Leaving the Nest: The Rise of Regional Financial Arrangements and the Future of Global Governance

This article examines the impact of regional financial arrangements (RFAs) on the global liquidity regime. It argues that the design of RFAs could potentially alter the global regime, whether by strengthening it and making it more coherent or by decentring the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and destabilizing it. To determine possible outcomes, this analysis deploys a ‘middle‐up’ approach that focuses on the institutional design of these RFAs. It first draws on the rational design of institutions framework to identify the internal characteristics of RFAs that are most relevant to their capabilities and capacities. It then applies these insights to the interactions of RFAs with the IMF, building on Aggarwal's (1998) concept of ‘nested’ versus ‘parallel’ institutions, to create an analytical lens through which to assess the nature and sustainability of nested linkages. Through an analysis of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), the article demonstrates the usefulness of this lens. It concludes by considering three circumstances in which fault lines created by these RFAs’ institutional design could be activated, permitting an institution to ‘leave the nest’, including changing intentions of principals, creation of parallel capabilities and facilities, and failure of the global regime to address regional needs in a crisis.     

Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers,self‐insuring and regional insulation

This article examines the interaction between the emerging and traditional powers in global governance reform, and asks whether we are heading towards an international financial system that is more fragmented, where power is more diffused and national and regional arrangements play a more prominent role, at the expense of global multilateral institutions. It begins with a brief discussion of the global systemic and country‐specific factors that motivate Brazil, China and other emerging countries to accumulate large currency reserves. We find that national arrangements for managing financial and currency crises will continue to hold sway for emerging countries in the wake of the global crisis. However, the actual capacity of regional arrangements in managing future financial crises is uncertain, and the significance of regional alternatives in the emerging architecture should not be overstated. The real capacity of East Asian regional arrangements to manage financial crises, payments problems or currency attacks is still untested, and key thresholds in multilateralization still lie ahead. In South America, multilateral lender‐of‐last‐resort support inside the region is largely confined to the sub‐regional level and is limited by Brazil's reticence. Enduring reliance on bilateral measures for financial crisis management is noted. Where there has been progress in regional solutions, since the global crisis, has been in the role of regional development banks in providing financing for developing countries to enact counter‐cyclical policies. Such support also provides insulation for states in the region against the contagion effects of international financial crisis. We are in the midst of transitioning to a more diverse and multi‐tiered global financial and monetary system. A reformed IMF could have a role to play in addressing global imbalances and encouraging a shift from national reserves to collective insurance, however, it would be preconditioned by significant shifts in the policy, lending operations, and internal governance of the Fund, and willingness among the G20 to strike a new consensus on how to deal with imbalances, and new accommodation on acceptable reserve levels.     

‘Minilateral’ Development Banks: What the Rise of Africa's Trade and Development Bank says about Multilateral Governance

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are one of the most popular forms of international organization, with at least 27 operating in the world today. Although most academics and policy makers focus on the World Bank and major regional MDBs, the majority of MDBs are in fact relatively small, and controlled by developing as opposed to industrialized countries. How do the differing governance arrangements of these ‘minilateral’ development banks (MnDBs) impact their operations? This article takes the Trade and Development Bank (TDB), an MDB in Africa with 22 regional member countries, as a case study to consider this question. Based on an analysis of TDB's track record since 2005 and interviews with management and shareholders, the author finds that borrower‐led governance leads to substantial disadvantages in terms of access to finance. Borrower‐led governance permits TDB and other MnDBs greater operational flexibility, which partially compensates for this financial disadvantage, but these operational strategies come with trade‐offs in terms of developmental effectiveness. The findings suggest that MnDBs have substantial latent potential and, in an increasingly multipolar world, they are likely to grow in coming years. However, MnDBs need to ensure that their developmental value added is strengthened in step with their financial power.     

Global Liquidity,the Private Sector and Debt Sustainability in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This article analyses the effect of changes in international financial markets on the debt dynamics in sub‐Saharan Africa in recent years. A key development is the rise of the private sector as both a lender and a borrower in African debt markets, a process that is associated with the growing integration of the region into global financial markets. The article argues that the Debt Sustainability Framework of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has taken some steps to account for this growth of private sector, cross‐border debt, but such steps still fall short of what is needed. A full appreciation of the importance of private debt implies, first, that debt sustainability in sub‐Saharan Africa be understood in the context of countries’ integration in global financial markets and the global liquidity cycles that characterize those markets and, second, that the interplay between private and public debt be monitored in order to provide a fuller picture of the impact of private sector debt on fiscal sustainability.     

