The Kosovo war in perspective

In historical perspective, the Kosovo war stands as a significant turning point. Within the Balkan region, Operation Allied Force marked the end of the nationalist wars of the 1990s and the beginning of a new phase of partnership and integration with the EU and NATO. In terms of the wider European security order, its repercussions were contradictory. NATO reasserted its role as Europe's leading security institution, yet Operation Allied Force also gave significant momentum to the EU's development as a quasi military body. Further afield, an immediate crisis erupted in Russo-western relations followed by renewed cooperation on the ground; the longer-term impact, however, was a lingering resentment in Moscow at NATO action. At the global level, meanwhile, Operation Allied Force appeared to symbolize the primacy of both American-led western power and of the liberal norms and values that underpinned the intervention. But this was arguably a high point: future global security crises would be managed in the context of the rising power of the non-western world, a more fragmented West and greater contestation over the norms that should underpin international society.     

The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications

This article offers an analysis of the EU's engagement in Georgia as a standpoint from which to assess the EU's role as a conflict manager. The article begins with a brief narrative account of the development of EU—Georgia relations in the context of the country's two unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It then proceeds to the analysis of two sets of factors—those within, and those external to, the EU—that are crucial for understanding the nature and impact of EU efforts to manage the two Georgian conflicts. On the basis of this case-study analysis, the authors offer a wider analysis of the EU's potential for assuming a wider role as an international security actor. This is undertaken by considering both the limitations of the EU's existing capabilities for conflict resolution and the new developments contained within the Lisbon Treaty. The final part of the article asserts that the EU has suffered from two key weaknesses that have prevented it from living up to its aspirations of becoming a globally significant and effective conflict manager. The first is structural—the lack of, to date, a permanent External Action Service; the second is conceptual—the lack of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy. The article concludes with five substantive principles that should guide the EU's approach to conflict management.     

From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's relations with the West

This article reviews the main developments in the Kosovo crisis in the context of relations between Russia and NATO/the West. For Moscow, Operation Allied Force constituted a flagrant breach of international law, a threat to post-Cold War European security governance and a challenge to Russia's status in the international order. Official Russian interpretations, heavily influenced by domestic politics, reflect a perception among Russia's political elite that, rather than upholding liberal democratic values, NATO's intervention constituted a selective defence of the interests of the leading western powers.
Such views have influenced Moscow's position on the thorny question of Kosovo's independence and Russia's more assertive foreign and security policy in the recent period, not least in the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008. Ultimately, Operation Allied Force resulted in the Russian governing elite reassessing its views on statehood, the international order and the norms underpinning international society.     

Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter‐Governmental Authority on Development

This article assesses the contribution that IGAD has made to regional security in the Horn of Africa since the adoption of its peace and security mandate in 1996. It describes the evolution of IGAD and its mandate in the context of regional conflict and wider African peace and security processes. It explores the local dynamics of the two major IGAD‐led peace processes, in Sudan (1993–2005) and in Somalia (2002–2004), and discusses the effectiveness of IGAD's institutional role. A consideration of the wider impact of the peace agreements highlights the way IGAD has enhanced its role by setting the agenda on peace support operations in Somalia. The article concludes that IGAD's successes are more the result of regional power politics than of its institutional strength per se. Despite the obvious need for a better regional security framework, the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict‐resolution capability will remain limited. However, IGAD brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management that locks in regional states and locks out interested parties beyond the region. With regard to Somalia, the organization has played a pivotal role in directing African and wider international responses to conflict in the region.     

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate during the early part of the twenty‐first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non‐military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate‐damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden‐sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.     

Kosovo: Cultural Heritage in Conflict

Abstract

The secession of territory represents a unique challenge in the protection of cultural heritage in conflict. The declared independence of Kosovo has considerable implications for international cultural heritage. This paper focuses on the deliberate destruction of examples of historic architecture such as De?ani Monastery and Hadum Mosque as a means of contextualizing the nature of heritage in conflict with respect to international cultural heritage law. It offers a preliminary examination of aspects of cultural heritage in conflict, particularly in regard to the secession of territory and how it applies to historic monuments. The aim of this paper is two-fold: to address the considerations of immovable cultural property within the borders of Kosovo; and to utilize the examples of Visoki De?ani Monastery and Hadum Mosque to highlight the significance of cultural property in conflict.     

