The Arab Uprisings and the United States: The Dichotomy Between Balancing Stability and Upholding Commitment to Democracy

The Arab Spring, a revolutionary movement for democracy that swept across the Arab Middle East in 2010, has contributed to the downfall of several oppressive authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. The movement represented several uprisings that placed the United States in a precarious position. While the uprisings have shaken U.S. policy to the core, they also presented a historic opportunity for American policymakers to craft a new and comprehensive policy that is compatible with the much‐coveted principles of democracy, freedom, and justice in a region that has historically been unable to grasp such principles. This article argues that the American administration under President Barak Obama squandered this opportunity by pursuing an incoherent and inconsistent policy. This policy revealed Obama's support of the uprisings calls for political reforms that aligned with American liberal values. However, the policy also reflected a commitment to ensure security and stability by maintaining autocratic regimes the protesters hoped to overthrow. This article demonstrates that the policy lacked consistency and clarity as it shifted from one uprising to another.     

The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications

The Arab uprisings of 2011 are still unfolding, but we can already discern patterns of their effects on the Middle East region. This article offers a brief chronology of events, highlighting their inter‐connections but also their very diverse origins, trajectories and outcomes. It discusses the economic and political grievances at the root of the uprisings and assesses the degree to which widespread popular mobilization can be attributed to pre‐existing political, labour and civil society activism, and social media. It argues that the uprisings' success in overthrowing incumbent regimes depended on the latter's responses and relationships with the army and security services. The rebellions' inclusiveness or lack thereof was also a crucial factor. The article discusses the prospects of democracy in the Arab world following the 2011 events and finds that they are very mixed: while Tunisia, at one end, is on track to achieve positive political reform, Syria, Yemen and Libya are experiencing profound internal division and conflict. In Bahrain the uprising was repressed. In Egypt, which epitomizes many regional trends, change will be limited but, for that reason, possibly more long‐lasting. Islamist movements did not lead the uprisings but will benefit from them politically even though, in the long run, political participation may lead to their decline. Finally, the article sketches the varied and ongoing geopolitical implications of the uprisings for Turkish, Iranian and Israeli interests and policies. It assesses Barack Obama's response to the 2011 events and suggests that, despite their profound significance for the politics of the region, they may not alter the main contours of US foreign policy in the Middle East in a major way.     

ICT,Social Media,and the Arab Transition to Democracy: From Venting to Acting

There is widespread use of information and communications technology (ICT) in the Middle East and North African countries. Blogging and social media have played an important role in the recent calls for reform and change. Using these new communication systems and devices, citizens have been venting their anger and frustration with their autocratic governments and rulers. Most recently, the venting has turned into action, as shown by the eradication of the old regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, as well as the ongoing struggle in Syria. The most notable issues include lack of individual freedoms, deteriorating economic conditions, high unemployment, increased corruption, and violent treatment of citizens at the hands of security forces. The Arab Spring, or Awakening, and the events that have since followed have, in part, been promoted by ICT and other means of modern communications. Along with the popular Arab traditions of oral communication as well as Friday and Sunday sermons at mosques and churches, social media were used by organizers of the Arab Spring to call for and coordinate demonstrations against the regimes. Access to this newer media has circumvented the established and government‐controlled media such as printed press, radio, and television—outlets bent on appeasing the rulers and misinforming the masses. Arab authoritarian systems have discovered that they cannot simply flip a big red switch to stop the flow of information that they would rather keep hidden from the masses. Further discussed are digital democracies that are currently emerging because of the growing population of netizens, bloggers, and social media political activists throughout the Arab world and the many attempts to silence them.     

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests

The rapid and unpredictable changes in the Middle East collectively known as the “Arab Spring” are posing tremendous challenges to U.S. policy formation and action. This article will explore and evaluate evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East and its potential implications. There has always been a tension in American foreign policy between pursuing American “values” (foreign policy idealism) and protecting American “interests” (foreign policy realism). For decades, the United States has sought to “make the world safe for democracy,” while at the same time often supporting repressive, nondemocratic regimes because of national security or economic self‐interest. The tension between these two fundamentally distinct policy orientations has become even more pronounced as the United States tries to respond to the Arab Spring uprisings. Why did the United States actively support the rebels in Libya but not the protestors in Syria or Bahrain? Is there an emerging, coherent “Obama Doctrine” on intervention in Arab countries, or was Libya just a “one‐off” event? These are some of the questions that this article will attempt to answer.     

