Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations,Philippine Independence,and the Containment of Japan, 1932–1937

The declaration in 1932 of the United States to allow Philippine independence in March 1934 was an act that had a number of unintended consequences for the stability of the Far Eastern balance of power system. Given the state of tension existing in the international system between the major actors in the region: Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, any movement in the existing boundaries of the international spheres of influence between them could generate a significant destabilizing reaction. The American proposal to allow Philippine independence was such an act. If America surrendered its position and interests in the Philippines, who would replace it? What would happen if it was not replaced? Was it realistic, given the nature of the international competition for resources and strategic position, all linked to the creation and use of maritime power, that the Philippines could exist ‘on its own..’. This essay will analyse how the United States and Great Britain dealt with this instability, as well as how those interactions allowed a closer and more harmonious Anglo-American informal strategic relationship to be developed. That relationship would thereafter evolve into a collaborative alliance aimed at deterring further Japanese expansion.     

Anglo-American Relations and a Dilemma of Diplomatic Recognition: Royalists,Republicans and Crisis in the Yemen, 1962–1963

Abstract

This article investigates Anglo-American handling of their bilateral relations regarding whether to extend diplomatic recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic following a coup in 1962. Hitherto this issue has been cast largely within a narrative of relative British decline and/or deepening malaise in the special relationship. This article develops two principal counterarguments. First, the British viewed the crisis as a challenge to their intent to stay in, not retreat from, the Persian Gulf – which the Americans welcomed. Second, the special relationship worked relatively effectively. London and Washington made policy concessions in the interests of their cooperation in Yemen and the wider southern Arabian Peninsula. Bilateral policy friction was largely contained and negotiated within lower echelons of the British and American governments; Kennedy and Macmillan managed their exchanges amicably throughout.     

‘A Puppet,Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So’: Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement

This article demonstrates that US beliefs concerning racial identity guided the Eisenhower administration's encounter with Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Arab nationalism during the 1950s. It establishes that US texts propagated certain racial-identity assumptions about Arab peoples. The most important of these included the assertions that Arab peoples were irrational and easily manipulated or deceived. Policy-makers utilised these beliefs to explain and contextualise Arab actions, especially those of Egypt and its Arab nationalist government. Officials within the Eisenhower administration believed that Arab irrationality prompted Egyptian leaders to adopt a neutralist position in the cold war. The assumption that Arabs were susceptible to deception and manipulation convinced policy-makers that this position was unacceptable. The Soviets would ultimately, they believed, prey upon Arab manipulability and subjugate Egypt, the Arab nationalist movement, and the entire Middle East. These concerns made the Eisenhower administration's decision to contain Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Arab nationalist movement seem logical and necessary.     

The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933–59: Precursors of the Tri-sector Commonwealth

One of the unique features of the Commonwealth as an international association is the width and depth of its non-political manifestations. At recent Commonwealth conferences political and official consultations have been held in parallel with large civil society, business and youth forums and, in some cases, inter-faith dialogues. Growing collaboration between the political, civil society and business elements gives rise to the notion of the ‘tri-sector Commonwealth’. The concept of an ‘association of peoples’ as well as one of nations, does, however, have a long pedigree. Between 1933 and 1959 a series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, organised by Chatham House and its overseas affiliates, were held at roughly five-yearly intervals to analyse the implications of the most recent Imperial Conferences. Politicians and civil servants joined with lawyers, academics, editors, military men, agriculturalists and trade unionists. In contrast to the political Commonwealth, women had a part in the unofficial conferences. And among more than 400 participants at Toronto 1933, Lapstone 1938, London 1945, Bigwin 1949, Lahore 1954 and Palmerston North 1959 were fifty-five academic historians and other writers of history, who included most of the leading authorities on the Commonwealth of the 1930s and 1940s.     

Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?

Obama's election in 2008 as the United States’ first self-styled Pacific President drew a hearty round of ‘end of the affair’ editorials about Anglo-American relations. His first term was littered with ‘snubgates’, serious irritations in policy areas regarded as being core to the special relationship, and indications of an accelerating US departure from Europe with his premier foreign-policy strategy declared to be a pivot to Asia. His return for a second term in 2013 augers a continuation of first-term adjustments in US foreign policy and greater domestic focus given a divided Congress and a bitterly split and war-weary United States with domestic priorities to the fore. Doomsayers - or so-called terminalists - have been repeatedly gainsaid by the Lazarus-like quality of the relationship in the past but can the Anglo-American special relationship survive in the Obama environment? This article suggests it can and sets out the author's rather unfashionable argument in four parts: the weight of history; the canons of international-relations theory; the importance of considering interest and sentiment in explaining the special relationship's resilience; and a relativist argument that suggests the United States still really does have no better ally than the United Kingdom.     

A Double-Edged Sword: Anglo-American ‘Special Relations,’ 1936–1981

C.A. MACDONALD. The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936–1939. New York: St Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 220. $22.50 (US); DAVID REYNOLDS. The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xiii, 397. $28.00 (US); H.G. NICHOLAS (ed.). Washington Despatches, 1941–45: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xviii, 700. $40.00 (US); TERRY H. ANDERSON. The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 256. $18.00 (US); ROBERT M. HATHAWAY. Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 410. $25.00 (US); JOHN BAYLIS. Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1980: The Special Relationship. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. xxii, 259. $25.00 (US).