Kin state non‐interventionism: Albania and regional stability in the Western Balkans

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of Albanian regional policy from 1992 to 2013. Situated in a conflict‐ridden region and surrounded by co‐ethnics living in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, Albania has successfully resisted pressure to undertake interventionist regional policies. However, there are no structured accounts as to how Albania fashioned its non‐interventionist regional policy. This article fills this gap and retraces the development of Albanian regional policy as a function of its inter‐mingled domestic politics and regional and international dynamics. The article concludes that the Albanian regional approach has been shaped by its legacy of communist isolation, pro‐Western predisposition and recognition that accommodation of Western interests would overcome its constraints and advance the rights of Albanians living in the Western Balkans. The analysis is important not just for understanding Albania's actions but also for disentangling the relationship between regional policy, nationalism and a kin state's domestic and international constraints.     

Rentier Statebuilding in a Post‐Conflict Economy: The Case of Kosovo

Kosovo has been under various forms of international administration since 1999. Although the political dimension of this international experience has been widely studied by scholars — especially those associated with the critical theory of liberal peacebuilding — the economic dimension of international rule has received less attention. This article explores the economic dimension by linking insights from rentier theory with critical approaches to liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. The postulate informing this article is that the sources of a state's income have an impact on its institutional development. The article discusses liberal peacebuilding through the lens of rentier theory, it analyses the economic management in the early years of the international administration of Kosovo, and describes and explores some of the unintended consequences of this massive international presence in Kosovo for the local economy.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women,Peace and Security agenda

The European Union is seen to operate at the international level by promoting ideas and values, rather than by exerting military or economic power. As a gender actor, the EU has played a key role in the development of formal equality, which is presented as a foundational principle of European integration. It therefore follows that normative power Europe should seek to promote these values in external affairs. This article interrogates the role of the EU as a normative gender actor in relation to its implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions. Documentary analysis will be supplemented by a detailed assessment of speeches and public statements about the role of the EU as a gender actor in external affairs. This data will be used to assess whether there is a disjuncture between the dominant narrative about gender equality as a fundamental value of the EU and the actions of the organization. It will also allow us to assess whether gender mainstreaming is a tool for public diplomacy or has made a significant change to the way the external relations agenda is formulated and implemented. Additionally, the article will draw attention to the institutional obstacles to the EU performing a role as a gender actor in external affairs. It identifies a critical tension between framing the WPS resolutions as an extension of the EU's equality on the one hand, and understanding that gender mainstreaming is a mere policy tool in international affairs. In doing so, it highlights how competing institutional demands can ultimately undermine core values (e.g. equality) when they are used instrumentally.     

A common European foreign policy after Iraq?

Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant.
A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day.     

Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?

A major public debate on the costs and benefits of the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union is presently under way. The outcome of the referendum on 23 June 2016 will be a pivotal moment in determining whether the EU has a future as a component of the UK's European diplomatic strategy or whether there is a major recalibration of how the UK relates to Europe and more widely of its role within international relations. Since accession to the European Economic Community the UK has evolved an uncodified, multipronged European diplomatic strategy. This has involved the UK seeking to reinforce its approach of shaping the security of the continent, preserving a leading diplomatic role for the UK in managing the international relations of Europe, and to maximize British trade and investment opportunities through a broadening and deepening of Europe as an economically liberal part of the global political economy. Since accession the UK's European diplomatic strategy has also been to use membership of the EU to facilitate the enhancement of its international influence, primarily as a vehicle for leveraging and amplifying broader national foreign and security policy objectives. The strategy has been consistent irrespective of which party has formed the government in the UK. Increasing domestic political difficulties with the process of European integration have now directly impacted on this European strategy with a referendum commitment. Whether a vote for a Brexit or a Bremain, the UK will be confronted with challenges for its future European strategy.     

Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten

Since its formal launch in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed at a remarkable rate. In the subsequent decade, the EU has carried out 22 ESDP military and civilian operations and become an important element of Europe's ability to respond to international crises. For all this, however, there remain grounds for concern. These relate in part to the fact that, for all the early activism of ESDP, those military missions undertaken to date have been relatively limited in size and scope. The EU has also strikingly failed to intervene in certain crises that once seemed ideally suited to an ESDP deployment. The ESDP has also to a degree failed to bring about the enhancement to European military capabilities that some had hoped would be its major achievement. More generally, there is a danger that an exclusive focus on EU security policies will serve merely to distract member states from the broader international strategic environment, with ESDP serving as an alibi for their continued failure to live up to their international security responsibilities.     

