Headscarves,Judicial Activism,and Democracy: The 2007–8 Constitutional Crisis in Turkey

How are we to understand and analyse the constitutional tension in Turkey between the judiciary and the political sphere? In this article the issue is mirrored in the political crisis which started in April 2007 with the nomination of Abdullah Gül as presidential candidate by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). The more detailed empirical background consists primarily of the dress code problematics including the matter of party closure. Theoretically, the “hegemonic preservation” thesis elaborated by Ran Hirschl turned out to be a useful instrument when it comes to explaining this political crisis as well as the origin of the so-called new constitutionalism. This is illustrated by the judicial activism in the headscarf affair as well as by the eagerness of the Republican People's Party (CHP), as the political representative of the secular establishment, to play the ‘Atatürk card’ and to submit the protection of their interest to an independent judiciary and not to the uncertainties of the mechanisms of majoritarian democracy. However, with regard to the current Turkish case my analysis also shows that Hirschl's thesis is too static and should be complemented with a more dynamic perspective of constitutional politics as a repeated game. One example of this is that even if the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) had declared the constitutional amendment on the headscarf invalid and voted for economic sanctions against the AKP, it did not close the party down.     

Negotiating Difference in a Muslim Society: A Longitudinal Study of Islamic and Secular Discourses in Turkey

This article explores the changes in attitudes among Islamic and secular groups in Turkey through an analysis of their discourses regarding Islam, democracy, secularism, and dialogue. We present the findings of a longitudinal study (Q study) conducted in Turkey in 2002 and 2007. The time period under investigation marks the first uninterrupted five‐year‐long term of an Islamic‐leaning government, Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), in office since the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923. We suggest that the continuous electoral success of the AKP has played an important role in shaping Islamic and secular discourses in the Turkish public sphere. In contrast with its predecessor, the AKP has employed a rights‐based paradigm when defining the place of Islam in a secular society. This, we suggest, has softened the divide between Islamic and secular discourses in Turkey. In this article, after defining the core characteristics of both discourses that remained the same in both 2002 and 2007, we focus on the major shifts in discourses that have occurred during these five years. Our research reveals that during this time, both Islamic and secular discourses underwent important shifts with respect to Islam's place in a democratic society. We interpret the AKP's discursive shift toward a rights‐based paradigm and the increasing emphasis on dialogue in both Islamist and secular discourses as promising signs for expanding the scope for democratic polity in Turkey.     

Ethnic and Islamist populism in Turkey and its impact on Kurdish nationalism

Rather than addressing the Kurdish conflict in Turkey directly, this study focuses on how the rising nationalist populism bears on Kurdish voters supporting the pro-Kurdish party HDP. There are very few studies on how Kurds are affected by the nationalist populism often expressed in Turkey by the governing People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) with its slogan “domestic and national,” even though the literature offers a broad variety of studies on the Kurdish conflict. To fill this gap, this study is supported by focus group discussions with the Kurds in Turkey who support the HDP, based on a sample of the Kurds living in Istanbul, which is sometimes referred to as the “largest Kurdish city.” This study claims that the populist slogan of the “domestic and national” not only marginalises the Kurdish interviewees but also weakens their sense of belonging to Turkey, thus encouraging them to establish their own national identities. An important result of the focus group meetings is that AKP's polarising policy not only causes polarisation among Turks but also among the Kurds.     

Reconsidering Elitist Duality: Persistent Tension in the Turkish–Egyptian Relations

Since the Muslim Brotherhood's ouster in July 3, 2013, tension has escalated between Turkey and Egypt and gained media attention as an unprecedented incident in bilateral relations. However, disagreement has characterized bilateral relations since the declaration of the Egyptian Republic and the launch of diplomatic relations with Turkey in the 1950s. By tracking the history of both countries’ bilateral relations, this study contends that, according to the elitist duality thesis, Turkish – Egyptian relations were an exception to the Turkish – Arab relations, as they were not influenced by the ruling elite. It argues that regardless of the ruling elite identity, tension has disrupted the normal course of relations. By relying on extensive interviews conducted with members of the Justice and Development Party, and academicians and staff members in the Turkish ministries of economy and foreign affairs, the study analyzes the unaddressed tension in the Turkish – Egyptian relations since the 1950s until 2013 and provides policy recommendations to improve bilateral relations.     

