The Conservative Party and Defeat: the Significance of Resale Price Maintenance for the General Election of 1964

The 1964 general election was one of the closest in modern Britishhistory and resulted in the narrowest of defeats for the ConservativeParty, who had been in office continuously for thirteen years.In terms of the popular vote, the difference between the victoriousLabour Party and the Tories was just 0.3 per cent and—witha swing of just 3.5 per cent—the Labour majority in theHouse of Commons was only four, the smallest since Lord JohnRussell's Whigs in 1847. There were, of course, many differentfactors involved in the defeat, including the longterm damagecaused to the Conservative Party by the 'Profumo affair' andother security scandals. Yet, the issue that caused the greatestpolitical problems for the Conservative government in the run-upto the election was not a public scandal or the general managementof the economy, but a seemingly innocuous macroeconomic issueknown as resale price maintenance (RPM). The Macmillan and Douglas-Homegovernment's attempts to abolish RPM—a practice wherebyproducers would dictate the price at which their goods couldbe sold by retailers, thereby ensuring that prices were 'fixed'across the board—led to the biggest backbench rebellionsince Neville Chamberlain was forced out of office in 1940.During the RPM affair, Conservative MPs openly plotted againsttheir own government and threatened it with embarrassing defeatin a series of highly charged parliamentary votes. At one stagethe Conservative government's majority in the House of Commonswas reduced to just one vote. Party whips and managers foundthemselves unable to contain the rebellion, and even the Cabinetfound it difficult to remain above the fray, with several seniorministers strongly opposing the measures. Originally introducedby Harold Macmillan as part of an overarching policy programme,RPM abolition was highly controversial during his administrationand continued to overshadow that of his successor, Alec Douglas-Home.The Conservative government's attempts to legislate againstRPM culminated in an attempt to force through the controversialmeasures in the run-up to the general election. The measuresinvolved and the resulting rancour, fed by an anti-governmentcampaign organized by retailers and a large section of the press,split the party and alienated many 'natural' Conservative votersm the country. This study seeks to explain the issue of RPMabolition and its origins within the context of the two successiveConservative administrations, and to assess the political rationalebehind the controversial decision to proceed with the ResalePrices Bill in Parliament. The intention is not to show thatRPM abolition in isolation was responsible for the ConservativeParty's defeat in 1964, but rather to demonstrate that the directand indirect effects of the whole issue were crucial to theelectoral fortunes of the Conservative Party in one of the closestgeneral elections in modern British history.     

‘Continuous abuse’ or ‘a unanimous blessing’? Reassessing the Conservative Party’s stance on the 1951 Festival of Britain

The 1951 Festival of Britain has long been seen as both a key turning point in the country’s post-war history and an event which was delivered, by Clement Attlee’s Labour Government, in the face of formidable political (and media) opposition. This article considers the Festival’s status as a pivotal moment in modern British history but focuses primarily on the Conservative Party’s approach to the project. In doing so, its draws on previously neglected evidence to suggest that successive works on the subject have greatly exaggerated the extent to which the festivities were the subject of partisan campaigning and political contention.     

Blair's project in retrospect

New Labour came into being as an attempt to frame a successor project to Thatcherism, but in practice it has proved to be a continuation of it. Blair's project was to achieve hegemony for Labour by blending free market policies with a concern for social cohesion. He accepted the new economic settlement that Thatcher had established, but believed it could be made more sustainable if it was tempered with a concern for social justice. Within the Labour Party his project was set in terms of modernizing social democracy, but in the country as a whole it was perceived as a variation on One Nation Toryism—a strand in the British political tradition which the Conservatives had seemingly forgotten. In fact, Blair's domestic agenda has had more in common with Thatcher's than with either social democracy or One Nation Toryism. There were significant constitutional reforms in the first term, but privatization and the injection of market mechanisms into hitherto autonomous institutions has remained the central thrust of policy. Blair has been committed to modernizing Britain, but his conception of modernization was a variation on Thatcher's. In one centrally important area, Blair diverges from Thatcher: he believes an essential component of Britain's modernization was an improved relationship with the EU, culminating in British entry into the euro. Yet his uncompromising support for the US over Iraq has left Britain as deeply alienated from France and Germany as it had ever been in Thatcher's time. Britain may still some day join the euro, but it will not be Tony Blair who takes us in. Blair's strategy was to attain hegemony for New Labour by appropriating the Thatcherite inheritance. In domestic terms, this strategy has been a success, but it relies on continuing Conservative weakness and an economic and international environment congenial to neo‐liberal policies. At present both of these conditions appear to be changing to Blair's disadvantage. The Conservative Party seems to be shaping a post‐Thatcherite agenda. At the same time, the US is leading a movement away from neo‐liberal orthodoxies towards protectionism and deficit financing and faces an intractable guerrilla war in Iraq. In these circumstances, the neo‐Thatcherite strategy that sustained Blair in power could prove to be his undoing.     

