Kuwait,Political Violence and the Syrian War

Kuwait’s support of civilians in war-torn Syria has been commended by the international community. In addition, the Gulf state has joined US-led coalitions against the ‘Islamic State’ and affirmed many international agreements designed to choke off international assistance to militias operating in Syria. In 2015, Kuwait paid a heavy price for its involvement, becoming a victim of IS-affiliated terrorism. Whilst this suggests that Kuwait’s position on radical Islamist movements involved in the Syrian conflict is clear cut, this article will argue that Kuwait’s government has had to balance this official position against domestic support for elements of the radical Islamist opposition in Syria. These cross-cutting tensions were underscored by the US designation of the state as the ‘epicentre’ of private fund raising for militias in Syria. To explore these contradictions, this article will analyse Kuwait’s engagement with the Syrian war, its new anti-terror legislation and the tensions between the official and unofficial views on support for foreign militias. This analysis will highlight the challenges the Kuwait government has faced in addressing unofficial Kuwaiti engagement with the radical Islamist opposition in Syria.     

Iran's Shortsighted Policies in Iraq: Between Inflaming and Containing of Radical Sunni Islam: 2003–2015

The main goal of the 2003 war with Iraq of the coalition forces led by the United States was to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and establish a new political system that would adopt democratic practices. Iran, a country that deemed Saddam's regime to be a threat, considered this war to be very helpful in many ways — first because it put an end to Clinton's “dual containment” approach and would thus help Iran to become a regional superpower at Iraq's expense. Second, a war with Iraq could put an end to the decades of oppression of the Shi'a community in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's involvement in Iraq's internal affairs created chaos in Iraq and contributed to the sectarian conflict against Sunni terror groups, notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known by the Arabic name Daesh, a terror group with the most extreme form of Sunni Radical Islam ever known. The sectarian conflict that resulted from the above is now taking place between the Sunnis and the Shi'a of both Persian and Arab backgrounds and this clash could not have become as radical as it is without Iran's aggressive foreign policy. It should, however, be noted that Iran is not the sole player in the country and therefore its part in inflaming sectarian conflicts should be viewed through a realistic prism that allows other forces — domestic and foreign — to be seen as having influenced the events for their benefit.     

Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: the Case of Yemen

This article examines the role of Iran in Yemen within the context of Arab‐Iranian relations. It also examines the debate on the involvement of Iran in the ongoing political developments in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. The article focuses on the Houthi Movement in Yemen, its origin, growth and political expansion. It also investigates its relations with Iran and its allies in the region, and discusses other factors that strengthened its political image in Yemen. The article also provides an early assessment of the implication of the Decisive Storm military led by Saudi Arabia.     

Turkey's isolated stance: an ally no more,or just the usual turbulence?

This article explores the policy choices and political stances that lie behind Turkey's growing isolation both from its western allies and its regional neighbours. It details Ankara's approach to a range of current issues in its region—particularly relating to Syria but also Iraq, Libya, Iran, Russia and Israel—and seeks to trace these approaches back to the world‐view of the country's ruling party and its leading figures, most notably President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu. It also assesses Turkey's reactions to the complex regional circumstances that have confronted Turkey in recent years. It considers the content and impact of some of the rhetoric emanating from Ankara, especially where it is directed towards the West. The article asks whether and why Turkish foreign policy has acquired an anti‐western tone, and also looks at the extent to which its dealings with its neighbours can be explained by sectarian considerations or by pro‐Muslim Brotherhood leanings. It then goes on to speculate about Turkey's future relationship with NATO and to a lesser degree the EU. It considers the prospects for an improvement in Ankara's relationship with its western allies, or whether Turkey–US relations in particular are now likely to be characterized by ‘strategic drift’ and a more transactional and contingent approach to alliance relationships.     

The Islamic State lexical battleground: US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat

This article suggests that President Obama's consistent references to the extremist Sunni group as ‘ISIL’ (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is not a trivial matter of nomenclature. Instead, the Obama administration's deliberate usage of the ISIL acronym (as opposed to other commonly‐used terms such as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ‘ISIS’, ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’, ‘so‐called Islamic State’ and ‘Daesh’) frames the public perception of the threat to avoid engagement with the requirements of strategy and operations. Both the labelling and the approach could be defended as a response to the unique challenge of a transnational group claiming religious and political legitimacy. However, we suggest that the labelling is an evasion of the necessary response, reflecting instead a lack of coherence in strategy and operations—in particular after the Islamic State's lightning offensive in Iraq and expansion in Syria in mid‐2014. This tension between rhetoric, strategy and operations means that ‘ISIL’ does not provide a stable depiction of the Islamic State. While it may draw upon the post‐9/11 depiction of ‘terrorism’, the tag leads to dissonance between official and media representations. The administration's depiction of a considered approach leading to victory has been undermined by the abstraction of ‘ISIL’, which in turn produced strategic ambiguity about the prospect of any political, economic or military challenge to the Islamic State.     

