‘Postponing the Evil Day’: Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Sir Edward Grey is remembered largely as Britain's Foreign Secretary when ‘the lights went out all over Europe’ in the summer of 1914. His record remains contested. From David Lloyd George's crafty deception in his wartime memoirs to more recent revisionist historians, writers have sought to blame Grey for the outbreak of the First World War. Drawing on substantial research in private and official, British, and foreign archives, this paper will reconstruct Grey's career as Foreign Secretary with an emphasis on his objectives and the means which he employed to obtain them. Crucially, it places Grey's stewardship of British foreign policy within the broader international context, defined by the steep decline and subsequent renaissance of Russian power in the years between 1905 and 1912/13, with the aim of establishing the limitations of British power. More especially the shift in the international balance around 1913/14 shaped towards Russia, and away from Germany, shaped Grey's calculations during Europe's last summer. The July Crisis showed both the strengths and the limitations of Grey's diplomacy, this persistent and subtle pressing for mediation, but also his misreading of Austro-Hungarian policy.     

Grey and the Russian Threat to India, 1892–1915

ABSTRACT

As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Liberal Government from August 1892 to June 1895, Sir Edward Grey was exposed to the damage that an anti-British, Franco-Russian Alliance could do to the interests of the British Empire. The experience of those years left an enduring impression upon him. Between June 1895 and December 1905 Grey espoused the cause of agreement with the Russian Empire wherever possible. As Foreign Secretary, he advanced this cause through the Anglo-Russian Conventions of August 1907, whose objectives were to achieve what he described as ‘repose’ on the North West Frontier of India, and the reduction of Russian pressure on Persia in particular. So far as the outbreak of war in 1914 is concerned, Grey's known propensity to maintain good terms with Russia gave the latter a degree of leverage which they exploited to the full in insisting on British support in standing up to Germany and Austria-Hungary following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Grey's position within the Liberal Government, and his clear determination to resign unless Russian demands were met, swung the British government from a neutralist stance to one of full participation in the Great War.     

Sir Edward Grey,France, and the Entente: How to Catch the Perfect Angler?

ABSTRACT

This article will focus on the nine-year relationship between British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador at London Paul Cambon, principally during the years 1912 to 1914. It will show how the French perceived Sir Edward Grey himself, his foreign policy, and his understanding of the Entente. It will analyse the means by which Cambon in particular, and through him the French in general, sought to coax from the Foreign Secretary some form of Franco-British alliance. It will do so by analysing three things: first, what Paul Cambon hoped to obtain from Sir Edward Grey and how; second, the Anglo-German Haldane Mission in which Grey's manoeuvring got the better of Cambon; and third, the Grey-Cambon letters of November 1912, when Cambon got the better of Grey. More broadly the article might be seen as an example of how ambassadors seek to secure policies from the country to which they are accredited and how foreign ministers attempt to parry them.     

Sir Edward Grey and Austria-Hungary

ABSTRACT

Although in terms of their bilateral relations the ‘traditional friendship’ between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary was no mere phrase, in general political terms British policy in the last decade before the War was characterised by Grey's determination to cultivate the ententes with France and Russia and to do nothing to upset that division of Europe into two balancing groups (with Austria-Hungary firmly in the German camp) which he saw as the best guarantee of peace. Even though the Austrians gradually recovered from the shock of the Bosnian Crisis, in which Grey had come forward against them as Russia's chief supporter, and though the British for their part came to see in Austria-Hungary a useful element of stability in the Near East, Grey's attempts to uphold the unity of the Concert in the Balkan Wars were in the end vitiated by his overriding concern to avoid offending his Entente partners. Indeed, as the crisis deepened in the last year of peace, he took refuge in an increasingly abstentionist attitude, the objective effect of which - and herein, it is here argued, lies Grey's responsibility - was to intensify Vienna's desperation and loss of faith in the Concert that soon proved fatal to peace.     

Sir Edward Grey: The Private Life of a Foreign Secretary

ABSTRACT

This article examines the private life of Sir Edward Grey in order to explore some of the contradictions in Grey's character that continue to interest biographers and academics: he was apparently without ambition yet he pursued a successful political career; he longed to live his life in the country but spent much of it working in London; he was a man whose reputation was built on honesty and integrity but recent studies hint at extra-marital affairs and illegitimate children. It shows that Grey had an aptitude for public life and a desire to satisfy a sense of public duty but was reluctant to become defined by it, having other passions as countryman and naturalist. But the balance in his life between work and leisure became increasingly strained due to the pressures of a ministerial career and the changing nature of politics. It also finds that Grey's personal life was not without colour, even if not all the infidelities attributed to him seem credible. In addition the article contributes to the debate over whether Sir Edward Grey was an ‘ambitious political operator’ or a ‘gentleman amateur’.     

