The politics of US missile defence cooperation with Europe and Russia

Pushed by the realities of domestic politics to proceed with plans to deploy a US missile defense (MD) capability in Europe, the Obama administration has made cooperation on MD a key element in its strategy for engaging both NATO and Russia. While addressing many of the shortcomings of the Bush administration's approach, the current US vision underestimates both the technical and political obstacles ahead. European states and NATO see MD as a lower priority, particularly in the aftermath of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, and are unlikely to commit the resources necessary to making a shared NATO MD architecture a reality. Russia's cautious support for MD cooperation is based on a desire to create a more inclusive model of European security, an idea that has limited support in Washington and the European capitals. By trying to do too much with MD cooperation, the Obama administration risks the whole effort collapsing. Given domestic constraints, the administration cannot pull back from its European MD plans, but should nudge them off centre stage in its conversations on security with both NATO allies and the Russians.     

Big boats and bigger skimmers: determining Britain's role in the Long War

While much of the focus in the Trident replacement debate in the UK is on Britain's long-term role as a nuclear power, a second decision is imminent, concerning the acquisition of two large aircraft carriers. In combination, these two projects will do much to determine the UK defence posture for several decades to come and are therefore best analysed together. The decisions are particularly significant when viewed in relation to the post 9/II US defence posture, especially in what is now being termed the 'long war'. The new aircraft carriers will make it possible for the UK military to work closely with the United States in future expeditionary warfare, with all the potential political controversies that might result.     

US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race

This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino‐US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.     

The transformation of local politics: manufacturing plant closures and governing coalition fragmentation

A theoretical problem remains in the urban regime literature in that the connection between fiscal strain and regime fragmentation and thus the potential for coalition breakdown is not fully elaborated. Whelan et al. (1994) demonstrate that a shifting electoral coalition, in particular the emergence of a black majority electorate, can also lead to regime instability and fragmentation and the subsequent political struggles for dominance in an emerging governing coalition. In this paper a second mechanism for regime change is suggested; that is, that under conditions of economic restructuring and the subsequent fiscal strain, non-local actors, in this case national political actors operating primarily through party connections, can manipulate local political dependencies to forge governing coalition fragmentation and a regime change in a particular direction. This first finding is important because it highlights the often neglected role of party politics in the governing coalition/urban regime and the local state literature. Secondly, the complexity of state relations uncovered here does not bode well for a theoretically coherent concept of the local state but does display how the historical development of local social relations interacts with the state apparatus at the state and national level to create a particular ‘local’ politics. Finally, this transformation requires a shift in the location of political consensus building from the local democratic political electoral arena to a non-democratic quasi-public arena: a corporate-led governing coalition.     

Managing escalation: missile defence,strategy and US alliances

Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the alliance bargains that underpin agreement on extended deterrence strategy. Although increased defensive capacity is a clear net benefit, the strategic effects of its deployment and use can still be complex if, for example, missile defence increases the chances of localizing a conflict. The article discusses the role of missile defences for the US homeland, and of the territory and population of US allies, for extended deterrence credibility and the reassurance of US allies in Asia and in NATO. It argues that there is increased scope in strengthening deterrence by enmeshing the defence of the US homeland with that of its allies, and that allies need to pay closer attention to the way the deployment and use of missile defence influence pressures for escalation. In general, missile defence thus reinforces the need for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia to negotiate an overall alliance strategy.     

Competition and cooperation among jurisdictions: The case of regional cooperation in science and technology in Europe

This article analyzes the possible conflict between regional cooperation and jurisdiction and the cases in which cooperation is compatible with competition. This analysis is carried out beginning with the concrete case of regional cooperation that has been called the ‘Four Motors for Europe’ established in the field of cooperation in science and technology. The basis for the analysis of cooperation between jurisdictions in science and technology is the same as that for cooperation in the same field between companies. It allows the establishment of when this cooperation can degenerate into collusion or else when the result is a socially efficient organization. The risk of regional cooperation in science and technology is that it degenerates into collusion between the regions that occupy a more favourable technological position at the cost of those that are in a worse situation. The solution in order to avoid this risk would be to guarantee political competition in the same way that through regulations competition in the market is guaranteed.     

Trade and peace: the EU and Gaddafi's final decade

This article examines the effectiveness of the EU's use of trade to induce peace in Libya during Gaddafi's final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. Indeed, this peace‐through‐trade assumption is at the heart of the EU, which was founded on the notion that economic interdependence ameliorates potential causes of conflict. Initially, this article embeds its argument in the theory concerned with the relationship between trade and peace, followed by tracking the development of the EU's policy. The main body of the article then provides evidence which goes against the assumption that the trade–peace relationship is positively correlated. Specifically, it is argued that the EU's peace‐through‐trade policy failed in this instance due to the fact that it failed to take into account the Libyan context: namely, the Middle Eastern state's ethnographic and historical makeup; the weapons of mass‐destruction programme and the subsequently induced sanctions; Gaddafi's rule and attempts at reform; as well as the 2011 conflict. All these factors amalgamated to ongoing conflict in Libya during Gaddafi's final decade in power despite EU–Libyan trade continuing to take place during this timeframe.