Kosovo's final status

The Ahtisaari comprehensive proposal for a settlement of the status of Kosovo met with deadlock in the UN Security Council. It would neither be endorsed nor imposed upon the parties. In view of that position, a new round of negotiations, conducted by the EU, Russia and the US, was launched over a period of 120 days. During these discussions, Serbia's President Boris Tadic revealed a significant measure of flexibility when putting forwards options for wide‐ranging self‐government for Kosovo. However, these forward‐looking positions were undermined by a less advanced proposal emanating from other parts of the Belgrade government, including the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Serbian parliament sought to preempt developments by unilaterally adopting its own constitutional amendments relating to Kosovo, further undermining the credibility of Serbia's position at the international level. However, it could be argued that had Belgrade been willing to begin the previous round of negotiations let by Martti Ahtisaari with the advanced offers it was putting at the very end of the process, a different outcome might have resulted. Such action might have put pressure on western governments to impose an advanced autonomy settlement on Kosovo, rather than putting Belgrade under pressure to accept the Ahtisaari plan. In the end, Kosovo's independence was unilateral in two senses. On the one hand, Kosovo declared independence without the benefit of agreement from Belgrade or cover from the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Kosovo unilaterally accepted the provisions emanating from the Ahtisaari talks. These concessions had been made in the expectation that agreed independence would be forthcoming in return. Belgrade was therefore able to oppose independence and work against its consolidation, while profiting from Kosovo's agreement to the plan it had rejected.     

Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace: evaluating the EU's 'catalytic' framework in the eastern Mediterranean

There has been a consistent failure on the part of international actors over the past four decades to resolve the Cyprus problem. The EU framework, heralded as a catalyst, has failed so far to bring the two sides together, despite the significant advantages it possesses in linking resolution of the Cyprus problem with the Turkish ambition to join the EU. Cyprus has always been a testing ground for experimental approaches to dealing with conflict, and what may well emerge after the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004 is a form of 'shared sovereignty' where important governance functions that remain contested are undertaken by the UN and EU Commission. Furthermore, the EU framework has led to the Cyprus problem becoming a catalyst for Turkish accession. While very controversial, these avenues offer the opportunity for the international community to accept the political and interventionary nature of the 'peace' they prescribe.     

Trade and peace: the EU and Gaddafi's final decade

This article examines the effectiveness of the EU's use of trade to induce peace in Libya during Gaddafi's final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. Indeed, this peace‐through‐trade assumption is at the heart of the EU, which was founded on the notion that economic interdependence ameliorates potential causes of conflict. Initially, this article embeds its argument in the theory concerned with the relationship between trade and peace, followed by tracking the development of the EU's policy. The main body of the article then provides evidence which goes against the assumption that the trade–peace relationship is positively correlated. Specifically, it is argued that the EU's peace‐through‐trade policy failed in this instance due to the fact that it failed to take into account the Libyan context: namely, the Middle Eastern state's ethnographic and historical makeup; the weapons of mass‐destruction programme and the subsequently induced sanctions; Gaddafi's rule and attempts at reform; as well as the 2011 conflict. All these factors amalgamated to ongoing conflict in Libya during Gaddafi's final decade in power despite EU–Libyan trade continuing to take place during this timeframe.     

Defining the relationship between Australia and the European Union: is the framework treaty enough?

Australia is currently negotiating a framework treaty with the European Union (EU) that aims at closer cooperation on a wide range of shared policy goals. The treaty is not expected to include trade-liberalisation commitments. This article queries why this is, given the importance of trade and business relations with the EU for Australia, and the fact that the EU exerts international influence primarily as a trade power, rather than a foreign and security policy power. Since 2006, the EU has also been negotiating ‘new-generation’ bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), focusing on tariffs and regulatory non-tariff trade barriers. It has now committed itself to FTA negotiations with many of Australia's trade partners in Asia and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. An FTA and a complementary framework treaty were concluded with South Korea in 2010, and the EU is currently negotiating a similar package with Canada. As Australia and Canada are comparable trade partners for the EU, the article argues that an FTA on the EU–Canada model could be a more effective avenue for Australia to achieve deeper engagement with the EU.     

