Putting Severity of Punishment Back in the Deterrence Package

Studies of criminal deterrence usually show an effect of certainty of punishment but often fail to find an effect of the severity. This is a serious threat to the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence theory. Through both a survey of 39 analyses in 33 published studies and our own reanalysis of an often-used data set, we show the problem rests not with the theory but with the analysis of the theory. Finding no severity effect can be traced to "unbundling the theoretical package" when moving from the theory to the statistical models used to represent the theory.     

Deterrence Theory and the Implementation of Speed Limits in the American States

Despite the ubiquitous nature of these policies, there is disagreement in the literature regarding the direction and size of the impact that speed limits have on traffic‐related fatalities. We argue in this paper that the mixed results in previous work may arise because these studies have missed an important component of the implementation of speed limit laws. More explicitly, they have failed to adequately control for the deterrent effect of enforcement and sanctions. We develop the argument that the observed impacts of speed limits will be overly large when the certainty and severity of punishment are not accounted for. We test this assertion in a cross‐sectional time series analysis of state‐level traffic fatalities from the years 1990–2006 and find that lower speeds do save a significant number of lives. Interestingly, we find that the impact is significantly overestimated for 65‐mph limits and significantly underestimated for 70‐mph limits when enforcement, penalties, and the interaction of the two are excluded. The results also suggest that fines have a rather modest impact on fatalities unless states employ a sufficient number of troopers to enforce posted limits. In addition to clarifying previous findings related to speed limit policy, therefore, the findings contribute to the general application of deterrence theory by empirically confirming that the importance of sanction severity is dependent on the perceived certainty of punishment.     

职务过失犯罪处罚原则的理性思考

职务过失犯罪是业务过失犯罪中的一类。由于职务过失犯罪的行为人在从事公职的过程中亵渎自己的工作职责,严重侵犯国家机关及其他国有单位的正常活动,侵犯公共财产、国家和人民群众利益,故学界普遍主张对职务过失犯罪应从严惩处。为了加强对职务过失犯罪的处罚力度,从刑法理论的角度分析刑法处罚职务过失犯罪的现状、进行中外刑事立法的比较研究、论证从严惩治的法理、提出完善刑事立法的建议是十分必要的。     

The Behavioral Impact of Drinking and Driving Laws

All U.S. states have laws designed to discourage people from drinking and driving, but enforcement varies across the states. Existing studies offer conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in deterring drinking‐and‐driving behavior. Deterrence theories imply that the mere existence of such laws has little impact on criminal behavior, but the perception of enforcement and the probability of being detected have a deterrent effect. To test these hypotheses, we develop a measure of the propensity to drink and drive using item response theory and national survey data. Inferential models test the impact of perceptions of enforcement, actual enforcement levels, and deterrence laws on criminal propensity. Results indicate that the existence of statutes impacts only those least likely to drink and drive, while perceptions of the likelihood of arrest and individual agreement with the goals of drinking and driving laws significantly reduce the propensity for almost everyone. Actual enforcement rates display no behavioral effect.     

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: reshaping China’s approach to strategic deterrence

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in the midst of a sweeping reform programme to significantly transform its organisation, force posture, command and control structures, and internal politics. Among the many important aspects of this effort is the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Creation of the PLARF solidified China’s missile forces as a critical element of China’s evolving strategic deterrent posture, portends continued significant investment in PLARF modernisation, and points to a more concerted effort to integrate PLARF capabilities into more effective PLA-wide joint operations—all key developments in the fundamental reshaping of China’s approach to strategic deterrence. These developments will affect U.S. strategic and extended deterrence postures, U.S.-China strategic stability, allied conventional force operations, information dominance and security, critical infrastructure, and other key aspects of national security. This study details the organisational, technological, and doctrinal changes afoot for the PLARF, and analyses how—if successful—they affect U.S. and U.S-allied military strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.     

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

A nuclear North Korea and the stability of East Asia: a tsunami on the horizon?

This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease—rather than increase, as many believe—the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant—albeit less grave—risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability.     

Seeking Alfred's body: royal tomb as political object in the reign of Edward the Elder

This article addresses a crux in the Fonthill Letter: why Helmstan, an outlawed thief, visited King Alfred's grave. This episode coincided with a succession dispute in which Alfred's son, Edward the Elder, was resisting a challenge for the kingdom. To enhance his legitimacy, Edward celebrated his father's legacy and promoted his grave, building Alfred a monumental mausoleum. Edward removed Helmstan's outlawry after the visit – a reversal that resembles instances in which condemned criminals were spared punishment after seeking sanctuary protection. I propose that as part of his political efforts, Edward offered comparable clemency to offenders who visited Alfred's grave.     

Binding Gestures: a customary norm regarding the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child?

