Die Komplementarität von interner und externer Wissenschaftsgeschichte

In studies of the history of science two apparently diverging ‘ideal types’ can be distinguished. The internal analysis relies on methodology and on the philosophy of science and concentrates on the cognitive system and on the sequence of theories. The external analysis relies on sociology, the history of institutions, biographies, etc. and concentrates on the social system and on the interrelationship between science and society. Neither of the two approaches can claim to cover the whole truth and to give the only possible (causal) explanation, The cognitive content of scientific theories and the social process of bringing about and using them are by their very nature complementary.     

Schweretheorie und Weltbild des Nikolaus von Kues: Zu ihrer vermeintlichen Modernität

Regarding his world view and his heaviness theory Nicolaus Cusanus is imputed to having used (at least to some extent) forebodings and anticipations of modern conceptions. In the dialog Idiota de staticis experimentis he imputed the quantitative points of view of modern physics programmatically. In contrast with this, this article will show that the quantitative point of view is proposed for an inapt object at least. Cusanus based his reflections on one hand on the Aristotelic theories of elements and their heaviness with ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ weight (only thus, assumed inconsistencies can be explained), on the other hand he wants to determine the essential, qualitative properties of the forma, while only their complete abstraction by reduction on the mass without properties should result in an object for comparative weighings — lately in different ways by René Descartes and Isaac Newton. The putative modernness of cusanian conceptions compared with Aristotle are based on the tradition of platonian and stoic modifications which sooner were compatible with christian ideas.     

Im Blickwinkel der Technik: Neue Verhältnisse von Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte

Changing Perspectives – From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of “History and Philosophy of Science” (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. The so‐called “experimental turn” of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely “How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?” Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. – Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind‐independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history.     

Der medizinische Wissensaustausch zwischen Siebenbürgen und anderen europäischen Ländern im Spiegel des Auslandsstudiums und der ärztlichen Ausbildung der Siebenbürger vor der Gründung der Klausenburger Universität (1872)

The first perpetual university in Transylvania was founded rather late compared to European standards, namely only in 1872 in Klausenburg (Cluj, Kolozsvár). Through the centuries, the social request for physicians was satisfied by the education of Transylvanian students at foreign universities and by the immigration of physicians from abroad. Concerning the period from 1180 to 1849, we know about 7145 Transylvanian students at more than 80 different universities of the Occident. Thereof, 412 physicians and 219 surgeons can be documented by their names. The ranking list of the most frequented medical faculties (Vienna, Padova, Leyden, Utrecht, Jena, Lipsia, Erlangen, Frankfort‐on‐Oder, Goettingen, Basel etc.) proves that all of these medical men received their professional education (being sponsored socially) from the then most excellent foreign universities. Thus, studies abroad guaranteed continual transfer of knowledge from Western to Eastern Europe. This situation seems to partially have compensated the disadvantages of lacking own Transylvanian universities ‐ at least from the quality point of view, so that the professional standard of the education of doctors working in Transylvania used to correspond to the highest level of European medicine.     

Die subjektive Objektivität der mittelalterlichen Medizin

The problem of ‘reality’ and ‘realism’ is rarely discussed in medieval medical texts, although medieval medicine is based on objectivity. There are three reasons why medieval physicians were so sure about their image of human nature: the convincing model of humoral pathology, the undoubted truth of tradition, and the suggestive similarities between worldly things and their presumed divine purpose. Thus, individual cases were only examples of the common theory of medicine and were by no means able to change it.