Sino–American relations and the ‘Australian factor’: inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a ‘discriminate engagement’ policy toward their own regional interests if Sino–American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that country's relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its ‘dual strategy’ directed toward China and the United States.     

Trumping foreign policy: public diplomacy,framing, and public opinion among middle power publics

Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other states to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. The President of the United States thus often serves as ‘Diplomat in Chief’ in public diplomacy efforts to appeal directly to publics abroad. Given Donald Trump’s antagonistic approach to foreign relations and widespread lack of popularity, what are the implications for support for US policy among publics abroad – particularly among middle power states allied to the US? While previous research on public opinion relying on observational data has found that confidence in the US President is linked to support for American foreign policy goals, the mechanisms at work remain unclear. Using original data from survey-based experiments conducted in Canada and Australia, this article seeks to clarify the effect of ‘presidential framing’ (presenting a policy goal as endorsed or not endorsed by Trump) on attitudes toward key policy issues in the Canada–US and Australia–US relationships. Results point to a negative ‘Trump framing’ effect in Canadians’ and Australians’ trade policy attitudes, but such an effect is not observed in other policy domains (energy policy in Canada, and refugee policy in Australia).     

Australia's ‘special strategic relationship’ with Japan: another ‘China choice’?

In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.     

From forward defence to self‐reliance: Changes and continuities in Australian defence policy 1965–90

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's ‘declared’ defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its ‘operational’ policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid‐course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid‐1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of ‘defence self‐reliance’. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's ‘operational’ policy is flawed and in need of replacement The danger is that, as in the past, Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances.     

US-Australia-Indonesia Trilateral Security? Conditions for Cooperation

Since the 1950s, US strategic architecture in the Indo-Pacific has been premised on its hubs-and-spokes model of bilateral alliances and security partnerships. Since the 2000s the US began working toward forging deeper interrelationships between its regional allies and partners. The emerging strategy ultimately aims to interlink long-standing allies like Japan and Australia, and also non-traditional partners in the development of a security network capable of maintaining the regional ‘rules-based order.’ In analysing the US-led triangular Indo-Pacific geometry, this article considers the prospects of an evolving and substantive US–Australia–Indonesia security trilateral. It does so by utilising Miller’s ‘conditions for cooperation framework’ to test the likelihood of greater cooperation between these three states. These conditions include cultural similarity, economic equality, habits of international association, the perception of common danger, and greater power pressure. It concludes that while there remain strict limitations on any formal alignment between the ANZUS partners and Indonesia, there are convergent interests in key sub-strategic areas in the maritime space and thus a viable path toward greater trilateral cooperation but not, as yet, formal arrangements.     

The Japan-Australia contribution to a liberal and inclusive regional order: beyond the ‘China gap’

This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relations. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values.     

Australia’s new alliance dynamics,US–China rivalry and conflict entrapment in outer space

Canberra’s exposure to great-power conflict is arguably more complex and ambiguous than during the Cold War. Drawing from scholarly literature on entrapment and recent developments in outer-space security, this article explores Australia’s position in a hypothetical US–China war over Taiwan. The shifting military balance in outer space, recent war games by the US military and regional trends in defence planning all raise the possibility of a scenario opening with Chinese cyberattacks against information networks shared between Australia and the USA. As a result of its growing dependency on space systems, Australia may be entrapped in a novel way which poses questions for scholars and policymakers. These findings should encourage further study of regional crisis management, with the need for a shared understanding of strategic behaviour in outer space and cybernetworks.     

Australia,US torture and the power of international law

ABSTRACT

Australia cooperated extensively with the George W. Bush administration during the ‘war on terror.’ However, in doing so, Australia failed to condemn, and in some instances, condoned US torture and detention programs. Does Australia’s conduct demonstrate a failure of international law and human rights to constrain Australia’s actions? Although the Howard government was heavily criticised for failing to uphold human rights in the fight against terrorism, international law was not forgotten. This article argues that international law shaped Australia’s cooperation with the US. Australia strategically used international laws to legitimise its cooperation with the US in the face of evidence of US torture. International law was not dismissed to pursue national security interests but used to legitimise Australia’s security policies.     

Diversifying Australia’s Indo-Pacific infrastructure diplomacy

Infrastructure is an emerging component of Australian diplomacy. In recent years, many infrastructure and connectivity (I&C) programs have been launched in the Indo-Pacific, designed to close the ‘infrastructure gaps’ that plague the region. Competition amongst these, particularly between US and Chinese offerings, has posed a dilemma for Australian foreign policy. Australia has struggled to articulate a policy on China’s Belt and Road Initiative that balances strategic concerns against economic opportunities; while enthusiastic engagement with US alternatives risks perceptions of ‘choosing’ sides between the region’s two main powers. Yet the contemporary marketplace for Indo-Pacific I&C is much broader, with programs recently launched by many governments and regional organisations. These presents an opportunity for Australia to diversify its infrastructure diplomacy, particularly through engagement with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, cooperation with Japan and new avenues for commercial diplomacy. By engaging with a wider range of I&C partners and institutions, Australia can better integrate itself with the emerging infrastructure systems of the Indo-Pacific.     

