Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Nixon,Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

Few would have predicted in 1969 that the new Republican administration of Richard Nixon would initiate a rapprochement between the United States and communist China during his first term as president. That he succeeded in doing so was helped by the severity of the Sino‐Soviet dispute, which erupted into armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. By the end of 1970 China made it clear that it would not only be willing to receive a presidential envoy, but also the president himself. Two missions to Beijing by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger—one secret in July 1971 and the other public in the following October—paved the way for a presidential visit in February 1972. The talks in July and October 1971 and February 1972 covered a whole range of issues including the war in Indochina, the potential threat from Japan and relations with the Soviet Union. The most dif cult problem, however, proved to be that of Taiwan, where the American‐backed Nationalist government not only laid claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China, but occupied the Chinese seat in the United Nations. A modus vivendi was eventually reached in February 1972, helped perhaps by the United Nations General Assembly vote in October 1971 which unseated the Taiwan regime in favour of mainland China. The US negotiating position was not made any easier by the intense rivalry between Kissinger and the State Department and the latter's exclusion from much of the negotiation process led to a last‐minute crisis which threatened the success of the entire project. While neither the United States nor China achieved all that they had hoped, Nixon's visit to China had an enormous symbolic impact and contributed to a reconfiguration of the global balance of power.     

Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968–72

Abstract

This paper examines the ineffective implementation of American military strategy in the Vietnam War’s final years. While the Nixon administration conceived a comprehensive strategic concept aimed at winding down the war in South Vietnam, civilian and military leaders struggled to realize, in an effectual manner, Nixon’s wide-ranging political objectives. American officials in Saigon and Washington found it near impossible to balance the competing strategic imperatives of combat operations, diplomatic negotiations, Vietnamization, and the withdrawal of US forces from South-east Asia. This inability to reconcile imbalances within the American strategic framework helps explain more fully the outcome of US political and military efforts in South Vietnam.     

Lyndon Johnson's war? Part 2: from escalation to negotiation

IThis second article on the Johnson administration's policy towards the war in Vietnam, based on published American documents, covers the period from July 1965 to March 1968. Although it is now clear that the Communist forces in Vietnam encountered considerable difficulties as a result of the steadily growing commitment of US ground forces, the Americans encountered difficulties of their own: notably the problem of persuading their South Vietnamese ally to implement what they regarded as the necessary political and military policies; and the increasing criticism of the war at home. The bombing of North Vietnam was a key issue for the administration. While the president's military advisers were continually pressing for further escalation, most of the civilians were sceptical. The latter felt that the bombing was not achieving its principal objective of reducing the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, was unpopular at home and abroad and, if increased, posed serious risks of Chinese and Russian involvement. Although the bombing was temporarily halted or restricted more than once during this period in an attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement, nothing was achieved. On 1 November 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's growing disillusionment with the war prompted him to send a lengthy memorandum to President Johnson arguing for the cessation of the bombing of the North and the stabilization of the American effort in the South. Rejected at the time, this policy was partially implemented as a result of the Communist Tet offensive of February 1968, when countrywide attacks were beaten back after failing to trigger the expected popular uprising against the Americans and the South Vietnamese government, while at the same time producing a surge of hostility to the war in the United States. Three men‐McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and White House aid Harry McPherson‐were largely responsible for persuading President Johnson to accept the fact that the war could not continue on the same basis as before and that de‐escalation was a better option. The president rejected the military's request for a huge increase in the number of US troops and, on 31 March 1968, announced a halt to the bombing north of the 20 th parallel and called for immediate peace talks. He also surprised the nation and his advisers by declaring that he would not run for the presidency in the election due in November 1968, preferring to concentrate on the search for peace during the remainder of his period in office.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non‐communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.     

