Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Unsustainable? Implications for the Balkans and European Union

Two U.S.-based political geographers survey the current state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), characterized by increasing political tensions between its two constituent entities—the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (RS). The authors examine ways in which recurrent calls for a referendum on RS's self-determination/independence (from BiH) have charged the political atmosphere in both entities, delayed the formation of a central government in the aftermath of inter-entity elections in October 2010, and thus precipitated claims of BiH's unsustainability. In a concluding section, they explore the broader implications of renewed conflict and territorial fragmentation in BiH, which include the mobilization of seccessionist movements (and possible ethnic cleansing) in other contested regions in the Balkans and the former USSR and the possibility of renewed EU/NATO military engagement, with the attendant risks involving the EU's relations with Russia and member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 1 figure, 2 tables, 38 references.     

Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten

Since its formal launch in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed at a remarkable rate. In the subsequent decade, the EU has carried out 22 ESDP military and civilian operations and become an important element of Europe's ability to respond to international crises. For all this, however, there remain grounds for concern. These relate in part to the fact that, for all the early activism of ESDP, those military missions undertaken to date have been relatively limited in size and scope. The EU has also strikingly failed to intervene in certain crises that once seemed ideally suited to an ESDP deployment. The ESDP has also to a degree failed to bring about the enhancement to European military capabilities that some had hoped would be its major achievement. More generally, there is a danger that an exclusive focus on EU security policies will serve merely to distract member states from the broader international strategic environment, with ESDP serving as an alibi for their continued failure to live up to their international security responsibilities.     

Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011

Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US‐led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub‐national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war‐weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring ‘victory’. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational‐strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.     

Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa

This article overviews the development of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to date and examines EU involvement in this. The European Union is the major financial partner in both military and non‐military assistance to the African Union (AU). Europe has shifted from being a major UN troop contributor towards the funding of African‐led peace operations, as well as the emergence of time‐limited, high‐impact, missions. With the exception of Somalia, these ESDP operations have provided little direct security benefit to Europe and their success has been limited. They have provided experimentation opportunities of ESDP capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Guinea Bissau. Events in the eastern Congo in late 2008 demonstrate that the EU needs to consider carefully when it intervenes militarily in Africa: non‐intervention and coordinated bilateral diplomatic efforts by EU member states can be more effective.     

What after counter‐insurgency? Raiding in zones of turmoil

This article argues that the option of a military raid is becoming more relevant in the contemporary strategic environment. Two developments lead to this conclusion: the increase in the number of so‐called failed states and subsequently ungoverned areas; and the western inadequate response in the attempts to create zones of stability with clear strategic addresses. The efforts for statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed, and the US and its allies have realized that foreign interventions, even after the commitment of much treasure and blood, are ineffective. This means that the West must adapt its strategic thinking to the new developments and devise ways to deal effectively with the situation. This article explores the concept of strategic raid and elaborates on its theoretical underpinnings. The raids discussed here are military operations conducted in order to weaken and/or deter a non‐state actor, at least temporarily. In the absence of diplomatic and economic leverage, the aim is limiting the actor's ability to harm others. The use of force is designed to degrade the military capabilities of the non‐state adversary and to influence its resolve. Subsequently, it discusses a few historical examples of raiding strategy and then analyses two contemporary cases, Israel and the United States, in order to demonstrate the utility of raids today. Finally, the relevance of raiding strategy for other states in the contemporary strategic environment is discussed.     

Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women,Peace and Security agenda

The European Union is seen to operate at the international level by promoting ideas and values, rather than by exerting military or economic power. As a gender actor, the EU has played a key role in the development of formal equality, which is presented as a foundational principle of European integration. It therefore follows that normative power Europe should seek to promote these values in external affairs. This article interrogates the role of the EU as a normative gender actor in relation to its implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions. Documentary analysis will be supplemented by a detailed assessment of speeches and public statements about the role of the EU as a gender actor in external affairs. This data will be used to assess whether there is a disjuncture between the dominant narrative about gender equality as a fundamental value of the EU and the actions of the organization. It will also allow us to assess whether gender mainstreaming is a tool for public diplomacy or has made a significant change to the way the external relations agenda is formulated and implemented. Additionally, the article will draw attention to the institutional obstacles to the EU performing a role as a gender actor in external affairs. It identifies a critical tension between framing the WPS resolutions as an extension of the EU's equality on the one hand, and understanding that gender mainstreaming is a mere policy tool in international affairs. In doing so, it highlights how competing institutional demands can ultimately undermine core values (e.g. equality) when they are used instrumentally.     

Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?

