Legislative Coalitions and Presidential Signing Statements

We examine how the congressional coalition in favor of a law affects the probability of the president appending a positive or negative signing statement to it. Our results show that coalitions matter—presidents consider the power and status of a law's sponsor and the composition of its cosponsorship coalition when deciding whether to offer praise or raise concerns. Moreover, the factors driving praise and criticism differ from one another in important ways. These analyses demonstrate the value of assessing the valence of a signing statement rather than just its presence, and of extending the focus of research on signing statements beyond aggregate factors to investigate how the context surrounding a particular law shapes the president's reaction to it.     

Interest Group Competition and Cooperation at Legislative Hearings

Legislative committee hearings have attracted little attention from scholars, yet Schlozman and Tierney (1986) found that testifying is the advocacy tactic most frequently used by interest group lobbyists. I argue that opportunities to testify are valuable enough to lobbyists that they may be willing to put aside competitive differences with rival groups to jointly support committee agendas. I test this argument using data on lobbyist testimony before 20 committees on six issues from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that whether legislators actually desire competing lobbyists to present a united front behind the committee may depend on the committee's own ideological relationship with the parent chamber. I also find that the attractiveness of the incentive to testify is less enticing to lobbyists when it requires them to compromise their organization's position on issues of importance to their members, or when competition between interest groups is especially great.     

DAINZIN:A Legislative Committee Member

Waigyi Lhunzi, hidden in high mountains andstraddling the Supansili River, is regarded asnumber one county in Tibet, producing manyhistorical celebrities.One of these was Gar Tongtsan, a minister underSongtsan Gambo, who was sent to Chang'an (presentday Xi'an) to persuade the emperor of the Tang Dynasty(618-907) to allow Princess Wencheng to marry his king.Another is Tome Sangbozha, one of the "sevensaints" in Tibet.The third is Dainzin, according to many of thosewith whom I talked dur…     

A Prolegomenon to Responsible Legislative Reform

When you're young it's easy to streak appeals across the sky like rockets. But as you get older you feel increasingly esponsible for those traveling the road your rocket lights. What if you've led them wrong? You grow wary of making reckless appeals, and a sense of responsibility must be tempered above all with analysis and reflection. Relentless analysis alone, not childish shouting, embodies the true appeals.¹     

Legislative accountability in a mixed-member system

Accountability of representatives to electors is a key indicator of democratic health. In mixed-member systems, the coexistence of two kinds of representation provides the opportunity to test competing claims with minimal confounding factors. There is debate about the relative accountability of constituency and list MPs, and in particular, concerning dual candidacy, where individuals can stand for both constituency and list seats. Analysing New Zealand elections since 1999, with comparisons back to the previous single-member plurality system, this article examines the effects of dual candidacy, legislative turnover and the cases where constituency or electorate MPs have lost their seats, but remained in Parliament as list members.

代表对选民负责乃民主是否健康的一个关键指标。在混合成员制下,两类代表的共存为比较单纯地检验其竞争的主张提供了机会。不过,选区及名单议员的相对责任,尤其在一个个体可以既代表选区又代表名单席位的情况下的责任,对此是有争议的。本文分析了新西兰1999年以来的选举,并与之前的单一成员多数选举制做了对比,还考察了双重候选人制的效果、议员的流动、以及选区或议员落选但依然是国会名单成员的情况。     

Presidential Speeches and the Stages of the Legislative Process

Presidents go public frequently to increase their success in Congress. Yet scholars know little about when presidents speak within the legislative process or why. If presidential speeches are indeed a source of power for presidents, then presidents are likely to use them throughout the legislative process, not speak only to affect final passage. We argue that presidents speak generally to meet broad electoral and political goals, but target speeches according to their goals at each stage of the legislative process: to frame the debate at the agenda-setting stage, to push bills out of committee, and to finalize support from legislators at the roll call stage. We analyze 116 bills between 1989 and 2004, supplemented by Bush Library archival data and a case study of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The results illustrate that presidents speak mostly at the agenda-setting and roll call stages and presidential attention at each stage varies by informational cues provided by the larger political environment.     

