Who's afraid of sovereign wealth funds?

A spectre is stalking the world: the spectre of a rich Chinese state buying strategic resources, hollowing out companies, gobbling up financial institutions and threatening the sovereignty of the countries in whose resources and companies it invests. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) – a sovereign wealth fund company (SWF) – is the stalking horse of the Chinese state. Using the CIC as an example, this article argues that the warning about SWFs has little to do with their size, the speed of their growth or what SWFs have or have not done. It is about a shifting power relationship in the global economy. This broader realignment may have been occurring slowly, but it is happening. Neither side – those who have been writing the rules of the game for international political economy and those who are historically rule-takers – is fully willing to acknowledge the shift and take responsibility to build a new architecture of an international financial system that can accommodate interests of old and new players.     

The locus of financial regulation: home versus host

If the G's are the world's steering committee, the step from G7 to G20 deepened the democratic legitimacy of this committee. However, it also shifted influence to a group that share little else other than economic power: they have diverse experiences, challenges, cultural perspectives and starting points. This is particularly the case in the field of financial regulation, where action across these countries in recent months—despite all the language of global regulation—is increasingly local. The prospect of the new global being quite local has dismayed some. But it need not. This article challenges the dichotomy of more global versus more local. It argues that financial internationalism—greater cooperation by nations for the benefit of all—is better served by institutions that help to integrate diverse systems than those which try to enforce one‐size‐fits‐all approach to very different economies. International banks persuaded regulators of the benefits of home country regulation and a level playing field for bankers. But the benefits accrued largely to the banks in the boom and proved an avenue for contagion during the crash. Host country regulation may prove a safer way to regulate financial systems, in particular by allowing regulation to be more responsive to national economic conditions and cycles. It is likely that a shift back to host country regulation will act as a drag on international capital flows. The instinct of economists is that the cost of this is uncertain, suspect and conditional, especially when compared to the costs of financial crashes. Host country regulation does not mean there is no role for international institutions, such as the newly minted Financial Stability Board. Instead, it suggests a more nuanced role, potentially encompassing the policing of international market infrastructure, financial protectionism, information free flow between regulators and the convergence of regulatory principles and the consolidation of regulatory instruments. An informed and collegiate process of integrating different financial systems will be a more resilient system than one which tries to apply a single rule book across inherently different countries.     

Back to BASICs? The Rejuvenation of Non‐traditional Donors’ Development Cooperation with Africa

The world economy is in a state of flux. While most OECD countries struggle to minimize the damage of the global financial crisis, a few countries maintain positive economic growth rates and are thus changing global power configurations. Among the most important emerging economies for international development are the BASIC countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. This article analyses why these countries have rejuvenated development cooperation, what they actually do in Africa, and how they do it. It argues that the most important aspect of the rejuvenation of non‐traditional donors’ development cooperation with African economies is not the direct effects on these economies, be they positive or negative, but the potential gains that may accrue to African economies in terms of larger room for manoeuvre due to increased competition and the challenge to traditional donors’ development hegemony.     

Global Liquidity,the Private Sector and Debt Sustainability in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This article analyses the effect of changes in international financial markets on the debt dynamics in sub‐Saharan Africa in recent years. A key development is the rise of the private sector as both a lender and a borrower in African debt markets, a process that is associated with the growing integration of the region into global financial markets. The article argues that the Debt Sustainability Framework of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has taken some steps to account for this growth of private sector, cross‐border debt, but such steps still fall short of what is needed. A full appreciation of the importance of private debt implies, first, that debt sustainability in sub‐Saharan Africa be understood in the context of countries’ integration in global financial markets and the global liquidity cycles that characterize those markets and, second, that the interplay between private and public debt be monitored in order to provide a fuller picture of the impact of private sector debt on fiscal sustainability.     

Financialization and Global Commodity Chains: Distributional Implications for Cotton in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Restructuring of global and local markets has led to an increased influence of commodity derivatives markets on commodity price setting. This has critical implications for price risks experienced by actors along commodity chains. Commodity derivatives markets have undergone significant changes that have been referred to as the ‘financialization of commodities’, which we define as an increase in trading activity by financial investors and the reorientation of business strategies by commodity trading houses towards risk management and financial activities. This article assesses how these global financialization processes affect commodity producers in low‐income countries via the operational dynamics of global commodity chains and national market structures. It investigates how prices are set and transmitted and how risks are distributed and managed in the cotton sectors in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania. It concludes that uneven exposure to price instability and access to price risk management have important distributional implications. Whilst international traders have the capacity to deal with price risks through hedging, in addition to expanding their profit possibilities through financial activities on derivatives markets, local actors in producing countries face the challenge of increased short‐termism — albeit to different extents depending on national market structures — with limited access to risk management.     