Luxemburg on Tahrir Square: Reading the Arab Revolutions with Rosa Luxemburg's The Mass Strike

The protests on Tahrir Square in Cairo have come to symbolize the Arab uprisings of 2011. They have proven that Arab political life is more complex than the false choice between authoritarian rule or Islamist oppositions. The popular uprisings witnessed the emergence of “the Arab peoples” as political actors, able to topple entrenched authoritarian leaders, challenging repressive regimes and their brutal security apparatuses. In our contribution we want to analyze the political dynamics of these uprisings beyond the salient immediacy of the revolutionary events, by taking, as our guide, Rosa Luxemburg's pamphlet The Mass Strike (2005 [1906], London: Bookmarks). An interesting theoretical contribution to the study of revolution, Luxemburg's book provides us with tools to introduce a historical and political reading of the Arab Spring. Based on fieldwork and thorough knowledge of the region, we draw from evidence from the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the more gradual forms of political change in Morocco. Re‐reading the revolutionary events in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco through the lens of The Mass Strike offers activists on the ground insights into the dialectic between local and national struggles, economic and political demands, strike actions and revolution. The workers protests in Tunisia and Egypt during the last decade can be grasped as anticipations of the mass strike during the revolution; the specific mode in which workers participate as a class in the revolutionary process. This perspective enables an understanding of the current economic conflicts as logical forms of continuity of the revolution. The economic and the political, the local and the national (and one may add the global), are indissoluble yet separate elements of the same process, and the challenge for revolutionary actors in Tunisia and Egypt lies in the connection, organization and fusion of these dispersed moments and spaces of struggle into a politicized whole. Conversely, an understanding of the reciprocity between revolutionary change and the mass strike allows activists in Morocco to recognize the workers' movement as a potentially powerful actor of change, and trade unionists to incorporate the political in their economic mobilizations.     

Are Monarchies Exceptional to the Arab Uprisings? The Resilience of Moroccan Monarchy Revisited

With the onset of the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 and the emergence of popular demonstrations that raised the issue of crises of legitimacy across the Arab states, the literature on democratization in the Middle East and North African (MENA) studies has taken on new dimensions recently. One of the primary theoretical debates that has surfaced in the post‐2011 era has revolved around on whether or not the demonstrations will lead to regime change or increased authoritarianism in the MENA region. One of the crucial developments of the Arab Spring has, then, been the overthrow of some long‐standing rulers like Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt, as well as the questioning of authoritarian regimes by the masses. The public protests submerged some Arab republics, but monarchies found ways to overcome the public outcry through containing the opposition. This paper, therefore, takes the monarchy of Morocco as a case study with the aim of analyzing the methods and regime‐survival strategies the regime has employed to sustain itself and consolidate power in the post‐2011 Arab uprisings era. Additionally, the role of the Justice and Development Party as an emerging threat in the postdemocratization era, and the changing nature of the party’s relations with the palace, will be addressed.     

The Arab Spring: A Fourth Wave of Democratization?

Between 1974 and 1990, over 30 countries in southern Europe, Latin America, some parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa made transitions to democracy, nearly doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. Samuel Huntington described this global shift as “Democracy's Third Wave” in an article published in 1991, which was later developed in a book titled The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. In these two works, he discusses the causes, features, and transition processes of the third wave of democracy and examines its prospects for sustainability and possible expansion in a nondemocratic world. He argues that the first and second democratic waves “were followed not merely by some backsliding but major reverse waves during which most regime changes throughout the world were from democracy to authoritarianism” (Huntington, 1991a). He also addresses the causative factors of this reverse wave in some countries, and he claims that the third wave of democratization that swept the world in the 1970s and 1980s might become a dominant feature of Middle Eastern and North African politics in the 1990s. The delay in this prophecy for two decades motivates us to question whether the Arab Spring is part of Huntington's third wave of democratization or a new fourth wave of democratization, or even a false start to democracy, as described by Larry Diamond ( 2011 ). The purpose of this article is to examine the causes, features, and transition processes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in correlation with Huntington's theorization on the third wave of democratization which, along with other available literature in the field, will be combined in a theoretical framework that will enable us to discuss the abovementioned elements of the Arab Spring through the lens of the third wave of democratization. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the Arab Spring falls into the framework of Huntington's theory, or whether it can be classified as a new fourth wave of democratization in countries that have unfavorable environments for democracy. The first part of this article highlights the causative factors that eased the emergence of the third wave of democratization in different parts of the world. The second part provides a historical overview of the major events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, while the third and fourth parts analyze the causes, features, and transition processes of the Arab Spring from Huntington's third wave perspective.     

