伊斯坦布尔遭遇“热心肠”

<正>土耳其横跨欧亚大陆,其中有97%的国土在亚洲,仅有3%在欧洲,首都伊斯坦布尔位于欧洲区,是土国第一大城。初抵伊斯坦布尔,导游ISMAIL说,伊斯坦布尔不能代表土耳其。的确,走过大半个土耳其后发现:土耳其有两个世界,     

新书微讯

正《哈布斯堡的灭亡:第一次世界大战的爆发和奥匈帝国的解体》内容简介哈布斯堡王朝是欧洲历史上统治领域最广的王室,曾统治神圣罗马帝国、西班牙帝国、奥地利帝国、奥匈帝国。其在十七世纪抵御了土耳其人进攻、守护欧洲文明。当拿破仑军队在欧洲无往不利时,哈布斯堡也是抵抗革命势力的中流砥柱。但是在十九世纪的后几十年里,帝国的军力、国力在诸民族的威胁、瓜分里四分五裂了。一     

欧洲古建筑保护探析

作为古代文明滥觞之一的古罗马和古希腊拥有绚烂多姿的文化形态,文明传布于欧洲之后,更创造出浩如烟海、瑰丽无比的艺术奇迹,恩格斯曾有一句名言：＂没有希腊文化和罗马帝国所奠定的基础,也就没有现代的欧洲。＂在这众多文化遗产中,作为＂凝固的音乐＂的气势恢宏的古代建筑,更是当时文明的精华所在,历千年风霜而峥嵘依旧,显示出欧洲建筑保护工作之佳,理念之先进,政策之完备。     

迪士累利与1875—1878年近东危机中的英俄之争

“东方问题”是“由于奥斯曼帝国的衰落及其各继承国之间的对抗而在东南欧引起的各种问题的总称”。简言之,就是“对土耳其怎么办”?它形成于18世纪末,贯穿整个19世纪。1875——1878年的近东危机,是继克里米亚战争之后“东方问题”的又一次高潮。此次危机形式多样,内容繁杂:有巴尔干斯拉夫人反抗土耳其素丹政府的民族起义,有俄土战争,还有大国对土耳其遗产的争夺及由此引起的分歧与冲突。其中,英俄之争是主要矛盾,并成为当时欧洲国际关系的主旋律。迪士累利是此间英国的     

湛蓝荣耀

正土耳其是一个被蓝色海洋包围的国度。土耳其大致上三面临海,北面是黑海,南面是地中海,西面与希腊隔着爱琴海(地中海的一部分)相望。地理上,土耳其横跨欧亚,大部分国土属于亚洲,小部分国土属于欧洲,刚好把连接地中海与黑海的土耳其     

土耳其 蓝色星月的奇遇

正土耳其,一个古老而又美丽的国家,连接欧亚两陆,依山傍海,小亚细亚文明与地中海文明在这里交汇;亚洲的民俗传统,欧洲的行为思想,突厥人的生活方式在这里融合。这样的地方必然充满故事。这里曾经是富强的拜占庭帝国;这里曾经是辉煌的东罗马帝国,这里还曾经是强大的奥斯曼帝国……这里有宏伟的蓝色清真寺,这里有华美的圣索菲亚大教堂,这里有曾经繁华的以弗所,     

《旅游》信息

三大洲古老文明六城市盛情推介近日,一场主题为"三大洲古老文明,地中海浪漫风情"的路演活动由埃及旅游局与土耳其文化与旅游部联手在珠三角六城市隆重推出。全方位生动展现埃及和土耳两国独具韵味、绚烂多姿的风景文化及地域人情。本次路演将从11月24日持续至12月2日,在珠三角六个重点城市(广州、深圳、东莞、珠海、佛山、中山)陆续进行。其间,主办方还将在广     

