New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

1797-1800年美国与法国准战争探析

18世纪晚期,美国为维护海上权益与地缘安全,加剧了与英法之间的矛盾。美国在《杰伊条约》中对英国的让步,换取到美英之间十年的和睦,却导致美法关系紧张,美国与法国从同盟走向准战争状态。最终美法危机得以和平解决,但这场准战争深深影响了美国早期的内政和外交。     

从"货币战"到"有限合作"——1933-1936年美英法三国货币外交

20世纪30年代经济大萧条背景下,美英法三国的货币政策特别是汇率政策取决于各国如何权衡国内经济恢复和国际汇率稳定.1931年英镑贬值、1933年美元贬值都是美英当局把货币贬值作为刺激总需求和出口的主要手段.金本位制的崩溃和英镑、美元的相继贬值使国际金融和贸易体系处于分割和对立的状态.美国对国内经济恢复的重视、英国对自治领的义务、法国对金本位的固执导致1933年三方货币合作会谈的失败.不过,随着英美两国经济的恢复,特别是希特勒德国加紧重新武装所造成的欧洲紧张局势促使美国决策层积极推动美英法三方货币合作.从货币集团分割和竞争性贬值的"货币战"发展到1936年9月后三国在汇率政策上的"有限合作",这种关系转变不仅是美国决策层"思想进展"的结果,而且是特定国际形势的产物.因此,1936年的美英法<三方货币稳定协议>具有深刻的政治含义.