Public Outreach,Executive Orders,and the Unilateral Presidency

Scholars have traditionally and loosely defined executive orders as presidential directives that instruct bureaucrats about how to implement policy. In contrast, proclamations are thought to be used by presidents to address policy matters regarding the general public. This has been an assumption that scholars have accepted without empirical evidence. We have long known that presidents strategically pursue policy to build support among numerous groups, such as African Americans, religious organizations, women, educators, and labor unions. Presidency scholars also know that executive orders are an expedient tool that an administration utilizes to pursue its policy agenda. As a result, why should we assume that the exclusive target population of executive orders is members of the federal bureaucracy? This is the first study to explore whether and how presidents from 1936 through 2008 use executive orders to target specific populations with policy.     

Agency Characteristics and the Use of Executive Orders

Past scholarship has offered varying explanations for why presidents choose to use executive orders. However, to this point, much of what we know of unilateral powers does not adequately address the role the bureaucracy plays in the president's decision. This research seeks to account for bureaucratic factors as a strategic presidential consideration in the employment of such directives. I classify executive orders from 1989–2012 based on which agency or agencies they apply to, and consider the importance of various characteristics (e.g. agency ideology, level of centralization, politicization, etc.) in determining which organs of the bureaucracy presidents will direct executive orders to generally. The results provide evidence that the White House directs fewer executive orders to agencies that have a politically independent leadership structure, and this result holds across a variety of measures judging an order's impact. The results demonstrate that the type of directive is crucial in determining a president's strategic decision to use executive orders, in line with previous research, and that agency centralization is one crucial component of this strategic calculation.     

Presidential Unilateral Actions: Constitutional and Political Checks

Throughout history, presidents have invoked a broad array of powers. Some are legitimate and well grounded; others exceed constitutional boundaries and have met defeat in Congress, the courts, and the public. Still others originate from historical errors by the Supreme Court, particularly in the field of external affairs. The powers analyzed in this article begin with these: enumerated, implied, inherent, prerogative, ministerial, and discretionary. Presidential instruments of power include executive orders and proclamations. The erroneous “sole organ” doctrine, first appearing in the Curtiss-Wright case of 1936, was at issue in the Jerusalem passport case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry. The scope of unilateral executive authority is being tested in initiatives by the Obama administration in the field of immigration policy.     

Executive Branch Management and Presidential Unilateralism: Centralization and the Issuance of Executive Orders

Despite the useful simplifying assumptions of recent work on unilateral power, archival analysis shows the issuance of executive orders is a process rife with transaction costs as presidents bargain with the bureaucracy over formulating their scope and substance. As a result, presidents must create what Williamson (1985) called “governance structures” to minimize those costs, with the Office of Management and Budget's clearance process at its heart. As with legislative policy formulation, presidents assert more centralized control over executive orders (EO) production on items that affect large numbers of departments, on matters of executive reorganization, and on significant matters. Political contexts are trumped by managerial concerns. Orders dealing with implementation of recently passed statutes or other presidential “clerkship” functions tend to follow a far less centralized formulation process.     

Power Plus Persuasion: The Anatomy of Kennedy’s Housing Order

We examine the influence of various political actors on the substance and timing of presidential orders. Specifically, we analyze President John F. Kennedy’s decision to issue E. O. 11063, which directed the federal bureaucracy to eliminate discrimination in the sale or lease of residential property overseen by the federal government. We show that this order did not result solely from Kennedy’s policy preferences; rather, it was a product of persuasion by several political actors who coaxed Kennedy to act. This reinforces previous findings that the president’s power of the pen is often conditioned by the informal political costs of unilateral executive action.     

Affirmative Action and Business Deregulation: On the Reagan Administration's Failure to Revise Executive Order No. 11246

This case study of the enforcement of executive orders shows one of the complexities of presidential administrative leadership. Executive Order No. 11246, designed to implement equal employment opportunity in federal contracts, is the focal point for the study. Ronald W. Reagan wished to make sure that the impact of the executive order was not to impose numerical goals, quotas, or timetables on employers. However, even within his own administration, Secretary of Labor William Brock opposed Reagan's lessening of employment standards. More interestingly, perhaps, the larger contractors also opposed changing the order, thinking that uncertainty and reduced standards might affect them negatively. The study shows that even within the administrative presidency there are limits to presidential influence, as the wishes of the labor secretary and large government contractors prevailed.     

The Right Tool for the Job: The Canalization of Presidential Policy Attention by Policy Instrument

This article investigates how presidential policy attention is allocated across policy tools and whether there is a channeling of tool use by policy area. I also examine whether there is evidence of disproportionate information processing within presidential policy attention allocation and whether it is common across presidential policy tools. Presidential messages, hearings on administrations' legislative proposals, amicus briefs, and executive orders are employed to capture presidential policy tools. The allocation of attention via these four instruments is examined from 1957–2007 in the policy areas of defense and foreign affairs, macroeconomics, banking and commerce, civil rights, law and crime, and labor and immigration. I find that there is a canalization of presidential policy attention by instrument, and that the opportunity structure of policy tools shapes attention allocation. Additionally, I find evidence for punctuated equilibrium theory in the allocation of presidential policy attention via these four tools. When presidents do shift their attention to an issue area, they often attack the issue with some coordination of their policy instruments.     

