Israel and Post‐Mubarak Egypt: Perils of Historical Analogy

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has perceived the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 as a replica of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Drawing on the apparent similarities between the two revolutions—both made against dictators who reigned over secular, Western‐oriented regimes advocating coexistence with Israel, and both having Islamists as the best‐organized opposition force—Netanyahu appears to have concluded that the outcome for Israel would be the same: the advent of an aggressive Islamist regime in Cairo that would initiate a larger conflict. Based on this historical analogy, the Netanyahu government has adopted policies that are meant to help Israel defend against the potential deterioration in relations with Egypt. However, looking at Iran 1979 to draw on lessons about Egypt 2011 is misleading and does not take into account the significant differences that would rather lead Egypt to preserve the peace. This article analyzes Netanyahu's employment of this historical analogy and examines other appropriate lessons that Israel could draw from Iran's Islamic revolution, and proposes that Israel should instead engage the Egyptian revolution and reach a peace deal with the Palestinians so that it avoids misperception and maintains the Egyptian–Israeli peace.     

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the South Sudan question: reconsidering moderation

This article examines the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement's stand on the South Sudan question. The aim here is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the MB's moderation. Throughout the civil war in Sudan, the MB consistently objected to South Sudanese secession. Yet, while it had traditionally framed its objection in religious terms, describing the South Sudanese struggle as a Christian conspiracy against Islam, in the decade preceding South Sudan's declaration of independence it moved to base its opposition on more practical grounds, revolving around issues such the absence of democracy, stability and infrastructure in South Sudan. This correlated with wider shifts in the MB. Since the 1990s, the movement has claimed to have undergone a transformation, adopting a moderate, pro‐democratic stance. These statements persuaded many scholars that the MB has come to represent political moderation in both its domestic and international agenda. More recent works on the movement, however, have come to question the MB's moderation hypothesis, suggesting that even though the movement has changed its discourse and some aspects of its activism, this could not be seen as a linear process of moderation. This article uses the South Sudan case to further support this critique from a foreign policy perspective. It demonstrates that even though the MB changed its tactics and discourse, its goals remained unchanged— even when the circumstances and the normative environment changed dramatically. Moreover, it shows that at times of crisis, the liberal discourse gave way to the old‐fashioned radical discourse of previous decades.     

A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post‐Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring

Shortly after the Arab Spring began in 2010, multiple scholars noted that the dominant discursive trend present within these protests was that of post‐Islamism. Post‐Islamism is broadly defined as an ideology seeking to establish a democratic state within a distinctly Islamic society. Despite the presence of post‐Islamist opportunity structures, social movements embodying post‐Islamist principles have had little success consolidating power. The theoretical argument presented here is that the failure of these movements is the result of inherent flaws within post‐Islamist frames. Specifically, this study posits that unlike traditional Islamist frames (i.e., frames emphasizing the creation of a state governed by Shari‘a) post‐Islamist frames limit the ability of movements’ to monopolize religion as a cultural asset. As such, when post‐Islamist movements face political challenges during contentious periods they cannot rely on nontemporal legitimacy to retain power. Additionally, the challenging task of integrating Islamic and democratic frames in contentious moments renders post‐Islamist movements susceptible to counterframing. The preceding claims will be tested through a comparative analysis of the Iranian Hierocracy (1977–1979), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (2011–2014). Comparing the experiences of a post‐Islamist movement (Brotherhood) with that of an Islamist movement (Hierocracy) will explicate the flaws within post‐Islamist frames.     

Defending the West in All Its Amplitude: The Liberal Conservative Vision of Roger Scruton

This article explores the mixture of conservatism and liberalism that informs Roger Scruton's political and philosophical reflection. It highlights his response to the “culture of repudiation,” his resistance to totalitarianism, his defense of national loyalty (as opposed to ideological nationalism), his conservative-minded environmentalism, and his defense of order—and government—against libertarian and leftist assaults on legitimate authority. In particular, it explores a fruitful tension in Scruton's thought between a robust acknowledgment of the Christian features of Western civilization (a civilization that is unthinkable without a Christian emphasis on confession and forgiveness) and Scruton's forthright defense of the secular state against Islamist fanaticism. The article also explores affinities and differences between Scruton's understanding of the West's conjugation of Christianity and secularism and Pierre Manent's critique of radical secularism. The article concludes with reflections on Scruton's judicious melding of truth and liberty, and philosophy and Christianity.     

