The Relevance of Cassirer and the Rewriting of Intellectual History

Summary

This essay aims to discuss the historiographical implications and premises of Peter Gordon's masterly book Continental Divide, in which he re-evaluates the Davos meeting between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger. This impressive reminder of the prospects of intellectual history deserves to be paid serious attention, particularly in European philosophy departments. Gordon's book exemplifies how problems of systematic philosophy can be clarified by a detour through history.

I want to highlight three aspects of Gordon's book that fundamentally transform and deepen our understanding of intellectual history in general and the Davos meeting in particular. First, I highlight one of the main merits of Gordon's study: his emphasis on the plurality behind the term ‘continental philosophy’. This opens up a whole new perspective on a seemingly well-known event within the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Second, I address Gordon's methodological premises, which challenge and fundamentally transform our understanding of intellectual history. Third, I attempt to summarise, from an intellectual history perspective, Gordon's argument about Cassirer's relevance. Here we are faced with the task of realigning and legitimising philosophy in a radically historicised world. To adumbrate the core of my comment I should say that I am thrilled by Gordon's book. I agree with nearly everything he says apart from his conclusions. In a closing remark I will try to explain the reasons for this surprising divergence.     

Further Thoughts on the Imperial Endgame and Britain's Dirty Wars

The publication of my book Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire in 2011 provoked many to respond, although not with a criticism that was consistent across the board. In my work, I intentionally did not draw a moral conclusion and took care to present what I considered a balanced account of British decolonisation, without praise or condemnation of past actions. This has made my argument vulnerable from several directions since, as reviewer Ashley Jackson commented, ‘it is rather difficult to know on which side the author's bread is buttered’. This paper is an attempt to bring clarity to my argument and to continue the debate on some of the aspects of Britain's end of empire that my book discussed.     

2. IN DEFENSE OF PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: A RESPONSE TO CAROLA DIETZE

This response to Carola Dietze's critique of Provincializing Europe takes up for examination three key expressions or ideas on which the original argument of the book was founded: hyperreal Europe, historicism, and political modernity. I appreciate the spirit of Dietze's engagement with the book, but I show that her critique is based on a degree of misapprehension of these three central ideas. While clarifying the details and the degree of my disagreement with Dietze, I provide my own critique of Dietze's proposal of “equal histories” by arguing that Dietze has not named or explained the unit with respect to which different histories could be considered equal. I also argue that Dietze's proposals about judging societies only by their “own” standards, and basing human dignity on the idea of a “human nature” that could be seen as a “constant,” do not solve the problems she sees with my book and are themselves open to some serious historical and logical criticism.     

The more‐than‐minimal state defended against Nozick

Robert Nozick's book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia provides one of the most influential statements of the argument that the welfare state is lacking in moral justification because it infringes property rights. Most previous criticisms of Nozick's work have been concerned to reject the concept of abstract individual rights that forms his starting point. While sound, these criticisms may have little influence on those who find the concept of abstract rights plausible. In this paper Nozick's assumptions about rights are accepted and it is shown that a much more extensive state than Nozick's minimal defensive agency can be supported. Under the specified conditions this stage does not violate these rights. If so much of the argument of those who accept abstract rights is undermined.     

Montaigne: Founder of Modern Liberalism

In this essay David Lewis Schaefer summarizes and defends the argument set forth in his book The Political Philosophy of Montaigne (Cornell University Press, 1990; second edition 2019) that Michele de Montaigne's Essays (first edition, 1580) merits consideration as a founding text of modern political liberalism. After responding to the most extensive published critique of his interpretation (by James Supple) and citing other recent studies that harmonize with his argument, Schaefer compares his analysis of Montaigne's political aims and political-ethical teaching with those set forth in two other recent studies: Philippe Desan's Montaigne: A Life and Pierre Manent's Montaigne: La Vie sans loi.     