National Forces and the U.S. House Vote, 1980-2004: The Uncertain Progress of Nationalization

Much recent scholarly attention has focused on the theme of growing nationalization in U.S. House elections. In this study, I reach a mixed verdict concerning the extent to which national forces have become more determinative of the House vote from 1980 to 2004. Only voter partisanship, but not ideology, economic evaluations, or assessments of presidential candidates' personal qualities, has increased in importance during presidential year elections. Since presidential voting, on the other hand, has come to depend more heavily on all these factors except the last, this means that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the bases of House and presidential voting actually have grown less, rather than more, similar over time.     

Ideological Warriors and Constituent Servants: Understanding the Determinants of Participation on Health Care Legislation in the Polarized Senate

Recent scholarship on the Senate indicates that partisanship and polarization have fundamentally changed the dynamics and the nature of policy making in the institution. To understand how senators balance their roles as constituent servants and partisan warriors, we examine senators’ participation in floor amending on major health legislation over a 10-year period (2000–2010). Health care is central to the ideological divide over the nature of the welfare state and has a significant impact on constituents. Unlike previous studies, we develop a fuller picture of the factors that motivate senators to participate by analyzing both amendments filed to a bill and amendments considered on the floor. We find that minority party status and ideology, both the liberal-conservative dimension and ideological extremism, are important indicators of participation. Furthermore, senators elevate ideology in comparison to constituent need when an issue is a presidential priority. Finally, the influence of constituency factors varies by party. For Democrats, their ideological commitment to the social welfare state makes them more likely to participate on health issues regardless of constituent need. However, Republican senators become more likely to sponsor amendments as the level of observable constituent factors increases.     

Constitutional Design of the Executive: Vice Presidencies in Comparative Perspective

Given the history of the institution in the U.S., it is perhaps not surprising that few democracies have adopted a vice presidency. But, why do any countries have vice presidencies? What, if any, functions do they fulfill? In this paper we examine constitutional provisions for vice presidencies in 29 presidential democracies throughout the world. Specifically, we examine the extent to which the office of the vice presidency fulfills three possible institutional purposes: succession, legislative, or executive functions. Almost all vice presidencies included in our analysis fulfill the role of successor in the event of a presidential vacancy. Of those that have additional duties, most are assigned executive functions, while a few are assigned legislative functions. On the whole, the paper provides empirical evidence that vice presidencies seem to be marginal institutions.     

Checking Executive Power: A Simulation Model of Unilateral Executive Behavior

Abstract

What systematic influence does the court exert on unilateral authority? Though questions relating to the expansion and the exercise of unilateral executive power remain a perennial concern in political science, existing studies of the unilateral presidency generally focus on relations between the executive and the legislature, with less attention paid to the impact of the judiciary on executive behavior. Using a system of differential equations to model executive unilateralism and judicial constraints, simulation results identified four broad patterns of unilateral executive behavior and judicial influence. Overall, presidents strategically anticipate reactions from the courts and employ unilateral actions accordingly. Although they are cognizant of the court’s ability to strike down their actions, and thereby harming their preferred policy preferences and legacies, presidents nonetheless act unilaterally, albeit at a lower level. Results add to existing studies in separation of powers and constraints on unilateral executive behavior.     

Obama's Executive Branch Czars: The Constitutional Controversy and a Legislative Solution

The increasingly common practice of presidential appointment of so-called executive branch czars has become especially contentious in the Obama era. Much of that controversy unfortunately is highly partisan-oriented and misses the core constitutional issues at stake. In this article, we describe and analyze the Obama-era executive branch czars controversy from a constitutional analysis framework. In so doing, we offer a working definition of executive branch czars—a much-needed corrective to the current debates in which the term has been used very loosely. We examine and analyze the scope of authority exercised by the high-level executive branch officials during the Obama administration that we consider to be constitutionally troublesome. Although our focus is on the Obama czars that have vast and largely unchecked powers, we also acknowledge that some media-labeled czar positions are statutorily created and accountable and thus should not be in the same category. After addressing the Obama-era czars, we offer a set of reform proposals that provide a much-needed corrective.     

Executive Publicity and Congressional Resistance, 1905-1913: Congress and the Roosevelt Administration's PR Men

Theodore Roosevelt circumvented Congress and expanded presidential power at the beginning of the 20th century, in part, by using the press to establish executive leadership of public opinion. This article describes how Roosevelt and his chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, launched a crusade in the press for Progressive conservation despite the opposition of congressmen who tried to block the use of publicists by executive agencies. Although Congress forbade the hiring of "publicity experts" in 1913, they were already common in executive agencies.     

