‘Sword and plough’: settling Nazi stormtroopers in Eastern Europe, 1936–43

ABSTRACT

Most histories of the National Socialist stormtroopers (SA) come to a close with the Night of the Long Knives in the summer of 1934. For the remaining eleven years of National Socialist rule, the stormtroopers are usually regarded as a peripheral ‘nostalgic drinking companionship’ of early Nazi activists who, apart from their involvement in the persecution of the Jews, did not wield much influence. In contrast to such views, this article argues that the SA remained an important mass organization in the Third Reich that not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime within the boundaries of the German heartlands but also contributed importantly to German expansionist policies from 1935 onwards. My argument is developed in three stages. First, I assess the SA’s contribution to the German settlement movement in the 1930s that was originally concerned with the ‘inner colonialism’, the population transfer within the existing borders of the German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in disadvantaged German regions, in particular in the northern and eastern provinces. Second, I concentrate on the analysis of the plans and initiatives of the so-called ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers and matters of ethnicity’ between 1938 and 1942. In a third and final part, I discuss these plans and the actual developments in the light of the expansionist Nazi policies of de- and reterritorialization during the war years, advanced in particular by the SS. Although the SA’s extensive pre-war ambitions in ‘Germanization’ suffered a serious backlash with the outbreak of the war, it still contributed in important ways to the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft in the occupied territories.     

Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?

Obama's election in 2008 as the United States’ first self-styled Pacific President drew a hearty round of ‘end of the affair’ editorials about Anglo-American relations. His first term was littered with ‘snubgates’, serious irritations in policy areas regarded as being core to the special relationship, and indications of an accelerating US departure from Europe with his premier foreign-policy strategy declared to be a pivot to Asia. His return for a second term in 2013 augers a continuation of first-term adjustments in US foreign policy and greater domestic focus given a divided Congress and a bitterly split and war-weary United States with domestic priorities to the fore. Doomsayers - or so-called terminalists - have been repeatedly gainsaid by the Lazarus-like quality of the relationship in the past but can the Anglo-American special relationship survive in the Obama environment? This article suggests it can and sets out the author's rather unfashionable argument in four parts: the weight of history; the canons of international-relations theory; the importance of considering interest and sentiment in explaining the special relationship's resilience; and a relativist argument that suggests the United States still really does have no better ally than the United Kingdom.     

Relations between Tel Aviv and Jaffa 1921–1936: A reassessment

From the founding of Tel Aviv adjacent to the Arab city of Jaffa, a new and unique reality arose in Palestine in the form of neighborly relations between a Hebrew city and an Arab city. A deep rift in these relations resulted from the riots of 1921 and 1929, and in Zionist historiography it is argued that from the 1921 riots onward, the ties between them weakened and deteriorated constantly. This article aims to shed new light on the question, and to show that there was, in fact, a clear tendency of continuous improvement in the relationship from the first half of the 1920s until the outbreak of the 1936 riots.     

Warton,George Washington and the Lancashire Roots of the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’, C. 1880–1976

This article takes as its starting point the ancestral connection linking George Washington, first president of the United States, to the parish of Warton in north Lancashire. But rather than simply repeating the various details of this ancestry, this article considers instead the ways in which the Warton–Washington connection has been used within acts of ‘commemorative diplomacy’ — informal and often unofficial activities that deploy cultural memory in the interests of international relations. From the antiquarian endeavours of the 1880s, to the Washington-focused commemorations organized during the world wars, to the Bicentenary events of July 1976, places like Warton have long played a vital role in Anglo-American relations. Indeed, what Winston Churchill famously called the ‘special relationship’ has always been a carefully cultivated ‘myth’ as much as a political reality, and thus rooting it in specific places has been essential, ensuring it seems ‘organic’ rather than constructed, real rather than artificial, old and robust rather than new and superficial. Commemorative activities at Warton therefore offer an important perspective on twentieth-century Anglo-American relations, showing how a north Lancashire connection to the first president has provided an invaluable vector for defining, imagining and celebrating the transatlantic ties of the past and present.     

The ‘Sex Question’ in Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War

During the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, 1899–1905, the Persian Gulf states came to be treated by Calcutta as closely analogous to Indian Princely states. This shift in policy was most clearly expressed in the state tour of the Gulf in 1903 by the Viceroy. During this tour a number of symbolic, informational, diplomatic, and military methods were employed by the British to expand the role of the Indian Empire in the Persian Gulf. Curzon paid particularly close attention to his government's relationship with Muscat (modern Oman) and Kuwait. The catalyst for this change in the way the Government of India treated the Gulf states was a fear that France, Russia, and Germany were attempting to gain a foothold in the region. Historians of British Indian expansion have tended to focus on the role of ambitious frontier agents; the result has been a distortion which underplays the central role of metropolitan Calcutta, and in this case Lord Curzon, the Viceroy himself.     

