铁道兵二师在越南

1965年4月,美国在越南战场上的战争升级日益加剧。为支援越南人民的抗美救国斗争,遵照党中央、国务院的指示和中越两国1965年4月27日《关于修建铁路和提供运输设备器材的议定书》的协议,中央军委、铁道兵决定以铁二师为主组成“中国人民志愿工程队第一支队(后改为中国后勤部队第一支队,简称一支队),参加援越抗美战争,执行铁路工程保障任务。     

铁道兵二师在越南

1965年4月,美国在越南战场上的战争升级日益加剧。为支援越南人民的抗美救国斗争,遵照党中央、国务院的指示和中越两国1965年4月27日《关于修建铁路和提供运输设备器材的议定书》的协议,中央军委、铁道兵决定以铁二师为主组成“中国人民志愿工程队第一支队（后改为中国后勤部队第一支队,简称一支驮）,参加援越抗美战争,执行铁路工程保障任务。     

周恩来特批的援越女兵

在国内,关于援越抗美战争的公开史料并不太多,本文讲述的便是援越女兵的故事。 1964年8月,美国进一步扩大对越南的侵略,制造借口,轰炸越南北方,使战争逐步升级。中国应越南政府的请求,派出地面防空部队。     

周恩来特批的援越女兵

在国内,关于援越抗美战争的公开史料并不太多,本文讲述的便是援越女兵的故事。 1964年8月,美国进一步扩大对越南的侵略,制造借口,轰炸越南北方,使战争逐步升级。中国应越南政府的请求,派出地面防空部队。     

谈“军用代金券”

“军用代金券”于1965年发行,是专供中国人民解放军援越抗美部队,在越南民主共和国境内,内部使用的一种特定历史时期的军用货币。继朝鲜战争之后,美国又在印度支那发动了越南战争。1965年美国使用空军和海军对越南北方疯狂轰炸和炮击。根据越南胡志明主席和越南劳动党中央的请求,1965年6月9日中国援越先头部队浩浩荡荡出师友谊关,到1970年完成抗美援越任务,此期间先后派出了防空、工程、铁道、后勤等部队,为越南民主共和国的主权独立、领土完整,作出了不可磨灭的贡献。“军用代金券”正、背面图文均为平版印刷,票面四周有细线条组…     

从20世纪60年代的越南抗美战争看美、苏、中、越关系

20世纪60年代的越南战争,使二战后趋于缓和的国际局势再次陷入战争的混乱状态。整个越南抗美战争期间,中苏、中美和中越关系都发生了实质性的转变。越南抗美战争的胜利,使越南南北实现了统一,从此走上了独立发展的道路。战后中国的国际地位得到空前提高,苏联的经济迅速提高、军事实力急速上升,而此时的西方世界却陷入了严重的经济危机。     

我在驻越使馆见证的援越抗美

20世纪60年代,美国炮制“北部湾事件”,把战火扩大到越南北方。中国作为越南的大后方,全力支援越南人民的抗美救国斗争,直至越南南方完全解放,实现全国统一。我当时作为中国年轻的驻越外交干部,在某种程度上可以说是这场斗争的见证人。     

援越抗美述略

援越抗美的军事行动 ,从 1 96 5年 6月开始到 1 973年 8月结束 ,共经历了两个阶段。中国先后派出了高炮、工程、铁道、扫雷、后勤等部队 ,总计 32万余人 ,最高年份达到 1 7万余人 ,执行了反空袭作战、筑路、构筑国防工程、扫雷及后勤保障等任务。援越抗美部队的将士们与越南军民一起 ,以劣势装备战胜了拥有世界上最先进武器装备的美国侵略者 ,使越南人民赢得了抗美救国战争的光辉胜利 ,谱写了中越两国人民友谊的新篇章。     

对越自卫反击战

在越南抗法抗美战争的三十年问,中国派防空部队和工程部队支援越南,中国人民还勒紧裤带为越南提供了价值两百亿美元的无私援助。1975年越南统一后,越南政府却忘恩负义,疯狂反华排华侵华。为了保卫祖国的领土主权和人民的生命财产安全,     

海上秘密护送越南干部

越南抗美斗争最紧张最困难的时候,越南南方一批主要领导成员要从河内返回南方根据地。时间很紧,如果走越老柬边境上的“胡志明小道”,不仅面临美军战机轰炸危险,而且沿途道路崎岖,气候恶劣,一般需一两个月。为争取时间,让其尽快返回南方指挥战争,王伏林奉周恩来之命,克服重重困难,机智地躲过美军飞机的追踪,用远洋货轮秘密将越南干部送达目的地。     

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non‐communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.     