The Pendulum of Congressional Power: Agenda Change,Partisanship and the Demise of the Post-World War II Foreign Policy Consensus

Many scholars contend that Congress rarely matters in the realm of foreign policy. The source of this collective impotence is often explained by the weaknesses in congressional institutions vis-a-vis the president, as well as a general inability to respond effectively to a dynamic international political environment. We contend that the debate over congressional activism has not adequately addressed the role of agenda change. We analyze all roll call votes in the House of Representatives relating to the international affairs agenda between 1953 and 1998. We find that presidents have become significantly more likely to stake out positions on economic and trade issues as compared to other international issues. We also observe that presidential positions in the realm of foreign policy are increasingly characterized by interparty and interinstitutional conflict. While this increased conflict has dramatically decreased the president's ability to successfully pass executive priorities in foreign affairs more generally, presidential success on economic and trade issues has witnessed a significantly greater decline. We infer from these results that changes to the foreign policy issue agenda represent one important factor that has affected not only the incentives for political parties to participate actively, but also the willingness of Congress to challenge the president in the foreign policy debate.Asked one day whether it was true that the navy yard in his district was too small to accommodate the latest battleships. Henry Stimson (chair of the House Naval Affairs Committee early in the century) replied, 'That is true, and that is the reason I have always been in favor of small ships.'1Carriers have been, are and will be for the foreseeable future an absolutely essential part of our deterrence force…2John Warner, senator from Virginia, home state of Newport News Shipbuilding     

President Versus Congress: The Struggle for Public Attention

Power relationships between the executive and legislative branches in the United States are affected by the nature and shape of public opinion. Both branches actively seek the stamp of popular approval but the President has advantages in the struggle for public attention that are vital in the exercise of his powers. Television, in the coverage it gives to presidential activities and pseudo-activities, provides the President with an opportunity to move and lead the nation. Although we are a nation of shared powers, television projects the message that we are a presidential nation and that message is affecting both popular perceptions and power relationships on the national level.     

A Review of “Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government”

We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007. The results indicate that the type and number of objections raised in presidential communications affects congressional oversight activity.     

Who Should Run Elections in the United States?

Much has been said since the 2000 presidential election regarding the administration of elections in the United States, particularly about how election administrators are selected and to whom they are responsive. Unfortunately, there has been little research on the different administrative structures that are possible and the preferences of Americans regarding these different administrative options. In this article we present the results from a national survey of American adults in which we asked them their preference for whether elections should be run by partisan or nonpartisan officials, whether the officials should be elected or appointed, and whether the administration of elections should be by a single unitary executive or by an election board. In addition to eliciting the basic preferences of Americans about these administrative choices, we also undertake a deeper analysis of these data to determine the underlying patterns in support for the different administrative options.     

Electoral Messages from the District: Explaining Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives

Legislators are highly sensitive to those parts of their reelection constituencies whose support is least solid. Therefore, out-party members of Congress should be more supportive of the opposing party's president when that president enjoys greater electoral support among the legislators' reelection constituencies. This hypothesis is tested in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s and 1990s. The hypothesis is supported, even with controls for the ideology of the member and the political orientation of the district. The findings suggest legislators have a sophisticated view of their districts and perceive electoral messages from the voting patterns of their constituents. The results also imply that presidential success is conditioned by the forces that operate in the congressional election context.     

Le gaullisme et la crise de l'Etat

The heritage of 1789 left French politicians and political analysts with the complex task of reconciling the two antithetical ideals of the Revolution: the desire to make the nation the sole political arbiter through its representatives with the need to maintain its unity. The history of France from 1789 to de Gaulle reflects France's fearfulness toward a strong executive as well as its fundamental mistrust in the people's capacity to maintain the cohesion of the nation and serve the general will. Here it is argued that de Gaulle overcame these contradictions by retaining French liberalism's emphasis on a dual executive, while the Bonapartist ideal of a strong executive could, erroneously, appear to be de Gaulle's deliberate choice. Finally it is argued that 'cohabitation', the debate surrounding the duration of the presidential mandate and the changing attitude toward France's relationship to the Vichy regime, reveal transformations proper to the French state in the late 20th century as much as a crisis of Gaullism and the loss of its basic meaning.     

Humiliating the Brazilian poor: The iconoclasm of former president Lula

Circulating in Brazil's social media today are many vicious attacks against presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known simply as Lula. Widely and enthusiastically shared memes humiliate Lula by depicting him as a poor, uneducated drunkard who deserves to be in jail, thus criminalizing his class background and political biography. What do the memes and conversations reveal about the roots of this aggression against him? Brazil has been plagued by a large corruption scandal called ‘Operation Car Wash’, for which many hold Lula partly responsible. The attacks are also an attempt to discredit Lula as a presidential candidate, which has placed his candidacy in the balance. But the memes also suggest a deep and genuine fear of poverty and the poor, which is related to fragile consumer‐oriented class relations. The iconoclasm of Lula and the destruction of his dignity reflect this anguish. The memes serve to create a symbolic line between ‘us’ – the ‘middle class’, the ‘good people’ (pessoas do bem) – and ‘them’ – the poor, who are depicted as immoral drunkards who have no dignity.