HOW THE OLD LEFT HAS FOUND A NEW PLACE IN THE MEMORY GAME

In his new book, How Modernity Forgets, Paul Connerton seeks to show a relationship between the workings of late capitalism and the institutionalization of forgetfulness in ever more abstract conceptions of space and time. He uses this argument to explain why the topic of collective memory has waxed so large in contemporary historical scholarship. I interpret his argument in light of his earlier work on habit memory and his still earlier critique of Frankfurt School social theory. I close with some comments on his study in the context of recent work on mnemonic practices in modern culture.     

AFTER POLITICAL ECOLOGY

This book review article probes present anthropological engagement with the environment through the prism of political ecology, placing political ecology in conversation with newer work in environmnetal anthropology. In situating this conversation, the reviewer draws on four recent anthropological monographs that, in one way or another, deal with aspects of ‘nature’. The four monographs are Tania Murray Li's (2014) Land's end: Capitalist relations on an indigenous frontier; Marianne Elisabeth Lien's (2015) Becoming salmon: Aquaculture and the domestication of fish; Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing's (2015) The mushroom at the end of the world: On the possibility of life in capitalist ruin; and, lastly, Marisol de la Cadena's (2015) Earth beings: Ecologies of practice across Andean worlds. As I suggest, political ecology requires a radical remake, perhaps a political ecology 2.0, which brings in nature in a new way and makes the category of the political more inclusive.     

Outline of an intuitionist response to Nozick

The paper is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I counter criticisms that in Anarchy State and Utopia Nozick has no argument for his views on property rights, by presenting what I take to be his main argument that the absolutist nature of property rights makes redistributive taxation impermissible. In the second part, I outline an intuitionist response to this argument. This response presupposes the truth of all the premises of Nozick's argument except its basic absolutist premise : Never use persons (coercively) merely as a means without their consent.     

PHILOSOPHY AND GEOGRAPHY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A REPLY

So far as I can make out, Sitwell's comment on my essay says little that is relevant to its content. In fact he goes so far as to declare that my essay can in large part be ignored, presumably for purposes of gaining an understanding, or getting at the essence, of Margarita Bowen's book. I assume that Sitwell is writing a book review, more or less of the conventional sort, since he remarks that he is undertaking 'a review of the type May chose not to write.' I do not pretend for one moment that what I wrote is a book review. Perhaps it should not even have been called a 'review essay.' But Sitwell is not unaware of this, since he remarks that my 'essay is almost bound to be taken as a review,' which he regards as 'unfortunate.' Despite the fact that the tasks we have each undertaken are substantially different, and hence that our respective papers have little in common, I nevertheless think a few comments are in order.     

What's (written) history for?: On James C. Scott's Zomia,especially Chapter 6½

What could still trigger a worthwhile anthropological debate now that eight years have passed since the publication of James C. Scott's The art of not being governed in 2009? In this article, the author proposes a reading involving perhaps the most controversial chapter of Scott's book: Chapter 6½ – ‘Orality, writing, and texts’. Scott means to say that the absence of literacy in a society could result from a preference rather than a deficiency. He describes a project that refuses state formation, putting to use the advantages of flexibility and adaptation that an oral tradition has over a written tradition. Drawing on the case of the Hmong, the author proposes that Scott's argument might have been made more solid had he relied less on a geographical and historically rooted definition of Zomia, and more on a discussion of cultural elements such as egalitarianism and orality.     

Demythologizing the Satan Tradition of Historical-Criticism: A Reevaluation of the Old Testament Portrait of שָׂטָן in Light of the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha

This book continues the excellent work begun in Thompson's first book, The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narratives. In trying to find a context for the Bible, T. rightly focuses on the literary, theological, and ideological content of the biblical text. He well illustrates how recording history (from a modern point of view) is not the concern of the biblical writers. On the other hand, as he shows, to deny that the Bible is true historically is not to deny its truth in other areas. Although often agreeing with T. and applauding much that is in the book, the reviewer found certain areas of concern or disappointment. He feels that T. is often inconsistent, sometimes seeming to reject the use of literary sources almost altogether, yet still quietly using them when it suits his purpose. For example, the sources for the conquests of Alexander the Great have some of the same weaknesses as Josephus, 1 and 2 Maccabees, and even some of the narrative texts of the Bible, yet T. seems to accept that these still tell us something about Alexander. An area of weakness is T.'s grasp of the Hellenistic and Roman period where the sources andscholarship have not been mastered, and certain original sources are both explicitly rejected and then covertly used as a basis for many assertions. This is not a main part of T.'s argument, but it has implications for trying to put the writing of the Bible in the Hellenistic/Roman period. An area judged to be actually tendentious is T.'s argument that ''Jews'' and similar terms are only religious designations and carry no ethnic content. Despite these criticisms (which do affect T.'s approach and conclusions in crucial areas) the reviewer nevertheless accepts much that T. says and appreciates the attempt to give a holistic argument on this complex question. Especially appreciated is T.'s positive reconstruction of the history of Palestine based primarily on archaeology in a central section of his book.     

Some Personal Reminiscences and What They Meant for Me

There are those who have said I should write a book, and there are those—about the same in number—who have said I should not write a book. Those in the negative assert that my “book” already is written in the several hundred opinions (majorities, concurrences, dissents) I have filed over the years, and in my public utterances. There are valid arguments, I suppose, on both sides. I certainly do not wish to write anything that merely seeks to explain further my vote in decided cases, or to comment—supportively or adversely—on colleagues' votes, or to express little more than after‐the‐fact criticism. In that context, what might be said belonged in the decisional process itself. But there are other things in Supreme Court experience. Law students are inclined to ask questions. Example: “Tell me, how does one come to be a federal judge?” Justice Tom Clark had a direct response: “One has to be on the corner when the bus comes by.” One federal appellate judge plaintively said to me: “The only reason I am on the federal bench is because I was a close friend of a United States Senator.” (He had served for a time as the Senator's administrative assistant.) It may perhaps be said that every federal judge comes by his status in his own way. Of course, there are things one must not do, but I doubt that there is a specific path one must follow to be eligible and seriously regarded as a candidate for federal judicial service.     

NOTES ON CAMPS,OR, COUNTERFACTUAL FÜHRERS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE JOKE

In this review essay I explore the dynamics of “normalization” in historical and fictional depictions of the National Socialist past, examining both the “organic” normalization of catastrophic events through the passage of time, and efforts to normalize the Nazi past through aesthetics. Focusing on Gavriel Rosenfeld's Hi, Hitler: How the Nazi Past is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture, I argue against many dimensions of Rosenfeld's account of normalization, particularly his claim that aesthetic normalization can undermine our moral judgments regarding the Holocaust. Drawing on Sigmund Freud on jokes, and Susan Sontag on Camp aesthetics, I argue that every effort to normalize the Holocaust, especially ones that work through humor and jokes (a major topic of Rosenfeld's book), actually maintain the Holocaust's status as a series of historical events resistant to “normalization.” If “normalization” is a process through which extraordinary, or morally charged, historical events lose their moral charge, then aesthetic efforts to normalize the Holocaust actually reinscribe the special moral status that Rosenfeld believes they erase.     

