斯大林逝世与美国的反应和政策

1953年3月5日斯大林逝世后,艾森豪威尔政府迅速做出反应,并经过反复讨论,制定出一项利用斯大林逝世的心理战略计划,力图充分利用斯大林逝世提供的机会和苏联权力转移的内在困难,实施心理战和隐蔽行动,以削弱苏联的力量和影响。随着形势的发展,这一计划不断发展,构成艾森豪威尔政府国家安全政策的重要内容。美国对斯大林逝世的反应和政策不仅体现了美国遏制政策的加强,也揭露了美国图谋分裂社会主义阵营的实质。它折射了冷战斗争的严酷性,美国对外政策决策的适时性与实用性;同时也表明心理战、宣传战是美国重要的冷战战略武器,它对苏东剧变、冷战结束起了一种累积的、潜移默化的作用。     

冷战时期美国对东欧政策述评（1949—1969）

东欧八个社会主义国家在冷战年代具有极其重要的地位.美国历届政府都努力寻求制定一项促进东欧国家脱离苏联阵营,并最终放弃社会主义制度的政策.杜鲁门政府的遏制政策和艾森豪威尔政府前期的"解放"政策都不具有现实可操作性.因此随着新的国际局势的发展,艾森豪威尔政府后期确立了.演变"政策,该政策与以前的"解放"政策有着本质区别,并成为以后美国历届政府在冷战期间对东欧的基本政策.     

美国基督教锡安主义的发展及影响

美国基督教锡安主义是影响美、以关系和中东局势的一个重要因素。美国基督教主流一自由派主要出于世俗的、人道主义的考虑而支持或反对锡安主义,美国基督教福音一基要派则主要出于“神定时代论”的末世信仰而支持锡安主义和以色列。美国基督教锡安主义是美国长期偏袒以色列的社会文化基础。其宗教极端主义的成分加剧了中东的文明冲突,阻碍了中东的和平进程。     

试论艾森豪威尔的现代共和党主义

自罗斯福新政以来,美国国宋垄断资本主义约发展进入了一个新的历史阶段,国家对社会经济生活进行全面干预不仅仅是战争或危机时的权宜之计,它已成了美国历届政府必须遵循的长期施政方针。艾森豪威尔是在民主党人执政20年后第一次入主白宫的共和党人,他组织了美国历史上著名的“富豪政府”,曾使共和党保守派寄予厚望一回到传统的共和党主义。但是,从垄断资产阶级的总体和长远利益考虑,艾森豪威尔不得不顺应美国国家垄断资本主义日益加强的历史趋势,有限度地接受新政改革的自由主义原则,走上了中间道路。文章指出,这是在新的历史条件下,执政的共和党人在政治哲学和社会经济政策上所必然要发生的历史性变化。     

核扩散问题与艾森豪威尔政府和平利用原子能计划

艾森豪威尔政府和平利用原子能计划的主要目的是通过向非核国家提供有限核技术用于和平,以换取它们不开发核武器。然而,这一目标最终并未实现,核扩散问题呈加剧之势。其原因在于:美国主要关注防止垂直核扩散,忽视了水平核扩散;缺乏有效的国际控制和核查;艾森豪威尔政府防扩散政策的两面性;推行和平利用原子能计划的方式在客观上为一些国家开发核武器提供了便利。不可否认,和平利用原子能计划确实为许多国家带来了福利,但其副作用同样明显。作为建立国际不扩散协议的第一步,它打开了不受限制的核扩散大门。和平利用和军事利用原子能技术是一对连体婴,艾森豪威尔政府认识到可化核剑为犁,却忽视了核犁仍然可以重铸为剑。     

试析美国石油紧急分配法案的实施及影响

试析美国石油紧急分配法案的实施及影响刘波美国是一个十分重视市场调节的国家,然而,在其石油经济史上,却两次违背价值规律,对石油价格进行管制。１９５９年艾森豪威尔总统颁布＂石油进口限额法令＂,将大量廉价的中东石油拒之门外;１９７３年尼克松总统则不顾国际油...     