ABSTRACT

In March of 2017, officials with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security publicly acknowledged a proposed policy of forced separation of unauthorized migrant children from their parents. Conceived as a deterrent to other families that might yet contemplate crossing the U.S. southern border, the proposal sought to formalize and expand on similar practices of deterrence already implemented on a more ad hoc basis. By way of a brief examination of the internal logics and implications of deterrence thinking in this context and more broadly, fundamental incompatibilities with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child are revealed. Although the U.S. has not ratified the Convention, I argue that it is nonetheless beholden to a robust and binding customary norm of international law obliging all states to respect its key provisions, including rights that would prohibit the separation of children from their parents as a preemptive measure to deter unauthorized migration.     

The moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence: A critique

Theorists within the just war tradition of ethics differ in their conclusions about nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence. This paper examines three arguments for the conditional moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence—those of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, of J. Bryan Hehir, and of Michael Walzer—and argues that none of the three constitutes intellectually compelling and practically useful moral advice. The bishops fail to convince us that nuclear use can ever fulfil the requirements of proportionality, and therefore that the intention to use nuclear weapons can ever be justified. Hehir fails to convince us that nuclear deterrence policies in fact distinguish categorically between intention and use. Walzer's case that deterrence is bad but necessary is more convincing but it, like Hehir's, does not constitute coherent moral advice for the citizen, soldier or government official. I conclude that, given the inadequacy of attempts to justify nuclear deterrence, even conditionally, we have a strong moral obligation to pursue alternatives.

The level of citizen concern about the dangerous possibility of nuclear war has become greatly heightened in Europe and the United States in the 1980s. This is probably due to at least three factors: the significant technological developments in nuclear weaponry that have occurred during the last decade, the increased fear of Soviet military strength, and the concentration of recent U.S. administrations on developing and improving a nuclear war‐fighting capability. But even before the growth of the peace movement since 1980, a ‘new debate’ about the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy had begun in academic and theological circles. In this paper, I will analyze three arguments of moral philosophers and theologians, all working within the ‘just war’ tradition, about whether nuclear deterrence, in any form, can be morally justified.     

China,India and Pakistan: models for an intermediate stage towards disarmament?

As the USA and Russia seek to reduce their nuclear arsenals en route to universal disarmament, they are hamstrung by the lack of a doctrinal basis for minimum deterrence. The cold war debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett remains valid today. Though Wohlstetter's ideas, which produced large arsenals, remain influential, an examination of the history of nuclear rivalries shows that Blackett's thinking—offering security with more compact arsenals—is closer to reality. The minimalist doctrines and practices of China, India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan offer useful lessons for the USA and Russia. But the Asian powers themselves need to iron out the inconsistencies in their thinking, which harbours elements of Wohlstetter's thought, if they are to be truly useful models that the bigger powers can emulate.     

Public vices,private remedies in nineteenth-century Italy: Giulia Falletti di Barolo Colbert and Le Forzate

In nineteenth-century Italy notions of femininity and, no less, masculinity influenced the ways in which crime was viewed. The result was that criminality was perceived, judged and explained differently according to the sex of the offender. At every stage in the penal process, cultural understandings of what women were like, and how they ought to behave, operated to define the appropriate response to their misconduct and to structure their punishment. These 'gendered' aspects of criminal justice have influenced the practices of prosecution and sentencing, and, most clearly of all, the special regimes and attitudes adopted in women's prisons: throughout the century male prison regimes emphasized discipline and deterrence, while female prisons developed individualized programmes of 'moral regeneration'. This article deals with the history of the first prison destined exclusively for women - which was opened in Turin in 1821 - with the circumstances which brought about its creation as well as with its organizational structure and its aims. Its promoter - both in money and in spirit - was a woman, named Giulia Falletti di Barolo Colbert. Giving special consideration to the ideals of its foundress, this article examines how nineteenth-century perceptions of the female criminal differentiated the nature and purpose of penal servitude for women.     

从《二年律令》看汉律对渎职罪的处罚

《二年律令》严厉打击失职行为和渎职犯罪。小至使用驿传不当化公为私、监管偷税漏税失察,大到把守关卡不严、打击“强盗”不力等等。因行贿受贿而徇私枉法、“鞫狱故不直”、“故纵弗刑”、狱吏殴打刑徒致死等司法失职渎职行为,受到汉律的特别关注。对于失职渎职的处罚,有罚金、徒刑直至死刑,轻重的依据是情节、性质和后果的不同。对于勾结诸侯、司法渎职等犯罪行为,汉律处罚起来特别严厉,“弃市”、“腰斩”、灭族等残酷刑种在《二年律令》中都出现了。汉律所惩治的渎职行为涵盖了社会公务的方方面面,表达出汉初统治者对吏治状况的焦虑和整顿吏治的决心,体现了汉王朝为建立二个高效廉洁政府所做的努力。     

Australian foreign policy in political time: middle power creativity,misplaced friendships,and crises of leadership