MISREPRESENTING MARX: A LESSON IN HISTORICAL METHOD

In this book Jonathan Sperber deploys his extensive knowledge of nineteenth‐century European social and political history, and his diligent research into sources that have become readily available only recently, to produce a substantial biography of Karl Marx. We find, however, that Sperber is mistaken in his treatment of Marx's ideas and of the intellectual contexts within which Marx worked. In fact, we suggest that he is systematically mistaken in this regard. We locate a root source of the error in his reductive approach to theoretical ideas. In section I we focus on the claim, taken for granted in the book, that Marx's ideas are instantiations of “materialism.” By detailed reference to the record of Marx's writings, we show that there is no justification for describing Marx as a “materialist” in the usually accepted senses of that term. In section II we review how Soviet and other interpreters of Marx, taking their lead from the later Engels, insisted that “materialism” was fundamental to Marxism. We suggest that Sperber's presentation of Marx's thinking as “materialist and atheist” aligns far better with such interpretations than it does with what Marx actually wrote. In sections III and IV we criticize Sperber's “contextualist” approach to dealing with ideas in history. His approach may seem reminiscent of Quentin Skinner’ s, but where Skinner deploys the discursive conventions prevailing in a past time to illuminate theoretical ideas, Sperber reduces theoretical ideas to context. We name Sperber's approach “theoretical nominalism,” a term that we use to denote the view that theoretical ideas are nothing but interventions into particular situations. We end by suggesting that greater attentiveness to philosophy and theory would have enriched Sperber's efforts in this book.     

THE CONCEPT OF TRANSPARENCY,ITS HISTORY,AND THE THEORY OF BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE

In this review essay, I examine the theoretical assumptions required in order to reconstruct an understanding of another historical period. Stefanos Geroulanos has produced a masterful history of mid‐twentieth‐century French thought, and he argues for a significant difference between that period and our own based on the values and ideas associated with the concept of transparency. The book is innovative in both its method and interpretation of the period of 1945–1984. However, despite the suggestive theoretical framework announced at its start, Geroulanos prefers to explore the theoretical content of conceptual history more than to explain how one might go about identifying, understanding, and translating the concepts of a different epoch. In order to contribute to what is already a successful project, I endeavor to extend some of Geroulanos's theoretical sketches through a comparison with Reinhart Koselleck's theory of Begriffsgechichte. Despite some muted criticism of Koselleck from Geroulanos, I argue that the projects share similar commitments, although Geroulanos needs to develop his theoretical premises at greater length, both for a full comparison and in order to complete the critical project that Transparency appears to be undertaking.     

Equal Rights and Individual Freedom: Enlightenment Intellectuals and the Lascasian Apology for Black African Slavery

Juan Antonio Llorente's edition of Bartolomé de Las Casas's writings, Colección de las obras del venerable Obispo de Chiapa, Don Bartolome de las Casas, defensor de la libertad de los Americanos, illustrates how Las Casas was perceived and condemned in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In this article, I seek to explain why and in what ways Bartolomé de Las Casas's early propositions on African slavery played a fundamental role in Juan Antonio Llorente's edition of Colección, an ambitious editorial work that involved much more than selection, editing, and publication. By approaching the Colección's production and reception from the perspective of book history, I explore how Llorente's Colección reflects the role that colonial affairs and race had in the challenges faced by European rule and white hegemony.     

SEAGULLS! ON MARTIN HÄGGLUND'S THIS LIFE: SECULAR FAITH AND SPIRITUAL FREEDOM

In this review essay, I examine Martin Hägglund's This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom, a book that argues on behalf of democratic socialism on the basis of an atheistic confrontation with the fact of our mortality. Hägglund's book includes readings of Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Ove Knausgaard, Karl Marx, and Martin Luther King Jr. and is best assessed as a literary and philosophical, rather than historical, study of the relation between mortality and social action. Simply put, Hägglund believes that, from the standpoint of an atheistic confrontation with our mortality, our time itself should be our ultimate measure of value. He furthermore believes that democratic socialism is the political and economic form that most naturally follows from this, allowing us to honor, defend, and enhance one another's mortal time and freedom to make choices—and that, by comparison with atheism, religion offers only the false coin of otherworldly salvation. Although sympathizing with Hägglund's existential and political orientations, I criticize his account of religion, which I find to be historically weak. But I also criticize his approach to the problem of valuation, or the issue of how we make choices in relation to our limited time. Whereas Hägglund believes that mortal creatures like ourselves must make choices in a spirit of commitment—the “secular faith” of his subtitle—I observe that, despite our mortality, we humans make our choices in a variety of psychological states, and that asking us to occupy only one such state—one of zealous resolve—actually undermines our “spiritual freedom,” another one of Hägglund's key terms.     