The Anti‐Politics of Climate Finance: The Creation and Performativity of the Green Climate Fund

This paper is an empirical case study of the institutional design process of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change from December 2011 to May 2014. Powerful countries, corporations and banks have favoured a deepening of neoliberal environmental governance, while civil society actors have argued over retaining movement concepts, won small representational victories, while participating in a process that has subjected them to a deepened practise of advanced liberal governance. The process has thus far produced “non‐outcomes” that fail to meet hopes that the GCF could provide a significant scaling up and paradigm shift in global climate finance. However, civil society engagement appears to be, somewhat inadvertently, exposing the “overflows”, limits and contradictions inherent in advanced liberal governance. The impasse created has prompted alternative governmentalities to emerge, not least of spectacle and (non‐)performativity, which may be generating an anti‐politics in environmental governance.     

Strengthening the Foundations? Alternative Institutions for Finance and Development

The 21st century has ushered in the emergence of alternative institutions for liquidity provision and development finance, many of which are Southern‐led. The special issue that follows this Introduction assesses the extent to which existing theoretical perspectives and tools are sufficient for evaluating the implications of these alternatives for the global financial architecture. Our analysis finds that while an increasingly varied landscape of diverse institutions designed to foster financial stability and development comes with inherent risks, these new forms of finance bring real benefits to an architecture that has long been deemed insufficient. Larger and more capable Southern‐led institutions not only mean additional sources of financing for emerging market and developing countries, but also could increase their voice in an international financial architecture long dominated by the most advanced economies. That said, the variation in the landscape could create inequities and fault lines between new and existing institutions, which will be difficult to overcome through the coordination of a fragmented and diverse system. Finally, despite the increases in capital for liquidity provision and development made available by these new institutions, significantly more financing and coordination will be needed to achieve financial stability and economic development on a global scale.     

The (Ineffective) Financial Statecraft of China's Bilateral Swap Agreements

Since 2008, the People's Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) with 35 foreign central banks. Collectively, these deals amount to nearly US$ 500 billion in Chinese renminbi (RMB) available to Beijing's foreign partners. What has led China to be so aggressive in its efforts to sign so many swap agreements? What are the political economic implications of the swap programme for the US‐centric global economic order? China's BSAs can be understood as a form of financial statecraft: the use of national financial and monetary capabilities to achieve foreign policy ends. China has deployed BSAs for both defensive and offensive reasons. Defensively, Beijing has sought to use BSAs to promote trade settlement in RMB thereby reducing China's vulnerability to the dollar's structural dominance in trade. Yet, as explained in this article, they have been ineffective in this regard. Offensively, Beijing has used BSAs as a short‐term liquidity backstop outside of the Bretton Woods institutions for partner countries in need. Here, there is greater potential for BSAs to impact the status quo economic order by enhancing Chinese economic influence. However, their potential is dependent on Beijing's willingness to act as a unilateral crisis lender and its ability to further internationalize the RMB.     

Can South–South Cooperation Compete? The Development Bank of Latin America and the Islamic Development Bank

Southern‐led multilateral development banks (MDBs) play a key role in harnessing global capital to finance the sectors most important to borrowers, especially infrastructure. Two prominent Southern MDBs, the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), have become crucial drivers of regional infrastructure growth. This article explores whether their performance has lived up to their goals of establishing borrower control over bank governance without sacrificing financial dynamism. Using power‐weighted voting indices for member representation on bank boards, the authors determine that these banks offer borrowers much more representation on their boards than do their Northern‐based counterparts, the Inter‐American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The article also analyses bank operations to determine whether their governance structure impacts their internal performance, as reflected on balance sheets, and external performance — gaining relevance in development finance and particularly in infrastructure lending, including the burgeoning sector of sustainable (climate‐resilient) infrastructure. The authors find that the CAF and IsDB have become major players in development finance, including in sustainable infrastructure. However, important issues remain in relation to their continued internal capacity development, especially with regard to the environmental and social safeguards necessary to oversee lending.     