艾森豪威尔政府后期的国际收支困境与对策

艾森豪威尔政府后期,美国的国际收支陷入困境,黄金大量外流.为了改善国际收支,维护美元垄断地位,巩固美国的全球霸权,艾森豪威尔政府提出了一系列增加国际收入、降低国际支出的措施,其中最关键的是艾森豪威尔总统于1960年11月16日颁布的总统指令,该指令提出了撤回驻外军事人员家属等改善美国国际收支的措施.但是,由于现实的国际政治经济因素的束缚,艾森豪威尔政府调节国际收支的努力效果不佳.     

艾森豪威尔政府芬兰政策初探

艾森豪威尔政府时期,美国“遏制”的范围进一步扩大,手段进一步升级和多样化,由此导致冷战加速向第三世界、边缘地区和中立国家扩散。艾森豪威尔政府芬兰政策正是在这一背景下形成的。国家安全委员会5403文件标志着艾森豪威尔政府芬兰政策的确立。5914系列文件和6024文件则是对这一政策的调整,同时也体现了该政策的连续性和完整性。在承认苏芬关系特殊性的前提下,艾森豪威尔政府力图以适当的经济和军事援助,促进芬兰经济发展和社会稳定,增强芬兰对内遏制共产主义势力,对外抵制苏联政治和经济压力的能力。这些政策的推行,加强了芬兰的亲西方倾向,稳定和增强了北约的北翼战线,并对芬兰的社会历史发展产生了深刻影响。     

艾登与阿尔法计划

艾登在任外交大臣和英国首相期间,力图以埃以和解为基础,与美国共同制定了全面解决阿以争端的“阿尔法计划”,艾登提出这项计划是以纳赛尔对西方国家的友好和美国在中东地区与英国的合作为基础。由于艾登将阿尔法计划实施与要求美国在中东对英国的军事支持和美国加入巴格达组织联系在一起,因此英国逐渐失去了美国在中东的支持;随着艾登对纳赛尔敌意增加,阿尔法计划逐渐陷于困境,并且当运河危机发生时,阿尔发计划最终失败。     

艾登与阿尔法计划

艾登在任外交大臣和英国首相期间,力图以埃以和解为基础,与美国共同制定了全面解决阿以争端的"阿尔法计划",艾登提出这项计划是以纳赛尔对西方国家的友好和美国在中东地区与英国的合作为基础。由于艾登将阿尔法计划实施与要求美国在中东对英国的军事支持和美国加入巴格达组织联系在一起,因此英国逐渐失去了美国在中东的支持;随着艾登对纳赛尔敌意增加,阿尔法计划逐渐陷于困境,并且当运河危机发生时,阿尔发计划最终失败     

The Eisenhower Doctrine in its American and Middle Eastern Contexts

Book reviewed:
Salim Yaqub. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East . Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xiii + 377 pp. Illus., maps, notes, bibliography, index. $59.95 (cloth), $22.50 (paper).     

‘A Puppet,Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So’: Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement

This article demonstrates that US beliefs concerning racial identity guided the Eisenhower administration's encounter with Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Arab nationalism during the 1950s. It establishes that US texts propagated certain racial-identity assumptions about Arab peoples. The most important of these included the assertions that Arab peoples were irrational and easily manipulated or deceived. Policy-makers utilised these beliefs to explain and contextualise Arab actions, especially those of Egypt and its Arab nationalist government. Officials within the Eisenhower administration believed that Arab irrationality prompted Egyptian leaders to adopt a neutralist position in the cold war. The assumption that Arabs were susceptible to deception and manipulation convinced policy-makers that this position was unacceptable. The Soviets would ultimately, they believed, prey upon Arab manipulability and subjugate Egypt, the Arab nationalist movement, and the entire Middle East. These concerns made the Eisenhower administration's decision to contain Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Arab nationalist movement seem logical and necessary.     

