Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.     

The Representation of Small Parties and Independents in the Senate

Minor party and independent senators have played a critical role in supporting procedural changes which have given the Australian Senate the ability to play an independent role in the legislative process, and to scrutinise the executive branch effectively. This article examines how this situation has followed from the adoption of proportional representation (PR) for Senate elections since 1949. In looking at the evidence available in 1948, it is argued that the current symbiotic relationship between minor parties and the Senate could not have been foreseen. Whether intended or not, the adoption of PR and the representation of minor parties has done more to enhance the operation of parliamentary democracy in Australia than any institutional change since federation.     

Party Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1877-1990: An Assessment of Long- and Short-Term Effects

Although party voting in the U.S. Senate has been affected by long-term and short-term factors, models in previous research have ignored this distinction. The author employs a relatively new tool, error correction modeling, to measure the long- and short-term effects of internal and external factors on party voting in the U.S. Senate. The results show that party voting for both major parties is a long-term equilibrium relationship with ratification of the 17th Amendment and that external factors are much more important than internal ones for explaining changes in levels of party voting.     

Majority Party Bias in U.S. Congressional Conference Committees

This article examines the representativeness of conference committees in the U.S. Congress by measuring the difference in observed policy preferences between the conference delegations and the parent bodies. We predict and find significant differences between the House and Senate in terms of the partisan bias of conference delegations. House conference delegations are systematically biased in favor of the majority party and away from the chamber median. We take the additional step of exploring the source of this bias. In particular, we examine whether majority party bias in conference is a function of partisan processes at work directly in the selection of conferees. We find evidence that the conditions of majority party influence in the House are consistent with some existing theoretical models of party influence in legislating. There is less conclusive evidence of partisan processes in the Senate, which is consistent with institutional differences in appointment practices.     

After Cloture: Vote Switching,Credit Claiming,and Position Taking in the United States Senate

Vote switching in the United States Senate is not an uncommon occurrence. Nearly one in 10 cloture-final passage vote pairs involves senators switching their vote. We find that this inconsistency in voting behavior is a result of the combination of electoral pressures and the impact of the traceability of consequences in light of party forces and personal preferences. In general, we find that electorally vulnerable members of the majority party are more likely to engage in vote switching. The same is true of more electorally secure members of the minority party. However, the traceability of consequences is also a governing force in that electorally vulnerable members of the majority party are more likely to use vote switching as a credit claiming opportunity during periods of low media scrutiny. Electorally vulnerable members of the minority party are more likely to engage in position taking when there is greater media scrutiny.     

Shock troops: The emerging role of Senators in House of representatives campaigns

Since the 1949 introduction of proportional representation for the Senate there have only been two elections (1983 and 84) at which the ALP has gained more Senators in the chamber than the Coalition. The Coalition has held more seats than the ALP since 1987. The decline in Senate fortunes for the Labor Party has occurred despite (or, perhaps, because of) consecutive ALP Governments from 1972–75 and, more conspicuously, 1983–96. The professionalisation of politics through the 1980s and 1990s has dramatically changed the role major parties expect of their Senate teams. The Coalition and Labor Parties each use their Senators and Senatorial office resources as ‘shock troops’ in marginal seats, as well as points of constituency contact for electors in marginal seats or seats held by the opposition. Given that major party Senators are increasingly being used by the party machines as campaign tools, and are increasingly locating their offices and staffers in marginal seats, the numerical advantage the Coalition enjoys in the Senate is worthy of consideration. The additional campaign resources that Senators provide translates potentially into an electoral advantage in the House of Representatives for the Coalition. The Coalition's majority in the Senate may therefore be of as much interest outside the chamber as it is within it.     

The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design

The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate development, preventing the Senate from allowing its chair to reduce dilatory action, as the House has done. Accordingly, delay, via the filibuster, has become commonplace in the Senate. Such delay has reduced the Senate's efficiency, but has largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch.     

Governed by Experience: Political Careers and Party Loyalty in the Senate

In this article, we study the U.S. Senate to understand how legislators' previous experiences in elected office influence their political behavior. We posit that, as a result of their experiences in office, former governors in the Senate are less partisan than their colleagues. We code the political jobs held by senators between 1983 and 2015 and analyze the effects of these careers on party loyalty in Senate floor votes. We find that gubernatorial service is associated with a 7–8% decrease in Party Unity. We test several hypotheses for the observed “governor effect” and find that, relative to their colleagues, former governors are supported by donor networks that are less ideologically extreme. We conclude that the unique experiences associated with serving as governor, along with the personalized nature of governors' electoral support coalitions, affect a senator's relationship with the party. Ultimately, our analysis illuminates how personal attributes, such as prior experience in elected office, can inform the study of legislative behavior.     

