Malaysia and the End of the Bretton Woods System 1965–72: Disentangling from Sterling

This article examines the tense and complex monetary relationship between Britain, Singapore and Malaysia in the period from 1965 to 1972. It questions the assumption that Malaysia's economic significance to Britain was ‘on the wane’ by the 1960s. As the second largest government holder of sterling assets in the world, Malaysia should have been able to exert considerable leverage in London over the disposition of these assets. Ultimately, however, the very scale of these assets limited Malaysia's room for manoeuvre, as it could not sell off a significant proportion of them without undermining international confidence in the exchange rate of the pound and thereby precipitating the devaluation of its remaining sterling assets. The devaluation of sterling in 1967 emerges as a watershed in relations between London and Kuala Lumpur, with the Malaysians thereafter seeking to forge a more independent monetary policy. It is clear, however, that they did not actually succeed in doing so until 1972.     

Protecting the sterling area: The chifley government's response to multilateralism 1945–9

In 1942 the Australian Labor government accepted multilateralism in the form of Article VII of the Anglo‐American Mutual Aid Agreement. Some historians have argued that this was the beginning of a turning point in Australia's economic history: a movement away from the declining British empire towards the United States. I have two arguments in this article. The first is that Labor's acceptance of multilateralism did not lead, at least in the first five years after the war, to a deterioration in Australia's economic relationship with the United Kingdom. The reverse was true. Because of the acute shortage of dollars in the postwar world, Australia was obliged to expand her trade within the sterling area and to discriminate against American goods. The second argument is that although the Chifley government supported multilateralism as a theoretical concept, it opposed vigorously what it regarded as the Americans’ precipitate moves to dismantle the sterling area. The Chifley government sought to protect this cooperative system of exchange and import controls as a bulwark against the dollar shortage and against the possibility of a depression spreading from America.     

British Imperialism and the Political Economy of Malayan Independence

The article focuses on Britain’s relationship with Malaya shortly before and after its independence from the British Empire. The article looks at the negotiations concerning the financial settlement prior to independence. Britain sought to keep Malaya within the sterling area at all costs, even after de jure convertibility had been achieved, due to its high dollar earning capacity, which remained important due to persistent trade deficits with the US from the end of the Second World War. The article argues that this settlement, while seemingly very generous for an independent Malaya, was still very much intended to maintain Britain’s role within the global economy, to ensure sterling’s status as an international currency and to support conditions for British economic growth.     

Judging government economic performance

ABSTRACT

The macroeconomic theory of judging contends that when justices on courts of last resort consider cases involving their governments and economic issues their voting behaviour will be affected by the state of the economy. Using decisions from the High Court of Australia from 1970 through 2018, the findings suggest that both economic conditions, particularly inflation and the GDP growth rate, and the partisan identity of the Commonwealth government affect the Commonwealth’s probability of winning economic cases. The High Court’s behaviour is consistent with an institution that is part of the national policymaking system and is responsive to the state of the economy.     

The Commonwealth and South Africa: From Smuts to Mandela

The creation of modern South Africa as an independent unitary state within the British Empire (c. 1910) gave birth to the Commonwealth idea. Jan Smuts’s views on Commonwealth were formative and they continued to inform the evolution of the organisation until the end of the Second World War. Also significant was the role played by Afrikaner nationalist leader J. B. M. Hertzog, who exerted a critical influence on the 1926 Balfour Declaration and Statute of Westminster. At the point of South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961, the Commonwealth divided between new entrants, who cast South Africa as a pariah, and older member states who lamented the exit of a troubled family member. Even after South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961, apartheid’s significance as the global exemplar of institutionalised racism and colonial rule helped to bind the Commonwealth as a multi-racial organisation with strongly defined ethical values. South Africa’s reintegration in 1994, with Nelson Mandela to the fore, was welcomed as a triumph for the Commonwealth. Paradoxically, however, this proved a pyrrhic victory and may actually have contributed to the Commonwealth’s state of indirection.     

The Plural Society: Labour and the Commonwealth Idea 1900–1964

ABSTRACT

The Labour Party founded in 1900 necessarily confronted the imperial nature of the British state, the empire as an economic and military entity, and the inequalities it contained. Yet Labour initially thought on the subject primarily in terms of the liberal objective of the advancement of self-government. It was only in the 1930s, in the writings of Lansbury and Attlee, that more systematic thinking about the empire in terms of global divisions of labour of which the British working class were among the beneficiaries, began to emerge. Tensions between the perceived interests of these beneficiaries and of the working classes of the empire as a whole remained in Attlee’s postwar government. It did, however, begin to develop a reconceptionalisation of the empire as a multi-racial Commonwealth. This facilitated a Labour patriotism around the Commonwealth that reached its apogee in Gaitskell’s weaponising of it as a means of resisting European entry in 1962. Yet the economic and military relations he evoked were already out of date, leaving his successor, Harold Wilson, to adjust to a multi-racial partnership.     