Restoration Leeds and the Aldermen of the Corporation, 1661–1700

Abstract

In the 1945 General Election, the Conservative Party under the leadership of Winston Churchill was defeated in a largely unexpected Labour landslide. The former Prime Minister's son, Randolph Churchill, MP for Preston since 1940, also lost his seat, but by a swing much lower than the national average. This was hardly due to his performance as a constituency MP. He was largely absent on military service. His ability to antagonise his own constituency workers was no help to his cause. He did have the advantage of name recognition and a heroic war record, but these were hardly decisive factors. It is argued here that his comparatively strong electoral performance was due to his adoption of the cause of social reform combined with his ability to campaign in a flamboyant manner that appealed to electors, which suggests that a very different result might have been possible if his approach had been taken up nationally by the Conservative Party.     

Heir Not Apparent: Douglas Hailsham,the Role of the House of Lords,and the Succession to the Conservative Leadership 1928–31*

The moment that Lord Curzon was passed over and Stanley Baldwin succeeded Andrew Bonar Law as prime minister in 1923 is generally regarded as a turning point in British political history. From this time it appeared that members of the house of lords were barred from leading political parties and becoming prime minister. In an age of mass democracy it was deemed unacceptable for the premier to reside in an unelected and largely emasculated chamber. This understanding is seemingly confirmed by the career of the Conservative politician, Douglas Hogg, 1st Viscount Hailsham. Notwithstanding a late entry into political life, he was regarded as a potential successor to Baldwin. His acceptance of a peerage to become lord chancellor in 1928 has been seen as the moment when Hailsham's claims to lead the Conservative party ended. But although Hailsham never became Conservative leader, his experience undermines the suggestion that peers were unable to lead political parties in inter‐war Britain. Despite his position in the Lords, his chances of succeeding Baldwin never vanished. The crisis in Baldwin's leadership after the loss of the 1929 general election and the lack of a suitable successor in the Commons created the circumstances in which leadership from the Lords by a man of Hailsham's ability could be contemplated. Hailsham's continuing prominence within the Conservative ranks and specifically his contributions to the party during the years 1929–31, together with the thoughts of high‐ranking Conservative contemporaries, make it clear that he very nearly emerged as Baldwin's successor at this time.     

Empire, Patriotism and the Working-Class Electorate: The 1900 General Election in the Battersea Constituency

The extent to which the Unionist victory in the 'khaki' general election of 1900 was the result of patriotic sentiment arising from the South African war has long been a source of controversy among historians. Battersea has been cited as an area that was largely unaffected by patriotic and imperial fervour during this period. This article examines the general election campaign in the Battersea constituency. The sitting MP, John Burns, was re-elected despite his opposition to the war, but the Conservatives achieved their highest percentage vote of that at any parliamentary election between 1885 and 1918. While the war was not the only issue raised during the campaign, it was the most prominent and clearly benefited the imperialist and pro-war Conservative candidate. In order to retain his seat Burns had to fight a far more dynamic local campaign than his opponent, and even then he won only narrowly. Although imperial sentiment was not quite enough to oust Burns from this otherwise safe seat, it was the main reason for the strong Conservative performance.     

Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s

Leo Amery has long been seen as one of the leading figures inthe anti-appeasement movement. However, key aspects of his caseagainst government foreign policy are not addressed in previouswork. This article considers Amery's reputation pointing outthat it is problematic to characterize him as an ‘anti-appeaser’because he did not rule out concessions to Germany and was willingto see Germany dominate Central Europe. However, he differedfrom the government in advocating a Danubian economic bloc tocreate stability and satisfy some German desires. This flowedfrom Amery's imperialism and his economic nationalism. Meanwhile,he fervently opposed colonial concessions, believing that Germangrievances could only be satisfied in Europe. Considering whetherAmery was an ‘anti-appeaser’ or a ‘real appeaser’,the article analyses Amery's doubts over whether to supportNeville Chamberlain over the Munich agreement. It concludesthat although Amery disagreed with Chamberlain more on tacticsthan strategy, these alternative tactics were significantlydifferent from government policy. As such, aspects of the anti-appeasementcase should be seen as being more nuanced than previously recognized,and the imperialist dimension of it should be understood.     

‘A Tiny Little Footnote in History’: Conservative Centre Forward

In May 1985, two years after he had returned to the back benches, Francis Pym launched the first organised display of dissent within the parliamentary Conservative Party against Margaret Thatcher's leadership: Conservative Centre Forward. Those Conservative MPs who joined the group were very much believers in One Nation Conservatism. Conservative Centre Forward survived for barely a week after going public; it rapidly collapsed amid accusations of disloyalty and inept leadership. The group proved to be a short-lived experiment which achieved little of note and exposed those who were involved to widespread ridicule. Yet, it was precisely because Conservative Centre Forward collapsed so quickly and achieved so little that it was significant. In its own way, the short life of the group provided a revealing commentary upon the character of the mid-1980s Conservative Party. It was a party which, on the one hand, was moving inexorably to the right and therefore ever further away from the values of One Nation Conservatism which Conservative Centre Forward espoused. On the other hand, it was a party which was still traditional enough to view open displays of dissent, of whatever magnitude, as a threat to the unity upon which its continued electoral success depended.     

The playwright who dramatised his own war record: a reassessment of William Douglas-Home’s accounts of his refusal to fight for the liberation of Le Havre

At a court martial in October 1944, William Douglas-Home was convicted of wilfully disobeying a lawful command because he claimed a moral justification to do so. Cashiered and jailed for his offence, he would return to the events that occasioned his refusal throughout a long career as a playwright. In his post-war accounts, Mr Douglas-Home developed a defence of his decision that depicted it as principled. He submitted petitions in which he sought to overturn retrospectively the court martial ruling. This essay argues that he concocted the accounts of his actions on which his efforts to revise the record were based.     

Banquo's Ghost: Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, and the High Politics of Decolonization, 1957-1963

This article reconstructs the bitter political argument betweenLord Salisbury and Harold Macmillan over decolonization. Inorder to do so it makes extensive use of their private papers.It describes their view of each other and their political manoeuvres.The article argues that Macmillan and Salisbury themselves wereso obsessed by their conflict that it dominated much of theprime minister's thinking on the empire throughout his premiership.The obsessive nature of the struggle was a result of genuineideological differences but took on its particular characterbecause the two principals had known each since their schooldays.The account contends that a political contest between intimatescan best be understood through the lens of ‘intimate history’.     

The Rebel Chief Whip: The Role of Leslie Wilson in the Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1922

This article explores the crisis within the Conservative Party in 1922 over the continuation of the coalition with Lloyd George's section of the Liberal Party, focusing on the actions of the Conservative chief whip, Leslie Wilson. Previously unused papers relating to Wilson's career shed new light on his role in the fall of the coalition. Wilson co‐ordinated opposition to the continuation of the coalition in its existing form, helping to solidify the group of junior ministers opposed to Lloyd George into a cohesive and powerful faction, which then forced the Conservative Party leader, Austen Chamberlain, into making concessions. Above all, Wilson was influential in forcing Chamberlain to agree to a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, at which the rebels won a decisive victory, causing the resignation of Chamberlain as party leader and Lloyd George as prime minister, in one of the most important events in modern British political history.     