Over the past century, Australian foreign policy orders have been stabilised by the construction of ideas that have reduced uncertainty regarding national interests. Yet, such ideas have often evolved in ways that have engendered misplaced certainty, renewed instability, and crisis. To explain such shifts, I highlight the role of an Australian ‘pragmatic liberal tradition’, one which has enabled alternating tendencies to principled stability or technocratic hubris. In a tripartite model, I trace stages over initial ‘middle power’ efforts to construct ideas that lead states—and particularly great powers—to identify interests in cooperation, misplaced certainty in great power ties which obscures new challenges, and the construction of crises that impede or enable change. Empirically, I apply this framework to the construction, conversion, and crises of the ongoing ‘Reform order’. These span the initial Hawke-era middle power integration of US and regional ties, Howard-era misplaced certainty in US-styled neoconservative bandwagoning and neoliberal macroeconomic accommodation, and evolving constructions of the War on Terror and Global Financial Crisis. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, highlighting the initial challenges that crises can pose for middle power leadership, and the subsequent scope for creativity.     

The end of the NPT regime?

In the context of rising regional instability and conflict, along with increased incidents of global terrorism, in a dynamic, uncertain security environment, emerging nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction threats—both state proliferation and terrorism—are seen as growing dangers giving rise to increasing global insecurity. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime, the centerpiece of which is the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty (NPT), is essential to current and future non‐proliferation efforts and needs to be maintained and strengthened, not replaced. The normative and legal weight of the regime is important for counterterrorism as well as non‐proliferation, but it will not likely directly affect the behaviour of so‐called ‘rogue states’ and terrorists. Preventing them from achieving their objectives if they attempt to wield nuclear and radiological weapons may deter and dissuade them, as may a credible prospect of punishment. The interaction of non‐proliferation and deterrence, so clear during the Cold War history of the NPT, remain crucial parts of an increasingly complex picture.     

PRICE UNCERTAINTY,FACTOR SUBSTITUTION,AND THE LOCATIONAL BIAS OF BUSINESS TAXES*

Consideration of the integrated production-location problem is extended to include several types of business taxes. Many of these taxes are technologically and spatially neutral under certainty, but are shown to be nonneutral when factor prices are stochastic and the firm is risk averse, even when the tax is spatially uniform. Consequently, even a nationally uniform tax can have regional biases and can encourage migration of plants. When factor prices are uncertain, the effects of taxes on output rates, input ratios, and plant location vary with the form of the tax imposed as well as the amount to be paid. Income taxes involve the taxing authority in sharing the risk with the firm and are shown to promote risk taking by the firm and induce the expansion of output. Locational incentives which are mutually beneficial to firms and the government are presented.     

A challenge to the reigning theory of the just war

Troubled times often gives rise to great art that reflects those troubles. So too with political theory. The greatest work of twentieth century political theory, John Rawls's A theory of justice, was inspired in various respects by extreme social and economic inequality, racialized slavery and racial segregation in the United States. Arguably the most influential work of political theory since Rawls—Michael Walzer's Just and unjust wars—a sustained and historically informed reflection on the morality of interstate armed conflict—was written in the midst of the Vietnam War. It should be no surprise, then, that the bellicose period of the past 20 years should give rise to a robust new literature in political theory on the morality of armed conflict. It has been of uneven quality, and to some extent episodic, responding to particular challenges—the increased prevalence of asymmetric warfare and the permissibility of preventive or preemptive war—that have arisen as a result of specific events. In the past decade, however, a group of philosophers has begun to pose more fundamental questions about the reigning theory of the morality of armed conflict warfare—just war theory—as formulated by Walzer and others. Jeff McMahan's concise, inventive and tightly argued work Killing in war is without doubt the most important of these challenges to the reigning theory of the just war. This review article discusses McMahan's work, some of the critical attention it has received, and its potential implications for practice.     

犯罪地理学的理论研究

目前,国内外学术界还没有建立起真正意义上的犯罪地理学,因此,犯罪地理学的理论研究就显得特别重要。为此,本文系统地探讨了犯罪地理学的理论体系,认为犯罪地理学的理论体系含有:①地理环境决定论;②环境论(月相说、星相说、地域说、犯罪地形说、折衷主义学派环境论);③犯罪时日论;④芝加哥学派的犯罪同心圆论;⑤犯罪区位论。通过犯罪地理学理论体系的研究,希望有益于犯罪地理学的创建和发展。     

The Relational Sources of Advocacy Strategies: Comparative Evidence from the European and U.S. Climate Change Sectors

How do advocacy organizations make tactical choices? This paper contributes to theory building in advocacy studies by examining how the decision‐making processes of advocacy organizations are affected by the choices of their peers. Drawing on qualitative interviews with practitioners in two contexts—the European Union and the United States—I document that organizations face pressures toward cohesion and differentiation with the tactical choices of other organizations. Other important processes—such as rational evaluation of political opportunities, resource dependence, and ideological constraint—are also reported to be influential, although these processes are sometimes influenced by relational dynamics. These findings suggest new variables and relationships of interest for future quantitative research and provide insight into the growing complexity of climate politics.     

The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing.