The Long Goodbye: British Agency in the Creation of Navies for India and Pakistan

The armed forces of India and Pakistan draw legacies from a common British imperial past. British influence persisted in the navies that emerged from independence and partition on the South Asia subcontinent. Complaints over treatment and other grievances in the colonial Royal Indian Navy underscored a major mutiny in February 1946, prior to division of warships, shore-based establishments and personnel between the two countries. The transformation into truly national navies was long and involved, buttressed by continued reliance on British professional expertise and arms transfers. While the Admiralty offered warships on the basis of association with the commonwealth and defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean, navies in India and Pakistan led by senior British officers pursued distinct agendas and force structures that more and more looked towards potential war against each other. Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, intervened often in naval matters before and after partition, encouraging Indians and Pakistanis to build up naval forces suited to national needs as well as serving British interests and imperial defence commitments during the early Cold War. Continued British presence impaired full nationalisation and the assumption of higher leadership roles by qualified indigenous naval officers in the newly independent commonwealth nations.     

An enduring influence on imperial defence and grand strategy: British perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935–1943

The Mediterranean was a vital artery of the British Empire. It was a strategic corridor, linking Britain to its Middle and Far East possessions and precious resources. Its control was a central tenet of British imperial strategy, yet by the mid-1930s, this faced a new challenge from Fascist Italy. The Italian Navy was central to expansionist aspirations and forced British reappraisals of the allocation of defence resources both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. It therefore came to exert a generally under-appreciated influence on pre-war British imperial defence policy and war planning. Although consistently viewed as vastly inferior to the Royal Navy, it was still seen as an impediment to Britain's ability to deliver imperial defence across the globe, or conduct a worldwide war against multiple enemies. This view persisted even after important defeats were inflicted on it in 1940–1941, and continued right through to 1943. Awareness of the seriousness with which the British viewed Italian naval strength adds important context to debates about British strategy in the Far East and over Winston Churchill's preference for a ‘Mediterranean first’ strategy. Italian naval power played a greater role in shaping the Allied prosecution of the Second World War than is commonly accepted.     

Scholarship and the ship of state: rethinking the Anglo‐American strategic decline analogy

This article uses the centenary of the First World War as an opportunity to re‐examine a major element of the existing literature on the war—the strategic implications of supposed British decline—as well as analogies to the contemporary United States based upon that interpretation of history. It argues that the standard declinist interpretation of British strategy rests to a surprising degree upon the work of the naval historian Arthur Marder, and that Marder's archival research and conceptual framework were weaker than is generally realized. It suggests that more recent work appearing since Marder is stronger and renders the declinist strategic interpretation difficult to maintain. It concludes by considering the implications of this new work for analogies between the United States today and First World War‐era Britain, and for the use of history in contemporary policy debates.     

Three thousand families: English Canada's colonizing vision and British family settlement, 1919-39

After the First World War, Canada's immigration policy became more restrictive and immigration more controlled. For English Canadians, immigration of the "right type" of people—those from the British Isles—remained vital to strengthening the nation. This article examines the 3,000 Family Scheme, a joint British-Canadian settlement project in which British families, comprised of over 18,000 individuals, were relocated to homesteads as colonizers of Canada's remote areas. There, many endured isolation and hardship, and were largely blamed for their own plight. A nation-building project that failed, the 3,000 Family Scheme reveals the connections among several enduring national myths in the interwar years: the potential for agricultural expansion, British superiority, and the capabilities of a maturing Canadian state to control the settlement process.     

‘The warrior has always shewed himself greater than his weapons’: the Royal Navy’s interpretation of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–5

During the Russo-Japanese War, British naval attachés serving with the Japanese produced a series of reports on both technical and cultural aspects of the conflict. In seeking to explain the Japanese successes, the attachés compared and contrasted their hosts with themselves, Royal Navy and Britain more generally. These reports offer a rare insight of the cultural preconceptions of Royal Navy officers prior to the First World War, presenting explicitly the norms and beliefs that served to unite the service. Recovering these collective understandings helps to illuminate the decision-making processes that took place within the Royal Navy both prior to and during the First World War.     

‘Business as usual’: the impact of the Great War on the British ceramics industry

SUMMARY: The Great War had a dramatic impact upon the manufacturing industries and trade of the United Kingdom, and not least upon the ceramics industry. Manufacturers faced tremendous difficulties, including a massive decline in the overseas trade essential to their survival. At the same time, however, the war itself presented opportunities for the expansion and development of British ceramic manufacture and the repositioning of British ceramics in the global market. In August 1914 the British ceramics trade was in a precarious state, threatened both at home and in long-held overseas markets by low-priced porcelains from German and Austria–Hungary. However, the naval blockade of Continental ports which followed the outbreak of war denied these countries access to what had been an extremely lucrative overseas trade, leaving customers in many countries desperate for replacements for the goods no longer available. British manufacturers rose to the challenge, maintaining production, developing new lines and taking trade from its enemies. The war halted the steady decline of the British ceramics industry, but its post-war future was by no means secured.     

Sentiment vs Strategy: British Naval Policy,Imperial Defence,and the Development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14

This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet's policy of remaining strong in the Mediterranean Sea. He made some concessions to sentiment in the Dominions, but his attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for the naval defence of Britain and its empire were ultimately unsuccessful. By 1914 it was clear that the Dominions would not provide the additional warships Britain required for the Mediterranean, and on the eve of war the Admiralty was beginning to prepare an imperial naval strategy that more accurately reflected the Empire's capabilities.     

The Theatre of Navalism in Germany and Britain

Abstract

TWENTY YEARS AGO, the late Victorian and Edwardian navy was the preserve of ArthurJ. Marder. Since then, scholars includingJon T. Sumida, Nicholas A. Lambert, Andrew Lambert, Andrew Gordon, Jolm Brooks, Geoffrey Till, and Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. have revised our understanding of Bridsh naval policy in the run-up to the First World War and the navy's performance during it. t The flowering of naval history in file English language has not been restricted to British history. For fifteen years, the standard work on German naval policy under the empire had been published by Jonathan Steinberg in 1965 .2 Beginning with Holger Herwig, this field, too, was transformed by, among others, Ivo Lambi, Gary Weir, Lawrence Sondhaus, and Rolf Hobson? Works on other pre-First World War navies include Sondhaus and Milan Vego on the Austro-Hungarian navy; 4 George Baer, Peter Karsten, Ronald Spector, Mark Shulman, and Robert O'Connell on the US navy; 1 Charles Schencking, David Evans, mid Mark Peatde on the Japanese navy; 2 and Paul Halpern on the Mediterranean theatre.     

Fiction and memoir of Britain’s Great War: disillusioned or disparate?

Historical and literary critical orthodoxies hold that unfavourable British literary responses to the First World War did not materialise until Journey’s End and the war-books controversy of 1930. What appears to have happened is that an initial and largely factitious 1930 newspaper controversy has been conflated artificially with artefacts of popular culture from the 1960s to create a linear historical narrative of popular misrepresentation. A review of war fiction and memoir in English published prior to 1929 shows this narrative to be entirely unhistorical: considerable numbers of unfavourable responses to the First World War exist in British writing from this earlier period. The argument that there was a spell of post-war optimism before the general public changed its mind in 1929 is impossible to sustain. There never was a unitary British narrative of the First World War, and if the general perception of it by the British people since 1929 has been negative, the explanation does not lie in Depression-era war books but in whatever caused readers and reviewers of the time to respond favourably to individual accounts of the war rather than to a patriotic gloss.     