The Field Artillery Revolution and the European Military Balance, 1890–1914

ABSTRACT

This article centres on the introduction of the French 75mm light field gun, and its impact on the European military balance in the two decades before the First World War. It argues that the 75mm (and particularly its new recoil-absorption mechanism) dramatically accelerated the rate of fire and gave France a major military advantage over Germany between c. 1899 and 1906. Subsequently the application of the new technology to howitzers and heavy artillery enabled Germany to redress the balance. On the eve of war, however, Germany's leaders feared a new round of French and Russian emulation, and this fear influenced their policy in the July 1914 crisis. The article also examines the failure to forestall the quick-firing revolution at the First Hague Peace Conference; the new technology's role in the First Moroccan Crisis; its dissemination across Europe and the Franco-German competition to amass reserves of shells.     

A comparative survey of the economic decline of Empires

Abstract

On 15 December 1965 Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom (UK) because of Harold Wilson's policy towards Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Although Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere took this course of action to comply with a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, he made the support for Rhodesian independence a central pillar of Tanzania's nation-building project. Since 1967 human dignity, African liberation and opposition to racialism and colonialism became central tenets of both Tanzania's foreign policy as well as the Ujamaa socialist policy implemented internally by its government. The loss of a British £ 7.5 million loan notwithstanding, Tanzania's unyielding criticism of British policy towards UDI strengthened Nyerere's national and international legitimacy and reinforced the Tanganyika African National Union's hegemony over the national political space. Relations between Tanzania and the UK were finally restored in July 1968, after the other African governments had re-established them. Nyerere felt sure that this policy reversal would not put at risk his government's political legitimacy.     

Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview: Uncovering the Roots of Nehruvian Non-Alignment

ABSTRACT

Scholarship on Nehruvian non-alignment often assumes an artificial continuity between Jawaharlal Nehru's pre-independence thinking and post-independence decision, as India's prime minister, to pursue a policy of rejecting any international blocs or military alliances. This article demonstrates that, in fact, the ideas that constituted Nehruvian non-alignment were largely absent from Nehru's pre-independence thought – during the decades before India's independence Nehru articulated a strong willingness to cede India's sovereignty to international groupings for idealistic aims. To explain Nehru's shift from idealistic internationalist to professed internationalist but de facto isolationist with regard to alliances and blocs, I advocate a first-image, constructivist approach which considers the impact of collective trauma on Nehru's worldview. Drawing upon a novel, synthesized approach to theorizing collective trauma's impact on national identity, this article argues that the collective trauma Nehru witnessed and experienced during the decades before Indian independence profoundly impacted his trust in international institutions and views on representational diplomacy. In turn, this trauma affected his interpretation of various ideational and strategic considerations, contributing to the formulation of Nehruvian non-alignment.     

Neville Chamberlain and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–9

Neville Chamberlain's role in the Spanish Civil War is a neglected subject in the history of the conflict. Yet he wielded considerable influence over Britain's Spanish policy. Like most Conservatives, his ideological sympathies lay more with the Nationalist forces led by General Francisco Franco than the besieged Republicans. At the same time, he deplored the intervention of Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia and was strongly committed to the policy of non-intervention, which he genuinely believed had confined the Spanish conflict and prevented its escalation into a European conflagration. He was strongly opposed to granting belligerent rights to Franco unless foreign volunteers were withdrawn from Spain. He deplored the bombing of civilians in Spain, sought to help the many refugees caused by the war, and tried unsuccessfully on occasions to mediate an end to the conflict. The civil war was a considerable obstacle which threatened to undermine Chamberlain's appeasement of Fascist Italy, intended to weaken the Rome–Berlin Axis, and to constrain Germany in pursuit of general European appeasement. The Prime Minister's commitment to non-intervention in Spain, more the creation of the Foreign Office than his own, did no serious damage to British economic and strategic interests before June 1940.     