The Determinants of Political Cleavages in Jordan,Tunisia, and Yemen: An Analysis of Political Attitudes Structure in the Arab World

This article investigates the determinants of political cleavages composing the structure of political attitudes in Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen following the Arab Spring. Further, it tests whether political cleavages carry predictive weight on ordinary citizens’ electoral choices in general elections. Using the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey, discriminant analysis was conducted to generate the dimensionality, type, and structure of political attitudes in the three nations. Findings suggest that the structure of political attitudes in Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen is multidimensional: the Islamic‐Secular division, a conflict along economic policy visions and an emerging divisive dimension concerning political reform. Evidence indicates that political cleavages do not possess significant predictive power in determining voters’ choice at elections booths. This research also points to the significance of social transformation processes such as modernization and globalization in causing a shift in values among ordinary citizens in the Arab World. This research argues that in countries where the effects of modernization and globalization are higher, a weakening of the Islamic‐Secular division is witnessed. This research is important since it paves the way for further empirical analysis on political ideology in the Middle East. It shatters conjectures concluding that Arab polities are only divided by a single hierarchical dimension: Islamic‐Secular. It contributes to comparative research on the dimensionality of political ideology by showing that the Arab World is similar to the industrialized world in the dimensionality, nature, and structuration of political ideology.     

Authoritarianism,revolution and democracy: Egypt and beyond

The pro-democracy Arab popular uprisings have been spontaneous, but perhaps not all that unpredictable. They have come against the backdrop of a growing gulf between the rulers and the ruled, political repression, social and economic inequalities, demographic changes, unemployment and foreign policy debacles. Although the uprisings began in Tunisia, it is the case of Egypt that illustrates the situation more compellingly and the impact that it has had on the rest of the Arab world. It is not clear at this stage what will be the ultimate outcome. But what can be said with certainty is that the Arab peoples have set out on a long journey in pursuit of genuine self-determination. The journey will be arduous and unsettling for the Arabs and outsiders, but this has to be treated as part of a transition from a dictatorial past to a politically pluralist future.     

Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: the Case of Yemen

This article examines the role of Iran in Yemen within the context of Arab‐Iranian relations. It also examines the debate on the involvement of Iran in the ongoing political developments in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. The article focuses on the Houthi Movement in Yemen, its origin, growth and political expansion. It also investigates its relations with Iran and its allies in the region, and discusses other factors that strengthened its political image in Yemen. The article also provides an early assessment of the implication of the Decisive Storm military led by Saudi Arabia.     

Unrest in the Arab world: why the 2011 uprisings still matter

This article reviews the current state of analysis of the 2011 Arab uprisings. It argues that valuable literature on the uprisings is emerging just at a time when the international policy agenda has moved away from 2011's flirtation with visions of a democratic Middle East. This literature presents a timely reminder that the uprisings were part of long‐term processes of political change, rather than isolated phenomena. Understanding the very different post‐uprising trajectories of different Arab countries requires comparative analysis of the political economy, state institutions, the role of the security sector and strategies of opposition movements, among other factors. Moreover, comparative experiences from transitions in other regions indicate that the conflicts, economic problems and social polarization that have ensued in most of the transition countries are not evidence of an Arab exception, but, rather, have parallels with political transitions elsewhere, which have rarely been peaceful or simple. Compared to 2011, the perceived costs of political change are higher today, while the gains remain uncertain. But the drivers of unrest remain unresolved; and a small minority will seek change through brutal and violent means. Western policy‐makers need to understand what is driving these movements. Yet they also, crucially, need to understand what is motivating and preoccupying the larger publics in the Arab world, in order to build broad‐based relations with these countries, and avoid inadvertently empower violent groups by allowing them to set the political agenda.     

Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism and Nationalism: The Evolution of Wataniyya into Qawmiyya

For many scholars, the Arab Spring was actually an Islamic Winter, especially when ISIS rose up in Iraq and Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood won democratic elections in Egypt and took control over the state. But in other unshaken regions in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, the Arab Spring or the Islamic Winter led to something different, which I will call “rethinking nationalism.” This article asserts that since Saudi Arabia's independence in 1932, the royal family has succeeded in forming Wahhabi nationalism, meaning that despite the fact that all Saudi civilians enjoy Saudi citizenship, only those who ascribe to the Wahhabism creed can be part of the nation in terms of political participation and policy decision‐making. Although some steps in affirmative action have been taken in recent years — also as a Saudi response to the Arab Spring — toward women and the Shi'a minority, these groups or sectors still are not perceived by the royal family as part of the nation, and probably not as equal citizens, for religious reasons that over the years have distinguished between real Saudi nationalist groups and Saudi civilians.     

From Idealism to Pragmatism: An Analysis of China's Policies toward the Middle East

After World War II, the Middle East stage attracted Beijing's attention. While Israel and China proved at that time to be too diverse, through the 1950s China made inroads with Arab countries. Egypt became the first to recognize the P.R.C., which, however, suffered rebuffs as anti-Communist forces generally prevailed in the Middle East. Beijing supported the people of Palestine. After the Soviet Union had become China's enemy, China tried to unite the Third World against the two superpowers. With Deng in 1978, China's Middle Eastern policy became more pragmatic, tilting toward the developed countries and economic cooperation rather than ideology (e.g., with Yemen). China enhanced relations with Gulf states; cooperated with the United States in supporting the Afghan mujahedin; and declared neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, although economic alliance with Iran grew. The Gulf War affected Beijing's attitudes toward weapons technology and toward the United Nations and China's role in it. Israel is currently viewed as a channel for possible influence with the West. Overall, China's basic policy now is to watch and wait.     

The 9/11 Events: A Precursor to the Arab Spring

Despite the fact that the Arab revolutions that swept important Arab countries by the beginning of 2011 from North Africa to the Middle East were the result of precarious economic and social conditions, still the causes and roots of these uprisings at that very moment indicate some inherent potential drives that are the result of years of simmering. The United States had long supported the expansion of democracy in the world, but the Arab world had always been seen as an exception. The September 11 events destroyed that approach to the Middle East. Accordingly, all attempts to explain the uprisings have been overwhelmed and distorted by the concurrent conditions of the Arab world in relation to its social, political, and cultural deficit. However, the underpinnings of the Arab revolutions can be traced to a distrust of people in their governments and a deep understanding of the new world order triggered by the 9/11 events and the invasion of Iraq. This article traces the impact of the 9/11 events on the Arab mindset ever since the Iraq war and how it resulted in the turmoil of the Arab revolutions.     

Social Media and Social Change

The growing impact of new media around the world has been the subject of study by scores of scientists in multidisciplinary fields. Satellite TV and the Internet have been viewed as instruments of social and political change — connecting communities, educating the youth, and creating social networks previously unaccounted for, like virtual groups. However, in the Arab World and the Middle East, such technological developments have been hailed as tools for the empowerment of marginalized communities such as women and the youth, also brought new opportunities that have resulted in the breaking of the communication monopoly by those in power and the creation of a new communication environment. Such environment has — as part of its manifestations — the current social transformations that the region is witnessing. Drawing on examples from social media networks used in Tunisia and Egypt, this article analyzes the extent to which new technologies have changed the rules of the game regarding public opinion construction and the communication flow traditionally monopolized by the hegemonic power structures in Arab society. This study not only reveals the decisiveness of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in the Arab Spring countries’ revolutions, but also the extent to which their availability served in a complex manner the democratic transition that Tunisia have been undergoing and the political turmoil that Egypt is witnessing. Furthermore this study argues that such online spheres of communication mark the emergence of the virtual yet vibrant space of political campaigning and social empowerment, especially for the youth and marginalized communities.     

