In the Shadow of Globalization: The European Community and the United States in the GATT Negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973–1979)

This article explores the trade negotiations between the United States and the European Community in the Tokyo Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, held in Geneva from 1973 to 1979. The article shows how the economic turbulence and the different domestic stances and policies toward the globalizing economy split the Western members of GATT into two camps. Countries, like France and the United Kingdom, less well equipped to face increased worldwide competition and the economic crisis were not keen on trade liberalization. Countries, like the United States and Germany, better equipped to face worldwide competition and in favour of policies that strengthened it, saw trade liberalization as the right path. Eventually, under US President Jimmy Carter's leadership and with the key support of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the results of the Round reflected a vote in favour of liberalizing international trade. Thus, the Round was shaped by the globalizing economy but, at the same time, its results gave further impetus to the globalization wave that would reach full swing in the 1980s–1990s. The GATT talks took place in the shadow of globalization: while attempting to govern the process, also built it up.     

Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy

Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK‐US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy‐making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo‐US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective.     

‘Marriage’, ‘Massage', Metaphor and Gender in US–Iranian Relations During the 1960s

Abstract

Although they were allies, during the 1960s relations between the United States and Iran were fraught with tensions. For American policymakers, Iran was an important Cold War client and oil-supplier in a turbulent region. It was vital, therefore, to maintain a good relationship with the Shah of Iran. Indeed, United States policy was based in large part on American assessments of the Shah as an individual. This article seeks to assess how the language and metaphors used by American policymakers to describe and understand the Shah reflected and informed United States policy. Officials within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations viewed the Shah through a highly gendered lens that magnified perceptions of him as a weak, highly sensitive and irrational leader – characteristics deemed to be overly feminine. This article therefore contends that US policy towards Iran was influenced by gender stereotypes as policymakers lamented their reliance on the Shah, who they deemed to be insufficiently 'masculine'.     

Breaking the CMEA hold: Romania in search of a ‘strategy’ towards the European Economic Community, 1958–1974

ABSTRACT

This article analyses Cold War Romania’s conceptualization of its relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and its struggle to influence the policy of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) towards the EEC in a way compatible with Bucharest’s interests. Addressing a significant historiographical gap, in a sense, this study investigates the origins of Romania–EU relations. Multi-archival in approach, it argues that the period between 1969 and 1974 represents the formative years of Romania–EEC relations. Exploring the political rationale behind Romania’s attitude towards the Common Market, the article finds that the country’s ‘strategy’ in this respect had three main characteristics: it was pragmatic, active and, to some point, adaptive; drawing heavily from Romania’s previous position, it took shape in the early 1970s; and, although it seemed to focus on the commercial aspects of relations, it reflected a far more complex interaction between the two political and social systems than previously acknowledged.     

The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

Trumping foreign policy: public diplomacy,framing, and public opinion among middle power publics

Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other states to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. The President of the United States thus often serves as ‘Diplomat in Chief’ in public diplomacy efforts to appeal directly to publics abroad. Given Donald Trump’s antagonistic approach to foreign relations and widespread lack of popularity, what are the implications for support for US policy among publics abroad – particularly among middle power states allied to the US? While previous research on public opinion relying on observational data has found that confidence in the US President is linked to support for American foreign policy goals, the mechanisms at work remain unclear. Using original data from survey-based experiments conducted in Canada and Australia, this article seeks to clarify the effect of ‘presidential framing’ (presenting a policy goal as endorsed or not endorsed by Trump) on attitudes toward key policy issues in the Canada–US and Australia–US relationships. Results point to a negative ‘Trump framing’ effect in Canadians’ and Australians’ trade policy attitudes, but such an effect is not observed in other policy domains (energy policy in Canada, and refugee policy in Australia).     

Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s

This article sheds new light on the interrelation between Western European integration and the Cold War by unveiling and bringing under scrutiny the active role of the EEC in East–West relations. It argues that the EEC's pro-active Eastern policy was pivotal in loosening Cold War constraints in Europe and engendering instead a new kind of intra-European relations. Relations between the EEC and socialist bloc countries grew more intense and diversified, irrespective of the renewed superpower confrontation. Not only were détente and integration compatible, they actually reinforced each other, and the EEC proved to be a major and successful promoter of the overcoming of the Cold War in Europe.     

Fabio Luca Cavazza,the New Frontier and the opening to the left in Italy

This article focuses on the key role played by Fabio Luca Cavazza, founder of the publishing house Il Mulino, in the development of cultural relations between the US and Italy in the early Cold War by drawing on Cavazza’s personal papers, an as yet unexplored archival source. The Department of State and the Eisenhower administration opposed a government that included the Socialists. However, thanks to the special relationship he had with the ‘New Frontier’s men’, in particular Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Cavazza was able to revive the issue, showing how it was in line with Kennedy’s New Frontier policy.     

