Hikma muta‘aliya in Qajar Iran: Locating the Life and Work of Mulla Hadi Sabzawari (d. 1289/1873)

The Qajar period witnessed a revival of traditional Islamic philosophy based on the philosophical method of the Safavid sage Mulla Sadra Shirazi. This was philosophy as a way of life, an ethical commitment born of a method that combined both rational discourse and mystical intuition, deployed to defend the intellectual and cultural norms of the old learning against the new European inspired centers in Qajar Iran. A prominent figure in this process of revival was Mulla Hadi Sabzavari, who trained in the seminaries of Mashhad and Isfahan and became the most famous teacher of the works of Mulla Sadra and of philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. This paper examines his life and intellectual and pedagogical contribution, and traces some lines of his impact on seminarian philosophy into the twentieth century through the many students who came to study with him in his hometown, including his influence on modern trends within Shi‘i jurisprudence and legal theory.     

The role of imagination in modern medicine

In Renaissance and early modern times, the concept of imagination (Latin imaginatio) was essential for the (natural) philosophical explanation of magic processes, especially in the anthropology of Paracelsus. He assumed that imagination was a natural vital power including cosmic, mental, phychical, and physical dimensions. The Paracelsians criticized traditional humor pathology ignoring their theory of' 'natural magic'. On the other hand, they were criticized by their adversaries as charlatans practicing 'black magic'. About 1800, in between enlightenment and romanticism, the healing concept of, animal magnetism' (Mesmerism) evoked an analogous debate, whether, magnetic' phenomena originated from a real (physical) power (so-called, fluidum') or were just due to fantasy or imagination (German Einbildungskraft). At the end of the 19th century, the French internist Hippolyte Bernheim created-against the background of medical hypnosis (hypnotism') as a consequence of Mesmerism - his theory of suggestion and autosuggestion: a new paradigm of psychological respectively psychosomatic medicine, which became the basis for the concept of, placebo' in modern biomedicine. From now on, all the effects of, alternative medicine' could easily be explained by the, placebo-effect', more or less founded - at least unconsciously - on fraud.     

Did Harrington’s cats catch Harvey’s chick? Vitalistic imagery in early modern republican political theory

In an early modern context, ‘vitalistic’ natural philosophies had been associated with antiauthoritarian political theories. Whilst mechanical philosophy has been characterized as amenable to (or even, sometimes, inspired by) conservative politics on account of the structural analogies between passive and inert particles that can only be organized by externally imposed strict mechanical laws on the one hand, and similarly passive citizens, on the other, vitalism understood as a monistic, dynamic materialism purportedly implicated alternative modes of agency and organization. This alternative model incorporated inherently active, self-organizing agents allegedly capable of bringing about higher structures in a bottom-up fashion both in the natural and in political realm. In this paper, I focus on James Harrington’s appropriation of William Harvey’s physiology and examine whether the republican philosopher actually made use of the political potential said to be inherent in vitalistic discourse. I intend to show that Harrington, rather than boldly capitalizing on vitalism’s decentralizing and democratic potential, adapts his physiological imagery to his wider set of ideas concerning human nature and moral psychology underpinning his politics. Simple analogy between vitalism and antiauthoritarianism is then lost in Harrington’s writings, pointing to a more complex relationship between early modern natural and political philosophy.     

Bernard Lamy,Empiricism, and Cartesianism

Bernard Lamy (1640–1715) is frequently included among the Cartesian Empiricists of the second half of the seventeenth century. He has also been described as an Augustinian who dabbled in Cartesianism. While acknowledging that there are both empiricist and Augustinian elements in his thought, I argue that it ought not be forgotten that there are central components of his philosophy that are both anti-empiricist and in opposition to Augustine. My aim in this paper, though, is not (merely) critical; I hope to show that Lamy provides us with one more example of the diversity present among the various thinkers labelled as ‘Cartesian’.     

The Impact of the Second Crusade on the Angelology and Eschatology of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux

Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, made a significant impact on twelfth‐century Europe and the church. As a result of the proliferation of Cistercian monasteries under his guidance, his numerous theological writings, and the miracles he performed, Bernard was canonised soon after his death. Conversely, there was no lack of criticism levied for his involvement in matters that some considered inappropriate. When Pope Eugenius III called the Second Crusade and requested that Bernard preach it, the infirm abbot could have justifiably declined but instead embarked upon the arduous task. However, he did so in the belief that this task, if successful, might propel humankind into the next age of time. After the crusade failed and as he neared death himself, Bernard's writings reflect a change from his previous assertions surrounding eschatology and the role of angels in the lives of the faithful. These alterations in Bernard's theology may also have encompassed a reaffirmation of his commitment to the contemplative life. It took the disaster of the Second Crusade to return him to his core convictions and ignore the arrogant speculations of those who claimed that they knew what Christ said they never would: the day or the hour.     