Promoting solidarity at home and abroad: the goals and tactics of the anti-Vietnam War movement in Britain

This article explores the nature, tactics and effectiveness of the vocal anti-Vietnam war movement in Britain. It focuses on the rhetoric and actions of a range of different groups, from the far-Left Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, to the broad-Left British Council for Peace in Vietnam and the labour movement. It asks how far the anti-war opposition was able to shape both government policy and public debate on the war, and positions the British opposition within its wider global anti-war context. It explores the meanings of solidarity (with the American, or global, anti-war movement or with the North Vietnamese) for the British movement, and it highlights the ultimately domestic focus of the campaign.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.     

Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968–72

Abstract

This paper examines the ineffective implementation of American military strategy in the Vietnam War’s final years. While the Nixon administration conceived a comprehensive strategic concept aimed at winding down the war in South Vietnam, civilian and military leaders struggled to realize, in an effectual manner, Nixon’s wide-ranging political objectives. American officials in Saigon and Washington found it near impossible to balance the competing strategic imperatives of combat operations, diplomatic negotiations, Vietnamization, and the withdrawal of US forces from South-east Asia. This inability to reconcile imbalances within the American strategic framework helps explain more fully the outcome of US political and military efforts in South Vietnam.     

Lyndon Johnson's war? Part 2: from escalation to negotiation

IThis second article on the Johnson administration's policy towards the war in Vietnam, based on published American documents, covers the period from July 1965 to March 1968. Although it is now clear that the Communist forces in Vietnam encountered considerable difficulties as a result of the steadily growing commitment of US ground forces, the Americans encountered difficulties of their own: notably the problem of persuading their South Vietnamese ally to implement what they regarded as the necessary political and military policies; and the increasing criticism of the war at home. The bombing of North Vietnam was a key issue for the administration. While the president's military advisers were continually pressing for further escalation, most of the civilians were sceptical. The latter felt that the bombing was not achieving its principal objective of reducing the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, was unpopular at home and abroad and, if increased, posed serious risks of Chinese and Russian involvement. Although the bombing was temporarily halted or restricted more than once during this period in an attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement, nothing was achieved. On 1 November 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's growing disillusionment with the war prompted him to send a lengthy memorandum to President Johnson arguing for the cessation of the bombing of the North and the stabilization of the American effort in the South. Rejected at the time, this policy was partially implemented as a result of the Communist Tet offensive of February 1968, when countrywide attacks were beaten back after failing to trigger the expected popular uprising against the Americans and the South Vietnamese government, while at the same time producing a surge of hostility to the war in the United States. Three men‐McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and White House aid Harry McPherson‐were largely responsible for persuading President Johnson to accept the fact that the war could not continue on the same basis as before and that de‐escalation was a better option. The president rejected the military's request for a huge increase in the number of US troops and, on 31 March 1968, announced a halt to the bombing north of the 20 th parallel and called for immediate peace talks. He also surprised the nation and his advisers by declaring that he would not run for the presidency in the election due in November 1968, preferring to concentrate on the search for peace during the remainder of his period in office.     

Race-ing Rape: Representations of Sexual Violence in American Combat Films

Abstract

Although portrayals of the rape of Asian women in American combat films are associated with the Vietnam War movie, such scenarios first became an established trope of the combat genre in films made during and about World War II. While pre-Vietnam War films used rape as a narrative device to justify US foreign and military policy, Vietnam combat films later used it as metaphor for US imperialism. Notwithstanding this difference, the combat film’s representation of sexual violence both pre- and post-Vietnam has always thrived on its confirmation of an American hegemony predicated on the subjugation of peoples (and, in particular, women) of colour.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

Why Vietnam? Postrevisionist Answers and a Neorealist Suggestion

Review in this Article
Andrew J. Rotter. The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia . Ithaca
Lloyd C. Gardner. Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954 . New York     

Welcome home: reconciliation,Vietnam veterans,and Anzac during the Hawke government

Recent studies regarding reconciliation have argued that restorative justice creates depoliticised consensus. This paper tests this argument by exploring the Hawke government’s role in the reconciliation of the Australian public with Vietnam veterans in 1987, and the opportunities that this resolution created to mark Anzac Day free of the complicating tensions that had characterised the day in the period since the Vietnam War. It argues that the restorative justice evident in the reincorporation of Vietnam veterans into national narratives of Anzac provided opportunities for political elites like Hawke to convincingly employ Anzac as an ideograph and inscribe the day with new meaning. This process had profound continuing effects for the marking of Anzac Day that demonstrate the politically limiting effects of restorative justice.     

Blurred lines: the home front,the battlefront,and the wartime relationship between citizens and government in the Republic of Vietnam

In the Republic of Vietnam, the blending of the home and battle fronts shaped the relationship between citizens and their government. Civilians viewed the national government as the institution responsible for various forms of social welfare related to the war and the resulting militarisation of non-combatants’ lives. An examination of citizens’ letters to its ministries shifts the focus from questions of political legitimacy to citizens’ expectations of their government. The role of gender in family and social structures also shaped how Vietnamese civilians perceived their war experiences and their relationships to the government.