

Since 2001, state governments have adopted 287(g) cooperative immigration enforcement agreements with the federal government that authorize their law enforcement personnel to assist in detaining violators of civil federal immigration law. Employing a theoretical framework drawn from theories of policy adoption, intergovernmental relations, and immigration research, we test which state‐level political, sociodemographic, geographic, and economic determinants influence states to enter into such a cooperative agreement. In addition to finding that the partisanship of a state's governor, a state's effort on public welfare, and an increase in a state's percentage of Hispanics are related to the adoption of a cooperative immigration enforcement policy, we found evidence of “steam valve federalism” working not at the state level as Spiro (1997) first theorized but at the local level. When a state's localities adopt immigration enforcement agreements with the federal government, the state itself is far less likely to adopt their own. Understanding the reasons states would adopt this type of policy sheds light on current trends in state immigration policy and their effect on future state/federal intergovernmental relations.     

The Determination of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948–1974*

The picture of the American state policy-making process which emerges from this analysis is one of a system where politics as well as economics matter a great deal. Partisanship and legislative competition are shown to have demonstrable effect on policy output. The control partisan preference exerts over policy decisions is severely constrained in taxing and spending areas, however, and is conditional on forces external to the model presented here. Surpassing the control over policy output exhibited by partisanship is the extent to which the electorate, or the electoral process, holds the parties responsible for policy performance. Apparently the public doesn't believe that “politics doesn't matter.”     

The Temporal Diffusion of Morality Policy: The Case of Death Penalty Legislation in the American States

The social learning theory of policy decisionmaking provides clear expectations for the temporal diffusion of policy through the American states (Gray, 1973; Rogers, 1995; Walker, 1969). But the diffusion of morality policy, with its technical simplicity, potential for high salience, and debate over basic moral values, may be driven by nonroutine decisionmaking. We hypothesize that morality policy will diffuse in patterns that depend on the purity of the morality debate surrounding it and the distribution of citizen values regarding it. We identify three distinctive temporal diffusion patterns for state death penalty policies that vary on these characteristics. We conclude that political decisionmaking driving some morality policy diffusion involves less policy learning, and more concern about majority public opinion, than does nonmorality policy.     

Public Policy and Intergovernmental Relations: Measuring Perceived Change(s) in National Influence-The Effects of the Federalism Decade

Federal grants-in-aid have been a major instrument for the exercise of national influence on the states. This research investigates empirically the degree of perceived national influence (PNI) exerted through the grant process during the 1970s and 1980s. Respondents were state administrators heading agencies that received federal grants. Surveys at four points in time across the two decades produced a unidimensional measure of PNI. PNI levels were notably higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s. Two competing explanations were offered to account for the decline: (a) intergovernmental institutional policy changes promoted by the Ronald Reagan administration from 1981 through 1988, and (b) symbolic and rhetorical advocacy of an altered (reduced) national role in relation to the states. Both factors appear to have contributed to sharp decline in PNI between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.     

Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States

In this paper we address two aspects of regulatory federalism in U.S. environmental policy. First, we suggest that environmental quality in U.S. states responds positively to increases in income. Second, we provide evidence that environmental quality did not decline when President Reagan's policy of new federalism returned responsibility for many environmental regulations to the states. Thus, state environmental quality appears to reflect more than just the dictates of federal policy. Additionally, we find that a "race to the bottom" in environmental quality did not materialize in the 1980s.