A Review of “Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency,the Supreme Court,and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History”

In 1974 David Mayhew proposed that incumbency was increasingly important in deciding elections to the House of Representatives. One cause of this increase, he speculated, might be more effective use of the resources of office by incumbents bent on improving their electoral position. These suggestions heavily influenced subsequent research on congressional elections, and helped shape the design of the 1978 national election survey by Michigan's Center for Political Studies. This essay surveys that line of research, except for the recent articles making use of the 1978 data or dealing specifically with campaigning, which will be treated in a sequel. Full length books, articles before Mayhew's, and unpublished papers are excluded, except for certain works of particular relevance.     

Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.