Secular Façade,Neoliberal Islamisation: Textbook Nationalism from Mubarak to Sisi

Beneath the secular veneer of official rhetoric, nationally unified school textbooks provide a striking image of the Islamist message promoted to young people in Egypt. While distorting the struggles and complexity of Egyptian history and heritage, the textbooks construct patriotic devotion and a form of docile ‘neoliberal Islamism’ as the route to national renaissance. They present a notion of ideal citizenship where personal piety, charity and entrepreneurship are the proposed solutions to ‘Egypt's problems’. However, to actually relieve its ‘problems’, the regime has relied on religious associations for the provision of social services, depended on significant foreign assistance and periodically activated anti‐western nationalism. This article details textbook constructions of national identity and citizenship in the late Mubarak era and reflects on whether the 2011 uprising proves their failure in securing his legitimacy. It describes key changes since 2011 and explores whether the Sisi regime is offering alternative formulas of legitimation.     

Shirking and Ideology: Defense in the Senate

A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of their constituents. This paper shows, at least for the case of defense in the Senate in the 1980s, that the evidence is sufficient to reject the claim that shirking represents the consumption of personal ideological policy preferences. Instead, the apparent impact of shirking on defense voting was an instrumental, reelection-oriented response to President Reagan's ability to muster popular support for his defense build up, and thus cannot be regarded as shirking at all.     

Tactical Flexibility: Libyan Foreign Policy under Qadhafi, 1969–2004*

On September 1, 1969, a group of junior Libyan Army officers took control of the Libyan government in a bloodless coup d'état. After the coup, the group formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), chaired by Muammar al‐Qadhafi. In the four decades following, Libya faced numerous foreign policy challenges. The Qadhafi regime took on a distinctly anticolonial flavor that mirrored the revolutionary political trends of Egypt under of Gamal Abdul Nasser. This change in foreign policy posture shook Libya's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom and initiated the degradation of Libyan–Western ties. Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya chose an ideological path for that focused on the strengthening of sovereignty while pursuing policies of unity and anti‐imperialism. This often put Libya at loggerheads with the West, and at times with its neighbors. Nevertheless, Qadhafi maintained popularity among his constituency. ¹ His domestic fame was the product of a carefully constructed persona that gave him the charismatic appeal necessary to maintain leadership during the latter quarter of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. Publicly, Qadhafi highlighted the similarities between himself and Libya's rural working class. He lived in a tent, and wore modest clothing. He fancied himself a devout Muslim, and praised the wisdom of the Libyan masses. He connected with his constituency through rhetoric that illustrated the stability of his policies over time, and their connection to the ideas that originally made him popular. This argues that the source of Qadhafi's charismatic power lay in his rhetoric, which connected Libya's foreign policy decisions to his foreign policy vision, the basis of his charismatic leadership. Qadhafi articulated his foreign policy vision during his first major speech to the Libyan people in September 1969, and he referred to it time and again when speaking about major Libyan foreign policy decisions. To demonstrate, this article describes the basis of Qadhafi's leadership authority and defines the parameters of his vision. Then Qadhafi's rhetoric surrounding major shifts in Libyan foreign policy is analyzed to show its congruence with his foreign policy vision. The rhetoric surrounding the Libya–Egypt war, the end of Libya's Chad intervention, Libya's surrendering of the two Lockerbie bombing suspects to be tried under Western authority, and Qadhafi's denunciation of the weapons of mass destruction programs—all major shifts in Libyan foreign policy—demonstrate how Qadhafi was able to maintain a single message, and thus his authority, over his first 35 years in power based on values established in the early days of his revolution. The flexibility of his vision enabled Qadhafi to maintain authority, while tactically adjusting Libyan foreign policy positions.     