Kennedy's international legacy,fifty years on

This article explores historical assessments of the foreign policy of President John F. Kennedy, who was assassinated fifty years ago. It traces the evolution of JFK historiography from the uncritical so‐called ‘Camelot’ school to harsh revisionist critiques in the 1980s and 1990s, and on to the current ‘third wave’ of scholarship. The article focuses in particular on new work concerning JFK's handling of the Berlin and Cuba superpower crises, his role in expanding the United States’ involvement in Vietnam (and whether blame for this war can be assigned to him) and larger questions about his approach to the danger of nuclear holocaust and the possibility of defusing Cold War tensions. The conclusion to the article examines his various peace‐seeking initiatives in the months following the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests that Kennedy may have been turning towards a more critical view of American Cold War politics when he was killed in Dallas in November 1963.     

Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?

Obama's election in 2008 as the United States’ first self-styled Pacific President drew a hearty round of ‘end of the affair’ editorials about Anglo-American relations. His first term was littered with ‘snubgates’, serious irritations in policy areas regarded as being core to the special relationship, and indications of an accelerating US departure from Europe with his premier foreign-policy strategy declared to be a pivot to Asia. His return for a second term in 2013 augers a continuation of first-term adjustments in US foreign policy and greater domestic focus given a divided Congress and a bitterly split and war-weary United States with domestic priorities to the fore. Doomsayers - or so-called terminalists - have been repeatedly gainsaid by the Lazarus-like quality of the relationship in the past but can the Anglo-American special relationship survive in the Obama environment? This article suggests it can and sets out the author's rather unfashionable argument in four parts: the weight of history; the canons of international-relations theory; the importance of considering interest and sentiment in explaining the special relationship's resilience; and a relativist argument that suggests the United States still really does have no better ally than the United Kingdom.     

America as a European power: the end of empire by integration?

Is the postwar partnership between Europe and America now a historical artefact? Much depends on whether the notion of America as a ‘European power’ still holds. The US attained this status through a strategy of ‘empire by integration’, extending its postwar ‘empire’ through negotiation and support for European integration, and envisaging a collectively powerful Europe as fundamental to the health of its most important security alliance. The election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the war in Iraq are often seen as producing deep ruptures both in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the embrace of a new US policy of ‘disaggregation’ of Europe is unproven, and in any event unlikely to mark a permanent shift. The US and Europe are surprisingly close to agreement on ends for the international order. Conflict over Iraq has obscured a significant increase in policy cooperation and convergence of strategy in the war on terrorism.     

Kennedy's Alliance for Progress: countering revolution in Latin America. Part I: From the White House to the Charter of Punta del Este

One of the first acts of the new administration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 was to promote an ‘Alliance for Progress’ throughout Latin America. JFK's stated goal was ‘to transform the American continent’ by improving the often desperate living conditions of its peoples; advancing industrialization; diversifying and increasing exports (especially away from heavy dependence on single items such as coffee); encouraging interstate trade and communications; and—above all—strengthening democracy: a term to inspire but one rarely, if ever, defined. The primary means for achieving these ends would be the extension of loans by the United States and others, thereby building up capital for industrial production while increasing food and raw material supplies to maximize foreign exchange—all with the aim of reversing the ‘dependency’ of ‘underdeveloped’ Latin America upon the more ‘advanced’ economies of the north Atlantic area. Kennedy's expressed fear was that Latin America, its impoverished peoples ripe for revolution, would follow the path of Cuba under the new regime of Fidel Castro. In the first part of a two‐part analysis the historical and political origins of the Alliance are traced to both US and Latin American sources, including schemes within the Organization of American States and ‘Operation Pan America’; in the second part the economic failures and the strategic successes of the Alliance during the presidencies of Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon will be evaluated as another, if varied, stage in the evolving ‘hegemonic presumption’ of the US towards its southern neighbours.     

‘Just and lawful war’ as genocidal war in the (United States) Northwest Ordinance and Northwest Territory, 1787–1832

This article focuses on the United States Northwest Ordinance of 1787's profession of ‘utmost good faith’ towards Indians and its provision for ‘just and lawful wars’ against them. As interpreted by US officials as they authorized and practised war against native communities in the Northwest Territory from 1787 to 1832, the ‘just and lawful wars’ clause legalized wars of ‘extirpation’ or ‘extermination’, terms synonymous with genocide by most definitions, against native people who resisted US demands that they cede their lands. Although US military operations seldom achieved extirpation, this was due to their ineptness and the success of indigenous strategies rather than an absence of intention. When US military forces did succeed in achieving their objective, the result was massacre, as revealed in the Black Hawk War of 1832. US policy did not call for genocide in the first instance, preferring that Indians embrace the gift of civilization in exchange for their lands. Should Indians reject this display of ‘utmost good faith’, however, US policy legalized genocidal war against them.     