The United States and Bahrain: Interpreting the Differentiated U.S. Responses to the Arab Spring

We examine how the United States' response to the situation in Bahrain can be differentiated from that in Libya and Egypt based on a comparative content analysis of the U.S. administration's press releases, remarks, and interviews during the first three months of the Arab Spring movement. Our findings indicate that although the level and duration of violence were comparable, the U.S. government response was strikingly different with the support given to the Bahraini government, in contrast to the critical stances adopted towards Libya and Egypt. We explain how the United States' lack of political incentive to act and concerted support by its allies were influential factors for the United States' differentiated policy during the Arab Spring.     

Electoral Pluralism,Social Division and the 2016 Parliamentary Elections in Jordan

Representing one of the most stable regimes in the Middle East, Jordan has been undergoing a process of political liberalization since 1989. Due to the so‐called East Bank‐West Bank cleavage that followed by the influx of Palestinian migrants to Jordan, the country has also come to epitomize a divided society. Within this context, this paper aims to analyze the ongoing prospects for democratization in Jordan through an examination of four persistent debates shaping its electoral pluralism: those over social/identity division, electoral law as a regime‐survival mechanism, the role of the Ikhwan and the IAF's electoral boycotts, and electoral apathy. Finally, the impact of the Arab upheavals/revolts on restructuring the process of political reform — as well as opposition in the kingdom in the post‐2011 era — will be explored with reference to the changing dynamics of Islamist opposition.     

The symbolism of the Arab flag in modern Arab states: between commonality and uniqueness*

ABSTRACT. The national flag, anthem and emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty. Although each state has its distinctive flag, there are similarities in the flags of certain countries, such as in Scandinavia (the cross) and Africa (colours). These symbolise certain propinquity in terms of ideology, culture and history. Similarity is also to be found in the flags of the Arab countries: out of the twenty‐two current members of the Arab League, ten share the same colours on their flags (green, white, black and red), while a certain Islamic symbol (eagle, star) in some flags represents the uniqueness of that country. Of the other twelve countries, most rely on one colour of the four (usually red or green) while nine use Islamic symbols (stars, crescent and sword) on their flags. In spite of the importance of this national symbol, the study of the modern Arab flag is almost non‐existent. This article explores the modern evolution of the Arab flag and the reasons for the similarities in many Arab flags. In particular, it will deal with the pan‐Arab flags of the Hashemites Kingdom of the Hijaz (1916–26), Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Egypt.     

Political Theology,Democracy, and the Exception in the Egyptian Revolution

As the sixth anniversary of the 2011 protests in Tahrir Square passes, those uprisings and the events that followed continue pose important challenges not only for students of Middle Eastern and North African politics, but also for students of political theory and political theology. While scholars debate the extent to which the “Arab Spring” has amounted to a truly revolutionary turn of events, it is commonly accepted that the protests that swept the region were exceptional in their unanticipated and profound disruption of ordinary affairs. Under the influence of Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, “the exception” has become a key figure in contemporary reflections on political theology, but attention to events in Egypt suggests that the familiar figure of the exception has not yet been mined for all of its implications for democratic practice. Slipping below grand articulations of the exception as a moment of sovereign decision, or as the suspension of the law, this essay turns its attention to the minor, everyday, background patterns of exceptionality that accompany the emergence of democratic practices outside the purview of the sovereign state. I argue that there is an intimate connection between the forms of exceptionality produced by longstanding practices of Egyptian secularism, the forms of exceptionality peculiar to the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath, and the forms of exceptionality that both make and unmake democratic practices. My argument has three parts: first Egyptian secularism is a process that manages and transforms authorized forms of Islamic practice, while at the same time producing exceptional formations, of which the Muslim Brotherhood is a key example; second that revolutionary politics can be understood as a matter of opening and sustaining the kind of exceptional circumstances that attended the 2011 uprisings, and that this can be usefully framed as an open-ended process of conversion; third that democratic practice requires courting both kinds of exception, despite their challenges, ambivalences, and potential dangers.     

Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis

This article explores explanations of Russia's unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al‐Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin's resistance to any scenario of western‐led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy‐makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.