The Immemorial Iranian Nation? School Textbooks and Historical Memory in Post‐Revolutionary Iran

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the fortunes of the pre‐revolutionary, Pahlavi nationalist narrative in post‐revolutionary Iran. The study analyses and compares pre‐ and post‐revolutionary school textbooks with the aim of demonstrating that, for all its revolutionary and Islamic‐universalist hyperbole, the Islamic Republic of Iran remained committed to the Pahlavi dynasty's conception of the ‘immemorial Iranian nation’ (or the ‘Aryan hypothesis’) as it was first articulated by European scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Post‐revolutionary Iran clung to the European/Pahlavi master narrative of Iranian history, its very basic ‘story line’. It was, therefore, subject to the same evolution, the same dialectic of remembering and forgetting, the same successive deformations, and the vulnerability to the very same manipulation and appropriation. This study, then, attempts to establish that the Islamic Republic's apparent shift from ‘Iran Time’ to ‘Islam Time’, though it reaches far beyond Iranian borders, nevertheless remains wedded to, and embedded in, the dominant European, secular traditions of the Pahlavi era. Islamic consciousness in Iran does not in any way constitute the basis for an alternative myth to the national myth. Rather, it adds Islamic terminology to the very same myth. Political Islam thus remains within the confines of Iranian nationalism. It is articulated in the framework of the symbols of Iranian nationalism, endowing them with a meaning that is supposedly religious.     

Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis

This article explores explanations of Russia's unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al‐Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin's resistance to any scenario of western‐led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy‐makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.     

Iran's ISIS policy

This article assesses Iran's strategy in dealing with the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It examines the implications of the rise of ISIS in Iran's immediate neighbourhood for Tehran's policies in Syria and Iraq and investigates how each of these countries affects Iranian national interests. It provides an overview of the major events marking Iran and Iraq's relations in the past few decades and discusses the strategic importance of Iraq for Iran, by looking at the two countries' energy, economic and religious ties. It also considers Iran's involvement in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. The article sheds light on the unilateral action taken by Tehran to counter ISIS, the adjustments it may have to make to its involvement in Syria, and the potential areas for tactical cooperation between Iran and the United States, as well as other key regional states such as Saudi Arabia. The article investigates three likely scenarios affecting the developments in Iraq and Iran's possible response to them as the events in the Middle East unfold.     

The Islamic State,the Kurdistan Region and the future of Iraq: assessing UK policy options

The fall of Mosul in June of 2014 was followed in July by the establishment of a self‐proclaimed Caliphate by the Islamic State of Abu Bakr al‐Baghdadi. Since then, the Islamic State has continued to expand its operations, persistently pushing into Sunni‐dominated parts of Iraq and Syria, nearly defeating the Kurds of Iraq, and moving against the Kurds of Syria, in Kobani, as well as army units of the Syrian state. By doing so, it has maintained an astonishingly high tempo of operations and has shown itself capable, agile and resilient. It has also proved itself to be adept at utilizing social media outlets, and in pursuing brutal tactics against civilians and prisoners that have been aimed at shocking adversaries—potential or actual—and observers both in the region and beyond. The rise of the Islamic State poses a challenge not only to the security of Iraq and Syria, but to the state system of the Middle East. Western powers have been drawn into a conflict in a limited fashion—through air strikes and advising ground forces; the UK, while engaging slightly later than other countries against the Islamic State, has followed this pattern, though targeting Islamic State forces solely in Iraq. This article considers the nature and scale of the threat posed by the Islamic State, and assesses three possible areas of further policy engagement that they UK may, or may have to, follow.     

Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran's nuclear strategy

For the past decade, much attention has been devoted to the potential consequences of a nuclear‐armed Iran. Yet the binary ‘acquisition/restraint’ lens through which the Iranian nuclear issue is frequently viewed is limiting. There is now much evidence to suggest that Iran is engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than an outright pursuit of the bomb. This does not change the need to contain Tehran's proliferation potential, yet it does add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Iran will retain a low level of latency whatever the final outcome of longstanding diplomatic efforts to constrain the scope and pace of its nuclear efforts. This article will explore the implications of Iranian nuclear hedging and consider how regional rivals might interpret and respond to Tehran's nuclear strategy. On a larger scale, the article will explore the potential impact of the international community's approach to the Iranian case—implicitly recognizing, even giving legitimacy to, hedging—both in terms of the future of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the ability of the international community to limit the negative effects of this form of proliferation behaviour.     

