Twenty‐first Century Industrial Policy in a Small Developing Country: The Challenges of Reviving Manufacturing in Rwanda

The Rwandan government — widely lauded for its political commitment to development — has refocused its efforts on reviving growth in the manufacturing sector. This article examines how pressures from different levels — international, regional and domestic — have shaped the evolving political economy of two priority sectors (apparel and cement). To achieve its goals of manufacturing sector growth, the Rwandan government aims to access foreign markets (on preferential terms) and larger regional markets while developing effective state–business relationships with locally based firms. Despite the government's political commitment to reviving its manufacturing sector, its strategy has been both shaped and impeded by shifting pressures at the international level (through Rwanda's recent suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act), the regional level (through competition from regional firms) and the domestic level (through over‐reliance on single firms). Within the current industrial policy literature, there is limited reflection on how developing countries are dealing with the multi‐scalar challenges of enacting industrial policy in a much‐changed global trading environment. This article contributes to the industrial policy literature by addressing this lacuna.     

China's energy security

As the Chinese energy deficit increases at rates equal to or exceeding its economic growth, energy security raises an alarm among its policy-makers and the international community. This article asks whether China faces any threat to its energy security; and whether China's worldwide quest for energy is a threat to the regional and international stability. The main argument is that while China faces serious challenges in meeting its rising energy demand, its efforts to do so have been primarily domestically focused. In its foreign energy policy, China has behaved like a normal player in the international energy market, buying as much oil as it can and investing in as many places as it can afford. It is unlikely that the country is willing to seek overseas energy supplies at the expense of a peaceful regional and international environment which is a necessary condition for its continuing economic development.     

Iran: Island of Stability orLand in Turmoil

Iran is a critical state in international relations because of its natural resources, its strategic location, its controversial conservative Islamic regime and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. As a result, Iran is facing pressure from all sides. There are currently four possible future scenarios for Iran: the Iranian regime will remain stable; the Iranian regime will become increasingly unstable; the stability of the Iranian regime depends on international action; the Iranian regime will reform itself from within. It is only by improving its image, that the U.S. can positively affect any of these scenarios. Iran has historically been an essential actor in the international arena because ofits strategic location and its position as a major oil producer; Iran is currently the fourth largest producer of crude oil, the third largest holder of proven oil reserves and the second largest holder of natural gas reserves. Today, Iran remains a critical state, not only because of its strategic location and its abundance of natural resources, but also because of its alleged role as a “state sponsor of terror,” its nuclear program, its human rights abuses, its controversial conservative Islamic regime which is at odds with America, and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East, especially in light of the U.S. removal of the Taliban and Hussein regimes, two of Iran's biggest threats (Stockman, 2004). It is because of a combination of these factors that the Iranian government is feeling much pressure from all angles. Domestically, the Iranian regime is feeling pressure from the Iranian society as the regime is shifting back from a trend towards liberalism as represented by the Khatami government, towards Ahmadinejad's more conservative and traditional regime. Manifestations of this disapproval were seen in the 2007 municipal elections, in which reformers won the plurality of votes (Not Pro‐Prez or Pro‐Reform, 2006). Internationally, Iran has been accused of being a state sponsor of terror and has been labeled by the American government as a member of the “axis of evil,” and as a violator of human rights. Finally, within the regime itself, Ahmadinejad's confrontational foreign policy has caused a split within the conservative block; dividing the pragmatists who want to engage in trade and resume relations with the West, and those who adhere to a strict interpretation of the Islamic Revolution by welcoming confrontation with the West. Furthermore, tensions exist, not only between the reform minded Majlis and the conservative Council of Guardians, but also between the Majlis and the president, who has recently been criticized for his aggressive foreign policy that is isolating Iran from the world.     

Shale gas and the revival of American power: debunking decline?

The spectre of American decline is once again animating both observers and practitioners of US foreign policy. The global financial crisis, a faltering American economy and continued costly and controversial military engagements overseas have been presented as conclusive proof that American foreign policy will soon lack the resources needed to sustain its previous international hegemony. Arguments of domestic weakness have been linked to analyses of the economic vitality of America's competitors to demonstrate a seemingly watertight case for relative decline. The inexorable rise of China has been presented from various quarters as evidence that the American era will soon be drawing to a close. Yet, such declinist arguments continue to suffer from fundamental weaknesses, overestimating the likely future strength of America's rivals while concurrently downplaying the capacity of the US to rejuvenate its economy and thus revivify its liberal universalist creed. The most interesting development in this regard has been the sudden resurgence of the US energy sector. Written off less than a decade ago as being in terminal decline, the American oil and gas industry has staged a remarkable recovery. Vast reserves of shale gas and accompanying tight oil offer the potential to aid the revival of the American economy, with some forecasts pointing to US energy self‐sufficiency within two decades. Notions of US relative decline may yet prove premature. The geopolitical impact of American energy self‐sufficiency is likely to be very significant, making an important contribution to a reversal of the US trade deficit, a revival of America's industrial base, and the possibility of a corresponding relative decline in power for conventional fossil fuel exporters.     