The controversial framework of interaction between Russia and Europe is defined by some enduring parameters—geographic realities, historical experiences, religious beliefs, normative values, psychological characteristics, behavioural patterns, cultural orientations. The incongruity between cultural/civilizational and geopolitical identities further complicates Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes to, Europe. Russia's initial pro-Western enthusiasm in the early post-Cold War period was soon overshadowed by serious difficulties in its adaptation to a reduced position in Europe, as well as by numerous grievances with respect to the West. As a result, Russia's attempts to develop a 'pan-European architecture', as well as its policy with regard to multilateral structures operating in continental Europe, have been marked by deeply contradictory patterns of promoting openness towards Europe on the one hand and keeping a certain distance from it on the other. The enlargement of NATO and especially recent NATO military operations in the Balkans have been perceived in Russia not only as confrontational but also as relegating it to the sidelines of European developments. Although Russia's long-awaited transition to the post-Yeltsin era and its new European perspective have been undermined by the war in Chechnya, President Putin's unexpected pro-Westernism (its pragmatism notwithstanding) is a promising sign of rapprochement with Europe.     

More flexible,less coherent: NATO after Lisbon

At its 2010 Lisbon summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took significant steps towards becoming a modern alliance. In the face of a changing security environment and divergent strategic interests among 28 members, NATO adapted its strategic concept and reformed its way of formulating strategy. The new strategic concept advances conflict management as a core task for the alliance. In combination with a greater emphasis on developing partnerships, NATO conceptually strengthened its profile as a global security actor. The summit also reflected a new approach to formulating NATO strategy by providing the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with a strong role in setting the strategic agenda. Indeed, he assumed a more supranational function rather than acting as a representative of all allies. But as the Libya operation demonstrates, NATO will struggle to maintain cohesion in an increasingly ‘polycentric’ alliance. While the focus on conflict management will make the alliance more flexible, it will also become a less coherent global security actor.     

A European contribution to non‐proliferation? The EU WMD Strategy at ten

In the aftermath of the ruptures caused by the Iraq crisis, European states agreed in December 2003 on both a European Security Strategy and an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Ten years have passed since this attempt to kick‐start common European policies on WMD proliferation. How well have EU policies performed in this area? Has a specifically European way of dealing with proliferation challenges emerged? This article traces the development of EU policies on WMD proliferation since 2003 by examining, in particular, European reactions to the nuclear crisis in Iran, as well as European interactions with the international non‐proliferation regime and the cooperation with partner countries. The article concludes that the EU has performed much better than might have been expected in an area that has traditionally been one of the fiercely guarded prerogatives of national security policies. The EU's good performance is very much related to institutional flexibility, as exemplified by the EU/E3 approach to Iran; and, to a high degree of political pragmatism. However, important shortcomings remain, most notably the lack of coordination between national and European non‐proliferation efforts. In other words, the EU has not in the last ten years turned into a fully fledged non‐proliferation actor that can deliver tangible results in any area of proliferation concern.     

Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe

This article examines the potential of human security as a narrative and operational frame for the European Union's external relations. Human security is about the security of individuals and communities and it links physical and material security—‘freedom from fear’, and ‘freedom from want’. The article addresses both the lexis (language) and praxis (practice)of human security in relation to the EU. Much of the language currently used in EU external relations, particularly crisis management, civil—military cooperation and conflict management, already contains elements of a human security approach. At the same time, the concept of human security goes beyond these terms and if formally adopted and elaborated could greatly strengthen the EU's role as a global security actor. The article develops five principles of human security—human rights, legitimate political authority, multilateralism and regional focus—and makes the case that the application of these principles would increase the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of EU missions. The article concludes that the adoption of a human security approach would build on the foundational ideas of Europe in overcominga history of war and imperialism and could help to rally public opinion behind the European idea. More importantly, it would contribute to closing the real security vacuum that exists in large parts of the world today.     

Now that's Controversial! Tracing the Influence of Policy Discourses on History Education Reform in the Balkans

In this article, I bring an ethnographic lens to untangling the influence of policy discourses on civil society-initiated projects of history education reform in the Balkans. Drawing on data from a multi-sited project conducted amongst historians, teachers, and NGO personnel, I ask: what are the dominant discourses that impact civil society-initiated efforts to promote history education reform, and how are these discourses made authoritative? How does policy act to organize the work of this cluster of actors, and what kinds of responses does it provoke? While educational policy discourses and their impacts are varied, I argue that such discourses can be profitably viewed as technologies of governance deployed in the service of post-national citizenship formation. In analysing behaviours of “complaisance”, how “competencies” emerge as a slippery signifier whose expansive meaning was exploited to multiple ends, and how the demands of post-national citizenship can, and sometimes do, detract from the goal of addressing controversial history, I map the field of possibilities in which my interlocutors found themselves, and highlight how they navigated their positions as mediators of particular, shifting, social worlds.     

The European defence project and the Prague summit

This article reviews the state of the two security and defence institutions available to west Europeans: NATO and the EU's common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In each case, the authors assess the political maturity and stability of the institution, and then ask what it can contribute in terms of coordinated military capability to west European's strategic readiness. NATO's Prague summit in November 2002 will address the thorny issue of the next tranche of post–Cold War enlargement. But beyond the predictable debate about which candidates to admit, and what should be offered to those unsuccessful in their bid, there will be a far more urgent and important agenda to be discussed at Prague—the military capabilities of the European allies. Given that ESDP is still far from achieving its capability goals, the authors argue that the time is right for European allies to begin thinking in terms of generating a composite, joint strike force which could be configured to be interoperable with US forces and which could salvage something useful from the disheartening lack of progress in developing a European military capability.     