Violins and trowels for Palmyra: Post‐conflict heritage politics

Since the rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East, anthropological research has focused on the many deliberate destructions of cultural heritage in the region. Whilst such analyses can offer important insights into the multidimensionality of contemporary warfare and the important role of culture in perpetuating physical violence, heritage ethnographers should also spotlight the post‐conflict futures of Syria and Iraq's war‐torn heritage. Drawing on extensive ethnographic research on (world) heritage politics in the Russian Federation, this article highlights the strategic manipulation of Palmyra by the Russian Federation and investigates how conservation and reconstruction are also important political episodes in a heritage object's cultural biography.     

Quietness beyond Political Power: Politics of Taking Sanctuary (Bast Neshini) in the Shi‘ite Shrines of Iran

“The politic” and “the religious” have had many relations with each other in Iranian history and in some cases “the religious” has been defined in a situation beyond the extent of the political power. A case in point is the right of taking sanctuary in Shi‘ite shrines. Throughout Iran's history, subjects could take refuge in Shi‘ite shrines and some other places related to religious and non-religious authorities. Persecution was delayed or the individual was forgiven, though sometimes they were sentenced when exiting the shrine. By referring to religious texts that have reinforced that tradition, this article seeks to trace continuities between early Islam and modern Iran. It focuses on sanctuary taking and sit-ins at shrines and tombs, and on the interplay between those actions and political power, and discusses the changing mobility and dynamisms of those actions at different periods of Iranian history.     

From Etelāʿāti to Eslāhtalabi: Saʿid Hajjarian,Political Theology and the Politics of Reform in Post-Revolutionary Iran

This article examines the importance of the political thought and praxis of politico, ‘reformist’ strategist and intellectual, Sa?id Hajjarian, and his rethinking of the post-revolutionary Iranian state’s sources and bases of legitimacy in the 1990s and 2000s. It also provides an exposition and assessment of a number of his recommendations for the realisation of ‘political development’ (towse?eh-ye siyāsi) in the post-revolutionary order and their contribution to the discourse of eslāhāt during the presidency of Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Moreover, it attempts to situate Hajjarian within a broader spectrum of reformist political opinion and its proponents within the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political class.     

The Shiʿa Afghan Community: Between Transnational Links and Internal Hurdles

This article aims to present a political analysis of the relationship between the Shi?a community in Afghanistan and the new political system that emerged after the US military intervention of 2001. In light of the sectarian conflicts in the greater Middle East and the connection between South West Asia and the Syrian war since 2011, this article illustrates the limits of the social empowerment of the Shi?a communities in Afghanistan. The article outlines the internal religious scene and the connections between āyatollāhs (marāje?), mainly from Iran or Iraq, and Afghan Shi?ite believers. It also examines how the Afghan Shi?ite community differs from those of Iran and Iraq.     

Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a‘post‐Islamist’government and a Kemalist state

This article discusses Turkish foreign policy over the past four years, since the election of a ‘post‐Islamist’ administration. It argues that although this period has been ‘Huntingtonian’, in terms of the diff erent political values and origins of the government on the one hand and the largely Kemalist state on the other, in the realm of foreign policy at least the relationship has been more cooperative and complementary than confictual. By focusing on seven areas of Turkey's foreign relations, as diverse as the EU, Cyprus, Syria and the Israeli—Palestinian conflict, the article identifies four types of experience in the overall conduct of policy: convergence; contained disharmomy; managed ideological divergence; and neutrality. It concludes by arguing that, providing Turkey's political institutions remain robust, there is no reason why this surprisingly successful cohabitation should not continue into the next parliament after 2007.     

Imagining Shi‘ite Iran: Transnationalism and Religious Authenticity in the Muslim World

Religious authority in the Shi‘ite world is often claimed and justified by drawing on national ideologies. Examining the relations between the ruling religious elite in Iran and Lebanese Shi‘ite party of Amal and followers of the Lebanese Shi‘ite scholar Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, this article shows how the latter two actors seek to break official Iran's hegemonic claim to lead the Shi‘ite world through parody and critical narratives about the history and society of Iran. This politics of religious authenticity is not limited to debates among Shi‘ite scholars but also involves other actors such as political party members, students of religion, and pilgrims as they take part in shaping claims to seniority and authenticity in Shi‘ite tradition.     