Heading west? Georgia's Euro‐Atlantic path

Events in Ukraine in 2014 are likely to transform the presence and role of western institutions such as NATO in the post‐Soviet area. The crisis has starkly revealed the limits of their influence within Russia's ‘zone of privileged interest’, as well as the lack of internal unity within these organizations vis‐à‐vis relations with Moscow and future engagement with the area. This will have long‐term implications for the South Caucasus state of Georgia, whose desire for integration into the Euro‐Atlantic community remains a key priority for its foreign and security policy‐makers. This article examines the main motivators behind Georgia's Euro‐Atlantic path and its foreign policy stance, which has remained unchanged for over a decade despite intense pressure from Russia. It focuses on two aspects of Georgia's desire for integration with European and Euro‐Atlantic structures: its desire for security and the belief that only a western alignment can guarantee its future development, and the notion of Georgia's ‘European’ identity. The notion of ‘returning’ to Europe and the West has become a common theme in Georgian political and popular discourse, reflecting the belief of many in the country that they are ‘European’. This article explores this national strategic narrative and argues that the prevailing belief in a European identity facilitates, rather than supersedes, the central role of national interests in Georgian foreign policy.     

Chancellor Erhard's silent rejection of de Gaulle's plans: the example of monetary union

In the 1960s, French president de Gaulle's ambition to create a ‘European Europe’ depended heavily on German support. This article illustrates and reinterprets the crucial attitude of Ludwig Erhard by focusing on his role after the signing of the Elysée treaty in January 1963, and his reaction to a secret (and since forgotten) French proposal for monetary union in March 1964. The evidence shows that Erhard, fundamentally a moderate Atlanticist, was profoundly affected by the pressure of the Kennedy administration not to harbour Gaullist ideas. Indeed, as German chancellor Erhard feared that America might cease to defend Europe if de Gaulle's idea of a more independent Europe were to gain ground in Germany. Hence Erhard simply ignored any French move perceived to be contradictory to US policy. The article adds an element to the complexity of Franco-German relations in the 1960s while providing an example of how American power was exercised during the Cold War.     

Silvio Berlusconi and the traditions of Italian foreign policy: a comment on Ambassador Romano's presentation

Abstract

While open to criticism on many levels, the foreign policy of Italy under Silvio Berlusconi does not deviate in many significant ways from traditional approaches, especially on its management of Italy's relations with the United States and the European Union. Italy's ‘exceptionalism’ is also similar to that of many other European states.     

Rommel's Desert War

The article discusses why and how the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European allies came to hold such divergent opinions over what was at stake in Vietnam. It also examines how European reluctance to fight alongside the United States in South-East Asia affected relations within NATO. The voices of the smaller NATO members will also be considered. The article concludes that the transatlantic rift was contained not just because of cold-war realities but also because the Johnson and Nixon administrations took steps to repair the transatlantic relationship and because European integration acted as a binding force.     

Khaki Girls,VADs, and Tommy's Sisters: Gender and Class in First World War Britain

Abstract

Since the end of the cold war, and with particular urgency since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, historians and pundits have searched for parallel cases that make sense of the United States' military and economic predominance in the current international order. Many have chosen the British empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the most telling. As Dane Kennedy argues in an article recently published in The International History Review: ‘The United States' immediate predecessor was the British empire, and it should be the first case to which we turn for meaningful historical comparisons.’¹ For Kennedy, the United States, despite coming into existence by breaking away from the British empire, retained many of its institutions and doctrinal traditions. Having marshalled them to new purposes while expanding across the continent, the United States turned its attention abroad. Kennedy shows that, despite the different worlds of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both Britain and the United States built their global power in comparable fashion through the techniques of indirect rule, military strategies geared towards protecting imperial and commercial networks, and ideological claims to universally applicable civilizing missions.     

Sino–American relations and the ‘Australian factor’: inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a ‘discriminate engagement’ policy toward their own regional interests if Sino–American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that country's relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its ‘dual strategy’ directed toward China and the United States.     

Fortuitous Consequence: The Domestic Politics of the 1991 Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality

Following more than a decade of negotiations, the Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality entered into force on March 13, 1991, with the signatures of then-Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and US. President George Bush. Why was it so difficult for Canadian and US. negotiators to reach agreement? I argue that Canadian and U.S. domestic politics were the primary impediments to resolving the U.S.-Canada acid rain dispute. This article thus casts the dispute in terms of a pair of domestic environmental policy problems, whose timely and complementary solution, furthermore, required executive initiative as the handmaiden of ecological crisis. Heightened public concern about the threat of acidic air pollution in Canada prompted Mulroney's efforts to reduce acid rain. In the United States, a likewise critical change in the public's perception of air quality as a national emergency created the mass support necessary for Bush's federal acid rain control initiative