Anschluss: The Chamberlain Government and the First Test of Appeasement,February–March 1938

The union of Austria and Germany in March 1938 - the Anschluss - forced by Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany with the acquiescence of Italy was the first test of the appeasement strategy of the Neville Chamberlain government. Austro-German Anschluss did not occur unexpectedly: after Habsburg collapse in 1918, it had been desired by pan-Germans in Austria and Germany but denied by the Paris Peace Settlement; its possibility arose a couple of times in the early 1930s; and by 1937, the majority of Austrians seemed willing to unite with their Nazi neighbour. Even before Chamberlain became Premier in May 1937 and changed the strategic basis of British foreign policy, the Foreign Office and other ministries wrestled over whether to thwart Anschluss and, until 1937, worked to keep the two German-speaking Powers apart. After Chamberlain took power, the willingness to oppose abated as Hitler's pan-German solution spoke to both national self-determination and Austrian ambivalence about independence. Chamberlain's government submitted expecting that they might use the absorption of Austria as a means to divide Nazi Germany from Fascist Italy. ‘Good relations’ with the dictators existed as a cardinal element of Chamberlain's brand of appeasement.     

The future of Poland, 1914–1917: France and Great Britain in the Triple Entente

Abstract

THE POLISH QUESTION — whether, and if so how and in what form, to recreate an independent Polish state — was one of the most vexing problems that faced European diplomats during the First World War. Believing that aroused Polish patriotism could be a powerful weapon against the Central Powers, yet fearing that support for Polish national aspirations would alienate their Russian ally and fracture the Triple Entente, British and French statesmen had to decide whether they could include the recreation of Poland among their war aims without jeopardizing the Entente, and hence the chances of victory. Given their different strategic priorities, the French and the British gave different answers.     

The Importance of Status: The US–ROK Alliance Cohesion and the First Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1993–94

The US–ROK alliance during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis provides the most likely case of high alliance cohesion. Curiously, however, instead of dancing to the American tune in their joint management of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threat, the Republic of Korea (ROK) caused frequent policy collisions – supporting the US–DPRK negotiations at one point and opposing it at another – at the risk of jeopardizing its physical security. The main finding here is that the variations in the South Korean behavior were a function of their experience of status inconsistency. In particular, the ROK became compliant with the US–DPRK talks when it believed that its desired status marker of taking the leadership role in crisis management was within reach, and unyielding otherwise. These fluctuations ended up not only eroding the US–ROK alliance cohesion but also inhibiting a successful resolution of the crisis. All this bears directly on the fundamental question of whether international politics is to be understood in essentially realist terms.     

The United States,Great Britain,and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953–1954

This article examines the attitudes of US, British, and Soviet policy-makers as they planned for the forthcoming peace during the Second World War. It charts how they moved from planning a ‘peace by dictation’ of the great powers, to planning one which would be based on a model of collective security involving all members of the United Nations alliance. The latter plan would reflect both the great powers’ special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security and the stake which lesser powers had in such a venture. In addressing these historical developments the article employs two concepts familiar to International Relations scholarship, namely concert and hierarchy. It shows how the understandings which the principal post-war planners had of these concepts – and crucially of their inter-relationship - changed over time and the consequences of these changes. The article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning progressed, the attitudes of the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power–lesser power hierarchy changed radically; and secondly, that the structure and nature of today's United Nations Organisation is in significant part a consequence of these changes.     

Clarendon,Cavour, and the Intervention of Sardinia in the Crimean War, 1853–1855

The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff's wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financial director of the arms-maker Vickers, played a key role in making Zaharoff's services available to prime ministers Asquith and Lloyd George. While Zaharoff has often been portrayed as a sinister force, manipulating statesmen into pursuing his financial and political interests, the reality was the reverse. Zaharoff was a convenient tool of two prime ministers rather than a powerful political manipulator in his own right.