British Diplomatic Attitudes towards Europe, 1801–4Ignorant and Indifferent?

Recent decades have seen a rehabilitation of the reputation of Henry Addington's and Lord Hawkesbury's foreign policy during the course of the former's government, 1801–4. Nevertheless, the existing historiography has done little to place their actions in the wider context of British foreign policy in the early nineteenth century, nor to assess them in light of the debate around the arguments of Paul W. Schroeder's systemic theories and his attacks on eighteenth-century balance-of-power politics. This article argues that Schroeder's theories need qualifying in relation to this period and shall demonstrate that Addington and Hawkesbury conducted a logical, consistent, and Euro-centric balance-of-power policy, and one rooted in rules and assumptions governing their conduct, rather than a pell-mell free-for-all diplomatic system. It furthermore raises questions as to the continuity in British foreign policy and the need for additional research in this area.     

The neo-developmental cultural industries policy of Korea: rationales and implications of an eclectic policy

ABSTRACT

This article undertakes an explanatory case study of the South Korean cultural industries policy shift instituted under the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun governments (1998–2008). This shift can be well positioned within the broader context of the creative turn in national cultural policy around the world, which was initiated by the British New Labour governments (1997–2010). Despite the similarities in the driving discourses and policy methods, the Korean policy shift was significantly distinguished from its British counterpart because of the differing pace and trajectories of industrialisation in the two countries. Adopting the concept of the East Asian developmental state as an entry point, this article explores how and why South Korea went through a cultural industries policy shift in the period following the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and, additionally, examines what kinds of changes the policy shift brought about. Understanding the rationales and implications of this neo-developmental transformation can provide a unique opportunity to re-think the fashionable creative industries policies among various nations.     

The “tribal spirit” in modern Britain: evolution,nationality, and race in the anthropology of Sir Arthur Keith

ABSTRACT

This article re-examines the anthropological scholarship of Sir Arthur Keith (1866–1955), who served as the president of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1914–1917), the Royal Anatomical Society (1918), and the British Association of the Advancement of Science (1927), who wrote prolifically on anatomy, evolution, and the idea of race. While most commonly associated with the Piltdown man hoax, Keith's contributions to the discipline were far greater and more complex. This essay specifically considers how Keith sought to problematize the concept of the nation, considering the nation-state as an evolutionary unit. The first half of this essay examines Keith's theories on the mechanism of evolution (hormonal instincts) and how this informed his ideas of races and nations as evolutionary units. The second half of the essay considers how Keith deployed his ideas about evolutionary instincts, with the goal of advising Britons about how an evolutionary perspective would help understand, if not resolve, modern political challenges, both international and domestic, that faced the British Empire around the time of the First World War.     

The Canadian Rebellion,the American South,and Slavery

ABSTRACT

In the past few decades, thanks in large part to the work of several historians that appears in my edited collection, Revolutions Across Borders: Jacksonian America and the Canadian Rebellion (2019), there is a growing trend to consider the Canadian Rebellion within an American historical and historiographical context. Despite this exciting new research, most studies on the Rebellion and the United States continue to focus on the northern borderland. However, the Canadian Rebellion was a significant event that gained attention all over the United States, including the American South. Similar to the North, the American South was also invested in the outcome of the Rebellion. This was due to one reason: slavery. By specifically focusing on the American South and, more importantly, its influence on American foreign policy during the period, I want to encourage historians to take a more definitive stance; that slavery—just like the Panic of 1837, the Anglo-American rapprochement of thepost-War-of-1812 period, or the fear of British retaliation—played a major role in the United States Government’s official opposition to the Rebellion.     

Sentiment vs Strategy: British Naval Policy,Imperial Defence,and the Development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14

This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet's policy of remaining strong in the Mediterranean Sea. He made some concessions to sentiment in the Dominions, but his attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for the naval defence of Britain and its empire were ultimately unsuccessful. By 1914 it was clear that the Dominions would not provide the additional warships Britain required for the Mediterranean, and on the eve of war the Admiralty was beginning to prepare an imperial naval strategy that more accurately reflected the Empire's capabilities.     