Understanding the July 2016 Military Coup: The Contemporary Security Dilemma in Turkey

This study explores the link between religious identity and conflict in contemporary Turkey by examining the dramatic reversals in the relations between the country’s two prominent Islamic social forces, the ruling party AKP and the Gülen Organization. It shows how a particular trajectory of power and identity between the two religious forces transformed into a brutal security competition in the Turkish society and polity. It puts the analytical foci on the following puzzle: how did the Gülen community — once a confidential ally of AKP — turn into a coup plotter in the Turkish military to bring down the elected government? In order to explore the puzzle, the study offers significant departures from the standard approaches to religious identity and conflict by employing a distinct concept — the inter‐societal security dilemma.     

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

This article aimed to analyze the ascension of Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (AKP)—in Turkey and its political measures regarding both Islam and the country's Ottoman past, in order to comprehend the party's role in a potential shift of Turkish national identity and in Turkey's relationship with the Middle East. The article does this through a content analysis of decrees, laws, and other measures taken by the AKP that emphasizes its cultural and religious policies, as well as revisiting literature produced about the subject. Analyzing Recep Tayyip Erdo?an's government during his time as Prime Minister (2003–2014), two noteworthy features come to light: its Islamic influence and its so‐called neo‐Ottomanist outlook. However, this article argues that besides an identity‐ and ideology‐based motivation, the AKP had pragmatic intentions in adopting such approaches, aiming to gather support both domestically and regionally.     

Seeing for the state: Kemalist long‐distance nationalism in Australia

The recent literature on Muslim organisations in the Turkish diaspora context is voluminous as is analysis of Kurdish and Alevi grassroots politics against the Turkish state. Yet nothing has been written on those whose political orientation is in line with the secularist‐nationalist ideology of the Turkish Republic, that is, of Kemalists. As a contribution to this endeavour, this paper explores Kemalist actors' mobilisation in Australia. The paper argues that their current activism is related to a threatened economic privilege, a loss of cultural capital and a waning political dominance in the ongoing social life of Turkey.     

Reading politics through emotions: ontological ressentiment as the emotional basis of current politics in Turkey

For almost sixteen years now, politics in Turkey have been analysed with reference to the theme of victimhood. It is true that the political discourse of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi or AKP) gained its power by the mass response to its victimhood claims. Nevertheless, as this article argues, the legitimacy of the victimhood claim rests mainly on the already‐existing emotions of masses, aroused and triggered by political elites. Thus, Turkish politics during the AKP period cannot be thoroughly understood without taking into consideration the emotions of both political elites and the masses. This article shares insights into the sixteen‐year‐long AKP reign of power based on Recep Tayyip Erdo?an's appeals to such emotions as humiliation, envy, disgust, hatred, anxiety, and anger. It further argues that these emotions reveal a much deeper and stronger emotional trait which we identify as ontological ressentiment.     

Assessing party structures: why some regimes are more authoritarian than others

This article attempts to answer the puzzle of why, amongst undemocratic states, some regimes are more authoritarian than others. The author contends that differing party structures result in different authoritarian outcomes. A ruling, competitive authoritarian regime that has a party structure akin to a cadre party, or where there is little or no intra-party democracy, is more likely to be more authoritarian than a party which has intra-party democracy. The lack or absence of intra-party democracy ensures that elites remain cohesive and that there are lesser opportunities for the opposition to take advantage of divisions in the party, whereas in a party with intra-party democracy, there is a greater possibility of elite disunity, which could be capitalised on by the opposition, and there is also a greater likelihood of a different ideology being propagated by defectors from the party. The cases of the People's Action Party in Singapore and the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia are used to illustrate the author's case.     