US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a critique

Promoting democracy in the Middle East has been a key foreign policy objective of the Bush administration since n September 2001. Democratizing the Arab world, in particular, is seen as an important instrument in the ‘war on terror’. To help democratize the Arab Middle East, the US initiated a number of policies which, it claims, have encouraged reform. But what has really been the impact of US initiatives? This article examines the implementation of US democracy promotion policies across the Arab region, and in particular Arab countries, and argues that it has had mixed results. The article suggests three reasons why this is so. First, democracy is part of a wider set of US interests and concerns with which it is frequently in contradiction. Second, the Bush administration conceives democracy as a panacea: it overlooks the problems its implementation may cause and lacks clear ideas about achieving this implementation. Third, democracy promotion policies have limited outcomes because neither a politically neutral nor a more interventionist approach can initiate a reform process if it is not already underway for domestic reasons. On the basis of the three critiques, the article concludes with recommendations for US policy.     

从科伦坡计划到东盟——美国对战后亚洲经济组织之政策的历史考察

将科伦坡计划、亚行和东盟三个经济组织串在一起,通过对围绕它们的建立美国所持政策的探讨,弄清了事实真相;揭示了在它们的早期阶段,美国对其政策的内容、功能和推行的原因。从对美国对三个组织政策的比较研究中得出了带有规律性的认识,即美国对各个组织的具体政策虽有不同,但其实质相同,包括三点:在亚洲建立均势格局为其在亚洲的战略服务;将亚洲经济组织变成它在亚洲的经济和政治利益服务的工具;主导或以双边关系影响亚洲经济组织。此认识为解读美国对建立"东亚共同体"构想的态度提供了历史视角。     

试析冷战在中东的分期和特点

中东在美苏冷战中具有重要意义。中东的冷战可划为四个阶段:美国开始取代英法在中东的势力,苏联实现突破的努力失败;阿拉伯民族主义进入高潮,英法基本退出中东,美苏展开激烈角逐;英国彻底退出中东,苏联影响进一步增长,中东呈现不战不和局面;美国促成中东和平进程,苏联在阿拉伯世界的影响衰落。冷战在中东的主要特点如下:中东是除东欧外非两大阵营国家唯一与超级大国苏联有陆地接壤的地区,是美国遏制战略的前沿阵地;中东是冷战的发源地之一;中东成为美苏激烈争夺的地区,双方各有自己的战略;中东的局部战争和地区冲突延绵不断,并与冷战相互交织,而后者对阿拉伯世界的影响有限;冷战与中东起伏不定的民族主义相互影响;中东在冷战中诞生了高度敌视西方的极端伊斯兰主义。     

Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half‐hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates—both human and technological—that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long‐term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East— something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited.     

第一次石油危机中日本对中东政策的转折

在第一次石油危机期间,中东产油国把石油武器不仅对准支持以色列的美国等国家,也对准了持“中立”政策的日本等国家。日本一方面面临中东产油国不断加大压力,国内经济出现混乱,另一方面担心得罪美国而影响日美同盟关系,不敢轻举妄动。最后,为了维持以石油为主要能源的日本经济正常运转,日本政府不得不放弃“中立”政策,转而公开支持阿拉伯国家正义事业,并且提供巨额资金及技术援助中东有关国家,加强与中东有关国家关系,确保中东石油平稳供应。     

海湾风云的地缘政治分析

本文全面回顾分析了海湾风云中,伊科冲突和美国出兵海湾的地缘政治背景,以及苏联和阿拉伯世界基于地缘政治的考虑和选择。     

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests

The rapid and unpredictable changes in the Middle East collectively known as the “Arab Spring” are posing tremendous challenges to U.S. policy formation and action. This article will explore and evaluate evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East and its potential implications. There has always been a tension in American foreign policy between pursuing American “values” (foreign policy idealism) and protecting American “interests” (foreign policy realism). For decades, the United States has sought to “make the world safe for democracy,” while at the same time often supporting repressive, nondemocratic regimes because of national security or economic self‐interest. The tension between these two fundamentally distinct policy orientations has become even more pronounced as the United States tries to respond to the Arab Spring uprisings. Why did the United States actively support the rebels in Libya but not the protestors in Syria or Bahrain? Is there an emerging, coherent “Obama Doctrine” on intervention in Arab countries, or was Libya just a “one‐off” event? These are some of the questions that this article will attempt to answer.