霸权,文化政治和葛兰西的地理思想

20世纪90年代以来,以英语为主的地理学术界出现了所谓的新文化地理学,着重关注基于社会差异的文化政治或文化战争。葛兰西的霸权理论对于分析文化政治作出了很重要的贡献。葛兰西认为,霸权是一种关于权力平衡的概念,这种平衡包含了武力压制和意见一致。也就是说,霸权不能仅仅来源于恐怖统治和武力镇压大众,尤其是受压迫的团体,同时也得依靠被统治者的认可和来自心底的拥护。葛兰西强调地方的重要性,探讨了城市和乡村不同类型的生活方式,以及建成环境的设计和布置如何塑造共识、流行文化,以及日常生活。葛兰西的理论能够揭示中国过去三十年快速的社会空间转型。将这种转型放在更广泛的时间和空间尺度下来思考,人文地理学就可能做出独特的知识贡献。     

Introduction and Historical Context for the Archaeology of Institutions of Reform. Part I: Asylums

This introduction discusses the western cultural context that connects the following three articles of site-specific research on the Adelaide Destitute Asylum in South Australia, the Ross Female Factory (prison) in Tasmania and the Magdalen Asylum in Philadelphia. These institutions are a few of the many types of nineteenth century asylums and prisons. Although some research issues are raised the purpose of this introduction is to provide a general historical context for the different research designs which are presented in the articles. While this introduction provides a largely ungendered historical background from ungendered sources, the companion feminist commentary following the articles addresses the gendered historical context and the feminist issues in the articles.     

Italian receptions of Hegel: Epilogue

ABSTRACT

The reconstruction of national receptions of Hegel, and the inflections of his influence through local traditions and international exchanges, remains a fruitful field of investigation. The Anglophone literature has been relatively neglectful of the specific contributions made by Italian readings of Hegel, from his earliest reception onwards. The collection published here builds toward a fuller understanding of Hegel’s diagnosis of the origins and functions of the modern state and the dialectics of modern individuality and freedom, as these issues appear in debates undertaken in the Italian Risorgimento and beyond.     

General Roatta's war against the partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942

During General Mario Roatta's tenure as commander of the Italian 2nd Army in Yugoslavia, he faced a mounting Communist insurgency. To defeat the partisan forces of Tito, he resorted to proactive politics and a strategy of counter-insurgency. Owing to Italian military weakness and his army's lack of training in guerrilla warfare, Roatta was not averse to enlisting the services of Orthodox Serbs in Croatia, who the previous year had asked for Italian protection after a fearful massacre had been unleashed against them by Mussolini's handpicked ruler in Zagreb, the Croatian Usta?a leader Ante Paveli?. Against the wishes of the Fascist government in Rome, Roatta armed Serbs (called ?etniks) because they agreed to assist the Italian legions in fighting the partisans, their common ideological foe. But as Yugoslavia descended into civil war – one triggered by the Axis invasion – Roatta paid a price for his freelance pro-Serb politicking by alienating Zagreb, irritating the Germans, and dismaying his superiors in Rome. Italian policy was reduced to a tug-of-war between the Fascist empire-builders surrounding Mussolini and the military command in Yugoslavia, and Roatta became enmeshed in a cobweb of intrigues involving Croats, ?etniks and Germans. Apart from political manoeuvring, Roatta, in the ineluctable necessity of defeating the partisans, devised a detailed strategy of counter-insurgency. On 1 March 1942, he circulated a pamphlet entitled ‘3C’ among his commanders that spelled out military reform and draconian measures to intimidate the Slav populations into silence by means of summary executions, hostage-taking, reprisals, internments and the burning of houses and villages. By his reckoning, military necessity knew no choice, and law required only lip service. Roatta's merciless suppression of partisan insurgency was not mitigated by his having saved the lives of both Serbs and Jews from the persecution of Italy's allies Germany and Croatia. Under his watch, the 2nd Army's record of violence against the Yugoslav population easily matched the German. Tantamount to a declaration of war on civilians, Roatta's ‘3C’ pamphlet involved him in war crimes.     

Securing Zion? Policing in British Palestine, 1917–39

The British period in Palestine (1917–48) was fundamentally shaped by the commitment to promote the Jewish National Home (JNH) as originally stated in the Balfour Declaration (1917). The extent that that commitment shaped public-security policy in Palestine is examined in this article. While the need to reduce costs and the desire for a civilian (rather than military) force also shaped policy, the government's JNH policy was the key determinant in public-security policy in Palestine. It meant the police was specifically configured to protect the Jewish population and there were always a disproportionate number of British personnel in the force. This became more pronounced as British rule progressed. Following deadly riots in 1929, the number of British police was tripled; with the inception of the Arab Revolt (1936–39) that number more than quadrupled. Moreover, during the Arab Revolt the British increasingly relied on members of the Jewish community to assist with their protection. The majority of these Jewish forces were supposedly for defensive purposes; regardless, they were all members of the semi-secret underground Jewish army, Haganah. The British were well aware of this and tacitly approved. In doing so, the British made a significant contribution to the Zionist project.     

Riforma e Rinascimento,Protestantism and Catholicism in Antonio Gramsci's writings on Italian history, 1926 – 35

Abstract

This article readdresses Gramsci's use of Italian history, focusing on his judgement that the Italian Renaissance marked the start of a specifically Italian course of historical failure because it led directly to the Counter-Reformation, the Risorgimento and Fascism. It shows that Gramsci's political strategy after 1923 – on the need for a mass socialist movement – informed his historical opinions. His view of a regressive Renaissance contrasted the dominant historiographical consensus that saw it as the start of European modernity. Gramsci conceptualized modern European history according to a Reformation–Renaissance dichotomy that also determined his general sense of culture. By contrasting Catholic Italy (whose Renaissance had failed to lead to a Reformation) with the Protestant north (whose general Renaissance had formed a harmonious couplet with the Reformation), Gramsci reveals that his single greatest debt as a historian was to Weber rather than Marx or Croce.