Competition between regional governments and the federal culture of fiscal equalisation

Since federation, regional economic development in Australia has been shaped by fiscal competition among state and Commonwealth governments. Variations in the fiscal capacity of the different governments to provide goods and services, together with the Commonwealth's increased revenue collection powers since 1942, has led to vigorous political competition between the states over their share of the general purpose funds through a process known as fiscal equalisation. The state premiers themselves have been at the forefront of the debates over fiscal equalisation and, as events surrounding the 1992 June Premiers’ Conference have indicated, competition over an equitable share of the fiscal resources highlights the strong federal orientation of economic development. The aim of this paper is first, to explain the significance of the Commonwealth Grants Commission's equalisation process in the wider economic and political context of competitive state federalism and, second, to explain the historical importance of regional political values that contribute to the shape of state economic developments.     

Australian-African relations 2002: Another look

Various recent developments and events in Africa, including the involvement in 2002 of the Prime Minister of Australia in Commonwealth initiatives in relation to Zimbabwe, have made it timely to review the nature and extent of Australia's relations with African countries. This commentary describes current Australian policies on Africa, including trade relations and aid programs, against the background of the political and economic situation in Africa in the new millennium. In conclusion, the comment is made that Australia's dealings with African countries might have more significance to its own interests than is generally acknowledged. This is so particularly in respect of common standpoints on multilateral trade issues, and the future of the British Commonwealth.     

Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle

The reasons for the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf are highly contentious. While some scholars have focused on short-term considerations, especially the devaluation of sterling towards the end of 1967, in the British determination to quit the Gulf, others have concentrated on longer-term trends in British policy-making for the region. This article sides with the latter. Britain's Gulf role came under increasing scrutiny following the 1956 Suez crisis as part of an ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of Britain's Gulf presence. In this sense, British withdrawal fitted into a wider pattern of British decolonisation. By the 1960s, the Treasury, in particular, strongly questioned the necessity and cost-effectiveness of the maintenance of empire in the Gulf to safeguard British economic interests there. Recent interpretations which seek to disaggregate the British decision to leave Southeast Asia from the decision to depart from the Gulf are also questionable. By mid-1967, it had already been determined that Britain would leave both regions by the mid-1970s, the only difference being that this decision was formally announced with respect to Southeast Asia, but not with regard to the Gulf. The devaluation of sterling in November 1967, therefore, merely hastened and facilitated decisions which had already been taken. Despite the end of formal empire in the Gulf, Britain did seek, not always successfully, to preserve its interests into the 1970s and beyond.     

The Commonwealth and the Cold War,Neutralism, and Non-Alignment

In the Cold War era, the Commonwealth represented a global sub-system which both permitted and enabled multiple identities. Between 1949 and 1990, as a direct product of British decolonisation, the Commonwealth came to include forty-nine members of varying size with very different agenda and developmental needs to those larger members from the global ‘North’. Its heterogeneous membership included: NATO countries; ANZUS; the Non-Aligned Movement; the OAU; CARICOM; and the Organisation of East Caribbean States. As a ‘unique sovereign regime’, the Commonwealth defied ideological typecasting. It possessed organisational structure and bureaucratic support; it combined economic, financial, technical, and scientific association, and privileged the role of diplomacy through the latitude permitted to its Secretary-General. The Commonwealth's two sustained ‘grand strategies’ were the pursuit of racial justice (in Rhodesia, South West Africa/South Africa) and social justice through the promotion of development, focusing on the principal preoccupations of newly independent states and their nation/state-building projects. These intersected with, but were by no means defined by, the Cold War, and represented a collaboration of West/South, rather than the confrontation of East/West.     

The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933–59: Precursors of the Tri-sector Commonwealth

One of the unique features of the Commonwealth as an international association is the width and depth of its non-political manifestations. At recent Commonwealth conferences political and official consultations have been held in parallel with large civil society, business and youth forums and, in some cases, inter-faith dialogues. Growing collaboration between the political, civil society and business elements gives rise to the notion of the ‘tri-sector Commonwealth’. The concept of an ‘association of peoples’ as well as one of nations, does, however, have a long pedigree. Between 1933 and 1959 a series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, organised by Chatham House and its overseas affiliates, were held at roughly five-yearly intervals to analyse the implications of the most recent Imperial Conferences. Politicians and civil servants joined with lawyers, academics, editors, military men, agriculturalists and trade unionists. In contrast to the political Commonwealth, women had a part in the unofficial conferences. And among more than 400 participants at Toronto 1933, Lapstone 1938, London 1945, Bigwin 1949, Lahore 1954 and Palmerston North 1959 were fifty-five academic historians and other writers of history, who included most of the leading authorities on the Commonwealth of the 1930s and 1940s.     

