Maintaining transatlantic strategic,operational and tactical interoperability in an era of austerity

With the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan, how will the North Atlantic alliance maintain the unprecedented levels of interoperability developed over the last decade? One of the most effective means of building and maintaining interoperability—the forward‐based presence of US military forces in Europe— has shrunk significantly over the last 25 years and is likely to shrink further in the coming years, meaning it will become increasingly difficult for American and European military forces to operate side by side. Nevertheless, the United States continues to look to its allies in NATO as the primary partners in maintaining and promoting common interests around the globe. Additionally, Washington seems more committed than ever to wielding force in a coalition context. In order to help remedy this seeming incongruity, Washington announced in early 2012 a plan to deploy rotationally several hundred troops from the United States to Germany for periodic exercises with European partners and allies. However, it remains unclear whether a rotational model will be sufficient to generate the level of interoperability necessary for US forces and those of its most capable European allies to work seamlessly across the range of military operations. The loss of tactical and operational interoperability threatens transatlantic strategic interoperability, and therefore risks decoupling European and American security policy. To mitigate these challenges, the article discusses several policy steps the United States should consider.     

‘Cruising toward nuclear danger’: Canadian anti-nuclear activism,Pierre Trudeau’s peace mission,and the transatlantic partnership

In March 1982, news broke that the US Air Force planned to test cruise missiles in Canada. The issue brought the Euromissiles Crisis home to Canada, as Canadians took to the streets in record numbers to oppose the tests. Anti-nuclear activists linked their ‘refuse the cruise’ protests to anti-nuclear demonstrations taking place across the West. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau too saw testing in a transatlantic context, insisting they were part of Canada’s NATO obligations. Neither European nor American, the Canadians had an unusual place in NATO. Often, this translated to being completely ignored: transatlantic issues, including the decade-long Euromissiles Crisis, tended to be seen as US–Western European issues. This article considers the ways in which the Euromissiles Crisis came home to Canada and situates Canada in a broader transatlantic landscape. The Euromissiles Crisis framed Canadian debates over cruise missile testing, encouraging activists and politicians to think about how the threat of nuclear war could be reduced.     

CANADIAN NOVELS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND HISTORIANS

Most discussions about the impact of Afghanistan on the future of NATO focus on transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Union. But for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed into the south, facing heavy resistance and fighting from Taliban insurgents, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic Alliance. While this may seem surprising, given the cutbacks in Canadian defense spending in the 1990s and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany, it should not. For during that so-called dark decade, Canada continued to make major contributions to NATO and European security. This essay argues that Ottawa's multi-faceted military and political support of the “new” NATO of the post–Cold War era continued when the alliance undertook its involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, in its efforts in support of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the alliance that seems stronger than NATO's collective commitment to itself.     

Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy

Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK‐US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy‐making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo‐US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective.     

Introduction: The Future of Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

In her Introduction to this issue of International Affairs devoted to the future of Europe and the transatlantic relationship, Julie Smith highlights the challenges facing the West's major organizations—the European Union and NATO. The Convention on the Future of Europe, enlargement of both NATO and the EU, the euro debate, and the tensions in the transatlantic relationship are discussed in the context of the articles in these pages.     

New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?

In late 1994 and 1995, senior figures on both sides of the Atlantic advocated a transatlantic free trade area: in December 1995 the EU and the United States signed the New transatlantic agenda and the Joint EU–US action plan in Madrid; in March 1998, the European Commission proposed 'a new transatlantic marketplace', which was vetoed by France in the following month; and in September 1998 the Commission offered its latest plan–the Draft action plan for transatlantic economic partnership . This article examines the political and economic case for new institutions, drawing on the arguments the Commission used to support its proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace. These arguments are found to be unpersuasive. For an EU stance in trade policy matters to be improved by a French veto may be unprecedented. That is what has happened, however. The French veto actually led to the Draft action plan which provides transatlantic trade relations with a better framework than the proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace could possibly have done.     