Competition,cooperation and resistance: women in the political field in Iraq

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003 many women supported the process of transition and became active in political parties and coalitions. A wide range of groups were also formed which pursued women's rights agendas and, in many cases, included a call for peace and reconciliation and charity activities for women and children. However, female political action and the field of women's rights remain divided by the same multiple boundaries of belonging which affect Iraqi society itself; women operate in specific ethnic and denominational, local and regional settings, and they support nationalist, secularist, left‐wing or Islamist agendas. Women's rights—whatever the direction—can be of major or minor concern. This article outlines female political action and draws attention to the key issues which are discussed, in particular, by secular feminists in Iraq. In so doing, the article highlights how women in Iraq have not only lost, as a wide range of observers argue, but have also benefited from the restructure of the political landscape. Female political activists are still faced with old and new social, cultural, legal and political obstacles. The article argues that when women support narratives that leave men's superiority untouched, they are not simply victims of men or ‘false consciousness'; women either compete and cooperate, or they reject ideological narratives and power relations, while pursuing agendas of individual interest. Yet, despite competition among women and women's groups, and women's loyalty to agendas controlled by men, radical overtones that resist male domination can be heard— and should be supported.     

Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post‐Mubarak Egypt

The Arab Spring has reshaped the Islamist landscape in the Middle East drastically. After decades of repression and exclusion, Islamist parties have taken power in Egypt, Tunis, and Morocco. However, the startling rise of Salafism (Salafiyya) remains the most visible feature of the new Islamist scene in the region. After decades of eschewing politics for theological and political reasons, Salafi movements and groups have rushed into electoral politics enthusiastically. They became keen to form political parties, contest elections, and vie for power. In Egypt, the Salafi parties fared well in the post‐revolution parliamentary elections and are a key player in drafting Egypt's new constitution. This article explores the rise of Salafism after Mubarak and examines its effects on the democratic transition in Egypt. It investigates the ideological and theological stance of Salafi movements and parties on politics and democracy in particular. The argument put forward is that the extraordinary political openness in Egypt after the revolution has pushed Salafis into everyday politics. Subsequently, Salafis have become more inclined to adopt a pragmatic and practical discourse. Based on field research, this article provides a thematic analysis of Egyptian Salafism and assesses its political future.     

Electoral Pluralism,Social Division and the 2016 Parliamentary Elections in Jordan

Representing one of the most stable regimes in the Middle East, Jordan has been undergoing a process of political liberalization since 1989. Due to the so‐called East Bank‐West Bank cleavage that followed by the influx of Palestinian migrants to Jordan, the country has also come to epitomize a divided society. Within this context, this paper aims to analyze the ongoing prospects for democratization in Jordan through an examination of four persistent debates shaping its electoral pluralism: those over social/identity division, electoral law as a regime‐survival mechanism, the role of the Ikhwan and the IAF's electoral boycotts, and electoral apathy. Finally, the impact of the Arab upheavals/revolts on restructuring the process of political reform — as well as opposition in the kingdom in the post‐2011 era — will be explored with reference to the changing dynamics of Islamist opposition.     

Islam,Human Rights and Interfaith Relations: Some Contemporary Egyptian Perspectives

Abstract

This paper explores current discussions and debates on Islam, human rights and interfaith relations in Egypt through an analysis of the public statements and writings of various religious scholars and spiritual teachers and the textbooks used to teach Islam in public secondary schools. It is well known that Islamist perspectives have become mainstream in Egypt, a largely devout and socially conservative country that is also the source of most of the major Islamic trends and political ideologies that have impacted the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, there is a broad tendency in government-issued textbooks on Islam and in the population at large to equate Islam with democracy and human rights, despite the authoritarianism of the state and the contradictions between traditional interpretations of Islam and international human rights norms. The rhetoric of democracy and human rights is linked to the threat of terrorism, which is labeled un-Islamic. Among ordinary Egyptian Muslims, even those who support Islamist politics, there seems to be a new concern to eradicate Islamic extremism and more openness to unconventional Muslim approaches. The most liberal example of this is an association that teaches the unity of all religions from a somewhat Sufi perspective, promotes interfaith dialogue, and advocates reinterpreting the Shari'a to promote gender equality and equal human rights for all Egyptians.     

Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a‘post‐Islamist’government and a Kemalist state

This article discusses Turkish foreign policy over the past four years, since the election of a ‘post‐Islamist’ administration. It argues that although this period has been ‘Huntingtonian’, in terms of the diff erent political values and origins of the government on the one hand and the largely Kemalist state on the other, in the realm of foreign policy at least the relationship has been more cooperative and complementary than confictual. By focusing on seven areas of Turkey's foreign relations, as diverse as the EU, Cyprus, Syria and the Israeli—Palestinian conflict, the article identifies four types of experience in the overall conduct of policy: convergence; contained disharmomy; managed ideological divergence; and neutrality. It concludes by arguing that, providing Turkey's political institutions remain robust, there is no reason why this surprisingly successful cohabitation should not continue into the next parliament after 2007.     

Pauline Hanson,the Mainstream,and Political Elites: The Place of Race in Australian Political Ideology

Pauline Hanson is well known for claiming that Australia's major political parties are out of touch with 'mainstream' Australia on issues related to race. Parallel surveys of the electorate and candidates in the 1996 federal election allow this claim to be tested, with items tapping general ideological dispositions, but including questions about Aboriginal Australians, immigration, and links with Asia. I make three critical findings: the electorate holds quite conservative opinions on these issues relative to the candidates, and is quite distant from ALP candidates in particular; attitudes on racial issues are a powerful component of the electorate's political ideology, so much so that any categorisation of Australian political ideology ignoring race must be considered incomplete; racial attitudes cut across other components of the electorate's ideology, placing all the parties under internal ideological strains, but the ALP appears particularly vulnerable on this score. The data show the coalition parties to be the net beneficiaries of the ideological tensions posed by race. Racial issues thus resemble a realigning ideological dimension, with possibly far-reaching consequences for the conduct of Australian electoral politics. Racism is as Australian as lamingtons and sausage rolls but the real political leader is the man or woman who can appeal to what Abraham Lincoln called 'the better angels of our nature'. Robert Hughes (Lamont 1996)     

Islamist violence and regime stability in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, homeland of Osama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 hijackers of September 11, 2001, experienced low levels of internal violence until 2003, when a terrorist campaign by ‘Al‐Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’ (QAP) shook the world's leading oil producer. Based on primary sources and extensive fieldwork in the Kingdom, this article traces the history of the Saudi jihadist movement and explains the outbreak and failure of the QAP campaign. It argues that jihadism in Saudi Arabia differs from jihadism in the Arab republics in being driven primarily by extreme pan‐Islamism and not socio‐revolutionary ideology, and that this helps to explain its peculiar trajectory. The article identifies two subcurrents of Saudi jihadism, ‘classical’ and ‘global’, and demonstrates that Al‐Qaeda's global jihadism enjoyed very little support until 1999, when a number of factors coincided to boost dramatically Al‐Qaeda recruitment. The article argues that the violence in 2003 was not the result of structural political or economic strains inside the Kingdom, but rather organizational developments within Al‐Qaeda, notably the strategic decision taken by bin Laden in early 2002 to open a new front in Saudi Arabia. The QAP campaign was made possible by the presence in 2002 of a critical mass of returnees from Afghanistan, a clever two‐track strategy by Al‐Qaeda, and systemic weaknesses in the Saudi security apparatus. The campaign failed because the militants, radicalized in Afghan camps, represented an alien element on the local Islamist scene and lacked popular support. The near‐absence of violence in the Kingdom before 2003 was due to Al‐Qaeda's weak infrastructure in the early 1990s and bin Laden's 1998 decision to suspend operations to preserve local networks. The Saudi regime is currently more stable and self‐confident—and therefore less inclined to democratic reform—than it has been in many years.     