The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972–75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources

Relying on so far untapped Vietnamese archival sources, this article examines the impact of China's gradual curtailment of its economic assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) war and economic recovery efforts and its implications for Sino-Vietnamese relations between 1972 and 1975. While Beijing's gradual reduction of aid to the DRV during this period was primarily motivated by the declining importance of North Vietnam to China's strategic security combined with the reality of China's domestic economic hardship which largely resulted from the disastrous Cultural Revolution of 1966–69, Hanoi's reactions and policy responses were driven by their deep-rooted perception of Beijing's insincerity and hidden intention to keep Vietnam weak. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict that ensued after 1975 was not inevitable; Hanoi's leaders launched concerted diplomatic efforts to improve economic relations with Beijing throughout 1975 because they clearly recognised the importance of China's continued economic assistance and preferential trade agreements to its first five year plan (1976–80). However, Beijing's unchanged position and hasty decision to totally cut off aid to Vietnam and additionally take punitive economic measures against Vietnam's first five-year plan in late 1975 while at the same time increasing economic and military aid to the Democratic Kampuchea compelled Hanoi to tilt closer towards Moscow.     

‘A Billion Dollar Racket’: the United States,South Vietnam,and Global Currency Manipulation during War, 1968–9

While most historians have discussed corruption as a key factor leading to South Vietnam's downfall, they have not fully analysed the US and international dimensions of South Vietnamese corruption. This article argues that economic, political, and diplomatic circumstances of the Vietnam War encouraged widespread US participation in currency manipulation, an economically destructive form of corruption that had serious implications for the stability of the South Vietnamese state. The US inability to shape South Vietnam's setting of the official exchange rate allowed South Vietnam to overvalue the piaster at the cost of US taxpayers. Combined with the structural economic problems produced by the war, such as inflation, the favourable exchange rate encouraged Americans, Vietnamese, Indians, Chinese, Koreans, and other internationals to make quick profits through illegal transactions. From bookstores in Saigon to banks in Hong Kong, Dubai, and New York, currency manipulation involved a host of individuals and organisations around the globe. Although many critics of the war cited South Vietnamese corruption in their arguments for US withdrawal, congressional investigation into currency manipulation revealed that without the direct contributions of US soldiers and civilians, the magnitude of illegal economic transactions would not have existed as it did.     

Justified at Last? Kissinger's Cyprus Legacy, 1974–1976

This article focuses on the Cyprus talks between 1974 and 1976. It presents the beneficial role the former US secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, played in bringing the Greek and Turkish sides around the negotiating table and commit to the efforts for a mutually acceptable settlement following the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Kissinger acted as the honest broker between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia moderating each side's demands and communicating their respective positions when direct contacts were insufficient. All parties for different reasons welcomed his involvement and considered his presence a necessity necessary. Since the public in Greece and Cyprus remained hostile to him, the US secretary remained on the side-lines. Kissinger offered innovative solutions on controversial questions that prevented progress. Thanks to his contribution intense negotiations between the two Cypriot communities with the support of Greece and Turkey took place during the Ford administration. His intervention could not and did not suffice to overcome domestic conflicts and political considerations that prevailed over the efforts for a reconciliatory and mutually acceptable agreement. Nonetheless, he succeeded in paving the way for reducing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.     

The alliance echoes and portents of Australia's longest war

Afghanistan was Australia's longest war, yet the consensus between Australia's major political parties on the commitment never wavered over 12 years. The bipartisan unity held even as the nature of the war changed and evolved, Australian casualties rose and popular support fell away. The enduring centrality of the US alliance explains much—probably almost all you need to know—about the unbroken consensus of the Australian polity. Afghanistan was an example of the Australian alliance addiction, similar to Vietnam. As with Vietnam, the Australian military left Afghanistan believing it won its bit of the war, even if the Afghanistan war is judged a disaster. As Australia heads home it finds the USA pivoting in its direction; with all the similarities that can be drawn between Vietnam and Afghanistan, this post-war alliance effect is a huge difference between the two conflicts.     