Managing the interlocking climate and resource challenges

Energy security, climate change and food and water concerns are posing serious challenges to the management of international relations in an already turbulent world. These new developments—and the corresponding risk management strategies—will change the calculus of interests, powers and strategies for all actors, with significant impacts on the global political economy. Climate change action (such as targets for emissions reductions) will challenge the existing power structures, with the transition to a low-carbon economy creating new winners and losers in the global economy. Today, there is a fresh appreciation about the consequences of bad policy choices. Comparisons have been drawn between the fallout in the global financial system and the kind of risks that unmitigated climate change may bring. Even though the pressure on some resources may have eased since the onset of the global economic downturn in 2008, it is unlikely that the longer term trajectory has been reversed. This calls for renewed understanding and appreciation of the magnitude of risks foreseen. Multiple public goods need to be generated from the same production systems or sectors. In the context of climate change, international cooperation offers the only option that can best serve even narrowly defined national interests. Ensuring human security and peaceful relations among states in the decades to come will require short-term common action within the framework of long-term strategizing and visionary leadership as well as concerted efforts to deal head-on with worst case scenarios in our forecasting and policy planning.     

International order after the financial crisis

The Great Recession has brought a structural break in international economic and political order. The geography of power is at present being dramatically transformed, notably by the rapid economic rise of China. What makes international order legitimate in a world in which political and economic foundations are rapidly shifting? This article examines analogies and lessons from a previous transition, from a world order centered on Britain, to a US dominated global order. That transition saw two moments of crisis, or turning points, the 1931 financial crisis at the height of the Great Depression, and the diplomatic and military catastrophe of Suez. The article looks at two interpretations of the transition, one by E. H. Carr focusing on the destruction in the Great Depression of a liberal economic and political order and its replacement by a world of brutal Great Power politics; the other by Charles Kindleberger, stressing the need for a benevolent hegemonic power to provide public goods for the world economy and the world political system. China is beginning to behave in the way expected of a Kindleberger hegemon, but also sees the possibilities of asserting power in a world that in the aftermath of 2008 looks much more like the chaotic and crisis‐ridden interwar period as interpreted by E. H. Carr. The challenge for the management of the new international order will lie in the ability of China to embrace the universalistic vision that underpinned previous eras of stability, in the nineteenth century and in the late twentieth century.     

Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers,self‐insuring and regional insulation

This article examines the interaction between the emerging and traditional powers in global governance reform, and asks whether we are heading towards an international financial system that is more fragmented, where power is more diffused and national and regional arrangements play a more prominent role, at the expense of global multilateral institutions. It begins with a brief discussion of the global systemic and country‐specific factors that motivate Brazil, China and other emerging countries to accumulate large currency reserves. We find that national arrangements for managing financial and currency crises will continue to hold sway for emerging countries in the wake of the global crisis. However, the actual capacity of regional arrangements in managing future financial crises is uncertain, and the significance of regional alternatives in the emerging architecture should not be overstated. The real capacity of East Asian regional arrangements to manage financial crises, payments problems or currency attacks is still untested, and key thresholds in multilateralization still lie ahead. In South America, multilateral lender‐of‐last‐resort support inside the region is largely confined to the sub‐regional level and is limited by Brazil's reticence. Enduring reliance on bilateral measures for financial crisis management is noted. Where there has been progress in regional solutions, since the global crisis, has been in the role of regional development banks in providing financing for developing countries to enact counter‐cyclical policies. Such support also provides insulation for states in the region against the contagion effects of international financial crisis. We are in the midst of transitioning to a more diverse and multi‐tiered global financial and monetary system. A reformed IMF could have a role to play in addressing global imbalances and encouraging a shift from national reserves to collective insurance, however, it would be preconditioned by significant shifts in the policy, lending operations, and internal governance of the Fund, and willingness among the G20 to strike a new consensus on how to deal with imbalances, and new accommodation on acceptable reserve levels.     

Beijing’s institutional-balancing strategies: rationales,implementation and efficacy

China has in recent years been actively engaged in multilateral diplomacy. From the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road initiative, Beijing is pursuing strategies and promoting norms that are viewed as concerted efforts by China to challenge some of the key institutional arrangements of the existing international order. This article seeks to discuss these contentious issues and assess the rationales, approaches and implications of Chinese diplomacy in initiating and promoting what can be considered as institutional-balancing strategies. The author suggests that the rationales behind these Chinese strategies have as much to do with Beijing’s shifting priorities and the need to address them as with reflecting a degree of dissatisfaction with existing multilateral institutions. And there are more marked differences in Chinese motivations and modalities in security arenas than in economic areas. However, it would be overstating Beijing’s intentions and capabilities if these China-sponsored initiatives are viewed as direct challenges to the existing international and regional orders.     