Macmillan,Nkrumah and the 1961 Application for European Economic Community Membership

The views held by African Commonwealth leaders are absent from the historiography of the Britain's first EEC application, despite their value for understanding why the Macmillan government experienced such difficulty in reorienting its foreign policy towards Europe. Between July 1961, when Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah established his opposition to the application, and January 1963, when it was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Anglo-Ghanaian relationship was characterized by tension and acrimony. This article seeks to understand the impact of Nkrumah's objections to the application and Macmillan's reaction to Nkrumah's concerns. Though the Ghanaian President alone did not alter the course of Britain's approach to the Community, he did add to the tense atmosphere in which London considered how to approach the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Macmillan's efforts to maintain a positive relationship with Nkrumah, in the context of the Cold War, demonstrate the reluctance with which the prime minister loosened ties with the Commonwealth.     

A Provincial Minister in Politics: Henry W. Crosskey*

Henry W. Crosskey (1826–93), a late Victorian unitarian minister who served in Derby, Glasgow and Birmingham, is now best remembered for his involvement in Liberal politics and policy, especially education, as both an advocate and as a member of the Birmingham School Board. An eloquent preacher, he was also an important geologist, recognized both for his original research and for popularising the science and its impact on theology, and a revealing figure in the evolution of English unitarian thought. From his student days at Manchester College, Crosskey was a follower of his teacher, James Martineau, but, unlike Martineau, he advocated an active role for government, particularly local government, in promoting social well‐being. In the political crises of 1885–6, though differing from Gladstone on religious education, disestablishment, and home rule for Ireland, he was unable to follow Joseph Chamberlain, a member of his congregation, into alliance with the Conservative Party. His scientific convictions led to his emergence in later life as an admirer of the broad piety of the early unitarian theologian and scientist, Joseph Priestley, whose followers had warred with Martineau's disciples in the bitter mid century struggle between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ unitarianism, thus serving as a bridge between the two schools of interpretation. He is also an important reminder of the expanding demands, internal and external, of an urban pastorate in the later 19th century.     

为共产主义事业奋斗到底的一生--我所了解的晚年陈云(上)

陈云同志的一生是坚贞不渝的共产主义者的一生。他在晚年作为党的第二代中央领导集体的重要成员,为共产主义事业奋斗到底的精神,突出表现在他对改革开放的社会主义方向的把握上,对党的重大原则的坚持上,对党和国家战略的深谋远虑上,对人民群众切身利益的关心上以及对个人的严格要求上。在党的建设方面,他思考最多的,除了搞好党风外,主要是如何端正思想路线、保证党内民主和选拔优秀中青年干部的问题。在经济建设方面,他总是从国家的全局和长远利益出发,关注那些影响我们长期发展的制约因素;并且对计划与市场的关系进行了深入思考,为在微观搞活的同时加强宏观控制提供了理论依据。他时刻挂念人民群众的疾苦,关心群众的切身利益,并力求在制订具体政策中加以体现。他在晚年依然保持谦虚谨慎、顾全大局、艰苦朴素、克己奉公的作风,为我们树立了永葆共产党人政治本色的光辉榜样。     

A Call to Action: New Party Candidates and the 1931 General Election*

Sir Oswald Mosley established his New Party in early 1931. It proposed to cut across the party and class divides, with the objective of providing a ‘national’ solution to the economic crisis of the time. According to Mosley, the ‘old parties’– meaning the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Parties – had revealed themselves unable to adapt to the post‐war age. In their place, he argued, a modern organisation, based on youth, vitality and a scientifically reasoned economic plan, was needed to save Britain from terminal decline. Few heeded his call, and the party ultimately paved the way for the British Union of Fascists to emerge in 1932. Nevertheless, the New Party fought the general election of 1931, offering an unsuccessful but suitably intriguing challenge to the National coalition and Labour Party. This article will assess the New Party's election campaign, concentrating on those who briefly rallied to Mosley's appeal only to fall foul of the ballot box. In other words, it provides a case study of those who contributed to a dramatic electoral failure, and traces a significant stage along Mosley's journey to fascism.     