近代中国人的土耳其洲属观

随着西方"五大洲"学说的广泛传播,地跨欧亚的土耳其成为中国知识人想象亚欧与定位自我的灵活资源。晚清国人不仅从地理常识、地缘政治、西化改革角度判定土耳其为欧洲国家,也在洲际意识日益强化的时代背景下,将同处弱势地位、政教风俗相似的土耳其纳入亚洲舞台。一战之后,在奥斯曼帝国土崩瓦解、新土耳其革命和改革取得成功、中国反帝运动蓬勃发展、中日关系渐趋紧张等因素综合促动下,国内各政治势力和知识界偏向于将"亦欧亦亚"的土耳其明确归入亚洲,并赋予其复兴亚洲、抗衡西方的领袖国身份。此种建构与想象因评判标准的不同、观察视角的差别,以及与实际情况的背离,不时呈现某些逻辑困境和现实矛盾,反衬出"欧洲说"仍存在一定的合理性。     

俄土战争赔款的历史演变与现实影响

<正>沙俄削弱土耳其的手段不止军事,还有赔款。俄、土两国在1568—1922年间至少大战13次,俄方所谓"十次俄土战争"更是平均20年一次,但"即使杰出的俄罗斯和土耳其历史学家也完全忽略了赔款问题"[迈克尔·米尔格伦:"俄土关系中被忽视的问题:1878年战争赔款"(Michael R.Milgrim,"An Overlooked Problem in Turkish-Russian Relations:The 1878War Indemnity"),《中东研究国际期刊》(International Journal of Middle East Studies)第9卷第4期(1978年11月),第520页]。国内选译"1878年俄英关于修改《圣斯特法诺条约》的协约"时,甚至将赔款部分省略不译[王铁崖、王绍坊选译:《1871—1898年的欧洲国际关系》,北京:商务印书馆1957年版,第27页]。实际上,赔款既是近代俄土关系的重要议题,也是当代两国关系的制约因素。本文拟梳理历次俄土战争赔款史实,解释其演变成因,并分析其现实影响。     

浅谈土耳其民俗文化

土耳其是一个横跨欧亚大陆的伊斯兰教国家,被称为"文明的摇篮"。有着7000年文明史,在长期发展中,形成了其独有的民俗文化。本文通过整理、归纳和反思以往的研究并搜集散落于网络的资料和信息,从卡拉戈兹皮影戏和土耳其浴两方面,对土耳其的民俗文化作一介绍。     

Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?

This article examines EU‐Turkey relations and considers the potential impact of the EU pronouncement at the December 2004 summit and the subsequent (reluctant)decision to begin negotiations in October 2005 on Turkey's efforts to become a member of the Union. It briefly summarizes the debate over Turkish accession and outlines the main arguments and positions of EU members and institutions. It then highlights the inadequacies of the alternatives to full membership that have been offered to Turkey in the past and expresses the concern that the EU's adoption of ‘flexible integration’ may lead to Turkey being, at best, offered a ‘lower tier’ form of EU membership in the future. It continues by arguing that concerns about Turkey's suitability for EU membership because it is Islamic and its lack of ‘Europeanness’ are ill‐founded and/or irrelevant and that the best way to facilitate Turkey's continued contribution to European (and world)security and its western orientation, is to allow it to join the EU as a full member. It concludes that the decision to admit a new member is primarily a political one and that Turkey should be allowed to join the EU in the immediate future.     

Reflections on the European Legacy (from the Plains of Anatolia)

Turkey's insistence on its European credentials, and its endeavours to join the European Union, provide an opportunity to reflect on what the European legacy means. While acknowledging the diverse contributors to Europe, and the extensive interactions with the rest of the world that have shaped European history and identity, this essay locates Europe's most important legacy—and measure—in the realm of ideas, especially the ideas we use to organise our experience and approach the challenges of the world. These ideas came to fruition in the Enlightenment, and they provide an approach that is potentially liberating for peoples but uncomfortable for those with power, and those that aspire to power, including within Europe itself. The challenge for Turkey is to recognise that the EU is not necessarily the last word on ‘Europe,’ while continuing to engage creatively with the European legacy.     

Turkey and the European Union: A Review of Turkey’s Readmission Agreement

Our aim in this article is to analyze Turkey’s Readmission Agreement with the EU in light of Turkey’s membership goal. More specifically, our aim is to propose the most rational political decision for concluding this process. Our study addresses three questions: (1) the impact of the Readmission Agreement on Turkey’s accession negotiations; (2) the outcomes of the implementation of the Readmission Agreement for Turkey; and (3) Turkey’s aim of becoming a full member of the EU by concluding the Agreement. By assessing the three potential scenarios of the Readmission Agreement process—minimum, optimum, and maximum benefit—we conclude that, whereas the first scenario does not coincide with our analysis, the other two, especially the third scenario, do coincide with it. Because the optimum benefit scenario does not disrupt the Readmission Agreement process it appears to be the most rational, balanced and beneficial agreement for both Turkey and the EU.     