Global and regional orders and the changing geopolitics of energy

Attention by international relations scholars to the transformation underway stemming from the rise of China has not been matched by that given to the transformation underway in the international energy system. This article looks at three dimensions of that transformation: the end of cheap oil and the rising trend of energy prices; the changing role of the traditional international oil companies and the rise of national oil companies; and the growing energy importance of the Middle East and Russia. It looks at how these changes have already affected or are likely to affect three strategic relationships: US-Middle East; US-China; and Europe-Russia-US. It concludes that more attention needs to be given by scholars to what will be major changes in global geopolitical relationships with considerable consequences for the foreign policies of the major powers.     

Horror,hubris and humanity: the international engagement with Africa, 1914–2014

This article examines the international engagement with Africa from the First World War and the apex of colonial rule through to the present day. It is argued that there have been dramatic shifts throughout this period—from increasing interventionism on the part of the colonial state, to decolonization and the emergence of nation‐states with independent foreign policy programmes, to the predations and influences of the Cold War, to the developmentalism and humanitarianism of the contemporary era. Yet, there has also been marked continuity in terms of policy, perception and practice. In particular, Africa has long been seen in terms of economic opportunity—a place where markets and raw materials abound—and of military and political threat, a place in which intrinsic instability makes external intervention both desirable and inevitable. While immediate contexts have changed over time, the international engagement with the continent remains essentially economic and military. A concern for democratization and development represents a relatively new element, although even this can be traced to the paternalistic humanitarianism of the colonial era and, earlier still, moral stances toward Africa in the nineteenth century.     

Australian energy diplomacy

While Australia is considered an energy superpower, Australian foreign policy has often overlooked energy diplomacy. Given the transformations taking place in global energy markets, the time is ripe to begin a policy discussion in Australia on energy diplomacy. I argue that Australian diplomatic efforts should broaden beyond a historical focus on promoting fossil fuels and securing export markets, to driving global energy governance reforms through the G20. This will not only help to ensure that the international energy architecture is capable of achieving governance objectives around energy security, energy access and climate change, but significantly, it will also help Australia to achieve broader foreign policy goals, such as ensuring emerging economies become responsible stakeholders within the international system.     

‘An enemy at the gates’ or ‘from victory to victory’? Russian foreign policy

Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the ‘western alliance’ to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post‐Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics.     

Global energy governance: do the BRICs have the energy to drive reform?

It is widely accepted that the rising power of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—has the potential to re‐shape the international system. However, little attention has been given to the BRICs’ role in a growing area of strategic importance: global energy governance. While global governance scholars now argue that the international energy architecture requires substantive reform to keep pace with the rapid transformations in global energy markets, largely driven by the BRICs, it is not clear what role these countries will play in future governance arrangements. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance and international negotiations, interviews with G20 energy officials, and the observations of the author, a past delegate to G20 negotiations, this article examines whether the BRICs as a coalition have the capacity and willingness to drive substantive global energy governance reform. In doing so, it highlights the problems with the BRICs as a coalition on energy and considers the prospects for energy reform in light of China's increasing engagement with energy governance ahead of it hosting the G20 Summit in 2016.     

China's oil diplomacy in Africa

Within the next five years, Chinese trade with Africa is predicted to reach $100 billion per year. Much of this springs from China's growing expansion into Africa's oil markets. It is argued that Chinese oil diplomacy in Africa has two main goals: in the short-term to secure oil supplies to help feed growing domestic demand back in China; and in the long-term, to position China as a global player in the international oil market. Yet at the same time, this oil safari is being accompanied by an explicit stance that emphasizes state sovereignty and 'non-interference' in domestic affairs and is wholly disinterested in transparency or human rights. Consequently, Beijing has increasingly been accused of turning a blind eye to autocracy and corruption. China is also threatening to undercut efforts by the African Union and its western partners to make government and business more accountable. While China is providing investment where little was previously forthcoming, concerns about Beijing's engagement with Africa's oil industries need to be resolved, not least by African leaders themselves.     

