The defence dilemma in Britain

The UK faces a pressing defence dilemma. The declaratory goals of defence policy are struggling to match the demands made by operational commitments and the financial and organizational capacities. The article examines how and why this situation has come about. While recognizing that existing calls for higher defence spending, reform of the Ministry of Defence, efficiency gains or a renewal of the so‐called military covenant between the military and society may address discrete elements of the defence dilemma in Britain, it argues that current problems derive from a series of deeper tensions in the nexus of British defence more widely defined. These include a transnationalization of strategic practice, in ways that both shape and constrain the national defence policy process; the institutional politics of defence itself, which encourage different interpretations of interest and priority in the wider strategic context; and finally the changing status of defence in the wider polity, which introduces powerful veto points into the defence policy process itself. It argues that while a series of shocks may have destabilized existing policy, prompted ad hoc organizational adaptation in the armed forces and led to incremental cost saving measures from the government, a ‘dominant crisis narrative’—in the form of a distinctive and generally agreed programme of change—has yet to emerge. The article concludes by looking forward to a future strategic defence review, highlighting the critical path dependencies and veto points which must be addressed if transformative change in British defence is to take place.     

The arithmetic of defence policy

The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of European military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capability has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in military capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goals will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over the past 15 years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirations to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in capabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise faster than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of expensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measures now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for European nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. Despite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integration, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence provision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to exercise any influence over US defence and security policies.     

The transformation and future prospects of Europe's defence industry

Europe's defence industry has evolved by transforming itself from a collection of nationally oriented firms to one dominated by two giants. Stimuli external and internal to the European Union (EU) are responsible for this development. After describing the evolution of this sector since the end of the Cold War, the authors present four factors that played key roles: developments within the United States' defence industry; the impact of technology and defence economics; general economic restructuring within the EU together with nascent defence industrial policy; and progress towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy. While the evolution required all four factors, the EU played a critical and under–appreciated economic and political role in the changes that have transformed the European defence industry, and is now positioned to continue to shape this process.     

Missile defence and the transatlantic security relationship

This article examines the re-emergence of ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a contentious issue in US-European security relations since 1999. It begins by outlining three phases in the recent evolution of US missile defence policy from 1995 to mid-2001. The article then examines five key factors that have dominated European views and concerns in relation to BMD: a divergence between European and American assessments of the emerging ballistic missile threat; concern over the implications for nuclear arms control stemming from Russian and Chinese opposition to BMD; the impact of missile defence on deterrence and the Atlantic alliance; scepticism about the technological feasibility of BMD; and the potential opportunity costs associated with resource allocation to missile defence. It is shown that European anxieties have been exacerbated by a perception of a growing unilateralism in American security policy in recent years. The article proceeds by arguing that the US-European debate over BMD looks set to evolve in one of two directions. The more likely and most desirable scenario would involve the US reaching an understanding with its European allies on the way forward. The less desirable scenario would involve key European countries, such as France and Germany, deciding ultimately to withhold their political support for BMD, which would have the potential of causing significant rifts in both transatlantic and intra-European security relations. In both cases, it is argued that the BMD debate will be defined by the interaction of several key variables. These include the extent to which the Bush administration engages in meaningful consultations with the Europeans; the administration's ability or otherwise to reach an agreement with Russia on the way ahead; the architecture options of a future allied or global BMD system; the related issues of technological feasibility and financial cost; and the evolving missile threat.     

左、李塞防与海防之争新论

清同治、光绪年间,统治阶级内部在国防部署上曾有过一次塞防与海防之争.海防派以李鸿章为首,认为东南沿海千里海防是国防重点,主张弃新疆,专注海防.塞防派以左宗棠为首,主张塞防、海防并重,强调新疆在国防上的重要地位,坚决要求收复新疆.这场争论的实质是国防前线的战略部署和国家有限的财力如何分配;争论的焦点则是收复新疆还是放弃新疆.这场争论是公开的、正常的,其主张有正确与错误之分,其见解有高低之别,但不是爱国与卖国之争,不应因此给李鸿章戴上卖国或投降主义的帽子.     