William Temple: Christianity and the Life of Fellowship

Abstract

William Temple is best known for his contribution to the forging of a social consensus that resulted in the foundation of the post-war British welfare state following his untimely death in 1944 after only two years as Archbishop of Canterbury. Widely regarded as the most theologically gifted holder of that office since Anselm, his pioneering contribution to the elucidation of a methodology for Christian social ethics which emphasized the role of ‘Principles’ that should inform Christian social action and reflection reinvigorated the Church of his generation in the task of bringing to bear the Christian message on social problems. What is less well appreciated is how he was not only the spokesperson for the most advanced Christian witness in the inter-war years, but that he also provided a basis for Christian ethics that brought together the strengths of the Anglican incarnational theology stemming from F. D. Maurice with the British tradition of philosophical social idealism. Often moving from the circumference to the centre, he sought to relate philosophical questions and insights to the richness of the revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. He was as at home in this task as he was in leading a mission on a Blackpool beach and the British public loved him for it. He was, as Winston Churchill said at the time of his elevation to Canterbury, "the half-crown article in a penny bazaar."     

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.     

Colonies and Colonisation in Bulwer Lytton’s The Caxtons,A Strange Story and The Coming Race

Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, an eminently popular novelist, published The Caxtons in 1849. Though sub-titled A Family Picture and mainly concerned with domestic life, it included a lengthy disquisition on colonisation and emigration, its value to British society and its role in extending civilisation by spreading ‘God’s law, improvement’. His colonial example was ‘Australia’. A Radical MP in the 1830s, but opposed to the encroachment of ‘democracy’ and supportive of the Corn Laws, in the early 1850s Lytton turned to the Conservative Party. In 1858–59 he served as secretary of state for the colonies. In the light of his experience, his view of Australia and of self-governing colonies was modified, as A Strange Story (1862) shows. But in 1871, in The Coming Race, an elaborate satire on democracy and egalitarianism, he made a distinct addition to the colonial theme of The Caxtons. He did not doubt that ‘improvement’ and colonisation produced evidence of ‘the triumph of civilization’, but a metaphor embedded in the later novel indicated the inevitability of displacement of aboriginal inhabitants by Anglo-Saxon settlers.     

Why the General said No

Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community from 1961 to 1963 and the reasons why France vetoed Britains application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the Community and to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a con–federal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter's position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 and his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15–16 December 1962 that he did not believe that Britain was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude Britain before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy and Mr Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, although this agreement confirmed his belief that Britain was excessively dependent upon the United States. Although economic questions—particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support and to Britain's request for special concessions to Australia, Canada and New Zealand—did play an important part in de Gaulle's decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted Community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership.     

Neville Chamberlain and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–9

Neville Chamberlain's role in the Spanish Civil War is a neglected subject in the history of the conflict. Yet he wielded considerable influence over Britain's Spanish policy. Like most Conservatives, his ideological sympathies lay more with the Nationalist forces led by General Francisco Franco than the besieged Republicans. At the same time, he deplored the intervention of Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia and was strongly committed to the policy of non-intervention, which he genuinely believed had confined the Spanish conflict and prevented its escalation into a European conflagration. He was strongly opposed to granting belligerent rights to Franco unless foreign volunteers were withdrawn from Spain. He deplored the bombing of civilians in Spain, sought to help the many refugees caused by the war, and tried unsuccessfully on occasions to mediate an end to the conflict. The civil war was a considerable obstacle which threatened to undermine Chamberlain's appeasement of Fascist Italy, intended to weaken the Rome–Berlin Axis, and to constrain Germany in pursuit of general European appeasement. The Prime Minister's commitment to non-intervention in Spain, more the creation of the Foreign Office than his own, did no serious damage to British economic and strategic interests before June 1940.