Tourism and Cold War Diplomacy

Christopher Endy. Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France . Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 286 pp. $49.95 (cloth), $19.95 (paper).     

冷战后宗教与美国外交——动力、路线与机制

冷战后,宗教对美国外交的影响日益走向组织化、法制化和机制化,呈现出以宗教利益集团为动力、以在国会推进1998年国际宗教自由法为路线、以国务院国际宗教自由办公室和国会国际宗教自由委员会互动合作为机制的发展趋势。在此背景下,美国对华外交中也凸显宗教因素。     

冷战期间美国文化外交的演变

冷战开始后随着美苏两大阵营的对峙加剧,美国政府通过采取创建新闻署、组建和平队、成立国际交流署等手段,逐步将文化外交融入对外宣传范畴,演变为一种冷战工具,其间政治文化和领袖的国家使命感起到关键作用。这种文化外交在为美国赢得冷战的胜利发挥重要作用的同时,也使其国际信任度和软权力下降。     

经济外交与冷战史研究新视野

经济外交是认识和理解冷战历史的重要研究角度。经济外交与对外经济战略、对外经济关系、私人企业对外交往活动有着较为明显的联系与区别。对外援助是经济外交最重要的表现形式。美国相关解密外交档案的启示作用,一是帮助澄清了经济外交是美国实现冷战目标的最重要工具之一;二是冷战时期美国对第三世界国家实施的经济援助计划,是其遏制苏联大战略的有机组成部分。     

Economic Diplomacy, Alliance Politics, and the Element of Culture in the Cold War

Book reviewed:
Shu Guang Zhang. Economic Cold War: America's Economic Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance.     

Writing and Publishing the Cold War: John Berger and Seeker & Warburg

Following Christopher Lasch's early study, accounts of the ‘culturalcold war’ have become largely synonymous with the activitiesof the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The major accounts ofthe Congress have drawn on a comparatively narrow range of archivesources, personal papers, memoirs, and interviews Recent studiesof cold war broadcasting have broadened the scope of the ‘cultural’and made extensive use of previously inaccessible archive materialin Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Union This articlecontinues the process of broadening our understanding of thecultural dimensions of the cold war by focusing on the publishersSeeker & Warburg and highlighting, more generally, the opportunitiesthat publishers' archives afford for opening up new areas ofinvestigation and research on the cold war ^*I would like to thank John Berger, Mary Eagleton, Simon Gunn,Louise Jackson, and an anonymous referee for comments on anearlier version of this article I would also like to thank RandomHouse and Independent Labour Publications for permission toquote from material in the Seeker & Warburg Archive andthe ILP Archive Material from the Blair, E correspondence ispublished courtesy of the Lilly Library, Indiana University,Bloomington, IN Finally, I would like to thank Michael Bottand his colleagues at the University of Reading for their assistancein identifying relevant material in the Seeker & WarburgArchive     

Canadian Diplomacy and the 1982 Falklands War

As a case study, Canadian diplomacy during the Falklands War is emblematic of the confused, and at times contradictory, components of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's utopic and idealistic foreign policy. Canada's diplomatic actions during the war were based on four principles. The first, and most significant, was the safeguarding of what were deemed to be Canada's economic interests: chiefly nuclear exports. The second was Trudeau's ‘Third Option’ policy and the belief of ‘the vital importance of the North-South dynamic to Canada’. Third was the desire to distance Canadian foreign policy, economics, and military commitments from those of both the United States and Great Britain. Trudeau had mixed feelings about the Commonwealth and disliked both President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lastly, during the war Canadian politicians and diplomats took the position of an ambiguous neutrality to protect and promote what they perceived to be Canadian interests. Many of the political and economic decisions made by Canada during the Falklands War were met by harsh criticism nationally and internationally in both public and political spheres.     

War and Diplomacy in the Middle East

Book reviewed in this article: The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992, James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. DeFrank The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, his state and International Power Politics, Mussallam Ali Musallam     

Engineering Education in Cold War Diplomacy: India,Germany, and the Establishment of IIT Madras**

The Indian Institute of Technology Madras (IIT) was set up with assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1956 and 1974. It became the largest, and finally, a successful techno-scientific education project undertaken by the Federal Republic outside of Germany. In this paper, I argue that the engagement of the Federal Republic at IIT Madras has to be understood primarily as a project of Cold-War science and technology diplomacy, which on the German side was aimed at preventing an Indian recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign nation. In aiding the establishment of IIT Madras, the Federal Republic came into direct competition with the Soviet Union, which supported IIT Bombay but also with the United States of America, which supported IIT Kanpur. The assistance to establish IIT Madras and its governance followed mainly political guidelines, to which educational and scientific aspects were rendered subordinate. When the project was in a crisis after the first State Treaty to establish IIT Madras expired in 1963, the political flagship project of the Federal Republic was not allowed to fail. Instead, the cooperation was reorganized and support increased.