India's ‘non‐alignment’ conundrum: a twentieth‐century policy in a changing world

The idea of non‐alignment has remained a central component of Indian identity in global politics that is manifest in continuities: since independence in 1947 India has been in pursuit of strategic autonomy, a quest that in practice has led to semi‐alliances fashioned under the cover of non‐alignment and shaped by regional dynamics. In this setting, the rise of China now raises an interesting conundrum for Indian policy‐makers as New Delhi seeks to balance the benefits and risks of an increasingly assertive neighbour and a network of alliances with like‐minded countries. This article approaches this enigma by delineating continuities of non‐alignment from the early roots of the policy, through the Cold War‐era and into the modern‐day international system. Though domestic factors have had a significant influence on the trajectory of Indian foreign policy, the continuities of non‐alignment have prevailed through changes in leadership and domestic vicissitudes. By exploring the foundation of non‐alignment and how India has operationalized the policy, this article maintains that to some extent continuity will persist: India will likely continue its rhetoric in favour of strategic autonomy while moving closer to the West and its allies in practice. Yet in order to effectively balance China's growing influence, India will need to be more assertive in building these alliances, as the success of its modern‐day pursuit of strategic autonomy may well rest on a strong foundation of strategic partnerships. The coming to office in May 2014 of the National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi has signalled a move away from even the rhetoric of non‐alignment, with significant implications for the future of Indian foreign policy.     

The regulation of direct foreign investment in the Australian mining sector

Although Australia has relied on foreign capital and multinational corporations to develop its mining sector, it has been successful in restricting foreign ownership and control to 50 per cent The Australian experience provides a valuable case study because its successive minerals and energy booms in the last two decades occurred before and after restrictions were imposed and the Foreign Investment Review Board established in the mid‐1970s. During the prior minerals boom when there were virtually no restrictions, levels of foreign ownership and control increased from less than 30 to 50 per cent. During the second energy boom, in the late 1970s to early 1980s, a firm policy of 50 per cent Australian participation in all mining projects was successfully implemented. Australia did not become a ‘client state’ of international capitalism, nor did its federal system preclude the regulation of foreign investment The article summarises the results of Australia's regulatory policy and examines the political and policy reasons for its success.     

近代西北皮毛产地及流通市场研究

甘肃、宁夏、青海、新疆、绥远、察哈尔以及陕西的北部位于我国农牧分界线以北地区,是我国主要的皮毛产地,近代中国70%以上的皮毛产于这一地区。近代西北皮毛市场兴起是以天津开埠为起点。天津开埠后逐渐成为中国北方最大的港口和出口市场,其经济腹地不断由华北向西北延伸,带动了近代西北皮毛市场的兴起。近代中外贸易的主要特点是西方列强利用不平等条约对中国原料的掠夺。因此,在西北皮毛市场兴起的过程中,外商、洋行、买办起了先导作用。在近代西北皮毛的市场链中,以产地市场为基础,以中转市场为枢纽,以出口市场为尾闾,形成了比较完整的市场体系。皮毛市场的勃兴,对西北区域市场与国际市场的联系产生了至关重要的作用,增加了西北地区经济发展的现代化因素。     

Growth in the International Reserves of Russia,China, and India: A Comparison of Underlying Mechanisms

A noted international specialist on the Russian economy compares the different mechanisms by which the emerging powerful economies of Russia, China, and India accumulated substantial foreign reserves during the 2000s in the lead-up to the global financial crisis. He also investigates the costs incurred by these countries of intervention into exchange markets to maintain exchange rate regimes supporting such accumulation, as well as measures undertaken after the crisis to address sudden and massive outflows of foreign private capital and considerable decreases in demand for imports in developed countries. The author argues that each of the three countries can be viewed as a prototype for a particular means of reserve accumulation among emerging market countries that has led to the revival of the Bretton Woods international monetary system.     

Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia

After a decade of relative neglect post‐Soviet Central Asia has become a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic community. Both the United States and Europe have engaged with the region in recent years in pursuit of new strategic interests, including maintaining military basing access in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and securing the export of Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Despite this period of renewed engagement, however, the quality of democratic governance within the region remains poor, especially in comparison with other post‐communist regions that successfully completed their political transitions. In fact, the United States and the European Union have often tempered promoting their Central Asian democratization agendas in order to maintain access to these strategically important fixed assets. The transatlantic struggle to balance the pursuit of strategic interests and democratic values has been rendered more difficult by Russia's recent resurgence as a regional power. Backed by the Central Asian governments, Moscow has challenged the purpose and influence of western‐based international and non‐governmental organizations in the region, thereby further diminishing the transatlantic community's capacity to promote sustained democratic reforms.     