北约与跨大西洋的空气污染治理(1969-1976)

北大西洋公约组织以1969年组建的现代社会挑战委员会为载体,积极介入社会领域尤其是环保领域的事务,这被视为北约除防卫协作和政治协商功能之外的“第三维”。北约现代社会挑战委员会把空气污染治理列为第一批试点研究之一,围绕空气污染评估、空气质量标准、污染控制技术、空气质量模型、低污染动力系统开发等重大问题,开展了一系列的研讨、研究和推广活动,切实推动了跨大西洋的空气污染治理工作。北约现代社会挑战委员会通过积极举办空气污染治理专家会议或推动国际环保会议的召开,加强了各国空气污染治理的信息传播和经验交流,增进了跨大西洋社会的团结。其间,北约盟国特别是美国以试点研究的相关成果为依托,尝试推动同苏联在环保领域的合作,在一定程度上成为东西方政治缓和的重要副产品。但是,美苏之间的双边合作并没有全面地实现东西方、南北方之间的环保合作,全球范围的环保运动仍然任重而道远。     

Europe,the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden‐sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As Asian powers reach westward and the US shifts its strategic priorities eastward, classical geostrategic delimitations become gradually tenuous. Particularly important are the ‘middle spaces’ of the Indian Ocean, central Asia and the Arctic, in that they constitute the main avenues of communication between the Asia–Pacific and the European neighbourhood. The article seeks to understand how evolving geostrategic dynamics in Europe, the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific relate to each other, and how they might impinge on discussions on transatlantic burden‐sharing. It is argued that the ability of Europeans to contribute to a more equitable transatlantic burden‐sharing revolves around two main tenets. First, by engaging in the ‘middle spaces’, Europe's key powers and institutions are helping to underpin a balance of power in these regions. Second, by stepping up their diplomatic and economic role in the Asia–Pacific, strengthening their security ties to (US) regional allies and maintaining an EU‐wide arms embargo on China, Europeans are broadly complementing US efforts in that key region. There are a number of factors that stand in the way of a meaningful European engagement in the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific, including divergent security priorities among Europeans, the impact of budgetary austerity on European defence capabilities and a tendency to confine foreign policy to the immediate neighbourhood. The article discusses the implications of those obstacles and outlines some ways in which they might be overcome.     

MILITARY ASSISTANCE,FOREIGN POLICY,AND NATIONAL SECURITY

From the inauguration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in 1950, until its termination in the early 1960s, Norway was among the main European beneficiaries of military assistance from the United States. Previous research on this subject has mainly seen the MDAP from the perspective of the recipient, analysing what effect the influx of large amounts of equipment had for the shape and development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This article discusses the motives for US military assistance to Norway, and analyses this activity as an expression of US Cold War objectives concerning Norway and NATO’s northern flank. The article also explores how these objectives influenced policy making relevant to military assistance, and gives particular attention to the role of US representatives in Oslo. These actors played an important role in highlighting the political and strategic benefits of extensive aid to Norway.     

Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US–EU and US–UK relationships

A British exit from the EU would add to growing strains on the United States’ relations with Britain and the rest of Europe, but by itself would not lead to a breakdown in transatlantic relations due to the scale of shared ideas and interests, institutional links, international pressures and commitments by individual leaders. It would, however, add to pressures on the US that could change the direction of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of Washington, Britain risks becoming an awkward inbetweener, beholden more than ever before to a wider transatlantic relationship where the US and EU are navigating the challenges of an emerging multipolar world. The article outlines developments in the UK, EU, Europe and the US in order to explain what Brexit could mean for the United States’ approaches to transatlantic relations. By doing so the article moves beyond a narrow view of Brexit and transatlantic relations that focuses on the future of UK–US relations. In the conclusion we map out several ways in which US views of the transatlantic relationship could be changed.     