Green,red, yellow and purple: gendering the Kurdish Question in south-east Turkey

This article discusses the role of women in the contemporary ethno-territorial struggle of Kurdish Question in Turkey. I argue that gendered development has become the primary terrain where Turkish and pro-Kurdish political groups articulate their nationalist interests. The Kürt Sorunu (Kurdish Question) – the enduring debate over the political status and rights of Turkey's Kurdish population – is Turkey's largest geopolitical challenge to date. In the last decade, Turkish government policy towards the predominantly Kurdish south-east region has shifted from military intervention to gendered and socio-economic development. Simultaneously, the popularity and growth of a formal pro-Kurdish political movement has given the campaign for Kurdish rights an institutionalized voice and stronger role in regional affairs. The primary work of both the Turkish national government and local pro-Kurdish municipality of late has focused on women. Drawing on historical analysis and participant observation of development activities, I describe the symbolic and physical role women play in the contemporary Kurdish Question. Geographically, this pointed focus on women marks a territorialization of political power upon gendered spaces of the home and neighbourhood. I describe this process of territorialization through an examination of education curriculum, neighbourhood mapping and nationalist landscapes.     

Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?

The Justice and Development Party has been in power in Turkey since 2002 after a sweeping victory. The party has since implemented a successful economic stabilization programme and led the country into membership negotiations with the European Union. The educated modern‐urban segments of the population, however, continue to harbour suspicion that the government party has a secret agenda of turning Turkey into an Islamic state. Although the evidence for such a fear is not fully convincing, it can be understood within the broader framework of Turkish modernization which was carried out by a highly centralized state in the cultural‐educational domain in an uncompromising fashion, generating a social bifurcation between the moderns and the traditionalists. After the transition to competitive politics, elected politicians worked to curb the power of the state elites that have been the exponents of modernization policies. Supported also by economic development that has expanded society's power against the state, the political elites have worked to expand their scope for decision‐making. Such redistribution of power in society has been problematical and has twice resulted in military interventions. The shift in the balance of power in favour of the political (elected) elite is nearing completion. The struggle is currently centered on the election of a new president by the parliament in May 2007 because historically the presidency has been seen as a position that counterbalances the preferences of the political elite by those of the state elite. Although likely to cause perturbations, the president will be elected by the Justice and Development Party. Consolidation of Turkey's democracy is continuing.     

Exploring the roots and dynamics of Kurdish ethno‐nationalism in Turkey

Using comprehensive and original data derived from a recent major public opinion survey, this study examines an under‐investigated aspect of the Kurdish issue in Turkey: the dynamics and factors behind Kurdish ethno‐nationalism at a mass level. The empirical findings disprove the conventional socio‐economic peace and Islamic‐peace hypotheses around this issue, and our statistical analyses provide strong support for the relative deprivation hypothesis, i.e. that those who think the Turkish state discriminates against Kurds are more likely to have ethno‐nationalist orientations. Multivariate analyses further show that religious sectarian differences among Kurds (i.e. the Hanefi‐Shafi division) matter: the more religious Shafi Kurds have a stronger ethnic consciousness and a higher degree of ethno‐nationalism. The study also provides a discussion of the broader theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings, which may provide insights into conflict resolution prospects in countries with a Kurdish population.     