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this articles. Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics. Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander. Agents, structures and international relations: politics as ontology. by Colin Wight. Harry Potter and international relations. Edited by Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann. The ethics of territorial borders: drawing lines in the shifting sand. by John Williams. The parliament of man: the United Nations and the quest for world government. by Paul Kennedy. Peace at any price: how the world failed Kosovo. by Iain King and Whit Mason. The first ten years of the WTO, 1995‐2005. by Peter Gallagher. Normalization of US‐China relations: an international history. Edited by William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross and Gong Li. Of law and war. by David Kennedy. War and the law of nations: a general history. by Stephen C. Neff. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training and root causes. Edited by James Forest. Economic justice in an unfair world: toward a level playing field. by Ethan B. Kapstein. The next great globalization: how disadvantaged nations can harness their financial systems to get rich. by Frederic S. Mishkin. Italy and Albania: financial relations in the fascist period. by Alessandro Roselli. International law and sustainable development: lessons from the law of international watercourses. by Alistair Rieu‐Clarke. From world war to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the international history of the 1940s. by David Reynolds. War and state formation in ancient China and early modern Europe. by Victoria Tin‐bor Hui. A time for peace: the legacy of the Vietnam War. by Robert D. Schulzinger. The rift between America and old Europe: the distracted eagle. by Peter H. Merkl. The geopolitics of Euro‐Atlantic integration. by Hans Mouritzen. Managing EU‐US relations: actors, institutions and the new transatlantic agenda. by Rebecca Steffenson. Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in post‐communist Europe. by Geoffrey Pridham. The year of Europe: America, Europe and the energy crisis 1972‐4. Edited by Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon. Albania as dictatorship and democracy: from isolation to the Kosovo war, 1946‐8. by Owen Pearson. I. B. Military and society in post‐Soviet Russia. Edited by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers. Russian conservatism and its critics: a study in political culture. by Richard Pipes. The Middle East in international relations: power, politics and ideology. by Fred Halliday. Constructing international relations in the Arab world. by Fred H. Lawson. The trouble with Africa: why foreign aid isn't working. by Robert Calderisi. Security dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes region. Edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala. In the line of fire: a memoir. by Pervez Musharraf. China's rise in Asia: promises and perils. by Robert G. Sutter. Making China policy: from Nixon to G. W. Bush. by Jean A. Garrison. Hungry for peace: international security, humanitarian assistance, and social change in North Korea. by Hazel Smith. How Bush rules: chronicles of a radical regime. by Sidney Blumenthal. The one percent doctrine: deep inside America's pursuit of its enemies since 9/11. by Ron Suskind.     

Europe and the new balance of global order

The European Union has become an important shaping factor in international relations, but how and under what conditions it can exercise influence and contribute constructively to global order are still not well analysed. In fact, the EU's contribution may resemble more that of a force in physics than of a great power in the traditional sense of international relations (which the EU is not, and will not become in the near future), and its influence depends probably more on what the EU represents and how well it manages its own realm, rather than on what it can do externally. In this sense, European influence in international relations presently benefits from past achievements, and may therefore have peaked if the twin challenges of enlargement and national structural deficiencies are not addressed effectively. But even if the European Union does master those challenges successfully, and thus manages to sustain and perhaps even enhance its influence as a force in international relations, it will still have to proceed cautiously and clearly focus its attempts on shaping its external environment and contributing to a ‘concrete’ or ‘civilized’ global order. In a global setting that, despite appearances to the contrary, seems characterized by a diffusion rather than a concentration of power and by strong tendencies towards entropy rather than order, the EU can and will probably not remain America's principal ally in sustaining Pax Americana. Nor does it seem likely to become an equal partner in a constructive, balanced transatlantic relationship, let alone a great power capable of challenging, perhaps together with others, America's apparent pre‐eminence. The most plausible assumption for the EU's future role in the new balance of global order is that of a ‘civilian force’ with a regional focus. It may best be able to contribute to global order by managing its own realm well, promoting the normative and institutional infrastructure for civilized international relations, not least in the sense of functioning statehood, and working towards effective multilateralism.