Asia's role in twenty‐first‐century global economic governance

The basic foundations of today's framework for global economic governance were laid in the years following the Second World War. Reflecting the balance of economic power at the time, Asia did not play a major role in either designing the institutional architecture or setting the agenda for global economic governance. In more recent decades the centre of gravity of the global economy has shifted towards Asia, and this trend is likely to continue in the decades to come. Asia's growing economic weight enhances its potential to play a much stronger role in shaping twenty‐first‐century global economic governance. Realization of that potential will, however, depend upon how successfully Asia addresses five key challenges: rebalancing sources of growth; strengthening national governance; institutionalizing regional integration; providing political leadership; and adopting the global lingua franca—English. While the Asian policy‐makers' ambition to play a bigger role in global economic governance is growing, their appetite for addressing the necessary policy challenges is not necessarily keeping pace with that growing ambition. This gap between ambition and action will need to be gradually closed—only then can Asia help itself in playing a bigger role in global economic governance.     

Introduction

The aim of this special issue of International Affairs is to address the changing dynamics in the international economic system from an interdisciplinary standpoint, in order to unpack some of the emerging processes of globalization and to investigate the relationship between power and rule‐setting. The idea is to bridge the gap between the traditional realist accounts of the international system that place the nation‐state at the centre of the analysis, and the liberal, market‐driven approach that focuses on the problems of an increasingly integrated global economy and fragmented political authority. The framing question is how the global order (governance) has to change in order to accommodate the enlargement of the playing field and in particular the emergence of fast‐growing developing economies. How is this shift going to affect the distribution of power, both among nations and between state and non‐state actors? Is this shift going to drive a fundamental rethinking of the rules governing relations between countries—and regions—and institutions? The thread that links the articles in this special issue is the rather benign view of globalization, leaning towards ‘liberal ingenuity’ that sees governance as a way to accommodate conflicting interests through institutions in such a way as to minimize the potential for conflict.     

Sovereign wealth funds and national security: the Great Tradeoff

One of the most striking financial developments in recent years is the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—large publicly owned investment portfolios, which are growing rapidly in both number and size. In a global environment already roiled by a prolonged credit crisis, SWFs raise tricky and potentially controversial new questions for international financial regulation. One issue of concern to many in host countries is the possibility that some SWFs might be used for overt or tacit political purposes, posing a challenge for global monetary governance: a Great Tradeoff between the world community's collective interest in sustaining the openness of capital markets and the legitimate national security concerns of individual host countries. Can some balance between the two be found that will be both stable and acceptable to all concerned? Individually as well as collectively, recipient countries have begun to address the regulatory challenge directly. To date, however, accomplishments have been slight and have failed to stem a noticeable drift towards financial protectionism. A review of some recent proposals suggests that there is no foolproof solution to the Great Tradeoff. But the potential for controversy could be significantly reduced by a negotiated agreement among host governments addressing three key issues: definitions, risk assessment and dispute resolution. The most logical venue for such an exercise would be the OECD, building on its already extensive experience with international investment issues.     

Global energy governance: do the BRICs have the energy to drive reform?

It is widely accepted that the rising power of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—has the potential to re‐shape the international system. However, little attention has been given to the BRICs’ role in a growing area of strategic importance: global energy governance. While global governance scholars now argue that the international energy architecture requires substantive reform to keep pace with the rapid transformations in global energy markets, largely driven by the BRICs, it is not clear what role these countries will play in future governance arrangements. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance and international negotiations, interviews with G20 energy officials, and the observations of the author, a past delegate to G20 negotiations, this article examines whether the BRICs as a coalition have the capacity and willingness to drive substantive global energy governance reform. In doing so, it highlights the problems with the BRICs as a coalition on energy and considers the prospects for energy reform in light of China's increasing engagement with energy governance ahead of it hosting the G20 Summit in 2016.     

Continuity,Discontinuity and Incoherence in the Bretton Woods Order: A Hirschmanian Reading

This article examines the effects of the Asian crisis and especially the global financial crisis on developmental finance (that is, long‐term project finance and counter‐cyclical liquidity support) and the global financial architecture. In this connection three claims are advanced. The first is positive: that the crises occasioned meaningful although ad hoc, uneven discontinuities. The conjunction of discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the developmental and global financial architecture. The second claim is normative and controversial. Contrary to the common narrative, emergent incoherence is (on balance) productive of development and stability rather than debilitating. Actors in parts of the global South and East enjoy greater opportunities for institutional experimentation today in comparison with the limited space available in the coherent neoliberal era when the Bretton Woods institutions were monolithic. All of the experiments underway are not equally likely to survive, but even failures can provide lessons and networks that contribute to future successes. Emergent redundancy and new networks of institutional cooperation increase financial resilience. The article also explores the risks of incoherence and redundancy. The third claim is that productive incoherence can be understood within a ‘Hirschmanian mindset’ — an understanding of change and development informed by Albert Hirschman's theoretical and epistemic commitments.     

