The End of the Cold War on the Cold War?

Melvyn P. Leffler. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War .     

The CIA's Secret War in Tibet

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Was Civil War surgery effective?

During the U.S. Civil War surgeons performed a vast number of surgeries. Whether surgery increased wounded soldiers’ chances of survival has been debated ever since. I analyze a unique observational data set gathered by Dr. Edmund Andrews, a surgeon with the 1st Illinois Light Artillery. I use Dr. Andrews’s data, model selection tools, and doubly robust estimation methods to estimate treatment effects from surgery. I find that surgery increased wounded soldiers’ chances of survival by 0.09–0.16, depending on the specific model of surgical procedure.     

From World War to Cold War: Scandinavian media attitudes to the Soviet Union 1945–1948

At the end of the war in Europe in 1945, an alliance-loyalty attitude was predominant among the Scandinavian public voices on the Soviet Union. This attitude incorporated a favourable image of the Soviet war effort and implied that the Soviet system had undergone changes during the war. Another significant group supported the Soviet system more unequivocally. These attitudes were dominant in the Scandinavian media and public debate until late 1945 or early 1946, when opposition to and fear of the Soviet Union began to be openly expressed in conservative and social-democratic newspapers. A bipartisan attitude to the Soviet Union had not developed at this stage, as the alliance-loyalty attitude was transformed into a clearer third-voice attitude that saw the Soviet Union on the one hand as a power which was not worthy of imitation, but which on the other hand accepted that the Soviet Union was seeking international peace and cooperation. Third-voice supporters in the Scandinavian media sought investigative reports on conditions in the Soviet Union, as they claimed that the growing anti-Soviet attitudes were based on a lack of accurate knowledge. Considering that Denmark, Norway and Sweden had experienced different conditions during the war, the differences in public attitudes to the Soviet Union were comparatively small. The public third voice on the Soviet Union was clearly weakened in 1948 by the reception of more critical information on the Soviet system and the perception of news on international developments.     

“Spectral,Dancing Hosts of War”: German-language Research on Sword Dancing before World War I

This article focuses on four major German and Austrian figures, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the study of the history of sword dancing, and their key approaches to the field: Karl Müllenhoff, Wilhelm Mannhardt, Heinrich Schurtz, and Leopold von Schroeder. Their work drew on classical studies (Tacitus's the Germania has an apparent reference), comparative ethnography, the ideas of secret men's societies and their initiation rituals, and, underlying everything, the concept of Germanic continuity from prehistory to the present.     

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non‐communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.     

Sousveilling the ‘Global War on Terror’

This article theorises what it means to challenge official regimes of surveillance in the War on Terror by further developing the notion of ‘sousveillance’. In particular, we focus on the performative dimension of surveillance by attending to its sites of struggle, particularly where alternative and counter-performances work to disrupt and dislodge official regimes of vision. These potent counter-performances have become important flashpoints for discussion in the ongoing negotiation of security state power since the onset of the War on Terror. The article begins by considering what it means to call surveillance ‘performative’ and how such official performances have had a documented chilling effect on free expression and democratic deliberation. It continues by exploring Steve Mann’s notion of ‘sousveillance’, or the view from below, as a theoretical resource for understanding counter-visual performances that otherwise challenge authoritarian surveillant practices. Finally, the article illustrates these dynamics through a number of sousveillant performances that have provoked new deliberative spaces in the context of the War on Terror.