Why peace can be as difficult as war

The book under review fills an important gap in examining American foreign policy during the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the events of September 11, 2001. It documents American reactions to the events during and after 1989 and explains some of the difficult foreign policy choices facing the US during the 1990s. It also describes how the mid-1990s came to be seen by some as 'an age of anxiety'. The book largely focuses on the thinking of the foreign policy elites and, in the opinion of this reviewer, might have said more about American domestic politics at this time. The rise of the conservative movement, the belief in the unfettered free market, and the seemingly unconditional support for Israel were largely rooted in domestic politics but had important foreign policy implications. One paradox, so this reviewer argues, was the way in which some in the West—the Cold War victors—seemed disorientated or even demoralized by their own victory. One underlying problem, implicit in this book, is that of achieving cohesion in the absence of a common enemy. For that reason peace can sometimes be as difficult as war.     

Experimental Systems in the Co-Construction of Scientific Knowledge**

The publication of Toward a History of Epistemic Things 25 years ago was a landmark in science studies. Not only was the book a brilliant overview of new research trends, but it was also a personal and highly original contribution because of its emphasis on the major role of experimental systems in the construction of scientific knowledge. The paths that it opened have not yet been fully explored. More seriously, the ambition of the author to reinforce the value of scientific knowledge by the role of experimental systems in its construction has not been pursued.     

Confronting Political Religion with Divine Religion: Christian Strategies of Re-Evangelization in the 1930s

Abstract

Western Christianity is currently engaged in a debate on religious pluralism, postmodernity and re-evangelization. This paper argues that the contours of this debate were already visible between the two world wars when Nazism (the ‘new Mohammedism’ as some Christian observers termed it) tried to take over the place Christianity was vacating. The defeat of this ‘political religion’ does not mean the victory of Christianity.     

Should we allow terrorists to terrify us?

These two books focus not on terrorism as such, but on its psychological impact on society. Stuart Croft traces the formation of American public opinion on terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. He argues that public opinion might have followed a different course, but stresses that attitudes to terrorism were formed not just by government or the media, but were linked to other forces such as fundamentalist religion and were even reflected in works of fiction. John Mueller asks which is the greater threat: terrorism or our reaction to it? He cites numerous cases in the past where Americans overreacted to perceived dangers; and points out that terrorism causes far fewer deaths than, for example, road accidents. He ends by suggesting that the best way to disarm terrorists is to persuade Americans to stop worrying about them—while conceding that this advice is unlikely to be followed. Critics of this book may object that it implicitly underrates the terrorist threat. But this in no way invalidates the message of both these books—namely that a genuine, or genuinely perceived, threat can sometimes lead to a disastrous response. Therefore, reports of alleged threats require more careful scrutiny by both politicians and the media.     

THE LIVING PAST

It is argued that although this book will be of interest to any scholar interested in Croce, Gentile, or de Ruggiero, it will be of particular interest to those interested in R. G. Collingwood, for the ultimate focus of the book is upon Collingwood's philosophy and how it developed in relation to the work of the Italian idealists. This is a subject that has not previously been investigated in any depth. Peters argues that the basic idea that unites all four philosophers is that “the past is not dead, but living”; but what distinguishes Collingwood's philosophy from the Italians' is the idea, and its justification, that “the past can live on even if we are not aware of it.” Collingwood explored and developed this idea in reaction to the “presentism” of the Italians, a position that is most obvious in the philosophy of Gentile but that is also to be found, albeit less obviously, in the philosophies of Croce and de Ruggiero. Without casting doubt upon the influence of the Italian idealists on Collingwood, it is suggested in this review that, as well as explaining that influence, Peters's book also throws Collingwood's similarities with Oakeshott into relief; by contrast with Collingwood, there is no evidence that Oakeshott ever read the Italian idealists.     