The 2013 elections and the Italian political system

The February 2013 Italian general elections were characterized by the highest volatility to date. Although, thanks to the majority bonus, the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) obtained the absolute majority of seats in the House of Deputies, it could not be considered the winner of the elections. Lacking a majority in the Senate, it was obliged to form a government with Silvio Berlusconi's party and with the rather small number of parliamentarians elected in former Prime Minister Mario Monti's list. In spite of his last-minute surge, Berlusconi was a clear loser, having lost almost six million votes in respect of his 2008 victory. Comedian Beppe Grillo's Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Stars Movement) received the highest-ever number of votes for a new entry into any post-war European general election. Unwilling to play the coalitional game and made up of inexperienced and incompetent parliamentarians, Grillo's party has remained isolated and ineffective. The present Italian party system consists of three poles, the Movimento Cinque Stelle playing the role of anti-system party. Institutional reforms and especially reform of the electoral system, which has been struck down by the Constitutional Court, are again the focus of debate. Restructuring of the Italian political system is yet to come.     

∗The Senate,Small Parties and the Balance of Power

The recent change to the number of senators to be elected from each state will alter the quota for election of senators in a way which will have the consequence of making it harder for minor party and independent candidates to secure representation in the Senate. This, in turn, will have the effect of reducing the likelihood that minor party and independent senators will hold the balance of power in the Senate with a consequent decline in the ability of the chamber to continue to make the major contribution to the governmental process at the national level that it has done in recent times. This proposition is examined first in terms of the logic of the quota system of proportional representation given various patterns of voting support for large and small parties, and secondly in terms of the performance of minor party and independent candidates in Senate elections since 1949.     

A Right-of-Centre Triumph: The 2004 Australian Half-Senate Election

The Australian Senate is a significant part of the Australian parliamentary system and the electoral contest for the Senate results in representational outcomes that will influence the way the Senate will perform. This paper argues that the 2004 half-Senate election result was significant because it resulted in the Liberal–National Coalition obtaining a majority in the upper house. It accounts for this outcome by examining the contest by way of inter- and intra-party bloc contests. It finds that a particularly strong Right-of-Centre performance in Queensland, to which voters voting for Ms Pauline Hanson made a major contribution, delivered the Senate majority to the Howard government. The significance of the result also lies in the way it confounded previously held views that the combination of proportional representation used for the Senate with the need to elect six senators from each State would make it unlikely for either Labor or the Liberal and National Parties to ever win an upper house majority in the future.     

Can the Australian Greens Replace the Australian Democrats as a ‘Third Party’ in the Senate?

In this article I discuss the likelihood of the Australian Greens being able to develop into a party that plays an equivalent ‘third party’ role in the Senate similar to that played by the Australian Democrats for most of their existence. My conclusion, based on attitudes underlying voting behaviour, is that they cannot afford to behave contrary to their position as part of a left-wing bloc without jeopardising a substantial part of their voter base.     

Staffing the Front Lines of the Culture War: Constituency Religious Effects on Assignment to the Senate Judiciary Committee

Previous research has debated the presence of a culture war in American politics and the relationship to party polarization, but it has largely missed the connections between the public and institutional actors. I analyze a conspicuous context for the institutional manifestation of culture war politics, the Senate Judiciary Committee. I hypothesize a conditional constituency connection between conservative Christians and committee membership. I find consistent evidence that the percentage of conservative Christian constituents, when interacted with party, affects Judiciary Committee assignment, especially since 1980. This effect remains in the presence of institutional, constituent, and personal controls. These findings lend support for the particularized effects of culture war politics and shed insight into the dynamics of partisan polarization.     

Attitudes Towards Divided Government and Ticket-splitting in Australia and the United States

Divided party government has become a frequent occurrence in both the United States and Australia in recent years. In the United States, Morris Fiorina has argued that this result is intentional on the part of the voters, who do not fully trust either party to govern by itself. We test this theory in both the United States and Australia by comparing the voting patterns of those who prefer divided versus united party government. It is hypothesised that Fiorina's theory will actually work better in Australia than in the United States, due to the presence of a strong party system as well as a voting system for the Australian Senate that facilitates strategic voting on behalf of small parties. Indeed, near-identical logistic regression models demonstrate that Australians' attitudes about divided government are a very significant predictor of straight-ticket voting even when a host of other factors is controlled for, whereas in the United States such attitudes are insignificant.     