‘Protection against the Lust of Men’: Progressivism,Prostitution and Rape in the Dominican Republic under US Occupation, 1916–24

This article explains the disparity between the United States (US) military government's efforts to defend and empower local women during the first occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–24) and its reputation for tolerating sexual assault. It argues that US officials, inspired by a progressive ideology that linked the social, economic and political spheres, set out to reshape Dominican sexual and gender norms as a means to ensure political stability. Yet, these efforts fell victim to both Dominican and US Marines’ conceptions of gender and normative sexuality. Building upon a thriving body of scholarship that addresses the significance of US efforts to redefine Dominican gender norms, this article analyses the military government's policies towards women and provost courts’ responses to sexual assault. It concludes that, combined with an aggressive anti‐prostitution campaign, the military government's reforms succeeded only in creating an atmosphere favourable to crimes against women. Moreover, rape and the way it was prosecuted revitalised the patriarchal norms that US officials had set out to transform, thus setting the stage for the regime of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, whose thirty‐year dictatorship depended on the conspicuous control of women. Thus, US policies and attitudes not only ensured the failure of progressive reform but also contributed to the ongoing subjugation of the very women the military government had pledged to empower.     

Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977

In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israel and the United States grappled with Lebanon's civil war. This is at once the tale of 40 months of negotiations, deceit and maneuvers, and the beginning of the troubled American relationship with the Assad dynasty.     

4. PARTISANS AND POPULATIONS: THE PLACE OF CIVILIANS IN WAR,ALGERIA (1954–62)

Carl Schmitt's influential text The Theory of the Partisan (1963) serves in this article to read the history of civilians in modern warfare, examining the case of Algeria (1954–62). Schmitt's argument that the partisan leads to a dangerous conceptual blurring in war, confusing soldier and civilian, friend and enemy, reveals important questions about the war, questions that are otherwise invisible in conventional readings of the archives. Notably it places in relief the figure of the “population,” a way that the French military conceptualized Algerian civilians and their place on the battlefield. The article argues that the population, as constituted in military theory, needs to be understood as the partisan's partner in contributing to the normlessness of violence. This offers both a new reading of the war in Algeria and the violence suffered by civilians, as well as a correction to Schmitt's politically one‐sided explanation of the problem of normlessness and modern warfare. Whereas Schmitt's revolutionary partisan is a figure of the left, the notion of the population originated among counter‐revolutionary French officers who rethought war in an effort to stop decolonization and reshape their own society along military lines. For them Algerian civilians served as a primary weapon against the National Liberation Front (FLN) by breaking up the nationalists’ claim to lead a single, undivided, and sovereign Algerian people. In effect, the notion of the population made Algerian civilians appear as potential enemies to the FLN, blurring the nationalists’ own understanding of the political configuration of the war, directly exposing civilians to its violence.     

论中国对越美和谈态度的转变及其对中越关系的影响(1968～1971年)

中国领导人对越南战争的态度在1968～1971年间发生了转变,即1968年初至1969年上半年,坚决反对越南与美国谈判;1969年下半年至1970年8月,从不干涉越美和谈转变为支持越南谈判;1970年9月后,态度鲜明地支持和谈。中国前后两种立场都引起越南的强烈不满。虽然中国没有以牺牲越南的利益来换得中美关系的缓和,而且在自己并不富裕的条件下,仍给予了越南大量的无偿援助,但这些努力都没有改变越南对中国的不满、疑虑与不安。在中美缓和与越美谈判的进程中,中越关系却不断恶化,这为后来双方的冲突埋下了隐患。     

Gender and Post‐war Relief: Support for War‐Widowed Mothers in Occupied Japan (1945–52)

This article analyses the gender implications that emerged through welfare support for the war‐bereaved in post‐Asia‐Pacific War Japan. It follows the foundation, activities and dissolution of the Federation of Bereaved War Victims, the first support group for the war‐bereaved that initially began as an organisation for military widows. After its dissolution, members of the Federation went on to create two separate groups – the Victims’ Federation and Widows’ Federation – whose members, scope and objectives presented stark gendered divisions. By examining this divide, and by analysing the earlier histories of the organisations, this article explores the relationships among gender, military, death and bereavement, and post‐war relief. The article pays particular attention to the tensions and negotiations among various interest groups, including military widows, women widowed from other causes, feminist activists, male lawmakers, bereaved fathers and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I place the dissolution of the Federation in its social and political contexts and analyse its relationship to the contemporaneous discussions on female citizenship. In particular, I focus on two areas mobilised by Japanese feminist activists since the early twentieth century: suffrage and motherhood. The short history of the Federation provides a means to examine the reconfiguration of the connection between gender and citizenship during the demilitarisation and democratisation processes that occurred in occupied Japan.     