The Arab Opposition Molehill

Arab Islamic oppositions have proven largely ineffectual in molding regime outcomes since the liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s, although many continue to overestimate their potential for propelling reform. This article argues that a keen sense of the past is necessary when evaluating whether or not an opposition matters for political reform. Section I introduces noted scholar Juan Linz's notion of “semi‐opposition”—limited and “semi‐free” opposition groups that may sustain authoritarian regimes as much as repression. Using interviews and English and Arabic sources, Section II demonstrates historical correspondences between semi‐opposition and the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organizations concerning origins and support, ideology and approach to politics, regime tolerance and political environment, and political behavior. Section III develops Linz's hypothesis on the links between semi‐opposition and authoritarian persistence by examining how the MB marginalizes and raises the costs of dissent for other opposition groups and actors. The MB is briefly contrasted with the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) opposition party of 1989–1992 in Section IV . Decidedly not a semi‐opposition, the FIS proved far more transformative than either the Jordanian or Egyptian MB, inducing centrifugal politics and the collapse of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) state that governed Algeria from 1962.     

Immigrants,Banlieues, and Dangerous Things: Ideology as an Aesthetic Affair

Abstract: This paper engages with the notion of ideology, bringing together Laclau's theorisation of the specificity of the ideological, and Rancière's notion of aesthetic regimes. Ideology, I argue, works through what it makes available to the senses and what it makes to make sense. It is in this sense that it is an aesthetic affair. This argument is illustrated with an account of the so‐called “securitarian ideology” in France that characterises the repressive policies of the recent governments.     

The Securitization of the Kurdish Minority in Turkey: Ontological Insecurity and Elite's Power Struggle as Reasons of the Recent Re‐Securitization

This article analyzes the treatment of the Kurdish minority by the government of Turkey. The uninterrupted power of the AKP (Justice and Development Party/Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi) that since 2002 has created a de facto dominant party democracy (today going toward totalitarianism) and is implementing a strategy of securitization (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998) of the issue of the Kurdish minority since the interruption of the ceasefire with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in July 2015. The article argues that this strategy has been implemented for three main reasons: the reduced ontological security (Giddens, 1991) of Turkey because of the recent violent conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the risk of loss of power of the ruling party and the elites (Snyder, 2000) because of the recent entrance in the Parliament by the HDP (People's Democratic Party, a pro‐Kurdish party), and the ideological threat posed by HDP to the AKP regime (a left‐wing progressive ideology opposed to the moderate Islamist ideology of AKP). The purpose of this study is to fill a research gap in the area of why the post‐July 2015 era constitutes a new context shaping the AKP's perception and management of the Kurdish issue. The methodology followed in this research is a qualitative case study analysis based on process tracing of the recent Turkish treatment of the Kurdish minority and, in particular, the recent events of the second part of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. The article starts with a brief historical overview of Turkish democracy and a theoretical overview on the securitization theory. Then, it analyzes the past and current securitization of the Kurdish issue, arguing that the causes of the recent intensification of this securitization since the summer of 2015 have to be found in these three factors: the low level of ontological security of the state; the fear of losing the power by the AKP ruling elite; and the threat to the political ideology of the AKP posed by the HDP.     

The Caliphate,and the Changing Strategy of the Public Statements of al-Qaeda's Leaders

Abstract

According to the American President George Bush's administration, the establishment of a global Caliphate is a key al-Qaeda goal. This article focuses primarily on the statements of Ayman az-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, with their public words traced throughout the last three decades, from Egypt to Afghanistan, to Sudan, back to Afghanistan and through the various conflicts that have happened since they have been on the run post 9/11. By highlighting the changing strategy of their discourse according to the events around them and internationally, it is shown that far from being a critical part of al-Qaeda ideology as some would have the public believe, the Caliphate plays a minor role in their objectives and rhetoric, used primarily as a motivational and instrumental tool in uniting the ummah in its efforts to expel foreign forces from what it considers to be occupied lands.     