Turkey's Bid for European Union Membership: Between "Thick" and "Thin" Conceptions of Europe

A team of Central Europe-based political geographers examines Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) membership, one of the most controversial issues confronting that country's and EU politics. The authors analyze Eurobarometer public opinion survey data on EU enlargement (and particularly Turkey's EU membership) across the 27 polities of the enlarged EU as well as in Turkey itself. The analysis of the data points to clear regional differences in support for Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, the authors' statistical analysis indicates two major components around which public perceptions of Turkey's EU membership coalesce. The first, identified as a "thick" component, based on the idea that EUrope embodies a specific cultural identity, opposes Turkish membership, whereas a second "thin" component, comprised of institutional-procedural norms, leaves the door open to Turkey. They argue that it is at the complex intersection of these two opposing views that Turkey's bid for EU membership should be located and eventually decided.     

The European Impact on State–Religion Relations in Turkey: Political Islam,Alevis and Non-Muslim Minorities

Since Turkey's application for membership of the European Union (EU) in 1987, the EU has itself been a structural component of Turkey's political transformation. The European impact intensified after Turkey was granted the status of an official candidate at the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999. Since then, Turkey has issued a series of reform packages with the aim of starting accession negotiations, which began in October 2005. These reforms have initiated a democratic regime that is structurally different from its predecessors in terms of its definition of political community, national identity and the territorial structure of the state. Among many other aspects of the current political transformation such as the resolution of the Kurdish problem and administrative reform, this article concentrates on how the European impact, which I label Europeanisation, has influenced state–religion relations in Turkey. Europeanisation has three major mechanisms that influence actors, institutions, ideas and interests in varying ways: institutional compliance, changing opportunity structures, and the framing of domestic beliefs and expectations. The article concentrates on how these mechanisms operate in the creation of a new regulatory framework of religion in Turkey.     

Confusion at home, Confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq

In November 2002 it looked as though Turkey was about to make a fresh start. A new post-Islamist political force, the AKP, had swept to power in national elections. Lobbying was in full swing for the EU to name a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. Ankara was talking to Washington about how Turkey could best help the US in the event of war with Iraq, and the Americans were fully prepared to reciprocate. There was even hope that the Cyprus problem might be solved. Some five months later those hopes are smouldering wreckage. Cyprus, and indeed the Kurdish issues, have returned to haunt EU—Turkish relations. The AKP is divided and discredited. The much-vaunted relationship between Turkey and the US, apparently built on the rock of geo-strategic relations, has dissolved into bitter recrimination. This article explores how and why the auspicious outlook for Turkey five months ago has dissolved so quickly and so thoroughly. It will be argued that the shortcomings of leadership, domestic ideological competition and the difficulty of managing a relentless and complex foreign policy agenda have all played their part. Turkey has been left with an economy on the edge of collapse, war on its borders, turmoil in its traditional friendships, a new crisis of domestic governance and the perception of rising existential threats. In view of these combustible components, there is little doubt that worrying about Turkey will continue to exercise the Atlantic community over the years ahead.     