Building Bridges across the Atlantic: the European Union Visitors Program. A Case Study for Public Diplomacy and the Transatlantic Relationship in the 1970s

This article addresses the core question of the complex interplay between Atlantic-alliance politics and European integration in the 1970s, a turning point in the European-US relationship. The analysis focuses on the European Community Visitors Program: the first European Community (EC) professional exchange programme seeking to foster mutual understanding between the Community and the United States, which is an intriguing case study in the history of transatlantic relations from a public-diplomacy standpoint. Its relevance is indeed twofold. From an intra-European perspective, it has contributed to laying the foundations for an identity discourse, upon which the narrative of a Euro-exceptionalism has been constructed from the 1970s onwards. Furthermore, as an exchange programme fostering connections among elites abroad, it has enhanced the EC's visibility outside its borders and thus promoted its recognition worldwide. At a systemic level, the ECVP - modelled after the most famous US public-diplomacy programmes - has served as a transatlantic bridge-builder and a prime tool for facilitating alliance management during the cold war, particularly in the troubled 1970s.     

Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Gold War, 19477ndash;1955

This article illustrates US policy on European integration and the European Economic Community (EEC) by focusing on the General Agreement on Tarriff and Trade (GATT) Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–7). However underestimated in the history of international relations, GATT provides in fact an outstanding framework for analysing the foreign policy of its members. Whilst analyses of the Round per se already exist, no scholar thus far has focused on US policy towards European integration. Moreover, no previous author has utilised the European archives and has examined the stances of the EEC. This article shows that US support for European integration, which both Kennedy and Johnson followed at the behest of the ‘Europeanists’ in their respective administrations, conditioned the bargaining position of the United States in Geneva. The US negotiators tried to enhance US trade interests while at the same time attempting to encourage European regional integration. In so doing, the United States played a role in the strengthening of European regional integration by favouring the unity of the area. Moreover, contrary to previous accounts, this article shows that US negotiators were able to direct and move forward a complicated negotiation, showing Washington's leadership. The article concludes by showing that the Kennedy Round ended a period of about twenty years during which the United States acted to promote the unity of Western Europe. At the end of the 1960s, with the worsening of the US economic conditions, the tension in transatlantic relations over monetary and security issues, and the strength that the EEC demonstrated during the Kennedy Round, ‘the Europeanists’ were no longer able to prevail with their line in the internal discussions. This change became apparent when the Nixon administration shifted to a more detached and ambiguous policy towards European integration.     

Science as propaganda: Swedish scientists and the co-production of American hegemony in Sweden during the cold war, 1953–68

This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish–American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well.     

Skiffle in the U.K.: the indigenization of a musical genre

ABSTRACT

This article examines the creation and diffusion of skiffle, and analyses how it emerged from the transatlantic flow of popular music from the United States to the United Kingdom, and the process by which it became “indigenized” in the U.K. I have also looked at the salience of race, the legacy of English music hall song traditions, and the idea of indigenization of music in post-WWII Britain. I have highlighted how skiffle eventually became “English,” its later impact on popular music in the U.K. in the 1960s and thereafter, and the complexities inherent in the idea of musical genre.     

Towards a ‘post‐American’ alliance? NATO burden‐sharing after Libya

NATO's recent operation in Libya has been described by some commentators as reflecting a new burden‐sharing model, with the US playing a more supportive role and European allies stepping up to provide the bulk of the air strikes. The US administration of President Barack Obama seemed to share this view and has made clear that post‐Libya it continues to expect its allies to assume greater responsibility within the alliance. Moreover, unlike previously, changes within the US and the international system are likely to make America less willing and able to provide for the same degree of leadership in NATO that the alliance has been used to. However, this article finds that Operation Unified Protector in Libya has only limited utility as a benchmark for a sustainable burden‐sharing model for the alliance. As a result, an ever more fragmented NATO is still in search for a new transatlantic consensus on how to distribute the burdens more equally among its members. While no new generic model is easily available, a move towards a ‘post‐American’ alliance may provide the basis for a more equitable burden‐sharing arrangement, one in which European allies assume a greater leadership role and are prepared to invest more in niche military capabilities.     

Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia

After a decade of relative neglect post‐Soviet Central Asia has become a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic community. Both the United States and Europe have engaged with the region in recent years in pursuit of new strategic interests, including maintaining military basing access in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and securing the export of Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Despite this period of renewed engagement, however, the quality of democratic governance within the region remains poor, especially in comparison with other post‐communist regions that successfully completed their political transitions. In fact, the United States and the European Union have often tempered promoting their Central Asian democratization agendas in order to maintain access to these strategically important fixed assets. The transatlantic struggle to balance the pursuit of strategic interests and democratic values has been rendered more difficult by Russia's recent resurgence as a regional power. Backed by the Central Asian governments, Moscow has challenged the purpose and influence of western‐based international and non‐governmental organizations in the region, thereby further diminishing the transatlantic community's capacity to promote sustained democratic reforms.     

‘Those European Chicken Littles’: Reagan,NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2

This article focuses on transatlantic relations in the run-up to and aftermath of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. Through an analysis of British, US, German, and NATO sources, this article highlights the fundamental differences and consequent disagreements that occurred between the Reagan administration and its European allies in 1981–2. It argues that these divergences originated from economic considerations, from a fundamentally discrepant conception of détente on the two sides of the Atlantic, and from the Reagan administration's mismanagement of the crisis. Not only did Reagan disregard NATO's contingency plans dating from 1980 and did not consult the allies, he also designed US sanctions specifically to dash a joint agreement between the Europeans and the Soviet Union for the construction of a pipeline that was to deliver Siberian gas into Western Europe.     

The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

Visions of Statesmanship Across The Atlantic: Presidential Masculinity and the American Response to Benito Mussolini

This article explores how hegemonic masculinity forged discourses of modern statesmanship in the United States and Italy in the first three decades of the twentieth century. It unpacks the ‘presidential masculinity’ of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and compares these gendered performances of political leadership in the United States to Benito Mussolini's Fascist rule in Italy during the 1920s. In doing so, this article contends that the manliness of these three modern leaders rested on a contrasting of pairs: if Roosevelt embodied the hegemonic ideal of the ‘frontiersman-as-president’, Wilson personified its ‘unmanly’, bourgeois-liberal countertype and thereby engendered the initially hospitable view of Mussolini's Fascist masculinity in the United States during the Jazz Age. The article covers the publications in The Atlantic Monthly to reveal how the American disillusion with Wilson's liberal internationalism transformed the Duce into a Fascist surrogate for Roosevelt. In a decade of political, economic and social upheaval, the transatlantic ‘public relations state’ in both the United States and Italy discursively positioned Mussolini as the personification of the masculine ideals of acumen, willpower and virility for the American public; a ‘Doctor-Dictator’ who, akin to Roosevelt, became a symbol of modern manliness that signified stability, progress and reform. In the process, the Duce's Fascist manhood shaped hegemonic ideals of statesmanship across the Atlantic while hinting at the paltry support for the liberal democracies of the West.     

Debating the transatlantic relationship: rhetoric and reality

The rhetoric surrounding the crisis in transatlantic relations is overcharged. Although the United States and Europe have reached a turning point, the changes that they need to make are neither fundamental nor controversial. No matter how you polarize the debate, the solution combines more flexibility and more cooperation. Moreover, this solution has been known for some time. Hence the real questions to consider are not about how this crisis came about, but why it persists. At least part of the answer lies in the structure of interdependence. Although both sides in the Atlantic alliance have an interest in flexible cooperation, the United States is much more central to the countries of Europe than 'Europe' is to the United States. Because of this asymmetry, a crisis that started from real misunderstanding has been extended as Americans appear neglectful and Europeans oversensitive. Part of the answer also lies in our expectations of the relationship. Some observers suggest that the crisis will only end when both sides realize that it is time to grow up. Perhaps they already have.