‘Chatham's Ghost’ and the Enduring Spectre of Lord Bute's Secret Influence: A Political Negotiation of 1778

Hints about the rise, fall, and reformulations of ministries were common currency in 18th‐century British political rhetoric. However, in 1778, chief among such rumours were three purported negotiations between the earls of Bute and Chatham, aimed at bringing one or both of them into administration. So damaging were these rumours to the political legacies of both individuals and their families, however, that they resorted to a ‘press war’ in order to absolve their respective kinsmen of any involvement. Drawing on previously neglected sources, this work examines these negotiations of 1778 and the subsequent press war in order to highlight the longevity, potency, and significance of the myth of Lord Bute's secret influence 15 years after his resignation from high office. In doing so, this work seeks to correct the common narrative that Lord Bute ceased to be a potent political symbol for constitutional issues following the publication of Edmund Burke's Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents in 1770. Far from being merely an anomalous and spontaneous revival of ill‐sentiments towards Lord Bute, this episode should be seen as a flashpoint in a process of vilification and traducement of the Scottish earl that had never, in fact, ceased and was symptomatic of the continuation of symbolic, or hieroglyphic, depictions of arguments concerning the significant constitutional issues which had been raised by Bute's political presence since the accession of George III.     

Afrikaner Nationalism in Action: F. C. Erasmus and South Africa's Defence Forces 1948–1959

Abstract. F. C. Erasmus became South Africa's defence minister in 1948 after two decades as the leading political organiser for the National Party. Although an architect of the Nationalists' post‐war victory, he was not considered a minister of the first rank. Erasmus initiated a process of ridding the defence force of officers who he believed were associated with the government of the Anglophile Jan Smuts and replacing them with party supporters. As a result, the military often lost experienced and talented officers, many with combat exposure. Erasmus felt that the armed services had been too British in ethos and appearance. He inaugurated tighter regulations on bilingualism, introduced Boer rank titles, launched new uniforms and original medals and decorations, to the acclaim of the Afrikaner Volk. His purpose was to have a defence force which was uniquely ‘South African’.     

Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011

Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US‐led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub‐national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war‐weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring ‘victory’. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational‐strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.     

A Most Unmanly War: British Military Masculinity in Macedonia,Mesopotamia and Palestine, 1914–18

This article argues that the most severe crisis of masculinity among British and Dominion soldiers in the First World War did not take place on the Western Front. Instead, British and Dominion soldiers serving on the war's sideshows in Macedonia, Mesopotamia and Palestine believed most acutely that their manliness was in question. Unlike soldiers on the Western Front, they were not battling the main German Army, they were not fighting to liberate occupied France and Belgium, and their war was not to preserve the rights of small nations and the inviolability of international law. This article explores how military masculinity played out much differently on the war's peripheral fronts in two ways. First, it suggests that where a soldier fought mattered more to military masculinity than a soldier's method of enlistment or any other variable. British and Dominion soldiers were fully aware that the home front only considered France and Flanders as the real war, and they actively argued against this misconception to loved ones and in their memoirs. Second, this article demonstrates an additional crisis of masculinity on the war's peripheral fronts: the lack, or more often effacement, of non‐white colonial (Eastern Mediterranean and Arab) women. Not only was British and Dominion military masculinity under assault on the war's peripheral fronts, heteronormative sexual relations were also being transformed in a world where few, if any, racially acceptable women were available.     

Rape as a Weapon of War(riors): The Militarisation of Sexual Violence in the United States, 1990–2000

This article uses a transnational feminist lens to examine how accusations of sexual violence were mobilised by the United States (US) government to justify military intervention at the same time that the US military failed to address sexual violence perpetrated by and against its own service members. Drawing upon an archive of civilian representations ranging from the New York Times to G.I. Jane, the author explores US interventions in the Persian Gulf, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia alongside sexual assaults committed by servicemen at the Tailhook Convention, on Okinawa and at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. This article draws connections between feminism and neo‐imperialism, between Cold War and War on Terror ideologies, and between rape as a weapon of war and rape during times of ‘peace’ in order to better understand the relationships between sexual politics and geopolitics at the end of the twentieth century.