Religion and ethno‐nationalism: Turkey's Kurdish issue

One approach within the Islamic camp treats Islam, which emphasizes overarching notions such as the ‘Islamic brotherhood’ and ‘ummah’, as incompatible with ethno‐nationalist ideas and movements. It is, however, striking that in the last decades, several Islamic and conservative groups in Turkey have paid increasing attention to the Kurdish issue, supporting their ethnic demands and sentiments. Even more striking, the leftist, secular Kurdish ethno‐nationalists have adopted a more welcoming attitude toward Islam. How can we explain such intriguing developments and shifts? Using original data derived from several elite interviews and a public opinion survey, this study shows that the struggle for Kurdish popular support and legitimacy has encouraged political elites from both camps to enrich their ideological toolbox by borrowing ideas and discourses from each other. Further, Turkish and Kurdish nationalists alike utilize Islamic discourses and ideas to legitimize their competing nationalist claims. Exploring such issues, the study also provides theoretical and policy implications.     

论陈云的党内民主思想

要充分发扬党内民主,是贯穿陈云革命人生的一个重要主张。他认为无产阶级政党 应当是最有纪律的党,也是最讲民主的党。在执政条件下坚持和发扬党内民主,是防止官僚主义、 保证党的正确领导和推进人民民主的重要条件。党内民主,就是要有正常的党内生活。要正确理解 和处理民主制与集中制的关系;要尊重和保证党员的民主权利;要有积极而健康的批评和自我批 评;健全党内民主,要有制度保证。陈云的党内民主思想具有重要的理论价值和现实指导意义。     

Nation–states and ethnic boundaries: modern Turkish identity and Turkish–Kurdish conflict

Ethnic and religious conflicts are two of the most pressing issues facing Turkey today. This article offers the argument that the development of the Turkish state and identity, and Turkey’s peripheral position in the interstate system, have collectively determined the parameters and dynamics of the conflicts. It is argued that modern Turkish identity has been forged by the state through the nation–state formation process that began in the 1920s. During the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic it was deemed necessary to redefine the state and Turkish identity. At the historical juncture, Islam was replaced with other ideals and universals such as Turkism, modernity and étatism. The sudden and large–scale shift away from religion followed by vigorous ethnic assimilation efforts created a contradictory context between the state and ethnic/religious segments of the population. The change also marked the beginning of a new era in the Turkish–Kurdish discord. Another assertion of the article is that the state’s approach to ethnic/religious issues and demands is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the ethnic democracy model.     

Examining the Impact of Turkey's Approach Vis‐à‐Vis Syria into Turkey's Iraq Policy

The tension between “international order” and justice has long been a focus of critical attention of many scholars. Today, with the rise of the humanitarian crises, the debate is once again visible, and Turkish foreign policy is one of the most important areas of observation of this tension. Indeed, the U.S.‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 paved the way for Turkey to actively engage in regional affairs. Meanwhile, the need to bring human justice into world politics makes Turkish foreign policy decision makers operate on a much more humanitarian basis. Nevertheless, active humanitarian engagement poses an important challenge to traditional Turkish foreign policy as it is mainly based on the notion of “non‐interference,” as well as on the elementary components of international order, by raising suspicions on the intentions of the Turkish authorities. This article aims to explore the challenges Turkey has been facing since the U.S.‐led invasion of Iraq, and diagnose Turkish foreign policy vis‐à‐vis Iraq in the shadow of the Syrian civil war from Hedley Bull's framework of “order” and “justice.” It argues that Turkey's recent fluctuations in the Middle East could be linked to Turkey's failure to reconcile the requirements of “order” with those of “justice” and the Turkish governing party's (AKP) attempts to use justice as an important instrument to consolidate its power both in Turkey and in the Middle East.     

Confusion at home, Confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq

In November 2002 it looked as though Turkey was about to make a fresh start. A new post-Islamist political force, the AKP, had swept to power in national elections. Lobbying was in full swing for the EU to name a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. Ankara was talking to Washington about how Turkey could best help the US in the event of war with Iraq, and the Americans were fully prepared to reciprocate. There was even hope that the Cyprus problem might be solved. Some five months later those hopes are smouldering wreckage. Cyprus, and indeed the Kurdish issues, have returned to haunt EU—Turkish relations. The AKP is divided and discredited. The much-vaunted relationship between Turkey and the US, apparently built on the rock of geo-strategic relations, has dissolved into bitter recrimination. This article explores how and why the auspicious outlook for Turkey five months ago has dissolved so quickly and so thoroughly. It will be argued that the shortcomings of leadership, domestic ideological competition and the difficulty of managing a relentless and complex foreign policy agenda have all played their part. Turkey has been left with an economy on the edge of collapse, war on its borders, turmoil in its traditional friendships, a new crisis of domestic governance and the perception of rising existential threats. In view of these combustible components, there is little doubt that worrying about Turkey will continue to exercise the Atlantic community over the years ahead.     