NAZISM AS A SECULAR RELIGION1

This article examines the implications of Richard Steigmann‐Gall's recent revisionist representation of Nazism as a Christian (Protestant) movement for the increasingly fashionable accounts of Nazism as a secular or political religion. Contrary to Steigmann‐Gall's contention that Protestant Nazism undermines these accounts, I suggest that his portrayal of Nazism as a variant of Protestant millennialism is not necessarily inconsistent with the secular religion approach. A closer look at the so‐called löwith‐Blumenberg debate on secularization indeed reveals that modern utopianisms containing elements of Protestant millennialism are the best candidates for the label of secularized eschatology. That Steigmann‐gall has reached exactly the opposite conclusion is primarily because his conceptual understanding of secular religion is uninformed by the secularization debate. Insofar as Steigmann‐Gall extracts his model of secular religion from contemporary political religion historiography on Nazism, this article points to a larger problem: a disjunction between historians utilizing the concept, on the one hand, and philosophers and social theorists who have shaped it, on the other.     

On realpolitik and its limitations

A largely peaceful collapse of dictatorships both in the communist world and beyond occurred in 1989. That year also saw one notable failure: the violent suppression of peaceful protest in Tiananmen Square, raising the perennial question of how far dictatorships can be effectively undermined by non‐violent methods. This review article offers no definitive answer to the question but provides a series of specific case‐studies from different countries, each chapter written by an expert on the country concerned. Besides covering the collapse of communist rule in the Baltic states, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, it examines the role of non‐violence in four post‐communist revolutions: in the rump Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Georgia and Ukraine. But its scope goes far beyond the former communist world. The authors demonstrate that non‐violence has, with varying degrees of success, played a role in many regions—in India under British rule; in the US civil rights campaign; in Northern Ireland prior to the troubles; in Portugal during the transition to democracy in the 1970s; in Iran before the overthrow of the Shah; in the Philippines before the removal of President Marcos in 1986; and in Chile in the late 1980s, gradually ending the Pinochet dictatorship. The negotiated dismantling of apartheid in South Africa is the subject of a long chapter. The book also examines two conspicuous failures of peaceful protest—China in 1989 and Burma in 2007. The book's conclusions are understandably cautious, but the authors concede that civil resistance has proved a more potent weapon than was previously supposed. At all events, so the reviewer argues, the notion that civil resistance can only work in free societies has been proved demonstrably wrong.     

Demythologizing the Satan Tradition of Historical-Criticism: A Reevaluation of the Old Testament Portrait of שָׂטָן in Light of the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha

This book continues the excellent work begun in Thompson's first book, The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narratives. In trying to find a context for the Bible, T. rightly focuses on the literary, theological, and ideological content of the biblical text. He well illustrates how recording history (from a modern point of view) is not the concern of the biblical writers. On the other hand, as he shows, to deny that the Bible is true historically is not to deny its truth in other areas. Although often agreeing with T. and applauding much that is in the book, the reviewer found certain areas of concern or disappointment. He feels that T. is often inconsistent, sometimes seeming to reject the use of literary sources almost altogether, yet still quietly using them when it suits his purpose. For example, the sources for the conquests of Alexander the Great have some of the same weaknesses as Josephus, 1 and 2 Maccabees, and even some of the narrative texts of the Bible, yet T. seems to accept that these still tell us something about Alexander. An area of weakness is T.'s grasp of the Hellenistic and Roman period where the sources andscholarship have not been mastered, and certain original sources are both explicitly rejected and then covertly used as a basis for many assertions. This is not a main part of T.'s argument, but it has implications for trying to put the writing of the Bible in the Hellenistic/Roman period. An area judged to be actually tendentious is T.'s argument that ''Jews'' and similar terms are only religious designations and carry no ethnic content. Despite these criticisms (which do affect T.'s approach and conclusions in crucial areas) the reviewer nevertheless accepts much that T. says and appreciates the attempt to give a holistic argument on this complex question. Especially appreciated is T.'s positive reconstruction of the history of Palestine based primarily on archaeology in a central section of his book.     

Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya*

This article is based on a debate held on 22 March 2011 at Chatham House on ‘Was Iraq an unjust war?’ David Fisher argues that the war fully failed to meet any of the just war criteria. The war was undertaken to disarm Iraq of its WMD but the evidence that it had such weapons was inadequate. There were concerns about the justice of the cause, reinforced by doubts that those initiating military action avowedly on behalf of the UN had the requisite competent authority to do so, given the absence of any international consensus in favour of military action. The doubts were further reinforced by concern that action was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort. Crucially, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seek to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. The individual failures mutually reinforced each other, so building up cumulatively to support the conclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and without adequate planning how to achieve a just outcome following military action to impose regime change. It thus failed the two key tests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken, designed to ensure that military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result. By contrast, current coalition operations in Libya are, so far, just. This is a humanitarian operation undertaken to halt a humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place, with wide international support, including authorization by the UN Security Council. Nigel Biggar argues that the fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from grave errors, some of them morally culpable, does not yet establish its overall injustice. All wars are morally flawed, even just ones. Further, even if the invasion were illegal, that need not make it immoral. The authority of moral law trumps that of international law, and where the politics of the Security Council prevent the UN from enforcing the law, unauthorized enforcement could be morally justified. Further still, massive civilian casualties do not by themselves make an unjust war. The decisive considerations are those of just cause, last resort and right intention. Proportionality is not among them, because estimating it is far too uncertain. The persistently atrocious nature of the Saddam Hussein regime satisfies just cause; evidence of collapsing containment grounds last resort; and the Coalition's costly correction of early errors proved the seriousness of its good intentions. In sum the invasion and occupation of Iraq was, despite grave errors, justified. Regarding Libya, Biggar notes the recurrence of conflict over the interpretation of international law. He wonders how those who distinguish sharply between protecting civilians and regime change imagine that dissident civilians are to be ‘kept’ safe while Qadhafi remains in power. Against those who clamour for a clear exit‐strategy, he counsels agility, while urging sensitivity to the limits of our power. What was right to begin may become imprudent to continue.     

Cultural Geography of American Foodways: An Annotated Bibliography

Despite recent interest in indigenous knowledge, few studies have linked it with indigenous beliefs system and its role in environmental stewardship. This link is important to cultural geographers interested in the study of small-scale cultural groups and how they relate to the environment. It also helps us understand the cultural dimensions of environmental stewardship and resource conservation. Based on a study of a monkey sanctuary in Ghana, West Africa, this paper argues that indigenous belief systems form an essential part of indigenous knowledge and that they can serve as a very effective tool for the protection of sacred groves and isolated patches of rainforests that have fallen victim to development as a result of increasing globalization, population pressures, and the spread of Christianity. The paper concludes that indigenous beliefs are not just a relic of the past but something that is needed today and may be needed in future for the conservation of natural resources in indigenous societies.     

On Political Theology: The Hidden Dialogue between C. Schmitt and Ernst H. Kantorowicz in The King's Two Bodies

In recent years, Ernst H. Kantorowicz's work The King's Two Bodies (1957) has been the object of both historical and philosophical research. Kantorowicz decided to subtitle his book ‘A Study in Medieval Political Theology’, but few scholars have actually recognised his work as research in ‘political theology’. The aim of this article, then, is to uncover the sense(s) in which his book might be considered a work of ‘political theology’, especially in the sense coined by Carl Schmitt in 1922. Such a discussion ultimately aims to contribute to the foundation of political-theology research, a subject that has been widespread among European intellectuals in the twentieth century and which continues to be a focus of interest. This article argues that Kantorowicz's book can be interpreted as a practice of—and also an enriching addition to—Schmitt's thesis on political theology, even if it does not mention Schmitt's name. Such a conclusion is only possible by accepting that there was a heated dialogue between Kantorowicz and Schmitt through Erik Peterson's work. The article further discusses its approach with other scholars that, even though they are based on similar hypotheses, make different conclusions.     

Europe's odyssey?: political myth and the European Union

The article argues that the European Union, despite being a different kind of polity, has political myths that are similar to those that have characterised nation‐states. It examines two types of political myth – foundation and exceptionalism – and demonstrates that they have been used in an attempt to make the European Union understandable and acceptable as a form of governing. The article also argues that political myths about the EU have had limited success not only because they are based on the same content as national myths but also because they do not always conform to recognisable narrative forms. The EU, with its ambiguous aim of creating ‘an ever closer union’, does not provide the basis for sacred narratives that become normative and cognitive maps that make the new polity ‘normal’ and provide the EU with ontological security.     

Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy (5th edition) * Peter Dicken

Being asked to review Global Shift is a somewhat daunting task.Most if not all of the readers of this will be familiar withthe book, if not in its current form then in previous editions.The fourth edition of the book, published in 2004, was describedby Nigel Thrift in his back-cover endorsement as being ‘beyonddefinitive’ whilst Thrift suggests the fifth edition is‘not just recommended but essential’. It, therefore,goes without saying that the book continues to act as a seminalcontribution to our understanding of processes of globalisation.Taking this as read, I want to consider here how the changesand additions made to the latest version of the book advanceour understanding and further build on the strengths of earliereditions [see Musson (2004) for a review of edition four].     

HAMMER TIME

Espen Hammer's exceptionally fine book explores modern temporality, its problems and prospects. Hammer claims that how people experience time is a cultural/historical phenomenon, and that there is a peculiarly modern way of experiencing time as a series of present moments each indefinitely leading to the next in an ordered way. Time as measured by the clock is the paradigmatic instance of this sense of time. In this perspective time is quantifiable and forward‐looking, and the present is dominated by the future. Hammer argues that this manner of experiencing time provides a way of living that brings with it not only the basis for great successes in technology, but also great costs—specifically, what he calls the problems of transience and of meaning. Hammer goes about his task by considering the ways some of the great modern philosophers have characterized present‐day temporality and have responded to the problems he has identified. Specifically, he considers what Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, (early) Heidegger, Habermas, Bloch, and Adorno provide in response to our peculiarly modern predicaments. The book is remarkable for its clarity and perceptiveness, but in the process in crucial places it simplifies the matters at hand or fails to push its insights as far as it ought, and in the end promises more than it can deliver. In this it betrays a rationalist confidence in the power of reason that founders on what in many ways remains a mystery.     

Further Thoughts on the Imperial Endgame and Britain's Dirty Wars

The publication of my book Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire in 2011 provoked many to respond, although not with a criticism that was consistent across the board. In my work, I intentionally did not draw a moral conclusion and took care to present what I considered a balanced account of British decolonisation, without praise or condemnation of past actions. This has made my argument vulnerable from several directions since, as reviewer Ashley Jackson commented, ‘it is rather difficult to know on which side the author's bread is buttered’. This paper is an attempt to bring clarity to my argument and to continue the debate on some of the aspects of Britain's end of empire that my book discussed.     

The 1913 Ottoman Military Campaign in Eastern Thrace: A Prelude to Genocide?

This article argues that the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) experimented with methods of mass expulsion for the first time during the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913. The success of these methods of mass violence contributed to their renewed application in World War I. Much has been written about the crimes committed against civilians by Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek armies in this period, but little about the Ottoman operations in Eastern Thrace in 1913. Neither European nor Turkish historiography has examined the issue closely, partly because the Ottoman campaign in Eastern Thrace was very short and of relatively little military significance, and partly because historians interested in the study of violence in the late Ottoman Empire have devoted their attention to the Armenian genocide, which began less than two years after the recapture of Thrace. And yet, it is during this brief period, from July to September 1913, that the Unionist leadership of the Ottoman Empire developed a very specific, new and systematic form of violence that would later be used against other Christian populations, including the Armenians. In this context, the 1913 Ottoman campaign is worth examining closely not just as an important aspect of the Balkan Wars, but also as a prelude to practices that would later be tragically used on a wider scale during World War I and World War II.     

