Sino–American relations: new changes and new challenges

Sino–American relations encompass a highly complex array of cooperative and competitive dimensions. Recently, they have evolved around the question of ‘China's rise’ or (as Chinese analysts would state it) ‘peaceful evolution’. This article surveys both the cooperative and competitive structural elements of this important bilateral relationship. It tracks recent transitions in that relationship, arguing that China's new-found status as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in American eyes will present a new set of American expectations and new forms of strategic collaboration that will seriously test both sides’ policy creativity and ability to adapt to a rapidly changing global environment.     

Elite‐nonelite linkages in Australia: An empirical analysis

Research conducted in Europe and the United States has shown that the nature of the linkage between the elite and the non‐elite is crucial in modern democratic societies. With data drawn from matched samples of the workforce, and of leaders in government, business and trade unions, this paper uses multivariate analysis to examine attitudinal linkages between the elite and the non‐elite in Australia. The results show, firstly, that there is little variation in the belief structures of the two groups, though this may be partly a consequence of the questions that were asked. Secondly, there are significant variations in where the elite and mass are distributed in these attitudes, and some additional variations within the elite itself. Finally, three hypotheses are tested to explain the differences in elite‐nonelite attitudes. Two hypotheses — that the variations can be attributed to socioeconomic status or elite networks — have little empirical foundation, while the third hypothesis — that variations in levels of information and political interest account for the differences — gains more substantial empirical support.     

Les relations franco‐allemandes contemporaines

Friend, J.W., The Linchpin. French‐German Relations, 1950–1990 (Praeger, 1991), xxi+135pp., $40.00, ISBN 0 275 94257 0

McCarthy, P., ed. France‐Germany, 1983–1993. The Struggle to Cooperate (St Martin's Press, 1993), xi+212pp., $50.00, ISBN 0 312 08524 9     

The Sino‐Soviet Conference, 1924–1927

Soviet Union issued two declarations toward China in 1919 and 1920, promising to nullify all treaty privileges in China previously established by the Tsarist government voluntarily. However, in the formal negotiations Karakhan insisted that old treaties must be replaced by new treaty. Finally, the Sino‐Soviet Agreement, literarily, “Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions”, signed in May 1924 and diplomatic relations restored at once, a conference was stipulated to meet within one month to solve all questions and to conclude a formal treaty. Nevertheless, the conference was postponed for more than a year; when it did convene too many controversies led it nowhere. Since no treaty was produced at the Sino‐Soviet Conference, the old treaties were not abolished, therefore the Soviet's promises were never practiced.     

Changes in Japanese strategy in 1939–1940 and the internationalization of the Sino–Japanese War

In the early stage of the Sino–Japanese War, Japan was trying hard to limit the conflict to within a scope where it could be resolved bilaterally between only the two nations involved. However, her actual behavior was in stark contrast to her wishful desire to be at peace with the United States, pushing the latter step by step instead in the direction of aiding China and thwarting Japan. Caught in a dilemma created as the United States abrogated the American–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and faced with the changes in the European situation, Japan’s policy makers were eventually pushed by their obsession with the “New East Asian Order” and by their yearning for the “Extended New East Asian Order” which was to include Southeast Asia, deciding to steer the Sino–Japanese War in the direction of “international resolution,” which was just an alternate route to the same goal sought by China. Subsequently, not only did Japan refuse to withdraw from China, she actually took one step further in an expansion southwards, trying to kill several birds with one stone. The war thus spilled over from China to encompass a much greater area. In this process, Japan’s diplomatic corps was often several steps ahead of the military, reflecting the carefully considered background in Japanese policymaking.