Philosophical instruments and toys: optical devices extending the art of seeing

Philosophical instruments were designed to examine phenomena experimentally, rather than by naturalistic observation alone. In the nineteenth century, some instruments were called philosophical toys because they provided popular amusement as well as experimental assistance. They were applied widely in natural philosophy, but attention here is directed particularly to manipulations of perceived space and time and their influence on art. One of the earliest instruments, which had a profound impact on art as well as science, was the camera obscura. It assisted image formation in art before it was applied as an analogy to the eye at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later philosophical toys were used to address visual perception of motion and depth. Development was initially driven by the need for stimulus control so that the methods of physics could be applied to the study of perceptual phenomena. The principal instruments were invented in the first half of the nineteenth century, and they consisted of simple contrivances that manipulated time and space in ways that had not previously been appreciated. They included thaumatropes, phenakistoscopes, stroboscopes, anorthoscopes, stereoscopes, tachistoscopes, and chronoscopes. Several of these philosophical toys proved to be phenomenally popular, particularly when combined with photography.     

Descartes' visit to the town library, or how Augustinian is Descartes' neurophysiology?

Rene Descartes was early accused of taking his central philosophical proposition from St Augustine. Did he also take his central neurophysiological concept from the same source? This is the question which this paper sets out to answer. It is concluded that the foundational neurophysiology propounded in L'Homme does indeed show strong and interesting resemblences to Augustine's largely Erasistratean version. Descartes, however, working within the new paradigm of seventeenth-century physical science, introduced a new principle: whereas Augustine's neurophysiology is pervaded throughout by a vital factor, the pneuma, Descartes' theory involved only inanimate material forces. It is concluded, further, that in spite of the interesting similarities between Augustinian and Cartesian neurophysiology there is no evidence for any direct plagiarism. It seems more likely that Augustine's influence was filtered through the Galenical physiologists of Descartes' own time and of the preceding century.     

Braucht die Theoretische Physik den Religiösen Glauben ? Neo-Scholastik und Positivismus in der Dritten Republik

As common wisdom has it, Pierre Duhem was one of the most important proponents of French philosophy of science around 1900. Usually, his conception of physical theories is regarded as the incarnation of the ancient — proto-positivistic - programme of “saving the phenomena”. This view is correct, but it needs to be supplemented by taking account of the discursive context of Duhem’s position. In this paper it is argued that Duhem’s philosophical colleague Abel Rey played a central role in this connection.     

An Epistemology of Scientific Practice: Positioning Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in Twentieth-Century History and Philosophy of Biology**

In this article, I first outline the professionalization of the history and philosophy of biology from the 1960s onward. Then, I attempt to situate the work of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger with respect to this field. On the one hand, Rheinberger was marginal with respect to Anglo-American philosophical tradition; on the other, he was very influential in building up an integrated history and philosophy of the life sciences community at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin and beyond. This marginality results, I suggest, from three main sources: his use of concepts coming from continental traditions in the study of the life sciences, which are foreign to Anglo-American philosophers of science; his focus on practices instead of theories; and his research trajectory as a molecular biologist, which led him to be critical of disciplinary boundaries. As a first step in situating and historicizing Rheinberger's trajectory, this article invites comparative studies and calls for a history of “continental philosophy of biology” in the twentieth century.     

Canadian Philosophy: A Dialectical Exploration

This article inquires into the difference between philosophy as a universal practice and philosophy as a cultural product; its aim is to establish a case for there being Canadian philosophy. Philosophy as a practice can exhibit a dialectical framework. The practice can pursue both universal truths and cultural variations in expressions of those truths. Each philosophical endeavor requires the other to be meaningful. No matter how abstract a “truth” may be, an example always creates cultural relevance. The article introduces the example of an early Canadian philosopher, whose work is documented in the book by Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott, The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Canada, 1850-1950. John Watson (1847–1939) was the most prolific and well-known contributor to philosophy in early Canada, pursuing universal questions and yet responding to the circumstances of his new home in developing Canada and, in doing so, contributing to Canadian cultural interpretations of philosophical questions. This article uses his example to conclude that the study of philosophy in Canada must include Canadian philosophy.     