P.A. Stolypin and the Legislative Chambers

Stolypin had great respect for the State Duma as an institution and did his best to work with it, although political conflicts within the legislature and between the Duma and the imperial government at times made that impossible.     

Re-Thinking Legislative Productivity: Commemorative Legislation and Policy Gridlock

This research charts the levels of commemorative legislation passed in Congress in the postwar era and assesses the conditions generating such legislation. Utilizing a statistical model of stalemate developed by Sarah Binder, it demonstrates that conditions hypothesized to produce gridlock on salient legislation also generate (even more statistically robust) activism on commemoratives. ¹ Our joint appreciation to Paulina Burdge-Small and Michael Williams for their help in collecting the data analyzed in this paper. In addition, Dodd expresses appreciation to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for support that aided his contributions to the paper.      

完善民族教育立法问题探究——辽宁民族自治地方的实证考察

民族教育立法是我国立法体系的重要组成部分,对于保障我国少数民族受教育权利,提高少数民族地区人口素质,推动民族地区经济社会发展具有十分重要而深远的意义。纵观我国现行民族教育立法,已不能满足民族教育发展的需要。完善民族教育立法是当前发展我国民族教育的当务之急。     

State of the Union Addresses and the President's Legislative Success

The State of the Union speech is generally considered a roadmap of the president's legislative program each year, yet little attention has been given to whether it functions as a determinant of the president's legislative success. The primary purpose of this article is to empirically examine the policy content of the message and the link to the president's policy success. In addition, I explore how this relationship is conditioned by the strength of the opposition party and the level of partisanship in Congress. Based on analysis of annual data from 1954–2000, the results indicate the speech has a positive and significant influence on the president's success in domestic policy. While this influence remains significant at low and average levels of partisanship and opposition party strength, it disappears when each factor is at high levels. I conclude with a discussion of how this study relates to previous research on the link between presidential speeches and legislative success.     

Personal Tragedy and Presidential Performance: Calvin Coolidge as Legislative Leader

The elevation of Calvin Coolidge to the presidency in the summer of 1923 was impressively smooth. The new president was entirely comfortable in his new role and impressed Washington officialdom with his self-assuredness, political adroitness, and hard work. One of his main initial objectives was to develop a strong and productive relationship with Congress and to lobby it to enact his extensive and progressive legislative agenda. During his first year, he worked vigorously at these tasks and achieved a notable degree of success. However, in July, 1924, the president confronted a devastating personal tragedy–the death of his young son–that left a deep imprint on the remainder of his presidency. He lost interest in legislative affairs and withdrew from interaction with Congress. The result is that he has been ranked among the least successful presidential leaders of Congress in U.S. history. However, incapacitation as a result of severe clinical depression rather than either incompetence or ideology was the precipitating cause.     

Obama's Executive Branch Czars: The Constitutional Controversy and a Legislative Solution

The increasingly common practice of presidential appointment of so-called executive branch czars has become especially contentious in the Obama era. Much of that controversy unfortunately is highly partisan-oriented and misses the core constitutional issues at stake. In this article, we describe and analyze the Obama-era executive branch czars controversy from a constitutional analysis framework. In so doing, we offer a working definition of executive branch czars—a much-needed corrective to the current debates in which the term has been used very loosely. We examine and analyze the scope of authority exercised by the high-level executive branch officials during the Obama administration that we consider to be constitutionally troublesome. Although our focus is on the Obama czars that have vast and largely unchecked powers, we also acknowledge that some media-labeled czar positions are statutorily created and accountable and thus should not be in the same category. After addressing the Obama-era czars, we offer a set of reform proposals that provide a much-needed corrective.     

The Evolution of American Colonial Assemblies as Legislative Organizations

I examine the organizational evolution of the American colonial assemblies. The assemblies, like their modern progeny, established organizational boundaries, created standing committees, adopted increasingly complex rules and procedures, evolved apprenticeship and seniority norms in regard to leadership positions, and acquired specialized staff and facilities. After documenting the rise of these common legislative features, I turn to the question of how we can explain their existence at a far earlier time than most political scientists realize. I conclude with an examination of the implications of these findings for our understanding of how legislative institutions evolve.