The Intervention Crisis of 1862: A British Diplomatic Dilemma?

In the fall of 1862, William Ewart Gladstone opened a cabinet debate whether Great Britain should intervene in the American Civil War. Influenced by the staggering death toll and lack of results, the British cabinet contemplated a humanitarian intervention. Coinciding with the debate was a cabinet crisis in France over French policies toward Italy and more importantly the overthrow of the Greek king. The revolution in Greece reopened the Eastern Question and forced the Palmerston Government to carefully consider its foreign policy. By closely looking at the chronological overlap of the intervention debate, the French cabinet crisis, and the Greek Revolution, this article shows the interplay of the entangled global crises during the fall of 1862 and their impact on trans-Atlantic diplomacy. The British Government had to determine whether the situation in North America or the containment of Russia and the Eastern Question required attention more urgently. The British Government determined that threats closer to home mattered more.     

Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations,Philippine Independence,and the Containment of Japan, 1932–1937

The declaration in 1932 of the United States to allow Philippine independence in March 1934 was an act that had a number of unintended consequences for the stability of the Far Eastern balance of power system. Given the state of tension existing in the international system between the major actors in the region: Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, any movement in the existing boundaries of the international spheres of influence between them could generate a significant destabilizing reaction. The American proposal to allow Philippine independence was such an act. If America surrendered its position and interests in the Philippines, who would replace it? What would happen if it was not replaced? Was it realistic, given the nature of the international competition for resources and strategic position, all linked to the creation and use of maritime power, that the Philippines could exist ‘on its own..’. This essay will analyse how the United States and Great Britain dealt with this instability, as well as how those interactions allowed a closer and more harmonious Anglo-American informal strategic relationship to be developed. That relationship would thereafter evolve into a collaborative alliance aimed at deterring further Japanese expansion.     

Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?

Obama's election in 2008 as the United States’ first self-styled Pacific President drew a hearty round of ‘end of the affair’ editorials about Anglo-American relations. His first term was littered with ‘snubgates’, serious irritations in policy areas regarded as being core to the special relationship, and indications of an accelerating US departure from Europe with his premier foreign-policy strategy declared to be a pivot to Asia. His return for a second term in 2013 augers a continuation of first-term adjustments in US foreign policy and greater domestic focus given a divided Congress and a bitterly split and war-weary United States with domestic priorities to the fore. Doomsayers - or so-called terminalists - have been repeatedly gainsaid by the Lazarus-like quality of the relationship in the past but can the Anglo-American special relationship survive in the Obama environment? This article suggests it can and sets out the author's rather unfashionable argument in four parts: the weight of history; the canons of international-relations theory; the importance of considering interest and sentiment in explaining the special relationship's resilience; and a relativist argument that suggests the United States still really does have no better ally than the United Kingdom.     

Out of Arabia: British Strategy and the Fate of Local Forces in Aden,South Yemen,and Oman, 1967–76

The British engagement with Oman from 1967–76 came at a time when other imperial and defence commitments were being reduced in the Gulf region and elsewhere. Following the ignominious retreat from Aden, the British chose to support the Omani regime in its conflict with Communist-inspired insurgents (1970–6). This article gives context to the dichotomy of outcomes in southern Arabia and examines the role of local military forces in the counter-insurgencies. It demonstrates that Britain's domestic political considerations, regional strategic requirements, and concerns for its global reputation, rather than counterinsurgency operations and the local forces, were the main drivers of outcomes. Insurgents and local actors nevertheless responded to changes taking place in and around Oman, recalibrating their decision to co-operate or resist on their own terms, and changes in the international support for the insurgents were decisive. The key argument is that the dynamic combinations of international support, British strategic assumptions and miscalculations, and local agency, were crucially important to the outcomes in the region. The ‘fate’ of those who had allied with, or resisted, the British, needs to be set in this context.     

A Double-Edged Sword: Anglo-American ‘Special Relations,’ 1936–1981

C.A. MACDONALD. The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936–1939. New York: St Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 220. $22.50 (US); DAVID REYNOLDS. The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xiii, 397. $28.00 (US); H.G. NICHOLAS (ed.). Washington Despatches, 1941–45: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xviii, 700. $40.00 (US); TERRY H. ANDERSON. The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 256. $18.00 (US); ROBERT M. HATHAWAY. Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 410. $25.00 (US); JOHN BAYLIS. Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1980: The Special Relationship. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. xxii, 259. $25.00 (US).