REPORT Neurology of the Arts Mansell Bequest Symposium at the Medical Society of London 30 April–1 May 2001

Philosophical instruments were designed to examine phenomena experimentally, rather than by naturalistic observation alone. In the nineteenth century, some instruments were called philosophical toys because they provided popular amusement as well as experimental assistance. They were applied widely in natural philosophy, but attention here is directed particularly to manipulations of perceived space and time and their influence on art. One of the earliest instruments, which had a profound impact on art as well as science, was the camera obscura. It assisted image formation in art before it was applied as an analogy to the eye at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later philosophical toys were used to address visual perception of motion and depth. Development was initially driven by the need for stimulus control so that the methods of physics could be applied to the study of perceptual phenomena. The principal instruments were invented in the first half of the nineteenth century, and they consisted of simple contrivances that manipulated time and space in ways that had not previously been appreciated. They included thaumatropes, phenakistoscopes, stroboscopes, anorthoscopes, stereoscopes, tachistoscopes, and chronoscopes. Several of these philosophical toys proved to be phenomenally popular, particularly when combined with photography.     

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science. The role of mathematics in eighteenth‐century science and of eighteenth‐century philosophy of science can hardly be overestimated. However, philosophy of science frequently described and analysed this role in an anachronistic manner by projecting modern points of view about (formal) mathematics and (empirical) science to the past: From today's point of view one might be tempted to say that philosophers and scientists in the seventeenth and even more in the eighteenth century became aware of the importance of mathematics as a means of ‘representing’ physical phenomena or as an ‘instrument’ of deductive explanation and prediction. But such modernisms are missing the central point, i.e. the ‘mathematical nature of nature’ according to mechanical philosophy. Moreover, the understanding of this mathematical nature changed dramatically in the course of the eighteenth century for various (i.e. mathematical, philosophical and other) reasons – a fact hardly appreciated by former philosophical analysis. Philosophy of science today should offer a more accurate analysis to history of science without giving up its task – not always appreciated by historians – to uncover the basic concepts and methods which seem relevant for the understanding of science in question. This paper gives a ‘structural account’ on the development of rational mechanics from Newton to Lagrange that tries to give justice to the fact that rational mechanics in the eighteenth century was primarily understood as a mathematical science and that – starting from this understanding – also tries to give good reasons for the fundamental change of the concept of science that took place during this period.     

Huygens’ stargazing scientists: the idea of science in Cosmotheoros

This paper deals with the book Cosmotheoros (1698), in which Christiaan Huygens presented his concept of a universe made up of many inhabited planets. Recent interpreters of this work have focused especially on cosmological issues presented in the book. Cosmotheoros, however, comprises also various philosophical ideas. In this paper I want to focus on the concept contemplator coeli – stargazer. The stargazer was the embodiment of the philosophical ideal of the contemplative way of life that appeared in classical philosophy and astronomy. I want to argue that Huygens followed on from the idea of the stargazer and used it in his hypothetical construction of extra-terrestrial life. At the same time, however, he altered this idea in such a way that it corresponded better to the ideals of science at the end of the seventeenth century. In Huygens’ concept, the noble contemplator coeli turned into the modern scientist who works with other scientists on the advancement of mankind’s knowledge of nature. Huygens’ stargazers are a good example of how strikingly the basic assumptions of knowledge of nature in the early modern period changed with regard to classical antiquity.     

Western women and imperialism: Complicity and resistance

The eighteenth-century moral philosopher Archibald Campbell is now largely forgotten, even to specialists in the Scottish Enlightenment. Yet his work is worth recovering both as part of the immediate reception of Bernard Mandeville and Francis Hutcheson's rival moral philosophies, and for better understanding the state of Scottish moral philosophy a decade before David Hume published his Treatise of Human Nature. This paper offers a reading of Campbell as deploying a specifically Epicurean philosophy that resists both the Augustinianism of Mandeville, and the Stoicism of Hutcheson. This leads him onto ground later claimed more conclusively by Hume, whilst helping us to better conceptualise the deployment and recovery of Hellenistic thought in the early modern period.     

Natural Law in Dryden’s Translations of Chaucer and Boccaccio

This article examines the influence of natural law philosophy upon four of Dryden’s translations of Chaucer and Boccaccio published in his final collection Fables, Ancient and Modern (1700): “Sigismonda and Guiscardo”, “The Wife of Bath, her Tale”, “Palamon and Arcite” and “Cymon and Iphigenia”. Situating Dryden’s tales alongside the writings of his philosophical, political and literary contemporaries as well as their classical sources, it argues that Dryden’s distinctive choice of vocabulary and innovative amplifications of his originals constitute a subtly provocative interrogation of the use of natural law rhetoric within the seventeenth century.     