‘This Community Which Nobody Can Define’: Meanings of Commonwealth in the Late 1940s and 1950s

Assessments of early postwar understandings of the power and potential of the Commonwealth have suggested the body either failed to shield the British public from a sense of national decline or that it comforted them that there was no need to worry about decolonisation because the organisation enabled the maintenance of British authority by other means. However, historians and political scientists who provided public comment on the present and future of the body in the late 1940s and 1950s complicate such assessments, wracked as they were by a profound uncertainty over what the Commonwealth could achieve. Their sense of uncertainty was not derived from a pessimistic reading of the tangible events and processes of the period that we might today assume blunted commentators’ faith in Commonwealth cohesion, such as Britain’s relationship with Europe, neutralism, apartheid, or even Suez. Instead, uncertainty over the Commonwealth’s capacity to realise a latent potential supposedly rooted in its members’ willingness to work together was rooted in something more elemental, namely sustained uncertainty regarding the nature of the body’s connections and functions. The body was judged an abstraction, a nascent and unparalleled experiment whose bonds were extensive yet impossible to measure. Its perceived opacity rendered it neither a cause for concern nor a salve to a wounded British morale.     

Are you willing to be made nothing? Is Commonwealth reform possible?

A new round of Commonwealth reform proposals commenced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting of 2009. An ensuing report, titled A Commonwealth of the people: time for urgent reform, contained a long list of proposals that eventually resulted in 2013 in the adoption of the Commonwealth Charter. Many classic international organizations are in need of reform, but this is, of course, challenging. This new Commonwealth reform process will not lead to satisfying changes and will not make it a more relevant actor in global governance. The year 2015 marks the Commonwealth Secretariat's first half‐century. We take this symbolic marker to push for a forward‐looking exercise, arguing that because the true nature of the Commonwealth is often misunderstood, a better understanding of the organization is essential before embarking on any successful change‐management project. In the article we identify four different kinds of Commonwealth: three of a ‘formal’ nature (the official, bureaucratic and the people's Commonwealth) and a fourth ‘informal’ one (Commonwealth Plus). By describing the potential of these four different kinds of Commonwealth, we can anticipate better the challenges with which the Commonwealth network is faced, both internal (including its mandate, its British imperial past and dominance, the organization's leadership and its membership) and external (other international organizations, other Commonwealths, rivalry with regional organizations and the rise of global policy networks). Consequently, this should lead to a better and more sustainable debate about the Commonwealth's future role in global governance.     

Australian Federal Government Road Funding 1972–1986

Increasing Commonwealth Government desire to establish national priorities for road expenditure was successfully thwarted by constitutionally powerful State Governments until the early 1980s Political considerations interfered with the consistently efficiency-orientated national priorities suggested by the Commonwealth Government's advisory organisation. The paper evaluates efficiency, equality and equity as potential bases for road funding, before analysing what happened over the period 1972-86. The 1982 ABRD program allowed the Commonwealth to impose its priorities in an area of State constitutional authority.     

Canadian Diplomacy and the 1982 Falklands War

As a case study, Canadian diplomacy during the Falklands War is emblematic of the confused, and at times contradictory, components of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's utopic and idealistic foreign policy. Canada's diplomatic actions during the war were based on four principles. The first, and most significant, was the safeguarding of what were deemed to be Canada's economic interests: chiefly nuclear exports. The second was Trudeau's ‘Third Option’ policy and the belief of ‘the vital importance of the North-South dynamic to Canada’. Third was the desire to distance Canadian foreign policy, economics, and military commitments from those of both the United States and Great Britain. Trudeau had mixed feelings about the Commonwealth and disliked both President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lastly, during the war Canadian politicians and diplomats took the position of an ambiguous neutrality to protect and promote what they perceived to be Canadian interests. Many of the political and economic decisions made by Canada during the Falklands War were met by harsh criticism nationally and internationally in both public and political spheres.     

