共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1995,58(1):199-205
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1996,58(2):467-472
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1991,53(4):843-847
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1992,54(3):579-582
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1991,54(1):183-185
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1993,55(4):813-820
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1996,58(3):713-715
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ALFRED J. ANDREA 《The Historian; a journal of history》1993,55(2):411-416
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1992,54(2):399-400
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1996,58(4):931-937
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Alfred J. Andrea 《The Historian; a journal of history》1992,55(1):183-190
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Gloria Toivola Oberstar 《政策研究杂志》1983,11(4):616-625
Using traditional models of electoral behavior one would not expect single-issue interest groups to have the impact on the American electoral system evident in recent elections. The difficulty in understanding their success lies in the assumption that the rational voter merely maximizes utility by choosing between the positions offered by the candidates/ political parties. Single-issue interest group activity has demonstrated, to the contrary, that it is possible for an assertive rational voter to successfully force candidates/ parties to take specific positions on issues and to form winning coalitions. 相似文献
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Peter W. Colby 《政策研究杂志》1983,11(4):699-708
The topic here is whether broad public interests in consumer rights, a clean environment, and political reform have the organizational strength to be represented effectively when policy-making is the responsibility of bureaus and administrative agencies. The most persuasive explanation of why such interests could not be effective on a sustained basis is the collective action theory of Mancur Olson. The paper supports research arguing for modifications of Olson's theory by showing how public interests have been at least partially successful in maintaining effectiveness over time based on four concepts: the similarity of public interest groups to social movements, the use of purposive and solidary incentives, the use of material incentives to support lobbying as a by-product of other activities, and the role of organizational entrepreneurs supported by new technology, notably the computerized mailing list. 相似文献
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