Essentialism and Historicism in Danto's Philosophy of Art

Arthur C. Danto has long defended essentialism in the philosophy of art, yet he has been interpreted by many as a historicist. This essentialism/historicism conflict in the interpretation of his work reflects the same conflict both within his thought and, more importantly, within modern art itself. Danto's strategy for resolving this conflict involves, among other things, a Bildungsroman of modern art failing to discover its essence, an essentialist definition of art provided by philosophy which is indemnified against history, and a thesis about the end of art once it has been defined. Is this strategy successful, or does it result, as I argue, in a philosophical disenfranchisement of art of precisely the type that Danto himself has criticized?     

William Pulteney Alison, the Scottish philosophy, and the making of a political medicine

This article considers the public health and social-reform agitations of Dr. William Pulteney Alison (1790-1858), professor of medicine at Edinburgh University and leader of the Scottish medical profession, in the context of Scottish moral philosophy. Throughout his career, Alison reflected on what has come to be recognized as a central problem of social medicine: where did its domain end? At what point did the medical mission of identifying and eliminating factors that harm health pass into a non-medical domain-the provinces of political economy, individual liberty, participatory politics, or acceptance of nature's dictates? On these issues Alison was an expansionist, relentlessly pushing back the borders of medicine. Drawing on Alison's writings on such disparate topics as the philosophy of mind, the epidemiology of infectious diseases, and modes of agrarian organization, the article argues that the trajectory of much of Alison's work was to discover the structural implications of a comprehensive biological reading of human capacity and behavior. It is therefore appropriate to see him as a promulgator of a "political medicine," which he presented as a critical alternative to the classical political economy of the Scottish Malthusians. The article concludes by suggesting that Alison's work (and influence) have been under-recognized and remain pertinent to modern social epidemiology, public health, and medicine more broadly.     

Philosophy and Esotericism

Abstract

Arthur Melzer's Philosophy Between the Lines establishes the historical reality of esotericism, or at least the reputation for it, throughout Western and Islamic philosophy until late modernity. But Melzer wants to do much more than that: to establish that there is a whole new world of philosophy to uncover and explore, thus to promote the recovery of “a long lost art of philosophical literacy.” I argue that he fails in this task. Most of the evidence he has for esotericism concerns religious beliefs, and it does not show that a significant portion of the work of important philosophers is to be read esoterically. I offer a detailed analysis of his account of Aristotle's alleged esotericism to give some indication of the weakness of his evidence. I also argue against the Straussian assumption (regarding the dualism of human nature between theory and practice) that stands behind so much of his account of esotericism. I end with a discussion of pedagogical esotericism, contrasting Melzer's Straussian account with my Nietzschean account of what esotericism can contribute to philosophical education.     

DEFENDING SPIRIT,SPIRITUALIZING MATTER: NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE MEDICAL SCIENCES

This review essay discusses Larry Sommer McGrath's Making Spirit Matter: Neurology, Psychology, and Selfhood in Modern France (2020), a history of the philosophical current known as “spiritualism.” The book covers the long nineteenth century, focusing especially on the first part of the Third Republic (1870–1914), and studies how French academic philosophers confronted the discourses about human cognition and behavior that were produced by physicians—namely, physiologists and pathologists, phrenologists, neurologists, alienists, and psychiatrists. It describes how, while engaged in this confrontation, French philosophy took a peculiar shape, eventually influencing the development of some sciences—namely, psychology, which emerged progressively as a discipline at the crossroads of medicine and philosophy. In the second part of the essay, starting from a terminological analysis of a series of terms dealing with “spirit,” I consider the formation of spiritualism by adopting an approach that diverges slightly from the ones proper to history of philosophy and intellectual history. I inscribe the philosophical discourses in their contexts of emergence, paying particular attention to institutional macrostructures and their inertia. This provides another perspective on “spiritualism,” which may no longer be conceived as a current or a school; rather, it should be conceived as the effect of the conditions of possibility of academic philosophy in France. It seems to me that, starting from the beginning of the nineteenth century, because of the organization of the educational institutions, the French philosophers’ agenda consisted mainly in opposing all forms of materialism, mechanism, and determinism and in defending the legitimacy of their discipline.