Deal or no deal: the outlook for agricultural land investment in Africa

Recent sharp increases in food prices have prompted some food-importing countries to promote the acquisition of farmland abroad as a strategy to secure food supplies at affordable prices. Businesses are recognizing new opportunities for strong returns from agricultural investment, including agri-food, biofuels and other agricultural commodities. Dubbed 'land grabs' in the press, large-scale land acquisitions have kindled much international debate, in which strong positions are taken on the impacts of such investments on the environment, rights, sovereignty, livelihoods, development and conflict at local, national and international levels. This article provides an analysis of this complex and shifting situation, focusing on Africa and drawing on quantitative inventories of land acquisitions in four countries and on a small sample of land deals. The article lays out key trends and drivers, and discusses the main features of international land deals before analysing the main risks and opportunities involved, focusing on implications for local, national and global food security. The article concludes by outlining practical steps to make the renewed momentum in agricultural investment work for development, and avoid the pitfalls of exacerbated political tensions.     

A Bretton Woods moment? The 2007–2008 crisis and the future of global finance

The 2007–2008 global financial crisis encouraged speculation about the prospects for a ‘Bretton Woods moment’ in which the global financial system would be radically redesigned. Many of those hoping for this outcome have since become disillusioned with the limited nature of the international financial reform agenda. But the success and innovation of the Bretton Woods conference was made possible by unique political conditions that are not present today, notably concentrated power in the state system; a transnational expert consensus; and wartime conditions. Moreover, a close reading of history reveals that the Bretton Woods system did not emerge from a single moment but rather from a much more extended historical process. If a new international financial system is being born today, it will be a slower and more incremental development process that can be divided into four phases: a legitimacy crisis; an interregnum; a constitutive phase; and an implementation phase. Viewed from this perspective, post‐crisis developments look more significant. The crisis of 2007–2008 has already intensified twin legitimacy crises relating to international financial policy and leadership. It has also generated an international reform initiative that has been unusual for its speed and internationally coordinated nature. Many of the details of this reform initiative remain unresolved and its content and breadth are hotly contested in various ways. We thus find ourselves in more of an interregnum than a constitutive phase. It remains unclear how quickly, if at all, the latter might emerge and in what form.     

“一带一路”倡议下中国与克罗地亚贸易投资合作研究

克罗地亚是马可·波罗的故乡,作为中东欧地区的重要国家、古丝绸之路的重要一站,对推动“一带一路”倡议的有效实施具有重要作用。本文基于2013—2020年中国与克罗地亚贸易投资合作数据,对“一带一路”背景下两国的贸易投资合作进展及其贸易投资中的互补性和竞争性进行分析。结论发现：中国在中国与克罗地亚的贸易投资合作中处于相对核心位置;中国与克罗地亚的贸易投资合作更具互补性,竞争性较弱,存在较大合作潜力。目前,中国与克罗地亚的贸易投资稳步发展,今后可进一步扩大中国与克罗地亚的贸易投资合作领域和范围,加强两国在优势产业、基础设施、旅游和服务外包项目等方面的合作。     

新自由主义的危机与都市治理——从全球到地方

自2008年的经济危机之后,新自由主义作为西方国家和城市治理的主要手段也受到根本性的挑战,这些政治经济的失败,最终表现在都市空间的治理当中。本文将以新自由主义的扩张案例入手,通过国内外都市空间治理的实践经验,剖析新自由主义所带来的短期和长期的政治经济危机后果,并讨论全球不同空间尺度当中撤退空间的治理与挑战。新自由主义的问题不仅存在于西方国家,在网络时代和全球化的趋势下,资本的累积是在全球范围内产生危机,亚洲国家以及中国也必须思考如何应对危机,以及探索后新自由主义的发展道路。最后,文章从全球到地方的撤退空间讨论当中,反思新自由主义作为一种全球性的都市治理政策在全球的流动,认为就后政治的城市来说,要超越新自由主义的局限还有待观察,中国城市走向后新自由主义的治理转型就必须勇于摆脱英美社会脉络所产生的都市治理论述,建构符合地方社会脉络的理论和实践。     

The benefit-sharing principle: Implementing sovereignty bargains on water

A global water crisis is emerging that may challenge states' existing and future water availability. With countries already heavily reliant on international rivers, the issue of managing water scarcity in these basins is mounting. An already complex issue due to climatic change and the politics of access, the management of water resources is complicated further by sovereignty. In a context shaped by political boundaries and a concomitant territorial exclusivity, nation-states seek to guarantee their societies' water by exerting control through physical and institutional infrastructure. Yet, the basin's hydrological interdependency implies co-riparian countries remain vulnerable to each other's use of the shared river, suggesting ecological rather than just political limits to sovereignty. The continued vulnerability, as envisaged within the greening of sovereignty, suggests international cooperation is necessary. Explained as sovereignty bargains, in which states trade reduced autonomy for future benefits, international cooperation is, we suggest, bi-directional and can stem from or create international institutions. We examine an instance of international cooperation that exemplifies an alternative approach to international river management. The benefit-sharing principle focuses on allocating the outputs from water use, rather than the water itself; and was used by the Senegal basin riparians to access key services such as electricity despite a context of poverty, climatic change and intra-basin politics. What emerges is a strong narrative of cooperation sustained, over decades, by the states' willingness to engage in sovereignty bargains.     