WITH OR AGAINST HAYDEN WHITE? REFLECTIONS ON THEORY OF HISTORY AND SUBJECT FORMATION

This article reflects on Hayden White's understanding of the subject and explores how best to move forward discussions in theory of history after his arguments about narrativity. To do so, I reconsider his arguments in light of more recent feminist and queer theorizations. Through a reconstruction of the current international new wave of feminism and LGBTQ+ activism as a rich and complex social movement that involves a narration of its own (practical) past, I will recontextualize and revaluate White's insight from the perspective of Judith Butler's theory of subject formation. The argument will unfold in four parts. First, I will recall White's ironic and existential stance on language and narrativity in the representation of reality and in relation to social beliefs. Second, I will again raise the question of the value of narrativity, as framed by White, in the context of the publication of a recent feminist manifesto. It is here that another issue will emerge as crucial: the relationship between the limits of linguistic self-consciousness and the question of the subject. In the third part, my argument will take a partial turn “against White” and toward Butler's subject formation theory. My claim will be that there is a residue of the belief in the sovereign individual in White's insistence on self-consciousness. However, I will also show that his suspicion regarding the psychological impulse toward narrative closure can be re-elaborated as the challenge Butler is facing with their theory of subject formation: that of critically resisting the belief in our being coherent and self-sufficient individuals. In the fourth part, I will present Butler's refiguration of the thesis of the subject's opacity in terms of the primary relationality that binds human beings to one another, and I will offer a new understanding of the individual, norms, agency, infancy, and ethics. Finally, I will conclude that we are bodies in history and that theory of history can find a promising line of research through this conception of the subject, a conception that reframes how we understand the intimate links between political consciousness, historicity, and embodiment. I also claim that this line of research constitutes an ethics for our historical undoing.     

THE TIME OF THE SELF AND THE TIME OF THE OTHER

What is time? This essay offers an attempt to think again about this oldest of philosophical questions by engaging David Hoy's recent book, The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality, which proposes a “history of time‐consciousness” in twentieth‐century European philosophy. Hoy's book traces the turn‐of‐the‐century debate between Husserl and Bergson about the different senses of time across the various configurations of hermeneutics, deconstruction, poststructuralism, and feminist theory. For him, what is at stake in such a project is to distinguish between the scientific‐objective “time of the universe” and the phenomenology of human temporality, “the time of our lives.” Hoy's approach is to organize his book around the three tenses of time—past/present/future—and to view objective‐scientific time as derived from the more primordial forms of temporalizing lived experience that occur in our interpretation of time. In my reading of Hoy's work, I attempt to explore how “time” (lived, experiential, phenomenological) can be read not in terms of “consciousness” (Hoy's thematic), but in terms of the self's relationship with an Other. That is, my aim is less to establish a continental tradition about time‐consciousness, understood through the methods of genealogy, phenomenology, or critical theory, than it is to situate the problem of time in terms of an ethics of the Other. In simple terms, I read Hoy's project as too bound up with an egological interpretation of consciousness. By reflecting on time through the relationship to the Other rather than as a mode of the self's own “time‐consciousness,” I attempt to think through the ethical consequences for understanding temporality and its connection to justice.     

THE HISTORIAN AS A PUBLIC MORALIST: ON THE ROMAN ORIGINS OF A SCHOLARLY PERSONA

In her recent book, Virtus Romana, Catalina Balmaceda provides a fascinating analysis of the concept of virtus in Roman historiography. Although virtus, which translates as courage or more generally as virtue, meant different things to different Roman historians, Balmaceda shows that disagreement was never about whether historians should provide readers with examples of virtue. Historians' differences of opinion focused rather on where such models were to be found and what they should look like. This review essay summarizes Balmaceda's main arguments, raises a question about historians' own virtus, and draws some implications from the book for the study of scholarly personae. Did the persona of the historian as a public moralist, such as is known from nineteenth‐century Europe, originate in ancient Rome?