Back to the future or forward to the past? Strengthening markets and rules for effective global energy governance

Current public policy debates on energy security are characterized by a singular focus on questions regarding access to resources. This lopsided attention to the geopolitical dimension of energy security is based on the myopic and erroneous presumption that global energy politics is necessarily a zero-sum game in which one country's energy security is another's lack thereof. In fact, debates deflect attention from the real issues that policy-makers should consider in their attempts to foster effective global energy governance—the central role increasingly international energy markets play in balancing demand and supply—and, even more importantly, the significance of the 'rules of the game' that structure these markets. This article makes a first attempt to apply a broader analytical lens by pointing out and analyzing the important role rules play in determining outcomes in international oil and gas markets; by examining how current trends are affecting the existing 'rules of the game'; and by highlighting consequences for public policy.     

Rationalizing the Guerilla State: North Korean Factory Management Reform, 1953–61

This article examines the Taean Management System (TMS), a North Korean factory management reform program of 1961. Three factors explain why the TMS emerged at the time it did: first, influence from the Soviet Union and China since 1945 provided the knowledge of factory management; second, decreasing foreign aid since the mid‐1950s urged the North Koreans to search for ways to increase productivity; and third, the rise of an ideology of self‐reliance excluded the option of being integrated into the international economy. The resulting TMS, which arose at this juncture as an amalgam of rationalization and ideology, was the origin of modern management in North Korea.     

Domestic troubles,national identity discourse,and China's attitude towards the West, 2003–2012

Prior to its recent, much discussed international ‘assertiveness’, China's attitude to the West had deteriorated, as reflected in official discourse of national identity. Drawing from political science and social psychology literature on identity studies, I argue that the discursive pattern of national identity can shift as a function of an elite strategy to exclude internal others through opposition to foreign others. Internally exclusionary nationalism, often employed by elites during major crises, is instrumental to consolidating control and maintaining order. But when targeting internal opponents alone is politically inconvenient or lacks public resonance, elites will accentuate ethnocentric national identity discourse vis‐a‐vis foreign nations in order to reinforce internal battles and divert popular discontent externally. An interpretive analysis of the official texts of Chinese national identity discourse during the Hu Jintao decade, supplemented by quantitative data, shows a significant correlation between the regime's fear of internal instability and bottom‐up political opposition on the one hand and the timing and intensity of ethnocentric identity discourse regarding the West on the other. The party‐state negatively framed the West in order to shift the blame for domestic troubles onto foreigners and discredit internal resistance.     

The commodity crisis of the 1970s: scarcity,vulnerability and the West German metal supply

ABSTRACT

The 1970s were a period marked by price hikes and fluctuations in the commodity markets, both of which had considerable economic and political repercussions. Although this refers to almost all kinds of raw materials, the case of oil dominates the memory. Metals, by contrast, have received little attention despite their crucial importance for both industrialized consumer states and ore-exporting developing countries. This article develops three main points. First, by highlighting the global metal markets from the late 1960s to the early 1980s it contextualizes the oil-price shock and points out the interactions between the markets for energy and other raw materials. Second, the article aims to draw attention to the sense of crisis in Western industrialized countries regarding their metal supply during this period. This is a topic which has been overshadowed by the case of oil, but which nevertheless deserves study, also because of the parallels to recent developments between 2004 and 2011. Third, the article analyses how notions of resource scarcity, vulnerability and crisis were constructed despite the fact that the commodity crisis proved to be a merely anticipated crisis with high and volatile prices, but no long-term disruptions of supply. Within this article West Germany serves as a case study for highly industrialized, import-dependent countries. The focus is on non-ferrous metals like copper, nickel and aluminium.     

The Perpetuation of Regime Security in Gulf Cooperation Council States: A Multi‐Lens Approach

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have been engaging in diversification efforts, yet the types of efforts suggest that the primary interest is regime security. Regional foreign policy is complex; hence we propose a multi‐lens approach to analyze overlapping and complementary political, economic, and social forces. The international political economy of hydrocarbons demonstrates the similarities among GCC states, regional dynamics illustrate interstate relations and similar patterns, while economic diversification suggests individual state trajectories and comparative and competitive patterns. By outlining the contemporary context for GCC states, we argue that low oil prices, regional dependence on hydrocarbons, and trends in economic diversification efforts signal GCC states' preference to reinforce their rentier systems with alternative state revenue streams. GCC states' diversification into new markets and sectors and use of state‐owned enterprises in microcompetitions indicate a new search for alternative revenue streams and prestige, which in turn are used to assure the perpetuation of regime security. This finding sets trajectories and implications for the region, specifically economic stagnation and supplementary diversification processes.