Cruel and unusual

From early April to late June 2018, the nearly 2,600 immigrant children – mostly refugees fleeing violence and poverty in Central America – were forcibly taken from their parents at the United States’ southern border following implementation of the Trump administration's ‘zero tolerance’ policy. The policy took effect when the US Justice Department began aggressively prosecuting undocumented immigrants crossing the US‐Mexico border. Following a public outcry and growing protests, President Trump issued an executive order declaring an end to family separations on 20 June. Several days later, a federal court mandated that the government reunite those immigrant families affected by the ‘zero tolerance’ policy. In mid‐August, more than 550 children who had been detained following the implementation of the policy remained in federal custody. Thousands more ‘unaccompanied minors’ – typically teenagers who were caught crossing the border without adults –remain in indefinite detention. This editorial analyzes this situation from an anthropological perspective by reviewing relevant ethnographic literature on undocumented Latin American immigrants in the US.     

Intelligence cooperation and new trends in space technology: do the ties still bind?

For the first time since the 1970s, Canberra cannot assume the joint facilities will continue to underpin the Australia–US alliance. Intelligence cooperation via outer space, described as the ‘strategic essence’ of this relationship, is poised for transformation. New technologies are being developed for satellite communication, with laser systems capable of bypassing ground control stations outside US territory. As a result, the one indispensable role for Australia in US national security—hosting infrastructure to relay intelligence about nuclear and missile activity—could become irrelevant in the years ahead. With questions raised about the Trump administration’s commitment to security partners and the risk of US disengagement from Asia, these findings have implications for Australian alliance diplomacy. If intelligence ties bind these countries together at present, Canberra can expect some risk of loosening in the future and will need to think carefully about the development of national intelligence resources over the long term.     

Living with Giants and Inconvenient Truths: The US,China, and Everyone Else

ABSTRACT

The Trump administration is redefining the traditional post-World War II approach to American foreign policy, preferring an “America First” approach instead. At the same time, China is becoming increasingly assertive on the world stage, willing to throw its weight around and threaten smaller countries over any perceived slight. For the smaller countries who viewed the United States as a reliable security partner and China as an increasingly important trade partner, the world is looking increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded by the Trump administration’s more confrontational approach in its China policy. Other states, including Canada, are trying to navigate between a reluctant Washington and a temperamental and brash Beijing. This article argues that a major reset of US-China relations was both inevitable and needed. That said, it is not so much what the Trump administration is doing, but how it is doing it that is the problem. With its heavy-handed “America First” policies, the Trump administration risks losing the support of other states needed to push back against China.     

Contestability ‘theory’, its links with Australia’s competition policy,and recent international trade and investment agreements

This article examines how contestable market theory (contestability) has come to reconfigure the economic and regulatory concept of competition in order to enhance the compatibility of Australia’s economy with international trade and investment agreements. Australia has recently negotiated and signed a raft of bilateral, plurilateral and regional agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Australia–China Free Trade Agreement. In order to ensure that Australia meets its obligations and commitments to these agreements, two key advisory bodies—the Harper Panel on Competition Policy Review and the Financial System Inquiry—made recommendations, the majority of which were accepted by the government, to ready Australia’s competition governance and economic policy for greater global integration. Such impact is dependent on, among other things, how domestic competition policy meshes with the free market ideology underpinning such international agreements, which favours the breakdown of barriers to markets. Less well known is the role of contestability in radicalising ideology as it countenances monopolisation and privatisation in the guise of market access by justifying the substitution of actual competition with the mere threat of competition. The article concludes that the monopoly power of transnational corporations will be enhanced through the acquiescence of governments to the new governance regime of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which, supported by domestic policy, is set to redraw competition policy in the light of contestability theory.     

Asia's century and the problem of Japan's centrality

Japan has long been regarded as a central component of America's grand strategy in Asia. Scholars and practitioners assume this situation will persist in the face of China's rise and, indeed, that a more ‘normal’ Japan can and should take on an increasingly central role in US‐led strategies to manage this power transition. This article challenges those assumptions by arguing that they are, paradoxically, being made at a time when Japan's economic and strategic weight in Asian security is gradually diminishing. The article documents Japan's economic and demographic challenges and their strategic ramifications. It considers what role Japan might play in an evolving security order where China and the US emerge as Asia's two dominant powers by a significant margin. Whether the US–China relationship is ultimately one of strategic competition or accommodation, it is argued that Japan's continued centrality in America's Asian grand strategy threatens to become increasingly problematic. It is posited that the best hope for circumventing this problem and its potentially destabilizing consequences lies in the nurturing of a nascent ‘shadow condominium’ comprising the US and China, with Japan as a ‘marginal weight’ on the US side of that arrangement.     