THE REVEREND BAYES VS. JESUS CHRIST

The Bayesian perspective on historiography is commonsensical: If historiography is not certain like a priori knowledge or sense data, and it is not fiction, historiography is probable. Richard Carrier's book argues for a Bayesian, probabilistic interpretation of historiography in general and of the debate about the historicity of Jesus in particular. Jesus can be interpreted as a historically transmitted reference of “Jesus,” as a bundle of properties, or literally. Carrier devotes too much energy to debating literalism that confuses evidence with hypotheses. But evidence preserves information to different degrees; it is true or not. Carrier proposes to apply objective, frequentist Bayesianism in historiography despite the difficulties in assigning values. He argues that ranges of values can determine historiographical hypotheses. Carrier does not analyze in Bayesian terms the main method for Bayesian determination of posterior probabilities in historiography: inference from multiple independent sources. When the prior probability of a hypothesis is low, but at least two independent evidential sources, such as testimonies, support it, however unreliable each of the testimonies is, the posterior probability leaps. The problem with the Synoptic Gospels as evidence for a historical Jesus from a Bayesian perspective is that the evidence that coheres does not seem to be independent, whereas the evidence that is independent does not seem to cohere. Carrier's explanation of some the evidence in the Gospels is fascinating as the first Bayesian reconstruction of structuralism and mimesis. Historians attempted to use theories about the transmission and preservation of information to find more reliable parts of the Gospels, parts that are more likely to have preserved older information. Carrier is too dismissive of such methods because he is focused on hypotheses about the historical Jesus rather than on the best explanations of the evidence. I leave open questions about the degree of scholarly consensus and the possible reasons for it.     

Quid Sit Tyrannus? Seeking to Understand Tyranny within and among Regimes

Waller Newell's Tyrants is a public-spirited book, designed to contribute to a civic educational effort to identify and understand the characteristics of tyranny. But if, as Newell argues, entire countries—and not just individuals—can be tyrannical, does the character of democracy necessarily inoculate itself against tyrannizing over others? The example of Athens, among other ancient cities, should give us reason for caution. The effort to make an understanding of tyranny properly civic seems therefore to be a permanent challenge.     

BACK TO THE FUTURE: POSTNARRATIVIST HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Jouni‐Matti Kuukkanen has written an important book. It directly confronts a key theoretical dilemma that has shadowed debate in historiography for several decades: histories cannot be written without using some narrative structure or other, but epistemological evaluation cannot be applied to narratives qua narrative. Thus, if empirical inquiry takes the form of a history, then it cannot be rationally evaluable, and if rationally evaluable, empirical inquiry cannot be in the form of a history. Kuukkanen's book both directly confronts and proposes a strategy for surmounting this tired and tiresome theoretical barrier. Kuukkanen deserves great credit for attempting to reshape a long‐stalled debate in a way that enables the theoretical options to be imagined anew. Yet his structuring of the oppositional tendencies engenders some ongoing problems regarding how to understand the philosophical stakes and options. This review argues that achieving Kuukkanen's postnarrativist future requires going back to past epistemic concerns discarded because they were tied to conceptions of logic and explanation that could not be reconciled with narrative form. Kuukkanen practices postnarrativism but still preaches a prenarrativist conception of logic. To reach his promised future, to actually overcome the dilemma that he rightly seeks to transcend, one must actually have the courage of Kuukkanen's pragmatist convictions.     

Martin Amis,neo-Orientalism,and hubris

This article puts forward a reading of Martin Amis’s 2008 book The Second Plane with an emphasis on its cultural politics. It reconsiders Amis’s book from a distance of almost a decade in light of recent global developments, including the rise of ISIS in the Middle East, the resurgence of acute Islamophobia in Europe and the US, and Tony Blair’s public acknowledgement of the shortcomings of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With these factors in mind, the essay argues that it is possible to detect in Amis’s book early warning signs of how the West’s relationship with both Islamism and Islam would develop in the period following its publication. Drawing on William Connolly’s work on tragedy and Edward Said’s work on Orientalism, the essay argues that The Second Plane ought to be read as advancing a hubristic ‘neo-Orientalist’ cultural and political agenda which today threatens to lock much of the world into an ongoing cycle of recrimination and revenge. Against this, a case is made for an appreciation of the complex circumstances which give rise to suicide terrorism and for a sense of history largely absent from Amis’s writing on the subject.