Congress,Health Care Reform,and Reconciliation

This article explores the role of reconciliation in the passage of health care reform in the 111th Congress. Although counterintuitive, the analysis suggests that the loss of a filibuster-proof super-majority with the election of Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) aided Democrats in clearing the overhaul package by facilitating the use of reconciliation. Reconciliation provided the critical procedural mechanism enabling health care reform to be enacted into law. Despite reconciliation's importance, substantively the reconciliation “fixes” were relatively modest amendments. Moreover, notwithstanding the use of reconciliation, Congress passed the health care legislation with largely conventional means—separate health care reform measures cleared the House and Senate in 2009, in 2010 the House approved the Senate bill, and then both chambers quickly passed the reconciliation addendum. This research draws on discussions I had with over a dozen key actors after health care reform passed.     

Alberta’s Great Experiment in Senatorial Democracy

In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the unelected nature of the Senate is an inherent feature of Canadian parliamentary democracy and is a central pillar of the constitution. Members of the Upper House are appointed by the Governor General, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The decision taken by the Prime Minister is not subject to review by Parliament or the provincial legislative assemblies. Patronage appointments have given the Senate a reputation as a dumping ground for political friends and party insiders. In 1989, the province of Alberta enacted the Senatorial Selection Act, arguing that it would serve as a stepping stone for substantive reform to the Senate. The province has held four elections in which the people of the province have chosen senators-in-waiting. This article argues that the Court’s opinion in Reference re Senate Reform undermines the foundation upon which the provincial statute rests.     

(Re)assessing Parliamentary Policy Impact: The Case of the Australian Senate

A recent article in this Journal suggested that assumptions about the legislative influence of the Australian Senate may overstate its de facto power. Stanley Bach indicated that compromise with the Senate was relatively rare, and pointed out that most successful Senate amendments were government amendments. This paper provides an alternative view. We suggest that legislative influence is more subtle than Bach acknowledged, and that it is necessary to dig deeper in the data to fully understand the Senate's role. We therefore supplement his analysis in two ways: (1) through tracking the ultimate outcome of government defeats in the Senate; and (2) through analysis of two case study bills. We find that in confrontations with government the Senate ‘wins’ the great majority of the time. This shapes government behaviour in the chamber, such that many government amendments actually respond to non-government concerns. The most important element of Senate influence is therefore ‘soft power’– exercised through negotiation – backed up only in extremis by the ‘hard power’ of government defeat. This holds important lessons for the study of legislative influence more broadly, as well as demonstrating the true power of the Australian Senate.     

The Mandate and Responsible Government

This paper discusses mandate doctrine against the background of both recent empirical research and controversy surrounding the term in Australia. It defends the concept as a normative term which belongs with the responsible party model and consent theory. It further concludes that the Democrats' claim to enjoy a mandate equal to that of the coalition government is not justified from the perspective of responsible government. However, Senator Kernot's position marks another step in the constitutional evolution of the Senate. Final judgment on the meaning of mandate depends on what kind of polity emerges.     

Sources of electoral support for the Australian democrats in the house of representatives and Senate elections of 1990 and 1993: A comparative analysis

Election to the Australian Senate under proportional voting and statewide quotas gives to minor parties of the political centre a chance to win parliamentary representation otherwise denied them in the single member constituency‐based House of Representatives. Focusing on the Australian Democrats, vote splitting in the context of ? consistently higher levels of support for the Democrats in the upper house provides some evidence of differences among sources of electoral support between House and Senate, but within a context of general similarity of voter behaviour. Findings support a view that, as a party of ‘concerns’ rather than ideology, with a highly unstable support base, the future of the Democrats as other than a focus for protest must remain in doubt.     

Sentimental Science: Recent Essays on the Politics of Presidential Selection

Most studies of Senate elections have used aggregate data to examine the sources of electoral success. These studies have shown that incumbency, challenger quality, and candidate spending are important sources of electoral outcomes. Yet research also suggests that issues matter in Senate elections. In this study, we show that the abortion issue was an important source of vote choice in some of the 1990 Senate elections.