The Marginality Hypothesis and Supreme Court Confirmation Votes in the Senate

Studies of Supreme Court confirmations have found that a senator's vote is primarily determined by his or her ideological proximity to a nominee and that nominee's objective qualifications. This literature does not account for the extent to which a senator's electoral safety may enhance or mitigate the effects of ideology or qualifications. We argue that senators from less competitive states are more likely to eschew a nominee's qualifications in favor of their own ideological preferences. By analyzing roll call data on confirmation votes from Byron White to Elena Kagan, we support this argument and add an intriguing new piece to the puzzle underlying the changing dynamics of Senate confirmation voting.     

Does Money Buy Congressional Love? Individual Donors and Legislative Voting

Despite the popular belief that campaign contributions affect policymaking, study after study has suggested that legislative voting is unaffected. We reexamine this question by focusing on the increased dominance of individual contributors. Using data on roll calls associated with the Congressional Cooperative Election Study, we test for senators’ responsiveness to their parties’ national donor class. Several findings emerge. First, responsiveness to national donor opinion is significant, even controlling for the effects of in-state constituents, affluent citizens, activists, senator ideology, and a senator’s personal donors. Moreover, the results hold in specifications that account for the endogeneity of national donor opinion to legislative votes. Second, and consistent with scholarship that argues fundraising is increasingly important for party leadership positions, the relationship depends on the ideological favorability of a state to a senator’s reelection. Also consistent with this perspective, responsiveness to donors is unrelated to a senator’s wealth, time to reelection, or seniority.     

Setting the Table: Majority Party Effects in the United States Senate

This article joins the growing tide of research that studies party effects in the United States Senate. Previous work has shown that certain procedural tools disproportionately advantage the majority party at the expense of the minority. We build on this research by exploiting a new dataset that allows us to study motions to table amendments from the 91st to the 111th Congress. By examining the success of these motions, analyzing the voting calculus of individual senators on procedural and substantive votes, and simulating the aggregate impact of this tool, we provide some of the strongest evidence to date that political parties (and the majority party in particular) influence the legislative process and policy outcomes in the Senate. Our findings stand in stark contrast to the traditional vision of the Senate as an individualistic body.     

Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.     

国外政党意识形态观述论

政党的意识形态观是政党对意识形态所持的态度和看法,它通过政党对意识形态的地位和作用、意识形态与实践的关系、意识形态与民众利益诉求的关系所持的态度和看法得以体现。从这些方面对国外政党的意识形态观进行综合性考察,就能得出关于政党意识形态观的一般性规律。     

When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use Committee Assignments as Rewards?

Theories of parties in Congress contend that one tool that party leaders possess to induce loyalty among rank-and-file members is control over committee assignments, but conventional tests of this linkage have failed to distinguish loyalty from simply voting one's preferences in accordance with party leaders. We characterize loyal legislators as having a higher propensity for voting with party leaders when it matters, even when their preferences diverge from the mainstream of their party. Testing this strong definition of loyalty on committee assignment data for 1991–2015, we show that majority party members who support their party on the subset of votes for which party leaders have taken positions in floor speeches are more likely to be rewarded with plum committee assignments, especially those members on the ideological extremes.     

∗The Senate,Small Parties and the Balance of Power

The recent change to the number of senators to be elected from each state will alter the quota for election of senators in a way which will have the consequence of making it harder for minor party and independent candidates to secure representation in the Senate. This, in turn, will have the effect of reducing the likelihood that minor party and independent senators will hold the balance of power in the Senate with a consequent decline in the ability of the chamber to continue to make the major contribution to the governmental process at the national level that it has done in recent times. This proposition is examined first in terms of the logic of the quota system of proportional representation given various patterns of voting support for large and small parties, and secondly in terms of the performance of minor party and independent candidates in Senate elections since 1949.     

Governed by Experience: Political Careers and Party Loyalty in the Senate

In this article, we study the U.S. Senate to understand how legislators' previous experiences in elected office influence their political behavior. We posit that, as a result of their experiences in office, former governors in the Senate are less partisan than their colleagues. We code the political jobs held by senators between 1983 and 2015 and analyze the effects of these careers on party loyalty in Senate floor votes. We find that gubernatorial service is associated with a 7–8% decrease in Party Unity. We test several hypotheses for the observed “governor effect” and find that, relative to their colleagues, former governors are supported by donor networks that are less ideologically extreme. We conclude that the unique experiences associated with serving as governor, along with the personalized nature of governors' electoral support coalitions, affect a senator's relationship with the party. Ultimately, our analysis illuminates how personal attributes, such as prior experience in elected office, can inform the study of legislative behavior.     