Turkey's Emergence as a Geopolitical Power Broker

In a framing essay commenting on a symposium devoted to Turkey's role in a dynamic geopolitical world system, a prominent American political geographer presents the case for Turkey's evolution from regional power within that system to a key geopolitical balancing agent, reflecting its pivotal location within Eurasia. After first exploring the implications of the collapse of the USSR for U.S.-Turkey relations, he critically assesses the ruling Turkish political party's (AKP) recent foreign policy formulation of Turkey as a leader/role model of its own "civilizational basin" (Middle Eastern and Central Eurasian countries). Citing a range of linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences between Turkey and the Arab lands, he argues that Turkey's true civilizational basin is limited to Central Asia, where Russia holds geopolitical primacy, and advocates a broader framing of Turkey's geopolitical orientation as reflecting location, economics, oil, water, and natural interests. Such a conceptualization suggests that Turkey's pivotal role as balancing power may not be broadly defined as a bridge between Europe and Eurasia, but rather as a bridge between the EU and Russia. Also, the country's status as a role model may be more applicable for regional powers sandwiched between great powers than for emerging Islamic democracies per se.     

Wrestling with the integrity of a nation: the disputed internal boundaries in Iraq

The disputed internal boundaries in northern Iraq between the Kurds and the Arabs have been a persistent fault‐line in the state's history and have rapidly emerged as a core dispute since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Kurds underwrote, more than any other constituency, the democratic project in the new Iraq and contrived an ambitious constitutional route through Article 140 to place Kirkuk and other disputed areas under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) by December 2007. Article 140 was designed to resolve the issue in the Kurds favour once and for all, to circumvent yet another tedious negotiation round with the Arabs and to quarantine the Kurdish project from regional interference, particularly Turkey. On all three counts the strategy failed. This is primarily because of the complexity of the issue but there is also evidence of internal Kurdish discord with the strategy concerning the restoration of Kirkuk governorate's boundaries. The years 2007–2008 were a watershed for Kurdish designs to incorporate Kirkuk through a constitutional process and since then the disputed boundaries question has been left in a state of suspended animation. However, if a negotiating framework were to emerge the contours of a ‘deal’ have begun to crystallize and there is scope to move from management of the issue to resolution. Answers to the questions of when and how will depend on the shape of the complete package, the new government constellation and the extent that Turkey and Iran reveal themselves in the political marketplace.     

Turkey's "New" Foreign Policy toward Eurasia

Two geographers specializing in Turkey's international relations examine the reframing of foreign policy issues under the country's Justice and Development Party (JDP; also known by its Turkish acronym AKP), in power since 2002. After first locating the JDP within Turkey's current political landscape, the authors investigate how notions of civilizational geopolitics have led to a "new geographic imagination" under JDP that has influenced foreign policy thinking. The authors argue that JDP foreign policy exhibits some continuity with that of earlier governments in terms of activist policies toward Central Eurasia (comprising the Middle East, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia), but are based on a new conceptual foundation that views Turkey not as part of Western civilization but as the emerging leader of its own "civilizational basin" (consisting of the former Ottoman territories plus adjoining regions inhabited by Muslim and Turkic peoples). They then explore the implications for Turkey's future relations with the Central Eurasian region (of which Turkey is assumed to be the leader) and countries of the West (viewed now as "neighbors" but no longer "one of us").