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

This article demonstrates that Iran conforms to Richard K. Betts' model of a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant, as its nuclear program is driven by a potent combination of security, normative and domestic political motivations. The regime's commitment to its nuclear program is influenced by Iran's long-standing sense of vulnerability to both regional and international adversaries, and an enduring sense of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, in parallel with a powerful belief in the superiority of Persian civilisation. This has resulted in the development of a narrative of ‘hyper-independence’ in Iran's foreign policy that simultaneously rejects political, cultural or economic dependence and emphasises ‘self-reliance’. The presumed security benefits that a nuclear weapons option provides are seen as ensuring Iranian ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’. This suggests that current strategies that focus exclusively on Iran's security motivations or on a heightened regime of sanctions are fundamentally flawed, as they fail to recognise the mutually reinforcing dynamic between Iran's security and normative/status-derived nuclear motivations.     

The Revolution's Forgotten Sons and Daughters: The Jewish Community in Tehran during the 1979 Revolution

The 1979 revolution in Iran was one of the most popular revolutions of the twentieth century. It was supported by all the classes of Iranian society, and crossed social strata, positions, and religious affiliations. A lot is known about the participation of different parts, such as students, urban professionals, religious leaders, bazaaris, and leftists, yet little is known about the participation of Jews in the revolutionary movements. This article sheds light on a little-known event in the life of the Jewish Iranian community and seeks to tell the story of different segments of the Jewish community during the tremulous years of the “Islamic Revolution.” This article examines two main arenas in which the Jews facilitated the revolution—the Society of Jewish Iranian Intellectuals, and the Sapir Charity Hospital in Tehran—and seeks to draw attention to the minorities' contribution to the most important national revolution in Iran.     

Iran: Island of Stability orLand in Turmoil

Iran is a critical state in international relations because of its natural resources, its strategic location, its controversial conservative Islamic regime and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. As a result, Iran is facing pressure from all sides. There are currently four possible future scenarios for Iran: the Iranian regime will remain stable; the Iranian regime will become increasingly unstable; the stability of the Iranian regime depends on international action; the Iranian regime will reform itself from within. It is only by improving its image, that the U.S. can positively affect any of these scenarios. Iran has historically been an essential actor in the international arena because ofits strategic location and its position as a major oil producer; Iran is currently the fourth largest producer of crude oil, the third largest holder of proven oil reserves and the second largest holder of natural gas reserves. Today, Iran remains a critical state, not only because of its strategic location and its abundance of natural resources, but also because of its alleged role as a “state sponsor of terror,” its nuclear program, its human rights abuses, its controversial conservative Islamic regime which is at odds with America, and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East, especially in light of the U.S. removal of the Taliban and Hussein regimes, two of Iran's biggest threats (Stockman, 2004). It is because of a combination of these factors that the Iranian government is feeling much pressure from all angles. Domestically, the Iranian regime is feeling pressure from the Iranian society as the regime is shifting back from a trend towards liberalism as represented by the Khatami government, towards Ahmadinejad's more conservative and traditional regime. Manifestations of this disapproval were seen in the 2007 municipal elections, in which reformers won the plurality of votes (Not Pro‐Prez or Pro‐Reform, 2006). Internationally, Iran has been accused of being a state sponsor of terror and has been labeled by the American government as a member of the “axis of evil,” and as a violator of human rights. Finally, within the regime itself, Ahmadinejad's confrontational foreign policy has caused a split within the conservative block; dividing the pragmatists who want to engage in trade and resume relations with the West, and those who adhere to a strict interpretation of the Islamic Revolution by welcoming confrontation with the West. Furthermore, tensions exist, not only between the reform minded Majlis and the conservative Council of Guardians, but also between the Majlis and the president, who has recently been criticized for his aggressive foreign policy that is isolating Iran from the world.     

Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism and Nationalism: The Evolution of Wataniyya into Qawmiyya

For many scholars, the Arab Spring was actually an Islamic Winter, especially when ISIS rose up in Iraq and Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood won democratic elections in Egypt and took control over the state. But in other unshaken regions in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, the Arab Spring or the Islamic Winter led to something different, which I will call “rethinking nationalism.” This article asserts that since Saudi Arabia's independence in 1932, the royal family has succeeded in forming Wahhabi nationalism, meaning that despite the fact that all Saudi civilians enjoy Saudi citizenship, only those who ascribe to the Wahhabism creed can be part of the nation in terms of political participation and policy decision‐making. Although some steps in affirmative action have been taken in recent years — also as a Saudi response to the Arab Spring — toward women and the Shi'a minority, these groups or sectors still are not perceived by the royal family as part of the nation, and probably not as equal citizens, for religious reasons that over the years have distinguished between real Saudi nationalist groups and Saudi civilians.