Between Kant and Machiavelli: EU foreign policy priorities in the 2010s

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty invites and enables Europe to develop elements of a common foreign policy. Europe should resist the tendency of listing all issues calling for attention, and be aware that it will have to address three agendas, not just one. The first agenda is the Kantian one of universal causes. While it remains essential to European identity, it presents Europe with limited opportunities for success in the 2010s as could be seen at the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen. The ‘Alliance’ agenda remains essential on the security front and would benefit from a transatlantic effort at rejuvenation on the economic one. Last but not least, the ‘Machiavellian’ agenda reflects what most countries would define as their ‘normal’ foreign policy. It calls for Europe to influence key aspects of the world order in the absence of universal causes or common values. While Europe's ‘Machiavellian’ experience is limited to trade policy, developing a capacity to address this third agenda in a manner that places its common interests first and reinforces its identity will be Europe's central foreign policy challenge in the 2010s. A key part of the Machiavellian agenda presently revolves around relations with Ukraine, Turkey and the Russian Federation, three countries essential to Europe's energy security that are unlikely to change their foreign policy stance faced with EU soft power. Stressing that foreign policy is about ‘us’ and ‘them’, the article looks at what could be a genuine European foreign policy vis‐à‐vis each of these interdependent countries, beginning with energy and a more self‐interested approach to enlargement. The European public space is political in nature, as majority voting and mutual recognition imply that citizens accept ‘foreigners’ as legitimate legislators. At a time when the European integration process has become more hesitant and the political dimension of European integration tends to be derided or assumed away, admitting Turkey or Ukraine as members would change Europe more than it would change these countries. Foreign policy cannot be reduced to making Europe itself the prize of the relationship. What objectives Europe sets for itself in its dealing with Ukraine, Turkey and Russia will test whether it is ready for a fully‐fledged foreign policy or whether the invocation of ‘Europe’ is merely a convenient instrument for entities other than ‘Europe’.     

Turkey's isolated stance: an ally no more,or just the usual turbulence?

This article explores the policy choices and political stances that lie behind Turkey's growing isolation both from its western allies and its regional neighbours. It details Ankara's approach to a range of current issues in its region—particularly relating to Syria but also Iraq, Libya, Iran, Russia and Israel—and seeks to trace these approaches back to the world‐view of the country's ruling party and its leading figures, most notably President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu. It also assesses Turkey's reactions to the complex regional circumstances that have confronted Turkey in recent years. It considers the content and impact of some of the rhetoric emanating from Ankara, especially where it is directed towards the West. The article asks whether and why Turkish foreign policy has acquired an anti‐western tone, and also looks at the extent to which its dealings with its neighbours can be explained by sectarian considerations or by pro‐Muslim Brotherhood leanings. It then goes on to speculate about Turkey's future relationship with NATO and to a lesser degree the EU. It considers the prospects for an improvement in Ankara's relationship with its western allies, or whether Turkey–US relations in particular are now likely to be characterized by ‘strategic drift’ and a more transactional and contingent approach to alliance relationships.     

坚守还是让渡——二战后英国人主权观述论

英国人对主权让渡的认识经历了较为复杂的过程:从欧洲一体化初期不愿让渡主权,到加入欧共体时出现"无关主权"、"共享主权"和"威胁主权"三种认知,之后逐渐形成主流共识:一方面,让渡部分主权、融入欧洲一体化有利于增进英国国家利益;但另一方面,无论"亲欧派"还是"疑欧派"都坚持英国的核心主权不可让渡的原则,并且不认同欧洲联邦是欧洲一体化的终结目标。英国政府采取务实主义的态度,既通过"非政治化"努力避免主权让渡成为与欧共体/欧盟合作的障碍,又坚守英国的法理主权地位,部分主权的让渡与否取决于对本国利益的权衡和国内政治的需要。英国人对主权让渡的"保守"态度是他们认知主权的一种"英国方式",但它并没有改变英国人的上述主流共识。     

Culture for competitiveness: valuing diversity in EU-Europe and the ‘creative city’ of Berlin

The European Union (EU) has in recent years propagated an approach to ‘culture’ that pulls together support for the creative and cultural industries with diversity-sensitive immigration and integration strategies, drawing on popular policy visions of the ‘creative’ and ‘intercultural’ city. This approach emphasizes the role that the diversity of culture, as personal resource, can play in enhancing economic competitiveness. The article examines its logic and possible effects through an analysis of EU documents and policy in Berlin. Berlin intersects with the EU’s agenda, using EU structural funds and participating in the European program ‘Intercultural Cities’. It is shown that the attempt to use ‘culture for competitiveness’ equates support-worthy ‘diversity’ with forms of culture that conform to (neo)liberal values and priorities. The attempt to shape a cosmopolitan place attractive for investment and the high-skilled feeds into gentrification processes that create ‘diverse’ neighborhoods where ‘difference’ has no place.