Setting the rules: private power,political underpinnings,and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance

The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions‐based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross‐border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self‐regulation and/or public‐private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast‐moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision‐making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three ‘phases’ of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order.     

Global Environmental Governance and the Challenge of Shadow States: The Impact of Illicit Sapphire Mining in Madagascar

The environment has become a key site of global governance because of its transboundary nature: forests, wildlife and oceans have all become central foci for networks of global governance which link international organizations, international financial institutions, states and non‐governmental organizations. This article examines how contemporary forms of global governance can be challenged and even subverted. It uses the concept of shadow states introduced by William Reno to explore how invisible global networks flow through developing states, to show how they constitute important political and economic interest groups, and to assess what kinds of environmental impact they have. It explores how powerful these networks are, and whether they are able to challenge or subvert attempts to manage, control or govern the environment. The author provides an analysis of the ways in which the clandestine networks of shadow states impact on conservation initiatives in the developing world, focusing on the features of global environmental governance and the problems posed by illicit gem mining and trafficking in Madagascar.     

The Russian Stabilization Fund and Its Successor: Implications for Inflation

A senior Japanese specialist on Russia's economy and its oil- and gas-producing sectors analyzes the functions and performance of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation and the new system replacing it in 2008. The Fund, created to diminish the effects of possible future decreases in oil prices on federal budget revenues and to absorb excess liquidity in the economy, was expected to exert a major curb on inflation. The author investigates the extent to which the latter, inflation-fighting role of the Fund has been fulfilled, given increases in the country's money supply and in state-regulated prices within the natural monopolies. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: E50, E62, H20, H60. 4 figures, 5 tables, 25 references.     

The Neoliberal Seduction: Governing‐at‐a‐Distance,Community Development and the Battle over Financial Services Provision in Australia

This paper is concerned with understanding the reasons for the apparent success of neoliberalism: why the model of the ‘entrepreneurial, self‐reliant community’ has been adopted so widely and readily across Australia. It does this through an analysis of two events in the restructuring of financial services provision in regional Australia during the 1990s and 2000s: the John Laws/Australian Bankers’ Association ‘cash for comment’ affair, and the rise of ‘alternative’ financial service providers in the wake of the major trading banks’ financial service withdrawal programmes of the 1990s. This analysis is conducted using the conceptual toolkit of the governmentality literature. In this context, the paper explores the notion of translation — how authorities, agencies, etc., exert control over distant entities, whether these entities be branch staff or a far‐flung consumer market. In examining the often fragile character of ‘governing‐at‐a‐distance’ in modern forms of rule, it is argued that some recent advances in the ‘geography of power’ have much to offer in highlighting both the important roles played by space and scale in the execution of power in its various guises and the ways in which resistance to the more regressive features of neoliberal philosophy and policy may best focus.     

How many Gs are there in ‘global governance’ after the crisis? The perspectives of the ‘marginal majority’ of the world's states

The G20 summit has recently emerged as the dominant agency of global governance. It claims that its economic weight and broad membership give it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system. But the G20 still excludes from membership some 150 other countries, all of which have interests at stake within the contours of contemporary global governance. In the financial arena these excluded countries contributed significantly to the alternative agenda for dealing with the global financial crisis proposed by the United Nations conference that met in June 2009. In the trade arena they engaged extensively in a variety of coalitions within the World Trade Organization during the so‐called Doha Round and played a part in preventing a deal emerging that was unsatisfactory from their perspective. Questions are raised about the legitimacy of the G20 by the active presence of so many other country voices outside its remit and it can be expected that the excluded ‘G150’ will increasingly explore different ways to engage with the members of the G20 over the next few years.     

Exchange Rate Policy and the Central and East European Financial Crisis

A prominent specialist on economic developments in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries examines the ways in which the global financial crisis of 2008-2010 has impacted the economies of the 10 new eastern member states of the European Union (CEE-10). The author assesses the multiple preconditions of the crisis (e.g., excessive current account deficits, large foreign debt, inadequate currency reserves, immense credit expansion, rising inflation and real estate prices) as well as the rapid financial adjustments that had to be undertaken to overcome it (e.g., current account rebalancing, reducing budget deficits, pension and fiscal reform). He devotes considerable attention to the key issue of how the differences in exchange rate policies in these countries affected their abilities to respond to the crisis and outlines measures that should be implemented to enhance the crisis management capability of non-eurozone states relying on currency boards or floating exchange rates.