Military Identities,Conventional Capability and the Politics of NATO Standardisation at the Beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970–1980

This paper uses equipment standardisation as a lens for examining power relationships and the importance of military identity in framing the development of NATO conventional capability. In the face of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming military capacity the logic of standardisation was compelling. Standardising equipment and making military forces interoperable reduced logistics overlap, increased the tempo of operations and allowed partners to optimise manufacturing capacity. Applied carefully, standardisation would help NATO mount a successful conventional defence of Western Europe, a crucial aspect of the Alliance's flexible response strategy. In this paper, we apply Actor Network Theory to standardisation discussions thereby revealing the incoherence and volatility of NATO's collective strategic thinking and the vast networks of countervailing interests on which this is based.     

All the way? The evolution of German military power

German strategic decision‐makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO‐led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies’ reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision‐makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the ‘small war’ in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill‐prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war‐fighting. In addition, the government and the Bundeswehr lack vital strategy‐making capabilities. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force.     

Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests

The formation of a coalition government by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, combined with the need for important cuts to Britain's armed forces has raised significant uncertainties about Britain's attitude to defence cooperation within the European Union. Since taking office the coalition, while grappling with the implications of Britain's fiscal challenges, has shown an unprecedented interest in strengthening bilateral defence collaborations with certain European partners, not least France. However, budgetary constraints have not induced stronger support for defence cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, under the new government, Britain has accelerated its withdrawal from the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article assesses the approach of the coalition to the CSDP. It argues that, from the perspective of British interests, the need for EU defence cooperation has increased over the last decade and that the UK's further withdrawal from EU efforts is having a negative impact. The coalition is undermining a framework which has demonstrated the ability to improve, albeit modestly, the military capabilities of other European countries. In addition, by sidelining the EU at a time when the UK is forced to resort more extensively to cost‐saving synergies in developing and maintaining its own armed forces, David Cameron's government is depriving itself of the use of potentially helpful EU agencies and initiatives—which the UK itself helped set up. Against the background of deteriorating European military capabilities and shifts in US priorities, the article considers what drove Britain to support EU defence cooperation over a decade ago and how those pressures have since strengthened. It traces Britain's increasing neglect of the CSDP across the same period, the underlying reasons for this, and how the coalition's current stance of disengagement is damaging Britain's interests.     

NATO's Triple Challenge

NATO's future is again the subject of speculation and debate despite its having fought a recent and apparently successful war in Kosovo. This article proposes that there are three aspects to this challenge. First, NATO is facing a series of dilemmas in its relations with non‐members: how should it manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? The authors argue that NATO should seek to develop a consolidationist posture. The second challenge is that of developing an EU–NATO partnership in the light of the Helsinki Headline Goals. This, it is proposed, can be developed through a division of labour. The third task, that of military restructuring, is overshadowed by the complexities of processing a working European military structure. In conclusion, the authors suggest that a strategy for the alliance, a key component of the Cold War, but subsequently lost, can be refashioned from the above elements.     

NATO: the practice and politics of transformation

The Iraq crisis caused a deep rift in US–European relations and within Europe. NATO seemed sure at least to be damaged, if not fatally undermined. But to the dismay of those who have been waiting for many years for NATO finally to unravel, the Atlantic alliance spent 2003 proudly showing off its transformation project, and looking forward to its next enlargement in 2004. Yet these necessary improvements to NATO's political and military structures, and to its deployable capability, cannot alone secure the alliance's future. This article argues that what is needed, as ever, is a shared determination among governments that NATO can continue to serve their needs. There has been no better opportunity since the end of the Cold War to place the US-European security relationship on a firm footing through NATO. There has also been no moment when the penalties of failure have been higher. If NATO's transformation agenda, together with the NATO–EU 'Berlin Plus' arrangement, are not exploited to the full, then US-European security relations are unlikely to recover from Iraq.     

'A milestone in the history of the EU': Kosovo and the EU's international role

The Kosovo war was a decisive catalyst in the development of the EU's international security role. The escalating crisis in Kosovo confirmed that the EU was still unable to prevent, contain or end violent conflict along its own borders. This led the EU to augment both its hard and soft power through the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy and the Stabilisation and Association Process. These initiatives endowed the EU with the potential to make a distinct contribution to international conflict management. Unsurprisingly, this continuing transformation has encountered significant obstacles relating to capabilities, political will and coordination. Concerns have also been raised about how the development of a military dimension has changed the nature of EU power. However, the EU has not abandoned the core principle upon which its international role was founded, namely the need to transcend conflict. Ten years after its failings in Kosovo, the EU is assuming increasing responsibility for conflict management and becoming a more capable international security actor.     

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate during the early part of the twenty‐first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non‐military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate‐damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden‐sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.