THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF HIERARCHICAL INTER-URBAN SYSTEMS: EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMUM*

In this paper, I model a simple hierarchical inter-urban system in which the location of business firms is considered together with the determination of residential land-use patterns. By supposing a spatial externality between the business firms and all the residents of the region, three spatial structures are obtained: monocentricity, multicentricity, and a separate pattern where cities are spatially split with an agricultural land existing between them. It is also shown that the spatial structures of monocentric and multicentric patterns formed by the market principle tend to be more concentrated than the optimum.     

SPATIAL DEPENDENCE AND SPATIAL STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY IN APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS*

The stability of regression coefficients over the observation set (“regional homogeneity”) is typically assessed by means of a Chow test or within a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework. When spatial error autocorrelation is present in cross-sectional equations the traditional tests are no longer applicable. I evaluate this both in formal terms as well as empirically. I introduce a taxonomy of spatial effects in models for structural instability, and discuss its implication for testing. I compare the performance of traditional tests, robust approaches, maximum-likelihood procedures and pretest techniques by means of a series of simple Monte Carlo experiments.     

MILL PRICING AND SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MONOPOLY PERFORMANCE AND LOCATION WITH SPATIAL RETAIL MARKETS*

ABSTRACT. Most of the monopoly spatial price discrimination literature explicitly assumes uniform population density over space. It also implicitly assumes that firms (plants) are spatially isolated from each other with production and retail points that coincide in location. While departures from these assumptions have been explored separately in the literature, it remains to examine performance and location when these assumptions are relaxed simultaneously. What emerges in this paper is a model where density functions approximate a pair of cities isolated from other cities. Each city has its own retail market, while the location of a single production or wholesale point is determined by characteristics of the two markets. Comparisons of mill pricing and spatial price discrimination found in the spatial monopoly literature can be interpreted as special cases of the more general framework provided here.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF URBAN SPATIAL STRUCTURE. THE PORT-CITY MODEL RECONSIDERED*

In this paper, I consider a general equilibrium urban spatial structure in the setting of a port city by adopting Cobb-Douglas type functional forms for production and utility functions. Unlike previous port-city models, this one can generate four land-use patterns, that is, (1) monocentric, (2) completely integrated, (3) partially integrated (with integration at the center), and (4) partially integrated (with integration at the urban fringe) land-use patterns, and the last pattern suggests a new explanation of suburbanization of employment. The existence and uniqueness of each land-use pattern is proven in a simple constructive way.     

SPATIAL COMPETITION AND THE JOINT CONSUMPTION OF SERVICES*

In Hotelling location models, an implicit assumption has been made that a customer uses the service provided by the firm, independent of other customers. However, for firms that supply meeting rooms, wedding halls, tennis courts, and golf links it is essential to incorporate the fact that the customer only uses the service in conjunction with other customers. The objective of this paper is to formulate the Hotelling location model n consideration of the interdependence among customers in one-dimensional space, and to characterize the state of equilibrium. In our model, each group of members within a given distance enjoys a fixed amount of service of the firms, under the assumption that the travel cost incurred by each group is defined as the travel cost of the farthest customer in the group.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF SPATIAL PRODUCT AND LABOR MARKETS*

ABSTRACT A simple general equilibrium model relates spatial product markets and spatial labor markets. The firm is treated as being a spatial monopolist or as a Löschian competitor in the output market and as a spatial monopsonist in the labor market. Derived free spatial demand and free regional labor supply are defined, and their properties examined. The model provides the framework for analyzing the impact of a technological improvement in labor productivity on the structure of the spatial markets. The impact of entry on spatial labor supply is an important determinant of whether or not entry lowers wages and raises output prices. Unlike the spaceless competitive paradigm, zero-profit long-run equilibrium can occur in a space economy under conditions of increasing returns to scale.     

REGIONAL INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INSTABILITY*

ABSTRACT. National and regional employment patterns are subject to growth-instability tradeoffs. This paper applies the portfolio selection model to detailed employment data for the U.S. economy and selected states. Empirical results indicate that growth-instability trade-offs exist in a form not previously understood. The paper also identifies growth and stabilization potential by identifying stabilizing sectors.     

SOME SPATIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE OPTIMAL AND SUBOPTIMAL SOLUTIONS TO THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM

T he CALCULATION and economic interpretation of alternative solutions and sub-optimal solutions to the transportation problem of linear programming are discussed and illustrated with particular reference to their application in the Soviet wood-processing industry.