Australia and the challenges of order-building in the Indian Ocean region

This article considers the regional order-building challenges that Australia presently confronts in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author argues that while regional stability within the IOR constitutes an increasingly important Australian security interest, policy makers will struggle to translate the order-building strategies they have previously pursued in East Asia into an Indian Ocean context. In East Asia, Australia has historically pursued a ‘dual track’ order-building strategy centred on its participation in a US-dominated ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system alongside multilateral regional engagement. The absence of an equivalent alliance system or an established tradition of multilateral security diplomacy conversely precludes an extension of this strategy into the IOR. Growing tensions between the USA and China and between China and India, meanwhile, further complicate IOR security dynamics, while underscoring the urgent need for a more coherent approach to regional order-building. With these challenges in mind, the author concludes by proposing a range of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives that Australia should pursue to stimulate the emergence of a more cooperative IOR security environment.     

Mapping the potential impact of synthetic biology on Australian foreign policy

Synthetic biology is an emerging technology that will impact on the future security and prosperity of Australia. As a discrete policy area synthetic biology has not been explored in relation to Australian foreign policy. To begin this process an understanding of Australia’s genetic endowment, Australia’s agricultural endowment and those security concerns novel to synthetic biology need to be developed. The convergence of the biological sciences and the information sciences is creating novel security concerns that impact on Australian sovereignty, both mainland and the Antarctic Territories, plant and animal health, and defence medical infrastructure. These concerns cross many traditional disciplinary and policy boundaries, an awareness of this is required and a nascent national practitioner community can develop this further. Drawing from work conducted by the US and UK synthetic biology practitioner communities, this article lays out the unique touch points synthetic biology has on Australian foreign policy.     

Over‐promising and under‐delivering? Ambitions and risks in US defence strategy

Recent changes to US defence strategy, plans and forces have placed the United States at greater risk of over‐promising and under‐delivering on its global security ambitions. In 2012, the Obama administration released a new defence strategic guidance document to adapt to a shifting security environment and defence budget cuts. The guidance upholds the two long‐standing American goals of global pre‐eminence and global reach, but seeks to apply this military power by using new planning and regional concepts. It revises the Department of Defense's force planning construct, an important tool used to size US military forces, and identifies the Asia–Pacific and the greater Middle East as the two regions where the US military should focus its attention and resources. There are three major risks facing this revised US strategy: emerging security threats, the role of US allies and partners, and domestic constraints in the United States. Included in these risks are the proliferation of advanced military technologies, the US response to the rise of China, the continued prevalence of state instability and failure, the capability and commitment of NATO and other US allies, additional US budget cuts, political polarization in the United States, and interservice competition within the US military. In light of these risks, the United States faces a future in which it will continue to struggle to direct its military power towards its most important geopolitical priorities, such as rebalancing towards the Asia–Pacific, as opposed simply to respond to the many security surprises that are certain to arise. If the past is any guide, American political leaders will respond to the aforementioned risks in the worst way possible: by maintaining the current US defence strategy while slashing the resources to support it.     

The changing role of the FIRB and the politics of foreign investment in Australia

ABSTRACT

Australia’s policy on foreign investment aims to achieve both the liberal goal of maximising capital inflows and the statist one of ensuring that those inflows are in ‘the national interest’. This article analyses the tensions between these goals through interviews with policymakers who have direct knowledge of the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which has functioned as an ‘offstage’, pre-market regulator for capital inflows to Australia. The tensions between these policy goals were manageable because the FIRB exercised its powers rarely, decisively and quietly, and the government believed that foreign investment did not threaten the national interest. The emergence of state-owned enterprises as foreign investors, however, significantly altered this calculus, and the FIRB has been tasked with assessing the national security implications of proposed investments. Instead of working offstage, as in earlier decades, the FIRB has become central to debates about how Australia should respond to the rise of China.     

The Australian 2016 Defence White Paper,great-power rivalry and a ‘rules-based order’: an imagined correspondence between Carr,Bull and Bell

This piece is an imagined email correspondence between three renowned international relations scholars, E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Coral Bell, who are discussing the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper. The purpose of such an exercise is to reflect on the ‘big-picture’ international relations questions posed by what might otherwise be thought of as a relatively technical defence policy document. In particular, the correspondence between the three focuses on the central importance of the White Paper’s assumptions of a ‘rules-based global order’ and the relationship between this order and US power. In their time, all three authors spoke directly to questions of power, law and order in their scholarly work, which had been deeply influenced, in all three cases, by periods spent working at the ‘coalface’ of these issues in government in Britain and Australia. As such, Carr, Bull and Bell have much to say about how Australia is positioning itself for a post-unipolar world.