Britain's External Economic Policy in the Early 1950s: The Historical Significance of operation Robot

In February 1952 the British Cabinet met to consider implementinga series of proposals that would have transformed the postwarinternational political economy. The policies, code-named OperationRobot, centred on introducing sterling convertibility on a floatingexchange rate allied to the blocking of sterling balances andthe reopening of the London gold market on budget day, 11 March.To assess whether the defeat of Robot is of historical significancethis article analyses the likely impact of the plan on the internationalpolitical economy in the 1950s looking in particular at itseffect on the Sterling Area, Europe, and the United States.It concludes that the plan would have changed fundamentallythe existing international order leading most probably to theclosure of the European Payments Union and the InternationalMonetary Fund. Robot would also have undermined Franco-Germanco-operation and provided support for the British conceptionof European collaboration with sterling at the heart of an enlargedCommonwealth/European trading area.     

To Swear or Not to Swear?: Britain,Southeast Asia and the Attempt to Reform the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1964–1971

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explore the British government’s perception of the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a method of strengthening cohesion amongst the Commonwealth community, and in particular delves into the constitutional and diplomatic challenges that the British government faced in its attempt to utilise the Judicial Committee in order to maintain close ties with its former Southeast Asian colonies in the 1960s. Suggestions were made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Privy Council Office from the mid-1960s that newly-independent republics such as Singapore and Malaysia should be allowed to send its citizens to London as members of the Judicial Committee in order to dilute the prejudice against the Committee as a remnant of colonial rule. However, the proposals were rejected by the Lord Chancellor’s Office on the grounds that Asian judges were of insufficient calibre to sit as members of the Judicial Committee, and that citizens of republics were unable to swear an oath of loyalty to the British monarch as was required for all Privy Counsellors. The Privy Council Office were of the opinion that a new system could be introduced whereby the Judicial Committee member would not have to be a fully-fledged Privy Counsellor and therefore would not have to swear the oath, while the Commonwealth Secretariat put forward its argument that Asian judges were good enough to ensure standards of the Judicial Committee would not be lowered. However, the Lord Chancellor’s Office argued that such non-Privy Counsellors would only be ‘second-class’ constituents of the Judicial Committee whose rulings would be unacceptable to countries such as Australia and instead proposed the creation of a Commonwealth Court of Appeal which the Foreign Office deemed unrealistic. In the end, no judges from the Asian republics were allowed sit on the Judicial Committee, resulting in Malaysia and Singapore abolishing their appeals to the Judicial Committee in 1984 and 1994 respectively.     

Campaigning Against Apartheid: The Rise,Fall and Legacies of the South Africa United Front 1960–1962

ABSTRACT

The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral causes. Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the country. In March 1961, the international campaign against apartheid achieved its first major success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd chose to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of State Summit held in London. As a consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure would effectively serve as a catalyst for achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South Africa. The global campaign, centred on South Africa remaining in the Commonwealth, was the first of its kind launched by South Africa’s national liberation movements, and signalled the beginning of thirty years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a role in launching and co-ordinating this particular transnational campaign, the South Africa United Front (SAUF), an alliance of liberation groups, have been largely forgotten. Leading members of the SAUF claimed the organisation had a key part in South Africa’s subsequent exit from the Commonwealth, and the purpose of this article is to explore the validity of such assertions, as well as the role and impact it had in generating a groundswell of opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. Although the SAUF’s demands for South Africa to leave the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, the documentary evidence suggests that its campaigning activities and impact were not a decisive factor; however the long-term significance of the SAUF, and the position it had in the rise of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) has not been fully recognised. As such, the events around the campaign for South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth act as a microcosm of developments that would define the international struggle against apartheid.     

General Cariappa encounters ‘White Australia’: Australia,India and the commonwealth in the 1950s

There have been a number of studies of the White Australia policy and some examination of white Australia's relationship to the new, multiracial Commonwealth that emerged after the Second World War. Drawing extensively on Indian sources, this article examines how Australia was viewed by India's high commissioner to Australia and New Zealand, General K. M. Cariappa. In the period from September 1953 to April 1956 he sparked considerable controversy by suggesting that the White Australia policy ran the risk of alienating Asian opinion and undermining the Commonwealth ideal in India and Pakistan. Cariappa maintained a high public profile throughout his stay in Australia and was widely regarded as one of the most prominent diplomats posted to Canberra in the 1950s.     

英国退出印度的官方心态调整

英国财政困境与殖民统治问题是英国从印度退却的现实背景,然而,英国政府错误地认为自己仍然是印度独立进程的主导者,维持印度统一并把印度羁留在英联邦正是英国在此心态影响下制定的双重战略。内阁使团失败表明印度主要矛盾已经从殖民者与民族主义者对立转变为印度国大党与穆斯林联盟之间的利益斗争。随着印度局势恶化,英国政府的主导者心态转变为焦虑与无奈。蒙巴顿在形势压力下放弃统一印度的主张,承认了印巴分治的事实。英国政府在印度独立进程中的心态调整表明英国主动权非常有限,印度政治局势才是理解非殖民化的关键。