Two roads to Belgrade: the United States,Great Britain,and the first nonaligned conference

In 1961, at the height of the Berlin crisis, the United States and Great Britain simultaneously struggled to adopt effective policies toward the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade. While the John F. Kennedy administration initially adopted a policy of standoffishness toward the conference, the government of Harold Macmillan engaged in a campaign of quietly encouraging moderate attendance. Moderate British expectations led to sound policy, whereas the Kennedy administration's inability to develop a coherent outlook and response cost it a priceless opportunity to understand the emerging phenomenon of nonalignment.     

西班牙佛朗哥政府与美古间的秘密接触(1963-1967)

美国与革命后的古巴是意识形态严重对立的一对邻国。自1961年1月断交起,两国政府经常在公开场合表达对对方的敌意。但是,在双方敌意的背后却存在着美古间的秘密接触,特别是在古巴导弹危机爆发后的5年间。在此期间,真正获得美古两国政府信任、促成双方对话的是西班牙佛朗哥政府。西班牙与美古间长期维持的特殊关系,西班牙外交官高超的外交技巧,西班牙在经济腾飞后想要恢复帝国荣光的强烈心愿,是西班牙成功地充当美古中间人的重要原因。这一案例体现出前宗主国在前殖民地国家对外交往中所扮演的特殊角色。     

The Secret Policemen's Ball: the United States, Russia and the international order after 11 September

In this article, Anatol Lieven argues that the collapse of the Soviet and communist threats and the triumph of capitalism and bourgeois values gave the United States an unprecedented chance to act as a status quo hegemon, dominating the world with the consent of other major powers. The United States threw up this chance by acting instead as a 'dissatisfied' and even revolutionary power, creating a sense of menace and resentment across much of the world. After the 11 September attacks, the near-global threat of Sunni Islamist terrorism and revolution gives the United States another opportunity to rally much of the world behind it, in a kind of new 'Holy Alliance' of states against threats from below. But by mixing up the struggle against terrorism with a very different effort at preventing nuclear proliferation, and by refusing to take the interests of other states into account, the US risks missing this opportunity for a second time, and endangering itself and its closest allies such as Britain.     

New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

近十年来美英两国学术界冷战史研究述评

冷战主宰了20世纪后半期的国际政治。在后冷战时期,许多国家的学者利用新获得的档案资料来仔细考察和重新评估冷战史。自从冷战国际史项目于1991年在伍德罗.威尔逊国际学者中心建立以来,冷战国际史这一概念,已经被广为接受。根据相关英文文献,对过去十年美英两国冷战史研究新发展、新动向以及冷战史研究现状,做一总结归纳。主要涉及以下几个方面:美国的主要冷战研究中心、研究冷战的资料来源和新的研究方法、学者们关注的热点问题及最新研究成果的介绍、英国冷战研究概况等。     

Between Two Poles: The Last Two Decades of the Cold War

Raymond L. Garthoff. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan     

Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States, and the East German Uprising of 1953

Feverishly the strikers watched for signs of intervention bythe American and British occupation forces. It was beyond theircomprehension . . . that the nations of the free world withwhom they felt themselves allied, should stand idly by whilethe Soviet Union crushed the rising with its war machine. Insome places rumour had it that American tanks had crossed thezonal border, that American aircraft were to drop weapons.¹