甲午战争前后东亚海权与海防的较量及其影响

一场甲午战争,使东亚海权格局剧变,由此构成中日两国命运变化的历史拐点。战前,中日两国面对西方殖民扩张的相同遭遇,展开了近30年的海军现代化建设,并在互为敌手的竞争中日益凸显于以英国为主导的东亚海权格局之中。然而,不同的战略选择决定了不同的命运,甲午战争用血与火诠释了海权与海防的本质区别及其决定性影响。正因为战败后的中国已完全置身于东亚海权格局之外,再次陷入有海无防的境地,导致海权得以坐大的日本推行"大陆政策"更加有恃无恐,在列强瓜分中国的狂潮中走上独霸东亚之路。     

‘The Weary Titan Staggers under the Too Vast Orb of its Fate’. Post-Federation Australia and the Problem of Imperial Defence

This article investigates an under-studied aspect of the British/Australian defence relationship in the immediate post-Boer War period. The essential nature of the Australian Imperial Force was not an accident of 1914. Rather, as this article will show, the form, style and structure of the force that fought at Gallipoli was set in stone more than a decade before that famous name entered the popular Australian lexicon.     

Imperial Outposts and the War Beyond: Singapore,Hong Kong and the British Empire’s Land Force Contribution to the Korean War

Histories of the British Empire’s strategic outposts in the Far East have traditionally focused on their traumatic loss to the Japanese adversary during the Second World War. Only in the past decade-and-a-half have historians begun to examine the post-Second World War importance of these outposts to the continued defence and security of Britain’s empire in the Far East. In taking this line of historical enquiry still further, the article examines how Singapore and Hong Kong were used to project British military power, specifically army deployments, across the Far East, and far beyond the imperial frontier, in support of Britain’s involvement in the 1950–53 Korean War and therefore in pursuit of the empire’s foreign and defence policy objectives. It adopts an essentially operational analysis to this end, relying on operational and army ‘ground-level’ sources from the records of the Colonial, Foreign, and War Offices at the British National Archives. It uncovers the hidden workings of the mechanisms of imperial military power projection through strategic outposts, which ranged from training to logistical support to the exercise of command and control, and how these mechanisms and outposts were utilised by the British Far Eastern land forces involved in the Korean War. In so doing, the article sheds much valuable and original light on the historical importance of these strategic outposts to imperial defence.     

Enigmas of the Great War: Thomas Kettle and Francis Ledwidge

Recent publications in the field of Irish Studies have begun to address the previously neglected issue of Irish involvement in the First World War, including some limited attention to Irish First World War literature. This article explores the poetry of two nationalist writers who joined the British army, namely Thomas Kettle and Francis Ledwidge. Kettle was a public figure who had served as a Westminster MP and his poetry expresses the political complexity of his responses to the outbreak of war and to the Easter Rising. Ledwidge was first and foremost a poet and the article explores and evaluates that aspect of his oeuvre which can be described as war poetry.     

Frustrated Great Gamesmanship: Sir Garnet Wolseley's Plans for War against Russia, 1873–1880

Abstract

In three books published in 1940, 1956, and 1961, Arthur J. Marder established what became the orthodox view of the development of the British navy in the years leading up to the First World War.1 A.J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1965 (New York, 1940); idem,[Fear God and DreadNought: The] C[orrespondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord] F[isher of Kilverstone: II: Years of Power, 1904–14] (London, 1956); idem, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: I: The Road to War, 1904–14 (Oxford, 1961). Building upon the work of Sir Llewellyn Woodward, who argues that, from the outset of the twentieth century, British naval policy was framed as a response to the threat posed by the rising German naval power,2 E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (London, 1934). Marder makes precise claims about the nature of the response. In particular, he states that, under the leadership of the first sea lord from 1904 to 1910, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the admiralty undertook two root-and-branch reforms. First, it redeployed Britain's fleets and squadrons, reducing the number of foreign stations, scrapping obsolescent vessels, and stationing the most powerful units of the fleet in European waters. Next, at Fisher's prompting, it triggered a naval revolution by ordering the building of a new type of warship, HMS Dreadnought, the world's first turbine-powered, all-big-gun battleship. In both cases, Marder is unambiguous about the motive: the redeployment adjusted Britain's force posture to ensure a preponderance of strength in the vicinity of the North Sea, the theatre in which the expected war with Germany would be fought. The new type of ship was necessary to help to modernize the navy's matériel in keeping with advances in gunnery, propulsion, and torpedoes. If not explicitly aimed at Germany, the new ship would ensure that the navy was better prepared for a war that Fisher perceived to be ‘inevitable’s.     

Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952–1957

Some French writers, most notably Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and André Tardieu, have argued that French strategic interests during the early decades of the twentieth century had been seriously harmed because, alone among the Great Powers of Europe, France lacked a ‘diaspora’ in the United States. As a result of this, they have claimed, France had no advocacy group prepared to defend the interests of the European ‘kin state’ at a time when France’s great rival, Germany, was amply endowed with a sizeable demographic presence in the United States, willing to speak out in defence of Germany and its foreign policy. Moreover, a second large European diaspora had become established in the United States, whose numbers would swell after the mid nineteenth century: the Irish. Not necessarily committed to promoting German interests, the Irish-Americans did militate strongly and consistently against British interests, such that by the time France and Britain had become close security partners preceding and during the First World War, what worked against British interests would also work against French ones. This article constitutes a critical examination of the Duroselle-Tardieu thesis regarding France's allegedly ‘missing’ diaspora, and cautions against attributing too much geo-strategic influence to either the German-American or Irish-American ‘lobby’.     

‘No protection against the H-bomb’: press and popular reactions to the Coventry civil defence controversy, 1954

This article examines British popular and media reactions to America's Bravo test shot in April 1954 and Coventry City Council's subsequent decision to abandon civil defence. The article finds that three key motifs emerged which relate to Britain's broader sense of national identity in the 1950s. First, the controversy formed part of a cultural battle for national identity between a conservative and potentially militaristic culture, and one which was more progressive and opposed war and nuclear armaments. Second, opponents labelled the councillors as Moscow stooges and this revealed underlying anti-communism. Third, reactions engaged with a secular strain of Cold War apocalypticism.     

British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War

This work examines British conservative attitudes towards the Weimar Republic through the lens of several specific issues from the armistice up to the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. The author argues that a curious feature of British conservative opinion following the First World War was the consistent hostility British conservatives demonstrated towards the new German democratic state. To be sure, Great Britain had just fought a long and costly war against Germany, and there had been little time for the passions generated by the war to cool. Still, from the early days of the political changes in October and November of 1918, the German government was firmly committed to democratic principles. This was a development that the British nation claimed to favour, but the war left many British conservatives ill disposed to consider that the ‘inner change’ in Germany might be genuine or that a stable German democracy was possible. During its formative years, the Weimar Republic faced enormous challenges that would have tested any nation. Yet, even as political and economic conditions within Germany undermined prospects for democracy to succeed in that country, many British conservatives declined to take these developments seriously. Indeed, the attitudes of British conservatives substantially added to the difficulties the German government faced in dealing with the problems of the post-war world.     

Mythologising the Dominion Fighting Man: Australian and Canadian Narratives of the First World War Soldier, 1914–39

A stereotypical image of the nation's First World War soldiers—and a conventional understanding of their war experience and its meaning—is not a concept unique to the British Empire's former Pacific Dominions, but is also promulgated in other parts of the Empire. During the First World War and interwar period, Canada also saw the emergence of a ‘Myth of the Soldier’ that paralleled the Anzac legend in many ways. This article focuses on some of the similarities and differences in Australia and Canada's mythologising of their First World War soldiers, proposing that this process reflects aspects of identity formation common to settler societies within the British world.     

America's Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967–1971

Prior to 1971, Britain played a key role in the security of Malaysia and Singapore, especially during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and Konfrontasi (1963–1966). Britain's military withdrawal from the east of Suez beginning from 1968 not only became a catalyst for post-colonial development of Malaysia and Singapore, but also pushed them towards America's security umbrella. Negotiations to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with a new defence arrangement were fraught with pussyfooting on the part of British, Australian and New Zealand leaders. The Malaysian and Singapore defence ministers were divided and contributed to further foot dragging. By the time the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were signed by the five nations in November 1971, collective defence among the signatories had devolved to mere consultation. By analysing the obstacles encountered during the negotiations and American influence on the shape of the FPDA, this paper demonstrates that a power transition that had been set in motion after Second World War was completed by 1971 when British strategic influence in South-East Asia gave way to American dominance.