‘Nuclear Sword of the Moslem World’?: the United States,Britain, Pakistan,and the ‘Islamic Bomb’, 1977–80

There exists today considerable fear of nuclear proliferation across the ‘Islamic world.’ Despite this, an issue that - in part - set the tone for contemporary debates has largely gone under-examined in the scholarly literature. The emergence of the ‘Islamic bomb’ idea in the late 1970s created a meme that remains with us today. Analysing the roots of this meme allows us to examine its creation and the attitudes of governments towards this alleged emergent nuclear-proliferation threat. This analysis demonstrates that while the media portrayed the ‘Islamic world’ as violent, undifferentiated, and determined to gain nuclear capability, the US and British governments assessed matters evidentially and came to the conclusion that the ‘Islamic bomb’ represented a propaganda problem rather than an imminent nuclear-proliferation concern. Attitudes towards the ‘Islamic bomb’ highlight media and governmental attitudes towards the changing power balances in the Middle East and South Asia during a turbulent and troubled period.     

‘A “Special Relationship” sometimes in spite of ourselves’: Britain and Jordan, 1957–73

In view of Britain's role in the creation and development of Jordan, bilateral relations in the wake of the Suez crisis are an important test case of its continuing engagement, not only in the Levant, but in the Middle East as a whole. This article shows that despite the far-reaching changes which took place in British foreign policy between 1957 and 1973, Britain retained a significant bilateral relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Through a comparison of the role of the Western powers in the 1958 and 1970 crises, and through an analysis of the key events of the intervening years, including the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, this article explores the dynamics of this persisting relationship. It shows that the initiative often came from the Jordanian side, with King Hussein particularly keen to involve both Britain and the United States in the September 1970 crisis as witnesses to his dealings with Israel.     

‘‘This Secret Town’: British Intelligence,the Special Relationship,and the Vietnam War’

This article seeks to revise our understanding of Cold War intelligence as a practice. The conventional view is that Britain's MI6 waged a battle in the shadows consisting of espionage and covert action. However, a number of MI6 officers operated as observers, conducting what we might call ‘intelligence without espionage’. The dual identity of these officers raises important questions about how intelligence operated in the blurred space between traditional diplomacy and human espionage using agents. Using the case of MI6 officers in the British Consulate-General in Hanoi between 1965 and 1972, this article explores how a dual identity provided alternative means of acquiring intelligence within a highly secure state that exhibited remarkable paranoia about foreign spies. Furthermore, the United States lacked diplomatic representation in Hanoi and so the British Consulate provided a remarkable window for Western intelligence on the effect of ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’, Lyndon Johnson's escalating air campaign against North Vietnam. Both Johnson and Harold Wilson were avid readers of this material. Accordingly, in the context of the Cold War intelligence partnership between the UK and US, the consulate in Hanoi was an example of the ‘inverse’ special relationship, in which Britain enjoyed unique value.     

‘Those European Chicken Littles’: Reagan,NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2

This article focuses on transatlantic relations in the run-up to and aftermath of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. Through an analysis of British, US, German, and NATO sources, this article highlights the fundamental differences and consequent disagreements that occurred between the Reagan administration and its European allies in 1981–2. It argues that these divergences originated from economic considerations, from a fundamentally discrepant conception of détente on the two sides of the Atlantic, and from the Reagan administration's mismanagement of the crisis. Not only did Reagan disregard NATO's contingency plans dating from 1980 and did not consult the allies, he also designed US sanctions specifically to dash a joint agreement between the Europeans and the Soviet Union for the construction of a pipeline that was to deliver Siberian gas into Western Europe.     

Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations,Philippine Independence,and the Containment of Japan, 1932–1937

The declaration in 1932 of the United States to allow Philippine independence in March 1934 was an act that had a number of unintended consequences for the stability of the Far Eastern balance of power system. Given the state of tension existing in the international system between the major actors in the region: Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, any movement in the existing boundaries of the international spheres of influence between them could generate a significant destabilizing reaction. The American proposal to allow Philippine independence was such an act. If America surrendered its position and interests in the Philippines, who would replace it? What would happen if it was not replaced? Was it realistic, given the nature of the international competition for resources and strategic position, all linked to the creation and use of maritime power, that the Philippines could exist ‘on its own..’. This essay will analyse how the United States and Great Britain dealt with this instability, as well as how those interactions allowed a closer and more harmonious Anglo-American informal strategic relationship to be developed. That relationship would thereafter evolve into a collaborative alliance aimed at deterring further Japanese expansion.     

‘Marriage’, ‘Massage', Metaphor and Gender in US–Iranian Relations During the 1960s

Abstract

Although they were allies, during the 1960s relations between the United States and Iran were fraught with tensions. For American policymakers, Iran was an important Cold War client and oil-supplier in a turbulent region. It was vital, therefore, to maintain a good relationship with the Shah of Iran. Indeed, United States policy was based in large part on American assessments of the Shah as an individual. This article seeks to assess how the language and metaphors used by American policymakers to describe and understand the Shah reflected and informed United States policy. Officials within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations viewed the Shah through a highly gendered lens that magnified perceptions of him as a weak, highly sensitive and irrational leader – characteristics deemed to be overly feminine. This article therefore contends that US policy towards Iran was influenced by gender stereotypes as policymakers lamented their reliance on the Shah, who they deemed to be insufficiently 'masculine'.