International Acquisitions: Host and Home Country Explanatory Characteristics

To better understand what place-specific attributes are most important to foreign direct investors, we consider the pattern of international foreign acquisitions, for the year 1993, from a simultaneous home and host country perspective. It is shown that the world's most prominent buyer and target countries are few in number. Furthermore, with the use of a stepwise-like Poisson regression procedure, we determine that both home and host country conditions are important in explaining the spatial pattern of low-tech and high-tech international acquisitions.
Specifically, international high-tech and low-tech acquisitions are best described by country-specific variables measuring trade, investment risk assessment, patents and tourism and that low-tech acquisitions are also linked with a country's domestic economic strength and government efficiency and stability. The outliers from the Poisson regression equations provide evidence that, in particular, the United States and Canada as well as, other countries geographically adjacent are disproportionately active in this type of foreign direct investment.     

Multipolar governance and global imbalances

The deficiency of financial regulation and the presence of large macroeconomic global imbalances should be considered complementary interpretations of the global economic and financial crisis. The risk we face is that a new expansionary phase will bring back large and growing external imbalances, which will keep world growth on an unsustainable path. At the international level there is a classical ‘collective action’ problem to address since if export growth oriented strategies are pursued by all major countries they will generate a deflationary bias in world demand. This article explores how multilateral cooperation and international institutions can become reengaged with, and provides a meaningful device for addressing, these new issues and problems. It is necessary to restore shared rules of the game for international macroeconomic adjustment. This means endorsing a strengthened surveillance regime for the IMF in order to induce more compatible macroeconomic policies. In this regard, the IMF should have enforcement rule incentives and mechanisms, otherwise we are going to repeat past negative experiences where peer pressure did not produce significant results.     

Financial crises and the balance of power in international finance, 1890–2010

Has the centre of gravity of international finance irreversibly started to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific since the financial debacle of 2007-2008? This article discusses this highly topical question in a historical perspective, by considering previous changes in the balance of power in international finance and the role played by global financial in these changes. Particular attention is paid to the Baring Crisis of 1890, the American Panic of 1907, the financial crisis of July -August 1914, the banking crises of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the financial instability of the early 1970s and the ensuing banking failures, the International Debt Crisis of 1982, and the Japanese Banking Crisis of 1997-8. The article concludes that financial crisis, perhaps surprisingly, did not lead to clear changes in the balance of power in international finance; and that the financial debacle of 2007-8 is unlikely, in the medium-term, to fundamentally alter the current order.     

Global Environmental Governance and the Challenge of Shadow States: The Impact of Illicit Sapphire Mining in Madagascar

The environment has become a key site of global governance because of its transboundary nature: forests, wildlife and oceans have all become central foci for networks of global governance which link international organizations, international financial institutions, states and non‐governmental organizations. This article examines how contemporary forms of global governance can be challenged and even subverted. It uses the concept of shadow states introduced by William Reno to explore how invisible global networks flow through developing states, to show how they constitute important political and economic interest groups, and to assess what kinds of environmental impact they have. It explores how powerful these networks are, and whether they are able to challenge or subvert attempts to manage, control or govern the environment. The author provides an analysis of the ways in which the clandestine networks of shadow states impact on conservation initiatives in the developing world, focusing on the features of global environmental governance and the problems posed by illicit gem mining and trafficking in Madagascar.     

Systems and Boundaries in International History

The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn's preoccupation with national discourses at the expense of international structures and processes is diverting the field away from the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The author argues that international history should distinguish itself from global and transnational history by drawing clear yet open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of inquiry needs some consensus about what it is, where it is going and why: in other words, an identity, purpose, and values. The author argues that what defines international history is its focus on the origins, structures, processes, and outcomes of international politics, above all the causes of war and the conditions of peace.     

日蒙环境政策对话与前景展望

近年来日本抓住地球环境保护与国际合作这个国际政治的“第三重要课题”,欲从环境外交入手拓展自己的外交空间,提升自己的国际地位。日蒙环境对话与合作正是从这个意义上被重新认识,成为日本对中亚和蒙古实施环境外交的重要一环。日蒙环境政策对话已经连续进行了三次,是日本通过推进环境合作和交流,进而强化日蒙关系,提高日本国际地位和影响力的重要方式之一。