吕海寰与清末国防述略

吕海寰曾在甲午战争、日俄战争和英军侵藏等关键时刻,积极参与有关国防的各种活动,针对时局世变与各种具体问题,提出了一系列客观见解和切实可行的办法,体现出强烈的爱国情怀.这样一位在中国近代史上起过重要作用的历史人物一直未能得到学界的重视,这是不应该的.     

Educating the guardians: The politics of the Australian defence force academy

In 1978–80 there was a fierce debate in public and in private over the proposal to create a new university for the academic education of officer cadets from the three services. This debate was one of the most intense and widespread in the defence area since the Vietnam War.

The pressure for a single tri‐service military academy goes back at least to the early 1960s. It reflects a broader movement in the defence field towards centralization of functions and reduction of the influence of the three separate services. Significantly, the tri‐service proposal was accepted by a Labor government in 1974 and by a Liberal‐CP government in 1976.

Opposition to the proposal came principally from the three services, the universities and parliamentarians from all parties. Hearings by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works provided a forum for criticism which was widely reported in the media.

In the event the Public Works Committee recommended against proceeding with the project but was overridden by the government The episode illustrates significant aspects of civil‐military relations and the workings of the political process.     

Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance

Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implications for Australian foreign policy, force structuring, joint operations and the defence industry, which were most coherently laid out in the 1987 White Paper. Later White Papers adapted this framework, but the 2013 White Paper seems to move towards a new approach to defence policy and strategy, which continued use of the term ‘self-reliance’ obscures rather than elucidates.     

Australian defence policy and the possibility of war

The Defence White Paper of December 2000 declares that the main task of the ADF is to maintain the capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack without relying on the combat forces of any other country. Australia is unusual among contemporary Western states in affirming such a policy. Most other states are reordering their priorities to put less emphasis on conventional conflict and more on tasks such as peacekeeping and border protection, while assuming that in the event of major conventional conflicts they are likely to be involved as subsidiary members of a coalition led in most cases by the United States. Should Australia follow this trend? The article reviews this question in the light of a number of scenarios for the use of Australia's armed forces in the period ahead, and concludes that the arguments for change are not persuasive.     

欧洲历史上家庭概念的演变及其特征

本文分析了自古典时代到 1 8世纪欧洲人家庭观念的演变及其与欧洲社会经济发展的关系。作者认为 ,古代罗马的家庭具有奴性 ,与奴隶制有关。随着奴隶制和家长权的衰落 ,以婚姻和血缘关系为基础的自然家庭的重要性逐渐显现。但是 ,家庭要成为一个独立的社会组织还要经历一个漫长的过程。在中世纪前期 ,欧洲人的家庭生活集体依然依附于当时的土地耕作制度。份地是当时的赋税征收单位 ,它包容了数量不同、形式多样的家庭户。份地制度的衰落终于使家庭户成为独立的社会组织。但至少从中世纪中期起至 1 8世纪中叶 ,欧洲人所说的家庭实际上就是家庭户 ,同住的非亲族成员也被算成家庭的一员 ,与户主形成假性的家庭关系。近代初期 ,随着商品货币关系向家庭户的渗透 ,从前虚拟的家庭关系便转化为雇佣关系 ,家庭才成为一个以血缘和婚姻关系为基础、共同生活的亲族集体 ,现代的家庭概念得以形成。作者认为 ,在欧洲历史上 ,家庭组织的存在方式和人们的家庭观念始终与一定的社会经济条件相联系 ,它们的演变过程几乎就是一部简约的欧洲史。     

融西会东 奇丽壮美——布拉格国立美术馆藏20世纪中国绘画述论

享有“波希米亚宝石”之誉的布拉格城建于九世纪中叶,位于伏尔塔瓦河西岸的赫瑞迪坎尼山丘上。之后经过多次扩建,至十四世纪形成今天的规模。1918年,布拉格成为独立的捷克斯洛伐克共和国的首都。1948年,布拉格国立美术馆（National Gallery in Prague）正式成立。