“A German Bred Revolt”: the Manchester Guardian’s perceptions of the Irish Easter Rising, 1916

ABSTRACT

At the time of the Easter Rising of 1916 Britain had been engaged in the Great War against Germany for almost two years and on a scale and intensity previously unprecedented. This broader Great War backdrop is significant when analysing the 1916 Easter Rising, as it not only influenced the events which occurred in Dublin, but also the interpretation and presentation of the political violence. Despite the Easter Rising being well-documented in secondary literature, with a resurgence accounted for by its recent centenary, the British press and its portrayals of the events of 1916 has been one aspect which has not received as much scholarly attention. By analysing key stages in the uprising’s portrayal, it can be determined that the Manchester Guardian’s utilisation of the German connection had a two-fold implication. Utilising historical precedents of German-Irish “friendship”, such as the gun-running episodes of pre-War 1914, the newspaper justified its portrayal of Germany provoking violence in Ireland to disrupt British war efforts. Additionally, for the Manchester Guardian, the Irish rebels were depicted negatively in its articles as it attempted to halt the growth of republicanism, thereby ensuring the promotion of a more “moderate” form of nationalism.     

The German Reaction to the Dreadnought Revolution

Abstract

The former Conservative and Unionist prime minister, Arthur Balfour, contributed an article in 1912 to the German magazine Nord und Süd in which he explained why the ‘English point of view’s viewed Germany with ‘deep uneasiness’s. His theme was the role of narrative in Anglo-German relations: British anxieties stemmed from the interpretation that people ‘have thought themselves obliged to place upon a series of facts, or supposed facts, each of which taken by itself might be of small moment, but which taken together can neither be lightly treated nor calmly ignored’s. The building of a large fleet, the arms race, the demands for territory, and the threats to Europe's small states, notably the Netherlands and Belgium, made an Anglo-German war appear increasingly likely. If Germany wanted to improve relations with Britain, Balfour concluded, it had to prove its love for peace by co-operating with other states. A longer narrative underlay the famous memorandum written five years earlier by the head of the western department of the foreign office, Eyre Crowe. For him, the ‘maintenance of a state of tension and antagonism between Third Powers’s had characterized German foreign policy since the time of Prince Bismarck, whose bid for colonies had been an act of ‘direct and unmistakable hostility’s to Britain. By the time Crowe put pen to paper, in January 1907, German antagonism had become a feature in the landscape of British foreign policy-makers.     

U.S. Financial Aid for Iraq Under the Engagement Policy, 1988–1990

Abstract

This article reframes our understanding of the pre-Gulf War U.S. policy toward Iraq away from the issue of why the Bush administration ignored evidence that Saddam Hussein was not reciprocating U.S. efforts to moderate his behavior. Rather, it asks why the Bush administration did not consider Saddam’s abuse of U.S. export credit programs as relevant for evaluating Iraqi intentions and the efficacy of the engagement policy. It traces debates among federal agencies about two export credit programs to show that strategic considerations drove decisions to preserve or suspend these programs even though Iraq’s financial behavior offered insights earlier in time about its strategic intentions. While the Bush administration intended for engagement to reward or punish Saddam depending on his behavior, my examination of export credit controversies shows that it did not establish a rationale for deciding when and how to punish Iraq for threatening or abusive behavior.     

Nevile Henderson in Constantinople,Cairo and Belgrade: the prototype appeaser?

Abstract

This article will argue that far from being an inveterate appeaser, Henderson showed in Constantinople that he could be an advocate of tough measures. And that in Cairo, contrary to his reputation, he was a Foreign Office loyalist while his superior, George Lloyd, was critical of official policy. Nevertheless, Henderson's early career does offer useful insights into why, once posted to Germany in 1937, he became an advocate of accommodation. In Yugoslavia, in particular, he showed a willingness to work with authoritarian leaders and a sympathy for them, which helped him to secure the Berlin appointment.     

Italian foreign and security policy in a state of reliability crisis?

This article focuses on Italian foreign and security policy (IFSP). It looks at three examples of the country's policy-making which reveal its poor results as a security provider, namely: Italy's tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011, its prompt reaction to the Lebanon crisis in 2006, and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic directorate, the P5+1, approaching relations with Iran in 2009. The article considers whether government action has bolstered the reliability of IFSP and also discusses the country's FSP in terms of its basic differences from that of its partners in the European Union, France, Britain and Germany, envisaging how Italy could react to build more credibility. Italy's policy is observed through a three-pronged analytical framework enriched by concepts of the logic of expected consequences. The article concludes that IFSP is predictable, but it must still reveal that it is reliable, and explains why this is the case.