论英国新马克思主义学派的福利观

作为英国在福利思想方面的一个重要流派,新马克思主义学派对20世纪英国国家福利的产生和发展、战后国家性质的变化、国家权威的来源、国家与政府的关系、国家福利的功能和目的等问题作了较系统的分析,为战后英国福利国家的发展奠定了一定的理论基础。该学派基于马克思对资本主义国家的分析,在福利思想方面又分为体系决定论和相对自治论。相比较而言,相对自治论更符合战后英国政治、经济和社会发展的现实。     

After Cloture: Vote Switching,Credit Claiming,and Position Taking in the United States Senate

Vote switching in the United States Senate is not an uncommon occurrence. Nearly one in 10 cloture-final passage vote pairs involves senators switching their vote. We find that this inconsistency in voting behavior is a result of the combination of electoral pressures and the impact of the traceability of consequences in light of party forces and personal preferences. In general, we find that electorally vulnerable members of the majority party are more likely to engage in vote switching. The same is true of more electorally secure members of the minority party. However, the traceability of consequences is also a governing force in that electorally vulnerable members of the majority party are more likely to use vote switching as a credit claiming opportunity during periods of low media scrutiny. Electorally vulnerable members of the minority party are more likely to engage in position taking when there is greater media scrutiny.     

The Effects of Beneficiary Targeting on Public Support for Social Policies

We assess the tendency for the public to use group‐centric policy evaluations with evidence from a survey experiment concerning two issues within the social policy domain, health care and aid to cities. By randomly varying target group identity within each issue and using both negatively and positively regarded groups our evidence shows that differences exist in the tendency for members of the public to use group‐centric heuristics. Group‐centric evaluations are related to party identification and political ideology. Across both issues conservatives and Republicans are more likely than liberals or Democrats to adopt a group‐centric heuristic. Partisan and ideological differences suggest that established theories miss the mark by emphasizing how universal policy designs are preferred to designs that target unpopular groups.     

Roll Call Votes on Cabinet Confirmations

Studies of cabinet nominations by the Senate have focused on the process and the outcomes of cabinet confirmation votes in the Senate, while the individual votes of senators have received little attention. This study examines roll call votes on all cabinet nominations since 1969 in an effort to explore the effects political and personal factors have on senators' votes on cabinet confirmations. Three basic conclusions emerge: the most significant influences on senators' confirmation votes are personal factors, especially perceptions of the nominee being a policy extremist; negatives matter more than positives; and there are partisan differences, as presidential party senators have a higher probability of voting to confirm when allegations of wrongdoing are made.     

'We are faced everywhere with a growing population': demographic change and the British state, 1955-64

The early 1960s was a period of relative expansion for the welfare state, and the return to the use of planning techniques in macroeconomic policy. This has hitherto been explained by reference to a number of general causes. These have included party political electoral necessity, the need to gain popular support for the cold war by spreading the benefits of liberal capitalism, the power of welfare professionals, the growing realization that the post-war welfare state was not working as well as previously thought, and generational changes in politics and the civil service. Whilst not denying the importance of all these factors, this essay seeks to make clear the importance of another vital element in this story: the implications for the welfare state and the managed economy of the rise in the birth rate, and the perceived' population explosion', of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Statistical estimates are presented here that show just how large the implied expansion of the welfare state, and just how serious the pressure of a growing dependent population, would have been had the population predictions of the early 1930s proved to be accurate.     

Do electoral district size and diversity affect legislative behaviour?

This paper analyses how the size and socio-economic diversity of their electorate affect parliamentarians’ legislative behaviour. We study the Australian senate, which wields considerable legislative influence and is marked by large differences in the size and socio-economic makeup of the districts that senators represent. We demonstrate that as the size of their district increases, senators ask more questions and introduce more bills and amendments. By contrast, senators become less active as the diversity of their electoral district increases. The paper thus establishes that size and diversity of electorates have significant effects on legislative behaviour.     

WOMEN'S WORK: A CASE STUDY OF PROLETARIANIZATION OF PERI-URBAN VILLAGERS IN VANUATU

This study focuses on peri-urban women in Vanuatu from 1972 to 1983 in order to measure the impact of a greater participation of women in the labour market, an increase in the number of consensual unions in the village, and the changing pattern of female migration. Not unexpectedly, these result in a loosening of ties between some villagers and village land. What matters even more is that such a loss of land rights endangers the ideological reproduction of this hybrid sociological form in Melanesia. In effect, peri-urban villagers walk an ideological tightrope. What remains of their subsistence economy generates a corporate ideology under the form of discourses on the virtue of communality, and this is what distinguishes and preserves the village social field from that of the town. A loss of land rights may well lead to a questioning of communality and a realization of the hegemonic nature of the ideology of social undifferentiation.     