The "Trial" of Lee Benson: Communism, White Chauvinism, and The Foundations of the "New Political History" in the United States

Lee Benson was one of the first American political historians to suggest a “systematic” revision of traditional political history with its emphasis on narrow economic class analysis, narrative arguments, and over‐reliance on qualitative research methodologies. This essay presents Benson's contributions to the “new political history”—an attempt to apply social‐science methods, concepts, and theories to American political history—as a social, cultural, and political narrative of Cold War‐era American history. Benson belonged to a generation of ex‐Communist American historians and political scientists whose scholarship and intellectual projects flowed—in part—out of Marxist social and political debates, agendas, and paradigmatic frameworks, even as they rejected and revised them. The main focus of the essay is the genesis of Benson's pioneering study of nineteenth‐century New York state political culture, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy, with its emphasis on intra‐class versus inter‐class conflict, sensitivity to ethnocultural determinants of political and social behavior, and reliance on explicit social‐science theory and methodology. In what follows, I argue that The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy has its roots in Benson's Popular Front Marxist beliefs, and his decade‐long engagement and subsequent disenchantment with American left‐wing politics. Benson's growing alienation from Progressive historical paradigms and traditional Marxist analysis, and his attempts to formulate a neo‐Marxism attentive to unique American class and political realities, are linked to his involvement with 1940s radical factional politics and his disturbing encounter with internal Communist party racial and ideological tensions in the late 1940s at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York.     

Front and Back Covers,Volume 27, Number 2. April 2011

Front and back cover caption, volume 27 issue 2 Front cover THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF 2011 Over a million Egyptians in Tahrir Square praying in remembrance of the 25 January revolution's ‘martyrs’. More than 300 people were killed in the popular uprising that forced President Hosni Mubarak to step down on 11 February. A memorial, seen in the centre of the image, displays the photographs of some of those who lost their lives. Motivated by a pressing need for political and social reform and inspired by the recent success of the Tunisian revolution, Egyptians took to the streets on 25 January in unprecedented numbers. For 18 days, major protests erupted in several Egyptian cities calling for the removal of the regime. In Cairo protesters converged upon and occupied Tahrir Liberation Square, which became both the symbolic and physical centre of the revolution. With the tide of revolt sweeping across the Arab world fears were raised, both internally and internationally, about a possible Islamist hijack. Yet in Tahrir Square the main ideology was liberal; hundreds of thousands of Egyptians from diverse social backgrounds and radically different ideological inclinations united on the fundamental demands of freedom, equality, justice and dignity. In this issue, Selim Shahine reflects on the political consciousness of the young activists who led the uprising, and on the discourse on generations that surrounded these events. Mohammed Rashed presents a participant's account from Tahrir Square and reflects on some of the factors that might have contributed to the success of its continued occupation: the formation of an embryonic form of community, and the receding of the usual identities based on class and religion in favour of a simple yet powerful identity as people of the revolution. Back cover CLIMATE CHANGE AND ANTHROPOLOGY A man watches the ocean waves on Jaluit Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Few societies have a more intimate relationship with the sea. The country's average elevation is a mere seven feet, and the highest point is 32 feet. No point in the archipelago is more than half a mile inland, and most locals live within 100 feet of the shore. The islands have always been vulnerable to the ocean; an early 19th‐century account of Marshallese life refers to a local fear of inundation, and magical formulae to prevent it. In the present century, such dangers may increase past the point of adaptability and resilience, as sea‐level rise and other consequences of global climate change are likely to render the country uninhabitable. Marshall Islanders are familiar with these threats via local observation as well as media coverage, forcing them to come to terms, both conceptually and emotionally, with the possibility that their homeland is doomed. We usually conceive of climate change as an ‘environmental’ issue, but this framing may say more about Western conceptions of nature‐culture than about climate change itself. Global warming could as easily be termed a social issue: it is caused by socioeconomic behaviour, experienced by local actors, interpreted according to culturally specific ideologies, and communicated by human agents. In this issue, Peter Rudiak‐Gould draws on his ethnographic investigation of Marshallese climate‐change attitudes to argue that anthropology has only scratched the surface in its contribution to our understanding of global warming. A question of theoretical and practical importance remains largely uninvestigated: how is the foreign scientific prophecy of devastating climate change received, interpreted, understood, adopted, rejected and utilized by local communities? It is a question of particular relevance in an island society for whom that prophecy amounts to no less than nationwide destruction.