Welfare Convergence,Bureaucracy, and Moral Distancing at the Food Bank

This paper seeks to extend geographic thinking on the changing constitution of the UK welfare state, suggesting the need to supplement ideas of the “shadow state” with an analysis of the blurring of the bureaucratic practices through which welfare is now delivered by public, private and third sector providers alike. Focusing on the growing convergence of the bureaucratic practices of benefits officials and food bank organisations, we interrogate the production of moral distance that characterise both. We reveal the ideological values embedded in voucher and referral systems used by many food banks, and the ways in which these systems further stigmatise and exclude people in need of support. Contrasting these practices with those of a variety of “ethical insurgents”, we suggest that food banks are sites of both the further cementing and of challenge to the injustices of Britain's new welfare apparatus.     

The Multiple Roots of Party Loyalty: Explaining Republican Dissent in the U.S. House of Representatives

Why does any member of Congress choose to be loyal to one's party? The conventional wisdom is that party loyalty stems from constituent expectations, electoral concerns, or a lawmaker's ideological beliefs. However, this neglects two other, less-instrumental reasons for sticking with a political party: partisan identity and personal connections with party leaders. I test these alternative theories as well as conventional ones on a set of key moments in the 113th Congress (2013–2014) when rebellion against House Republican leadership by the rank-and-file was especially noteworthy. The results provide some support for both the party identity and personal connection hypotheses. They also indicate that although constituency characteristics help predict the likelihood of dissent from GOP leaders, there is little evidence for the electoral hypothesis, while cross-cutting ideological preferences as well as preferences along the traditional left-right spectrum prove statistically significant. In short, evidence reveals both personal and instrumental roots of party loyalty in Congress.     

No Hammock for the Idle: The Conservative Party, 'Youth' and the Welfare State in the 1960s

The postwar ‘baby boom’ focused unprecedented attentionon young people in Britain and made ‘youth’ a newand increasingly worrying category of both social and politicalidentity. Belief in the uniqueness of postwar youth was widelyshared among political parties but it caused particular anxietyfor the Conservatives who feared that young people in the 1960swere shaped by values that predisposed them to socialism, notconservatism. This article traces the Conservative party's interactionwith ‘youth’ through an examination of the policy-makingefforts of the Young Conservatives (YCs) organization. Afterthe 1959 election, the Conservative party was anxious to retainthe support of younger voters and saw the YCs as a vehicle topublicize its commitment to them. Departing from the YCs’long-standing emphasis on social activities, the party establisheda Policy Group Scheme to integrate younger members into policy-makingand encourage a ‘youth’ perspective on key policyareas such as the welfare state. However, in 1966, the PolicyGroup Scheme ended as it became clear that young people's loyaltyto the main party was not conditional upon participation inpolicy-making and the YCs’ model of postwar conservatismdiffered very little from that of older Conservatives. Thisanalysis of grassroots discussion of the welfare state thusestablishes the limits of a distinctive ‘youth’perspective on major issues in modern conservatism such as individualfreedom and the role of the state, and contributes to recentdiscussions of the role of age and demographic structure inpostwar Britain.     

Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate

Obstruction is a fundamental aspect of legislative politics. In the United States Congress, senators exercise procedural prerogatives to defeat a bill with which they disagree on policy grounds. We argue that senators also utilize obstructive tactics in order to do more than block legislation with which they disagree. We claim that legislators engage in “weak” (as opposed to strong) obstruction in an effort to accrue political benefits to themselves and their constituents, but only when senators support the underlying policy the bill addresses. We test our theory by measuring the frequency with which senators engage in weak obstruction on bills that passed the Senate between 1973 and 2013. We find that senators are significantly more likely to engage in weakly obstructive behavior when they stand to benefit politically.     

Ideological Primary Competition and Congressional Behavior

Abstract

Primary challenges on an incumbent’s more extreme flank have become increasingly common in congressional elections. We explore the consequences on the legislative behavior of successful incumbents following these types of challenges. We propose that the effect of extreme ideological primary challenges is conditioned on whether the member belongs to the majority or the minority party. We test our expectations on primary elections from 2000 to 2012 and corresponding changes in voting behavior in the next Congress. We find that incumbents in the majority party who have defeated an extreme ideological primary challenge are less likely to support their party, especially on key votes. We expect this reaction is because they fear appearing too moderate and thereby encouraging another extreme ideological primary challenge. We find that incumbents in the minority party who face an extreme ideological challenge do not change their general voting behavior, but are more likely to vote with their party on key votes.